CORRAL v. UNITED STATES

Filing 19

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/6/2014. (tf, n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PABLO FAVELA CORRAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 12-6220 (JBS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Pablo Favela Corral, Pro Se
17682-047
C I Rivers
P.O. Box 630
Winton, NC 27986
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
Plaintiff, Pablo Favela Corral, previously confined at the
Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Dix, New Jersey, and
currently confined at C I Rivers, Winton, North Carolina, submitted
a Complaint asserting jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (Docket Item 1). Plaintiff
originally submitted the Complaint to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, which transferred the case to
this Court on September 14, 2012 (Docket Item 3).

In this Court, on October 16, 2012, Plaintiff’s case was
administratively terminated for failure to submit the filing fee or
a proper in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application (Docket Items 5, 6).
Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a complete IFP application and the
case was reopened; however, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
without prejudice, granting Plaintiff thirty days to submit an
amended complaint (Docket Items 11, 12).
On September 26, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a “Notice of Action
Pursuant to the FTCA” (Docket Item 15), and on November 22, 2013,
an “Amended Document” (Docket Item 17). Plaintiff also submitted a
stack of documents in support of his amendments, on October 15, 2013,
which is in possession of the Court. Based on these filings, on
November 27, 2013, this Court reopened the matter (Docket Item 18).
The Court must now review the recent submissions, construed as
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and § 1915A(b) to determine whether the case, as amended, should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
should proceed.
BACKGROUND
In this Court’s previous Opinion dismissing Plaintiff’s claims
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without prejudice, the following facts were revealed:
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner serving a 188–month
term of imprisonment pursuant to a sentence imposed by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. See
United States v. Favela–Corral, Crim. No. 02–3121
(D.Neb.). Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered a “life
long actual injury” while confined at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey (“FCI
Fort Dix”). Plaintiff alleges that the injuries resulted
from Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) staff in Washington, DC,
providing too few health care staff at FCI Fort Dix,
providing too small a budget for health care both at FCI
Fort Dix and by outside providers, and being too slow to
respond to the need for outside treatment. Plaintiff
further contends that local FCI Fort Dix staff withheld
administrative remedy forms FN3 from Plaintiff and that
BOP staff in Washington had notice of that but failed to
remedy the situation. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that
certain remedy forms that he submitted were wrongfully
rejected.
Plaintiff alleges that he submitted an institutional
remedy in March, 2011, alleging that FCI Fort Dix health
care staffer Mr. Killen assaulted Plaintiff, who already
had a broken arm, thereby allegedly causing additional
injury. Plaintiff argues that the (otherwise undescribed)
response to that remedy by BOP staff in Washington was a
tortious breach of their duty of care to Plaintiff. He
further alleges that BOP staff breached their duty of care
to provide him with two health care experts. Plaintiff
alleges further that an unnamed outside medical expert
advised him that the treatment he received at FCI Fort Dix
did not meet published standards of care. He also asserts
generally delay and deprivation in the provision of
medical care.
In addition, Plaintiff generally alleges injuries to
his head, nose, and eyes, and he states that he has not
exhausted remedies with respect to claims regarding those
injuries because of Warden Zickefoose's exhaustion
obstruction scheme.
Plaintiff has attached to the Complaint a copy of a
December 6, 2011, administrative Claim form and
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attachments, asserting a claim under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, and alleging that the BOP staff at FCI withheld
administrative remedy forms between 2003 and 2011, that
supervisory staff in Washington, DC, were aware of this
but failed to remedy the problem, and that he received
inadequate care from the understaffed FCI Fort Dix medical
department for injuries to his back, arms, neck, hands,
head, legs, hip, feet, and blood. Plaintiff also attaches
a letter dated December 16, 2011, from the U.S. Department
of Justice, advising that the claim has been referred to
the Federal Bureau of Prisons and providing an address for
further correspondence. Plaintiff does not state whether
he has received any further response regarding his
administrative Claim.
In this Complaint, Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and seeks damages in the
amount of $10,000,000.00.
See Corral v. United States, 2013 WL 4540919 at **1-2 (D.N.J. Aug.
27, 2013)(internal citations and footnotes omitted)(Docket Item 11).
This Court analyzed Plaintiff’s claims under the FTCA and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, and found:
Here, Plaintiff's claims of medical malpractice are too
vague and conclusory to state a claim. Plaintiff does not
describe the nature of his medical problems, the treatment
received, the identities of the treatment providers, the
dates of the treatments, the alternative treatment
required, the manner in which the treatment received was
deficient, or the harm caused by the allegedly inadequate
treatment. Cf. Skyers v. U.S., Civil Action No. 12–3432,
2013 WL 3340292, *13–*14 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013)
(dismissing FTCA medical malpractice claim as
conclusory). To the extent he contends that some injury
resulted because officials up the chain of the
administrative remedy process acted negligently in their
review of grievances or requests for medical treatment,
Plaintiff has utterly failed to plead a single fact tying
events in the grievance or medical review process to the
delivery of medical care. Overall, Plaintiff has failed
to plead sufficient facts to raise his right to relief for
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medical malpractice above a “speculative level.”
See id. at *3 (internal footnote and citation omitted). This Court
further found that Plaintiff could not proceed under the FTCA for
negligent failure to process administrative remedies, nor could he
proceed on a theory that policymakers at the BOP were negligent in
decisions regarding the budget for medical services at prisons, as
such decisions fall under the “discretionary function” exception of
the FTCA. See id. at *4. However, this Court granted Plaintiff
permission to file an amended complaint within thirty days to address
the deficiencies of his original complaint as to his medical
malpractice claims, as set forth in the Opinion.
On September 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed a document construed as
an amended complaint (Docket Item 15). On October 16, 2013, Plaintiff
filed a stack of paperwork, including administrative remedy forms
and medical records, in support of his amended complaint, and on
November 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of his
amendment (Docket Item 17). On November 27, 2013, this Court reopened
the matter.
DISCUSSION
This Court has reviewed the documentation provided by
Plaintiff. In response to this Court’s holding that “Plaintiff's
claims of medical malpractice are too vague and conclusory to state
a claim. Plaintiff does not describe the nature of his medical
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problems, the treatment received, the identities of the treatment
providers, the dates of the treatments, the alternative treatment
required, the manner in which the treatment received was deficient,
or the harm caused by the allegedly inadequate treatment,” it appears
that Plaintiff has provided a great deal of records from his file,
including administrative remedies and medical records. The records
provide the information the Court requested, including the nature
of the medical problems, the treatment received and providers, and
Plaintiff’s complaints concerning treatment.
Further, this Court stated in its previous Opinion that, “if
Plaintiff chooses to pursue his FTCA action, he will need to allege
in his proposed Amended Complaint that he has complied with the
requirement of filing a timely administrative tort claim regarding
the torts he is alleging, and that such administrative claim
contained a demand for monetary damages in a sum certain . . . .”
See Corral, supra, at * 4.
With his amendment, Plaintiff provides a claim form dated
December 7, 2011, wherein he asked for ten million dollars for
injuries from the August 18, 2010, injury. See Docket Item 17 at pp.
1-2; Docket Item 15. This, in conjunction with the administrative
remedies he provides, are submitted in response to the Court’s
directive. Further, Plaintiff states in his Amended Complaint that
his injuries are open wounds (Am. Complt., Docket Item 15 at Sec.
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III), Orthopedic/ Rheumatology Injury (Id. at Sec. IV), Open Wounds
with regard to fracture (Id. at Sec. V), and attempts to describe
the injuries and his complaints concerning his treatment.
This Court notes that the documents filed in this case are
voluminous and not well-organized. However, at this juncture, the
Court recognizes that Plaintiff has responded to this Court’s holding
that his original Complaint was vague and conclusory and its
directive for information by providing his entire file. Pro se
pleadings must be construed liberally. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court of Appeals has
noted:
We are especially likely to be flexible when dealing with
imprisoned pro se litigants. Such litigants often lack the
resources and freedom necessary to comply with the
technical rules of modern litigation. See Moore v.
Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Pro se prison
inmates, with limited access to legal materials, occupy
a position significantly different from that occupied by
litigants represented by counsel”). The Supreme Court has
“insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do
not have access to counsel be liberally construed and [has]
held that some procedural rules must give way because of
the unique circumstance of incarceration.” McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124
L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (citations omitted).
Id.
Here, this Court finds that the case should be permitted to
proceed past sua sponte screening, and Defendant will be ordered to
file a responsive pleading.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court allows this case to
proceed past sua sponte screening. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated: August 6, 2014

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