PAREDES v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 9

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/10/2013. (drw)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
:
: Civil Action No. 12-7834 (RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
JORDAN R. HOLLINGSWORTH,
:
:
Respondent.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUENERGI ESTUPINA PAREDES,

Petitioner, a federal inmate confined at FCI Fort Dix, New
Jersey, filed a petition (“Petition”) seeking a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He is challenging his
conviction and sentence rendered by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida.
1.

See Docket Entry No.

Respondent filed an answer opposing the Petition, and

Petitioner traversed.

See Docket Entries Nos. 6-8.

Having

examined these submissions, this Court will dismiss the Petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts here are not in dispute.

Petitioner entered a

guilty plea with regard to a drug-trafficking offense conducted
in international waters, either 23 or 27 nautical miles outside
the coast of Columbia (or, to be more precise, either 11 or 15
nautical miles beyond Columbian territorial waters and into the
high seas).

See Docket Entry No. 6-2.

After the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir.
2012), reversed a certain criminal defendant’s conviction on
direct appeal, and interpreted the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (“MDLEA”), 94 Stat. 1159, 46 U.S.C. App. § 1901 et seq., as
extending the United States penal jurisdiction solely to the drug
trafficking activities taking place outside foreign territorial
waters, Petitioner filed his instant Petition seeking vacatur of
his conviction and sentence under the holding of Bellaizac.

See

Docket Entry No. 1.
Respondent opposed the petition, pointing out that the
holding of Bellaizac found lack of the United States jurisdiction
solely with regard to the offenses committed in foreign
territorial waters rather than on high seas, as it was in
Petitioner’s case.

See Docket Entries Nos. 6 and 7.

Petitioner

traversed asserting that this Court should expand the holding of
Bellaizac so to negate the United States jurisdiction as to all
drug trafficking activities outside the United States
geographical jurisdiction, regardless of whether these offenses
were conducted on high seas on in foreign territorial waters,
i.e., to find the MDLEA effectively unconstitutional in its
entirety.

See Docket Entry No. 8.

The Court declines this invitation.

The Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit implicitly upheld application of the MDLEA

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to the offenses conducted on high seas when the Court of Appeals
pointed out that no nexus to the United States was needed to
exercise United States penal jurisdiction (asserted under the
MDLEA) over the drug-trafficking activities committed in
international waters.

See United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993

F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1048 (1994).
Correspondingly, the narrow holding of Bellaizac, being limited
solely to the offenses committed in foreign territorial waters,
cannot be expanded in the fashion requested by Petitioner.1
Because the holding of Bellaizac is facially inapposite to
Petitioner’s circumstances, and it cannot be expanded, Bellaizac
cannot support his claims and, thus, prompts dismissal.

However,

and paramount here, the core deficiency of Petitioner’s
application is not substantive; rather, it is jurisdictional.
Congress established a procedure whereby a federal prisoner
might collaterally attack his sentence in the sentencing court by
means of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.2

See Davis v. United States,

1

Moreover, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit would adopt the holding of Bellaizac-Hurtado if
presented with the scenario where a litigant committed a drug
trafficking offense in foreign territorial waters. See MunozValdez v. Hollingsworth, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76445, at *9-15
(D.N.J. May 31, 2013) (extensively detailing the same).
2

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
3

417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S.
205, 219 (1952).

“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the

presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their
convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the
Constitution,” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d
Cir. 2002), and resort to § 2241 is jurisdictionally barred
unless the litigant establishes that § 2255 is a vehicle
“inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his/her
detention.

See Cradle v. Miner, 290 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2002); In

re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).3
The Court of Appeals in Dorsainvil addressed a scenario
where § 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective” and, thus, permitted
resort to § 2241: there, the Court examined challenges raised by

States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside
or correct the sentence.
3

A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective, authorizing
resort to § 2241, “only where the petitioner demonstrates that
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255
proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of
his wrongful detention claim." Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. Since
“[i]t is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability
to use it, that is determinative,” id., “Section 2255 is not
[deemed] ‘inadequate or ineffective’ merely because the
sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of
limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the
stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255. The
provision exists to ensure that petitioners have a fair
opportunity to seek collateral relief, not to enable them to
evade procedural requirements.” Id. at 539.
4

a prisoner whose underlying conduct became a criminal offense in
light of an intervening interpretation of the relevant criminal
provision by the United States Supreme Court.
119 F.3d at 251-52.

See Dorsainvil,

The Dorsainvil exception is narrowly

construed and, thus, facially inapplicable to the case at bar
because the Eleventh Circuit ruling in Bellaizac-Hurtado neither
(a) transformed Petitioner’s conduct on high seas into a
non-criminal activity nor (b) could qualify as a Supreme Court
interpretation of the relevant criminal provision.

It is a

decision not binding on this Court under Dorsainvil or even under
the doctrine of stare decisis, be it for direct-appellate or
collateral-review purposes.

See Munoz-Valdez, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 76445, at *6-9 (collecting relevant MDLEA cases and
detailing this jurisdictional principle on the basis of highly
persuasive observations offered in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605,
611-12 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Accordingly, this Court finds that § 2255 is not an
inadequate or ineffective remedy for Petitioner’ challenges.
Correspondingly, the Court will dismiss the Petition for lack of
Section 2241 jurisdiction.

An appropriate Order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

Dated: October 10, 2013

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