ISLAAM v. GRECO et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/21/2014. (bdk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SANTO MUJAHID ISLAAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
RODNEY A. GRECO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 12-7022 (JBS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Santo Mujahid Islaam, Pro Se
262092
Camden County Correctional Center
P.O. Box 90431
Camden, NJ 08101
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
Plaintiff, Santo Mujahid Islaam, confined at the Camden County
Correctional Facility, Camden, New Jersey, seeks to file this civil
rights complaint asserting jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As
Plaintiff provided an in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application, the
Court will grant Plaintiff's request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
and order the Clerk of the Court to file the complaint.
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint should
be permitted to proceed against certain parties.
BACKGROUND
To begin, the caption of Plaintiff’s complaint, as well as the
body of his complaint, reveal that Plaintiff seeks to sue Rodney A.
Greco, a Camden County Freeholder, and Eric M. Taylor, the Warden
of the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) (Docket Item 1-1,
Complt., ¶ 4). However, Plaintiff’s IFP application lists additional
defendants-- while it names Defendants Greco and Taylor, it also
names “Dr. Niel,” “Dr. Dunoff,” “Dr. Utreras,” and “Jen Houston.”
The Clerk of the Court placed these individuals’ names on the docket;
however, the body of Plaintiff’s complaint and the allegations do
not mention these defendants.
It appears the names were
inadvertently added to the IFP application, and the Court will order
these defendants terminated from the docket.
As to the facts of Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff states that
defendants Greco and Taylor have instituted “policies/rules that
govern and prohibit the Muslims from ‘peacefully assemblying on
Fridays’ for ‘Jumu’ah prayer’ in [CCCF] and specifically on the 3rd
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and 4th Floors.” (Id., ¶ 6).
He claims the Muslims were also denied
their “annual prayer and Feast Eid-ul-Adha on 10-17-12” and that the
Administration is “bias/prejudice towards the Muslims (Anti Muslim
Syndrome) in general.” He asserts that Christians are permitted to
assemble for Sunday services.
(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that this denial of rights violates the First
Amendment and the New Jersey Administrative Code, and asks that the
denial be remedied, Muslims be permitted to practice, and for
monetary damages. (Id., ¶ 7).
Attached to the end of his complaint, Plaintiff lists
approximately forty-nine (49) “Additional Plaintiffs,” none of whom
have signed the complaint and none of whom have submitted individual
IFP applications.
DISCUSSION
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a
district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against
a governmental employee or entity.
The Court must identify
cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
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from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court
must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also United States v. Day,
969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.2d 868 (2009).
The Court
examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Fed.
Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the proposition that “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that,
to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
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Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(citing
Iqbal, supra).
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are plausible.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 677-679.
See also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, &
n.3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011);
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012).
“A complaint must
do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
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Fowler,
578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)).
2.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
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was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania,
36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d
560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
3.
Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied the right to attend
his Muslim prayer service every Friday as required by his faith.
Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
defendants have no legitimate basis for this ban.
To establish a violation of his right to freely exercise his
religion, an inmate must satisfy the “reasonableness test” set forth
in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). The standards delineated in
Turner and O'Lone indicate that when a prison regulation encroaches
upon prisoners' rights to free exercise of their religion, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; O'Lone, 482 U.S.
at 349. Thus, Plaintiff must allege that the restrictions on his
religious practices are not reasonably related to the prison's
legitimate penological interest. See Robinson v. Ridge, 996 F. Supp.
447, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 175 F.3d 1011 (3d Cir. 1999).
The reasonableness standard involves the examination of the
following four factors: (1) whether the regulation or practice in
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question furthers a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression; (2) whether there are alternative
means of exercising First Amendment rights that remain open to prison
inmates; (3) whether the right can be exercised only at the cost of
less liberty and safety for guards and other prisoners; and (4)
whether an alternative exists which would fully accommodate the
prisoners' rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-18 (1989); Turner, 482
U.S. at 89-91.
In this case, Plaintiff's basic allegations may be sufficient
to state a First Amendment free exercise claim. Accordingly, the
Court will allow Plaintiff to pursue his claim at this preliminary
stage.
However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 governs the
permissive joinder of plaintiffs and states in relevant part:
(1) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as
plaintiffs if:
A) they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences; and
B) any question of law or fact common to all
plaintiffs will arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). Joinder under Rule 20 is discretionary and
when the District Court exercises that discretion, it “must provide
a reasoned analysis that comports with the requirement of the Rule,
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and that is based on the specific fact pattern presented by the
plaintiffs and claims before the court.” Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d
146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009).
Where more than one prisoner seeks to join in a complaint against
a government official or entity, the plaintiffs may prepay a single
$400.00 filing fee or seek in forma pauperis status.1 See Hagan, 570
F.3d at 150; see also Hood v. Cumberland Cnty. Dep't of Corrs., Civ.
No. 12–6395, 2013 WL 1593349, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2013);
McGeachy v. Aviles, Civ. No. 10–3562, 2011 WL 1885938, at *2 (D.N.J.
May 18, 2011). In the event that multiple prisoners seek to join as
plaintiffs and they do not prepay the $400.00 filing fee, then each
plaintiff must submit a complete application to proceed IFP if he
desires the complaint to be filed on his behalf. See Hagan, 570 F.3d
at 154–55. In that situation, if the Court permits more than one
prisoner to join as a plaintiff under Rule 20, then the Court is
required to collect a $350 filing fee from each prisoner-plaintiff
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Previously, at the time Hagan was decided, the filing fee for a
prepaid complaint was $350.00. Recently, however, the fee was
adjusted and the entire fee to be paid in advance of filing a civil
complaint is $400. That fee includes a filing fee of $350 plus an
administrative fee of $50, for a total of $400. A prisoner who is
granted IFP status will, instead, be assessed a filing fee of $350
and will not be responsible for the $50 administrative fee. If IFP
status is denied, the prisoner must pay the full $400, including the
$350 filing fee and the $50 administrative fee, before the complaint
will be filed.
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by directing the agency having custody of each prisoner to deduct
the filing fee in monthly installments from each prisoner's account
as if each prisoner were filing his own individual complaint. See
Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155–56.
Here, the plaintiffs listed on the attachment to the complaint
may or may not have known of the filing fee requirement. Thus,
Plaintiffs will be given an opportunity to either (1) move to join
this action, complying with the rules applicable to joinder of claims
and parties, including the filing fee and/or IFP application
requirements, or (2) file new and separate actions asserting their
individual claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim
may proceed against defendants Greco and Taylor.
The additional
plaintiffs listed will not yet be considered plaintiffs in this
action and may move to join the action or file their own complaints
upon filing individual application to proceed in forma pauperis or
prepayment of their individual filing fees.
The additional
defendants listed on the caption will be terminated from this action.
An appropriate Order follows.
February 21, 2014
Dated
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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