DEJESUS v. MOHAMMAD et al

Filing 37

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/29/2015. (dmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
RICHARDO DEJESUS,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 12-7007 (NLH/KMW)

v.
OPINION
DR. SHAKIL MOHAMMAD, M.D.,
et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Conrad J. Benedetto, Esquire
Law Offices of Conrad J. Benedetto
1814 East Route 70
Suite 350
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003
Attorney for Plaintiff Ricardo DeJesus
Dominic A. DeLaurentis, Jr., Esquire
Stahl & DeLaurentis, P.C.
10 E. Clements Bridge Road
Runnemede, New Jersey 08078
Attorney for Defendant Dr. Shakil Mohammad, M.D.
Frank Orbach, Esquire
Law Offices of Charles Peter Hopkins
200 Schulz Drive
4th Floor
Suite 405
Red Bank, New Jersey 07701
Attorney for Defendant Westfield Medical Center, L.P.

1

HILLMAN, District Judge:
Presently before the Court are two motions to dismiss the
fourth amended complaint, filed respectively by Defendants
Shakil Mohammad, M.D. (hereafter, “Mohammad”) and Westfield
Medical Center, L.P. (hereafter, “Westfield”), for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
Also before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendant
Mohammad pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff, Ricardo

DeJesus, filed opposition to the motion seeking dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) but has not opposed the motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 1

The Court has

considered the parties’ submissions and decides this matter
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction are granted, and Defendant
Mohammad’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied
as moot.
I.

BACKGROUND
This action arises out of personal injuries purportedly

sustained by Plaintiff in connection with spinal fusion surgery
performed by Defendant Mohammad on August 10, 2010.

1

Plaintiff

We note that Plaintiff has not requested transfer of this
action to another district nor has Plaintiff requested
jurisdictional discovery.
2

originally filed an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, but the claims were dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction in November 2012.
Plaintiff attempted to reassert his claims in this Court,
allegedly based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332, but his complaint failed to demonstrate a basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Pursuant to a number of

court orders, Plaintiff amended the complaint several times in
an effort to demonstrate that the Court could exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over this matter. 2

Plaintiff’s fourth

amended complaint contained sufficient averments concerning the
citizenship of the parties so as to satisfy the Court that
complete diversity of citizenship exists and that the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction.

Accordingly, this case proceeds

based on the allegations contained in the fourth amended
complaint.
Plaintiff contends in this case that he injured his back at
work and “failed conservative therapy.”
12.)

(Fourth Am. Compl. ¶

He was unable to work and was referred to an orthopedic

2

The Court will not recount in detail the substantial procedural
history concerning Plaintiff’s efforts to amend the complaint.
Such history is set forth in prior Opinions of the Court,
including the Opinion dated September 22, 2014.
3

surgeon, Defendant Mohammad, of Shakil Orthopedic Associates. 3
(Id.)

An MRI showed stenosis and degenerative disc disease in

Plaintiff’s lumbar spine at L5-S1.

(Id.)

Plaintiff underwent

spinal fusion surgery on August 10, 2010.

(Id. ¶ 13.)

Although

not specifically alleged, it appears that Defendant Mohammad
performed the surgery.

Plaintiff contends that there were

surgical errors that should not have occurred, or which should
have been diagnosed, corrected, or treated.

(Id.)

Following surgery, Plaintiff experienced severe pain,
numbness in his leg, an inability to void, and difficulty
passing urine.

(Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15.)

Defendants

allegedly disregarded Plaintiff’s complaints, prescribed an
antidepressant, and discharged Plaintiff from the hospital.
(Id. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff avers that he continues to have a

neurogenic bladder, severe damage to his left side L5 nerve
root, permanent disabling sensory loss, and pain in his left leg
with a complete inability to pass urine.

(Id. ¶ 16.)

Based on

these allegations, the fourth amended complaint purports to

3

Shakil Orthopedic Associates (hereafter, “Shakil Orthopedic”)
is also a named defendant in this action. A summons was
returned purportedly indicating that Defendant Shakil Orthopedic
was served on September 26, 2014, although the summons filed on
the docket [Doc. No. 20] is directed to Defendant Mohammad
rather than Defendant Shakil Orthopedic. Shakil Orthopedic has
not responded to the fourth amended complaint, nor has Plaintiff
sought entry of default against this defendant.
4

assert causes of action for, inter alia, negligence and
professional negligence, recklessness, and breach of contract.
Defendants Mohammad and Westfield now move to dismiss the
fourth amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Defendant Westfield submits an affidavit from its chief
executive officer, Yasin Khan, M.D., in which Dr. Khan
represents that Westfield was located in Allentown, Pennsylvania
from 2007 until its closure in 2013 and had no other place of
business.

(Aff. of Yasin Khan, M.D. ¶ 3.)

According to Dr.

Khan, Westfield is a limited partnership with a registered
office in Allentown, Pennsylvania, and it never maintained or
operated facilities, offices, or hospitals, or conducted
business in New Jersey.

(Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.)

In addition, Dr. Khan

states that Westfield never advertised in New Jersey by
television, radio or print media.

(Id. ¶ 7.)

Defendant Mohammad argues in his brief that he is a
resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is a licensed
physician in Pennsylvania, has not practiced medicine in New
Jersey, and is not professionally affiliated with any hospital,
healthcare institute or physician in New Jersey.

(Def.

Mohammad’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Fourth Am.
Compl. For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, at 5.)

Defendant

Mohammad further contends that he has not conducted business in
New Jersey, maintained offices in New Jersey, or solicited,
5

consulted or treated patients in New Jersey.

(Id.)

Furthermore, Defendant Mohammad asserts that he had no contacts
with Plaintiff in New Jersey and any contact he had with
Plaintiff occurred solely within Pennsylvania.
II.

(Id.)

STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) 4
A.

Burden of Proof

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for
dismissal of an action when the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.

“Once challenged, the plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.”
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150
(3d Cir. 2001)).
When a motion to dismiss is originally made, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.
Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817, 113 S. Ct. 61, 121 L. Ed. 2d 29
(1992) (citations omitted).

A plaintiff may do so by alleging

sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction over the defendant,
and the Court must accept these allegations as true and construe

4

Defendant Mohammad also moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Because the Court, for reasons discussed below,
grants the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
it does not consider dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
6

disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.

Metcalfe v.

Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457
(3d Cir. 2003)).

“If the moving party fails to submit evidence

contravening the allegations of the complaint, the court is
bound to accept plaintiff’s allegations regardless of whether
plaintiff presents further evidence in support thereof.”

In re

Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 367,
382 n.21 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citations omitted).

If it appears

that the facts alleged to support jurisdiction are in dispute,
the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

Carteret,

954 F.2d at 146. 5
B.

Requirements for Personal Jurisdiction

A defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a United
States district court if the defendant “is subject to the

5

Both of the moving defendants argue that the Court must find a
lack of personal jurisdiction because the state court has
already dismissed the action on the same ground. This Court,
however, evaluates personal jurisdiction based upon standards
articulated in federal law rather than New Jersey law. Neither
defendant has argued that the standard utilized in the state
court proceeding -- particularly with respect to the burden on
the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction -- is the same as the
standard utilized in the Third Circuit, nor has the Court been
provided with an opinion in the state court matter. As such,
the Court is unable to conclude that the decision in the state
court action precludes consideration of the issue in this Court
at this time.
7

jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located[.]”
4(k)(1)(A).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

“A federal court sitting in New Jersey has

jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New
Jersey state law.”

Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d

93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004)(citations omitted).

The New Jersey long-

arm statute “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to
the fullest limits of due process.”

IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert

AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Under the Due Process clause, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate when
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154,
90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940)).
A defendant establishes minimum contacts by “‘purposefully
avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State,’” thereby invoking “‘the benefits and
protections of [the forum State’s] laws.’”

Asahi Metal Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S.
Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
8

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985)).

This “purposeful availment” requirement assures that

the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court
in the forum and is not haled into a forum as a result of
“random,” “fortuitous” or “attenuated” contacts with the forum
state.

See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980); see also
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174
(internal citations omitted).
In deciding whether a defendant’s contacts with a forum are
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over that party, the
Court must consider the nature and extent of such contacts.

The

Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the cause of action is related to or arises out
of activities by the defendant that took place within the forum
state.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466

U.S. 408, 414 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 90 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).

If

the cause of action has no relationship to a defendant’s
contacts with a forum state, the Court may nonetheless exercise
general personal jurisdiction over the defendant if the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so “continuous and
systematic” as to render the defendant essentially “at home” in
the forum state.

Daimler AG v. Bauman, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct.

746, 754, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
9

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851,
180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011).

“‘For an individual, the paradigm

forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home.’”

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S.

Ct. at 2853-54).
III. DISCUSSION
In malpractice actions, 6 “courts generally hold that doctors
who treat patients who have travelled from another state to
receive care are not subject to jurisdiction in a malpractice
action in the patient’s home state after they return there.”
Brownstein v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., No. Civ. A. 94-907, 1994
WL 669620, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 1994) (citations omitted).
“The rule is based on the personal character of medical services
that, by their nature, are directed at the person who needs
treatment, not at any particular forum.”

Id.

“[A] doctor’s

treatment is essentially a local act, and not one that, without

6

Count I of the fourth amended complaint is titled
“Negligence/Carelessness/Recklessness and/or Professional
Negligence and/or Corporate Negligence and/or Corporate
Negligence of Defendant(s) Herein and/or Breach of Contract
and/or Warranty By Defendants.” The Court construes the
allegations of the complaint as asserting a medical malpractice
claim.
10

more, will subject [him] to long arm jurisdiction in the
patients [sic] home forum.”

Id.

The issue of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
hospitals and doctors was addressed in Gelineau v. New York
University Hospital, 375 F. Supp. 661 (D.N.J. 1974).

In

Gelineau, the New Jersey plaintiff traveled to a hospital in New
York to seek treatment by a physician licensed to practice in
New York.

Gelineau, 375 F. Supp. at 663.

The plaintiff was

admitted to the hospital, underwent surgery, and received a
blood transfusion.

Id.

Subsequently, the plaintiff was

diagnosed with hepatitis and sued the hospital for negligence in
New Jersey.

Id.

The court in Gelineau found that the hospital did not have
minimum contacts with New Jersey, even though some employees
lived in New Jersey and some professional staff were licensed to
practice in New Jersey.

Id. at 666.

In so finding, the court

noted that “[w]hen one seeks out services which are personal in
nature, such as those rendered by attorneys, physicians,
dentists, hospitals or accountants, and travels to the locality
where he knows the services will actually be rendered, he must
realize that the services are not directed to impact on any
particular place, but are directed to the needy person himself.”
Id. at 667.

The court further noted that “when a client or a

patient travels to receive professional services without having
11

been solicited . . . then the client, who originally traveled to
seek services apparently not available at home, ought to expect
that he will have to travel again if he thereafter complains
that the services sought by him in the foreign jurisdiction were
therein rendered improperly.”

Id.

The court concluded that New

York University Hospital did not purposefully avail itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within New Jersey, as the
medical services were performed in New York at the request of
the plaintiff who unilaterally traveled to New York to receive
them.

Id. at 668; see also O’Brien v. Sasso, Civ. A. No. 11-

4083, 2012 WL 909620, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2012) (citing
Gelineau in finding that doctor and treatment center did not
avail themselves of privilege of conducting business in New
Jersey, where plaintiff was New Jersey resident who sought
medical services provided by Pennsylvania citizens in
Pennsylvania).
A.

Minimum Contacts of Defendant Mohammad

In this case, the fourth amended complaint contains no
allegations to establish that Defendant Mohammad, either in his
professional relationship with Plaintiff or in general,
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of practicing
medicine in New Jersey.

The record fails to demonstrate that

Defendant Mohammad had any contacts with New Jersey.

Although

Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident, Defendant Mohammad’s
12

treatment of Plaintiff was a personal act, which appears to have
been performed in Pennsylvania, and was directed to Plaintiff
rather than Plaintiff’s home state.
With respect to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff fails to
demonstrate that his cause of action is related to or arises out
of activities by Defendant Mohammad that took place within New
Jersey.

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Mohammad

initiated or sought the consultation with Plaintiff pertaining
to Plaintiff’s spinal stenosis. 7

There are no allegations that

Plaintiff was ever contacted, consulted, or treated by Defendant
Mohammad in New Jersey.

Although the complaint does not specify

the state in which the consultation and surgery took place, the
complaint alleges that Defendant Mohammad is licensed to
practice medicine in Pennsylvania, that Defendant Shakil
Orthopedic is located in Pennsylvania, and that Defendant
Westfield is a hospital located in Pennsylvania.

(Id. ¶¶ 3-5.)

In the absence of any allegations indicating that Defendants
also operated a facility in New Jersey or were licensed in New
Jersey, it appears that the surgery was performed and subsequent
care provided in Pennsylvania at the request of Plaintiff, who
unilaterally traveled to Pennsylvania to receive such services.

7

The fourth amended complaint alleges generally that Plaintiff
was referred to Defendant Mohammad, without identifying the
individual who made the referral. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 12.)
13

Under these circumstances, Plaintiff does not establish that
Defendant Mohammad purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of practicing medicine in New Jersey as it relates to the
treatment of Plaintiff specifically.
Plaintiff also fails to establish that the Court may
exercise general jurisdiction over Defendant Mohammad.
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Mohammad is associated
with any hospital, healthcare institute, or physician in New
Jersey.

Plaintiff does not aver that Defendant Mohammad has

ever practiced medicine, consulted or treated patients, or
maintained an office in New Jersey.

Plaintiff does not allege

that Defendant Mohammad is licensed to practice medicine in New
Jersey, nor does he contend that Defendant Mohammad lives or
advertises in New Jersey.

Rather, Plaintiff alleges in the

fourth amended complaint only that Defendant Mohammad is a
citizen of Pennsylvania and is licensed to practice medicine in
Pennsylvania.

There are no allegations from which the Court

could infer that Defendant Mohammad had any contacts with New
Jersey, let alone contacts that are so constant and pervasive as
to place him in the same category as those who are domiciled in
New Jersey.
In so finding, the Court notes that Defendant Mohammad
submitted an affidavit of Defendant Shakil Orthopedic in an
effort to prove that he has no contacts with New Jersey.
14

The

affidavit of the business entity, however, does not foreclose
the possibility that Defendant Mohammad, individually, has had
contacts with New Jersey.

The affidavit does not even indicate

that Defendant Mohammad has any affiliation with Shakil
Orthopedic.

While the fourth amended complaint alleges a

relationship between Defendants Mohammad and Shakil Orthopedic,
it is possible that Defendant Mohammad also practices medicine
through a separate entity which has contacts with New Jersey.
Defendant Mohammad did not submit his own affidavit confirming
the absence of contacts with New Jersey.

Nonetheless, because

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction, and the fourth amended complaint contains no
allegations from which this Court could conclude that Defendant
Mohammad had any contacts with New Jersey, the Court will grant
Defendant Mohammad’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction at this time.
B.

Minimum Contacts of Defendant Westfield

In the present case, as in Gelineau, the fourth amended
complaint alleges that Plaintiff, a New Jersey citizen, traveled
from New Jersey to a hospital out-of-state to receive medical
services that Plaintiff requested.

There are no facts from

which this Court could conclude that Defendant Westfield had
minimum contacts with New Jersey sufficient to confer either
general or specific jurisdiction.
15

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate at this time that the Court
may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant Westfield.

As

noted above, it appears from the allegations in the fourth
amended complaint that the surgery and subsequent care of
Plaintiff at issue in this case occurred at Defendant
Westfield’s facility in Pennsylvania.

As in Gelineau, the

services provided by Defendant Westfield were not directed to
impact any particular place, but were directed to Plaintiff
himself.

There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that

Defendant Westfield purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in New Jersey in connection with
Plaintiff’s spinal surgery. 8
Additionally, the fourth amended complaint contains no
allegations to suggest that Defendant Westfield had a continuous
or systematic presence in New Jersey so as to be “at home” in
this forum.

According to the fourth amended complaint,

8

The Court notes Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Mohammad
is an agent of Westfield. “[A] corporation can purposefully
avail itself of a forum by directing its agents or distributors
to take action there.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759 n.13. As
such, agency relationships may be relevant to the existence of
specific jurisdiction. Here, however, as discussed above, the
fourth amended complaint does not contain any allegations that
Defendant Mohammad had contacts with Plaintiff in New Jersey
concerning Plaintiff’s treatment and surgery for spinal
stenosis. Therefore, at this time the Court does not find that
the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant
Westfield through the contacts of its purported agent, Defendant
Mohammad.
16

Defendant Westfield is a Pennsylvania limited partnership
located in Allentown, Pennsylvania which owned or operated a
medical facility authorized and licensed to provide medical
services in Pennsylvania.

(Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 5.)

The general

partner and limited partners of Defendant Westfield are alleged
to be either individuals who are Pennsylvania citizens, or
corporations that are organized and existing under the laws of
Pennsylvania with principal places of business in Pennsylvania.
(Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant

Westfield is affiliated with any hospitals, medical centers or
health care facilities in New Jersey.

Plaintiff does not allege

that Defendant Westfield advertises in New Jersey.

Plaintiff

does not allege that any employees or agents of Defendant
Westfield live, practice, or are licensed to practice in New
Jersey.
Moreover, Defendant Westfield submitted affirmative
evidence stating that it never maintained or operated
facilities, offices or hospitals in New Jersey, never conducted
business in New Jersey, and never advertised in New Jersey by
television, radio or print media.

Plaintiff has not responded

to Defendant Westfield’s motion, and therefore has not only
failed to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction but has
also failed to rebut the affirmative evidence presented on this

17

issue.

Based on the record, the Court finds that it may not

exercise general jurisdiction over Defendant Westfield.
Because the Court may not exercise general jurisdiction
over Defendant Westfield, and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate
that the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over this
defendant, the Court will grant Defendant Westfield’s motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
C.

“Fair Play and Substantial Justice”

Because Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing
“minimum contacts,” the Court need not consider whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would “offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. 154.

Int’l Shoe, 326

The Court nonetheless notes that

the rationale articulated in Gelineau further supports a finding
that allowing personal jurisdiction over either Defendant
Mohammad or Defendant Westfield would not further social policy.
In Gelineau, the court noted that if medical professionals could
be subject to suit in the jurisdictions of all of their
patients, there would be a chilling effect on the availability
of professional services to non-residents.
Supp. at 667.

Gelineau, 375 F.

The court stated:

Professionals in the medical field . . .
would be hesitant to treat a non-resident
defendant if they knew that thereafter, upon
the receipt of a registered letter, they
could be compelled to travel to a foreign
18

state, and there to account, under the laws
of that state, for the services which were
sought from them and rendered by them at
home.
Id. at 667-68.
This Court agrees that it would be detrimental to New
Jersey residents to adopt a rule that would have a chilling
effect on the availability of medical care to the residents of
this state.

Thus, the Court agrees with the rule articulated in

Gelineau that a plaintiff’s unilateral travel to another
jurisdiction for medical services cannot, standing alone, meet
the requirements to establish personal jurisdiction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
IV.

CONCLUSION
The only apparent contact with New Jersey in this case is

Plaintiff’s residence in this state.

However, “the residence of

a recipient of personal services rendered elsewhere is
irrelevant and totally incidental to the benefits provided by
the defendant at his own location.”
667.

Gelineau, 375 F. Supp. at

Plaintiff fails to provide any allegations or evidence

that would support a finding that either Defendant Mohammad or
Defendant Westfield had any contacts with New Jersey, let alone
sufficient contacts with this state such that the maintenance of
the suit would not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.

Therefore, the Court finds no basis to
19

conclude that it may exercise personal jurisdiction over either
of these defendants.

Accordingly, the motions to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction will be granted. 9
Finally, because the Court finds that it lacks personal
jurisdiction over Defendant Mohammad, it need not, and indeed
should not, reach the issues raised in Defendant Mohammad’s
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

That motion

will be dismissed as moot.
An Order accompanying this Opinion will be entered.

Date: April 29, 2015

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

9

As noted supra, neither the Plaintiff nor the moving parties
have requested transfer of this case to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We
note that there are still claims remaining against Defendant
Shakil Orthopedic Associates, and no party has challenged this
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Shakil
Orthopedic. Accordingly, we cannot conclude on this record at
this time that sua sponte transfer would be in the interest of
justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. However, the Court notes that
the claims in this case relate to events as far back as 2010 and
the plaintiff may be barred from re-filing these claims in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania because of the statute of limitations. While we
express no view as to that issue, this set of circumstances
raises the issue of whether transfer rather than dismissal would
be in the interest of justice within the meaning of § 1631. The
Court will stay dismissal of the claims against Defendants
Mohammad and Westfield pending additional briefing on this
issue.
20