WILLIAMSON v. ATLANTIC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 5/8/2013. (nz, )N.M.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN C. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
ATLANTIC COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 12-7345 (RBK)
OPINION
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Kugler, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the Clerk’s receipt
of Plaintiff’s civil complaint (“Complaint”), which arrived
accompanied by Plaintiff’s application to prosecute this matter
in forma pauperis.
See Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 1-1.1
The Complaint, a 16-page document, names the following
entities and individuals as Defendants in this matter: (1)
Atlantic County Superior Court (“Superior Court”); (2) Atlantic
County Prosecutor’s Office (“Prosecutor’s Office”); (3) Atlantic
County Justice Facility (“Jail”); (4) Egg Harbor Township
Municipal Court (“Municipal Court”); (5) Detective Heather Stumpf
(“Stumpf”); (6) Police Officer Shawn Owen (“Owen”); (7) Sargent
Charles Super (“Super”); (8) Sargent Hughes (“Hughes”); (9) Judge
1
On November 13, 2012, Plaintiff was convicted to a 3-year
term for stalking. See https://www6.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/
details?x=1419708&n=0.
Robert Switzer (“Switzer”); (10) Municipal Judge Cappuccio
(“Cappuccio”); (11) Superior Court Judge Bernard DeLury
(“DeLury”); (12) Julio Mendez, an Assignment Judge of the
Superior Court (“Mendez”); (13) pool counsel Bonny Putterman
assigned to represent Plaintiff in the State’s criminal
proceeding against him (“Defense Attorney”); (14) assistant
prosecutor Harlee Stein (“Prosecutor”); and (15) Geraldine Cohen,
the warden of the Atlantic County Justice Facility (“Warden”).2
See Docket Entry No. 1, at 1 and 3-18.
Plaintiff asserts that the above-listed Defendants violated
his rights because: (1) officers Owens, Stumph, Super and Hughes
(collectively, “Police Officers”) arrested Plaintiff without
probable cause; (2) Judges Switzer and Cappuccio conducted the
initial steps of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings in a fashion
Plaintiff found erroneous; (3) Judge DeLury conducted the followup steps of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings in a fashion
Plaintiff found erroneous; (4) Judge Mendez failed to supervise
Plaintiff’s grand jury proceedings; (5) Plaintiff’s Defense
Counsel denied Plaintiff effective legal assistance; (6) the
Prosecutor unduly file the indictment and prosecuted Plaintiff;
and (7) the Warden held Plaintiff at the ACJF during the pretrial period.
See id.
2
Plaintiff now seeks damages for the lost property,
affected credit history and loss of personal relationships due to
his arrest and conviction.
2
The Supreme Court detailed the standard for summary
dismissal of a complaint in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009).
The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
The Supreme
Court held that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil
complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that
the claim is facially plausible since that “allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs named, as Defendant, state courts, ACJF,
Judges, Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor, Defense Attorney, Warden
and the Police Officers.
Prosecutor’s Office
However, state courts, ACJF and the
are “arms of the state” and, thus, not
“persons” within the meaning of a Section 1983 action.
See Will
v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Reiff
v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 827 F. Supp. 319,
324 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (court is not a “person”); Grabow v. Southern
State Correctional Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J.
1989).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against these entities are
facially deficient and must be dismissed with prejudice.
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Moreover, judges are absolutely immune from damages for all
acts performed in their official capacity,3 and prosecutors are
absolutely immune from damages for acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,”
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31(1976), including use of
false testimony and suppression of evidence favorable to the
defense.4
3
The doctrine of judicial immunity provides that judges
are immune from suit for monetary damages arising from their
judicial acts. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760,
768 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991)
(per curiam). To determine whether the judicial immunity
doctrine applies, the Court must establish: (a) whether the
judge’s actions were “judicial” in nature; and (b) whether the
judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction over the
subject matter.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 n.6 (1978)). Where a judge “was
properly called to preside over [a litigant's court proceeding],
there could be no basis for a presumption that [the judge] acted
‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Peeples v. Citta,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52895, at *15 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012)
(relying on Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769). An act is judicial in
nature if “it is a function normally performed by a judge” and if
the parties “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”
Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. “‘[A litigant’s] allegations of bad
faith [and] malice’ cannot overcome [judicial] immunity."
Abulkhair v. Rosenberg, 457 F. App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11). Simply put, “an act does not become
less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption
of motive,” or that such action is “unfair” or “controversial.”
Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769; accord Stump, 435 U.S. at 363
(“[d]isagreement with the action taken by the judge . . . does
not justify depriving the judge of his immunity”).
4
Since Imbler, the Supreme Court has held that “absolute
immunity applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a
judicial proceeding, or appears in court to present evidence in
support of a search warrant application.” Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (citations omitted); see also
Allen v. Johnson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2432 (D.N.J. Jan. 7,
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Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the Judges and Prosecutor,
being based on the acts taken by these individuals in their
official capacities as judges or advocates of the State, are
facially barred and must be dismissed with prejudice.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s challenges against the Warden are
also subject to dismissal with prejudice since the Complaint make
it clear that the Warden had no personal involvement in the
events alleged in this matter.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.
The foregoing analysis leaves the Court solely with
Plaintiff’s false arrest allegations against the Police Officers.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees an individual’s right to be
free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
amend. IV.
U.S. Const.
Correspondingly, the Fourth Amendment “prohibits a
police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable
cause.”
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1995); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013);
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
Thus, to prevail on a
claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must prove that the officer
defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him.
See Groman v.
Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995).
Thus,
“[t]he proper inquiry in a Section 1983 claim based on false
2013) (absolute immunity applies to prosecutorial indictments);
David v. Miller, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178023 (D.N.J. Dec. 17,
2012) (same); Retzler v. Marrone, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68624
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2009) (same, as to an allegedly forced guilty
plea).
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arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed
the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause
to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”
Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).
“[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a person
committed even a minor crime[,] . . . the balancing of private
and public interests is not in doubt [and t]he arrest is
constitutionally reasonable.”
171 (2008).
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,
Correspondingly, a plaintiff must state “the facts
[showing that, under the] circumstances within [the officer’s]
knowledge, a reasonable officer could not have believed that an
offense had been or was being committed by the person to be
arrested.”5
Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 94-5 (3d Cir. 1996);
accord Revell v. Port Authority of New York, New Jersey, 598 F.
3d 128, 137 n.16 (3d Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff merely states that his arrest was “illegal,”
because it was, allegedly, based on a certain statement that
Plaintiff qualified, without any clarification or elaboration, as
a false document.
However, such allegations presents a purely
conclusory allegation the Court must ignore under the holding of
Iqbal.
Therefore, Plaintiff's false arrest challenge, as pled,
5
“Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, but
need not be based on evidence sufficient to support a conviction,
nor even a showing that the officer's belief is more likely true
than false.” Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F. 2d 967, 969 (7th Cir.
1989).
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will be dismissed with regard to the remaining Defendants, i.e.,
the Police Officers.
However, since Plaintiff might be able to
cure the shortcomings of this challenge by filing an amended
pleading detailing the circumstances of his arrest, the nature of
the statement at issue and the facts leading Plaintiff to
conclude that the statement was false, the Court will dismiss
this final line of challenges without prejudice.
See Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1962) (“The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision
on the merits”).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ application to
proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
His Complaint will be
dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s false arrest
challenges raised against the Police Officers, while the
remainder of his claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
Dated: May 8, 2013
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