CASTILLO v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 8

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/26/2013. (dmr)(n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JORGE MATUTE CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
JORDAN HOLLINGSWORTH,
Respondent.

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Hon. Jerome B. Simandle
Civil No. 12-7831 (JBS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
JORGE MATUTE CASTILLO, #50857-018
FCI Fort Dix
P.O. 2000
Fort Dix, NJ 08640
Petitioner Pro Se
PAUL A. BLAINE, Assistant U.S. Attorney
PAUL J. FISHMAN, United States Attorney
P.O. Box 2098
Camden, NJ 08101
Attorneys for Respondent
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
Jorge Matute Castillo, a federal inmate confined at FCI Fort
Dix in New Jersey, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his imprisonment pursuant to a
federal sentence imposed on September 28, 2009, by Judge
Elizabeth A. Kovachevich in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, after he pled guilty to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine, while on board a vessel subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), and
70506(b), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).

See United States v.

Castillo, Crim. 09-0147 judgment (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2009).
Respondent filed an Answer and the declaration of Michael R.
Gesele, together with several exhibits.

Having thoroughly

reviewed the record, as well as the docket in the underlying
criminal proceeding, this Court will dismiss the Petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2009, a grand jury in the Middle District of
Florida returned a two-count indictment against Castillo and four
other defendants.

The indictment charged that “[b]eginning on an

unknown date and continuing through on or about March 19, 2009,
while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States,” defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to possess
with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine
(count one), and defendants knowingly possessed with the intent
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (count two).
United States v. Castillo, Crim. 09-0147 indictment (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 2, 2009).

On July 27, 2009, Castillo pled guilty to count

one of the indictment.

On September 28, 2009, Judge Kovachevich

sentenced Castillo to 210 months in prison and five years of
supervised release.

Castillo appealed, and on August 4, 2010,

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the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the government’s
motion to dismiss the appeal due to a valid appeal waiver
contained in Castillo’s plea agreement.

The docket of the Middle

District of Florida shows that Castillo did not file a motion to
vacate the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Castillo, who is now incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix in New
Jersey, signed his § 2241 Petition on December 12, 2012.
raises two grounds:

He

“New 11th Circuit law - no jurisdiction in

territorial waters” (ground one), and “Ilegal[ly] incarcerated,
no jurisdiction for sentencing court to impose sentence” (ground
two).

(ECF No. 1 at 6.)

Petition, he argues:

In a memorandum accompanying the

pursuant to United States v. Bellaizac-

Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012), the sentencing court was
without jurisdiction to impose a sentence, and the “act for which
Petitioner was convicted is no longer considered to be a crime,
and he cannot raise this issue in a § 2255 motion.”
at 9.)

(ECF No. 1

Factually, he alleges that in March 2009, the U.S. Coast

Guard illegally seized him from a vessel “50 miles from Panama
coast,” and the United States prosecuted him under the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act.

(ECF No. 1 at 11.)

Relying on the

Eleventh Circuit opinion in Bellaizac-Hurtado, he seeks an order
vacating his criminal judgment or alternatively granting an
evidentiary hearing.

(ECF No. 1 at 16.)

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Respondents filed an Answer arguing that Bellaizac-Hurtado
does not apply to Castillo’s case because the vessel on which
Castillo was apprehended was stopped in international waters and
this Court should dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.
(ECF Nos. 5, 6.)

Castillo filed a Reply (labeled “Supplemental

Pleading”), arguing that his incarceration and sentence are
illegal under Ballaizac-Hurtado.
II.

(ECF No. 7.)

DISCUSSION

Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
that the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

Nevertheless, a challenge to the validity of a federal conviction
or sentence must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

See Davis v.

United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); Okereke v. United States, 307
F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).

This is because 28 U.S.C. § 2255

expressly prohibits a district court from entertaining a
challenge to a prisoner’s federal sentence under § 2241 unless
the remedy by motion under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of his detention.”

See 28 U.S.C. §

2255(e);1 see Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536 (3d Cir.

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The “inadequate or ineffective” language was necessary
because the Supreme Court held that “the substitution of a
collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to
test the legality of a person’s detention does not constitute a
(continued...)
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2002); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997);
Millan-Diaz v. Parker, 444 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1971); Application of
Galante, 437 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States
ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954).
A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective, authorizing
resort to § 2241, only where the petitioner demonstrates that he
“had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime
that an intervening change in substantive law could negate with
retroactive application.”

Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d

117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).
For example, in Dorsainvil, the Third Circuit held that § 2255
was inadequate or ineffective for Dorsainvil’s claim that he was
imprisoned for conduct that the Supreme Court ruled in Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), was not a crime, where the
Supreme Court issued Bailey after Dorsainvil’s § 2255 motion was

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(...continued)
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.” Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 381 (1977). Specifically, § 2255(e) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus
[pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241] in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that
the applicant has failed to apply for relief,
by motion, to the court which sentenced him,
or that such court has denied him relief,
unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
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denied on the merits and after the Third Circuit ruled that
Dorsainvil could not meet either of the gatekeeping requirements
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) to authorize the filing of a second or
successive § 2255 motion.2

See Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d at 250 (“A

Supreme Court decision interpreting a criminal statute that
resulted in the imprisonment of one whose conduct was not
prohibited by law presents exceptional circumstances where the
need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is
apparent”).
Here, Castillo claims that he is imprisoned for conduct that
the Eleventh Circuit (the circuit wherein he was convicted)
deemed non-criminal in United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700
F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) (after his conviction became final and
the time to file a § 2255 motion expired).

In Bellaizac-Hurtado,

the Eleventh Circuit reversed convictions under the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act on direct appeal on the ground that Congress
lacked “the power under the Offences Clause to proscribe drug

2

Section 2255(h) provides that a second or successive §
2255 motion must be certified by a panel of the appropriate court
of appeals to contain “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if
proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the
offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional laws, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) and
(2).
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trafficking in the territorial waters of another nation.”3

Id.

at 1249.
In this case, Respondent correctly contends that the holding
of Bellaizac-Hurtado does not make Castillo’s conduct noncriminal because Castillo was convicted of drug trafficking in
international waters, not in the territorial waters of another
nation.4
The vessel on which Castillo was apprehended was 50 miles
off the coast of Panama, in international waters lying beyond the

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The United States argued that the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, as applied to defendants who were drug
trafficking in the territorial waters of another nation, is a
constitutional exercise of the power granted to Congress “[t]o
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. Const.,
Art. I, §8, cl.10. See Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1248.
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The United States recognizes a territorial sea of 12
nautical miles. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441 n.8 (1989) (“On December 28, 1988, the
President announced that the United States would henceforth
recognize a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles”); 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994)
(Territorial waters are the coastal waters extending seaward at
most for four leagues or twelve nautical miles from the baseline
of a nation, and the high seas is the entire body of waters
stretching seaward of the nation’s territorial waters).
In the Petition, Castillo asserts that his vessel was 50
miles from the coast of Panama, which puts the vessel in
international waters. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) Respondent filed a
declaration of Michael R. Gesele, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard,
averring that the vessel upon which Castillo was apprehended was
approximately 22 nautical miles north of the Panamanian coast,
which is international waters, “since the Government of Panama
claims a 12NM territorial sea.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 2.)
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recognized 12 mile territorial limit.

Thus, this is not a case

where subsequent jurisprudence has rendered defendant's conduct
non-criminal under United States law.

In addition, unlike

Dorsainvil, Castillo did not raise or attempt to raise his
Bellaizac-Hurtado challenge in a § 2255 motion in the Middle
District of Florida.

Accordingly, this Court finds that § 2255

is not an inadequate or ineffective remedy for Castillo’s claim
and will dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.

See

Ortiz-Dominguez v. Hollingsworth, Civ. No. 13-0025 (RBK), 2013 WL
163284 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2013) (dismissing § 2241 petition raising
Bellaizac-Hurtado claim where vessel was 34 miles off coast of
Guatemala); Paredes v. Hollingsworth, Civ. No. 13-0531 (RBK),
2013 WL 435969 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2013) (160 miles off coast of
Columbia); Pandales v. Hollingsworth, Civ. No. 13-0841 (RBK),
2013 WL 618204 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2013) (80 miles off coast of
Guatemala).
III.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief Judge
Dated:

March 26

, 2013

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