SMART v. COUNTY OF BURLINGTON et al

Filing 59

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/28/17. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. No. 58)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
Salahuddin F. SMART,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil No. 13-354 (RBK/JS)
:
v.
:
Opinion
:
BOARD OF CHOSEN
:
FREEHOLDERS OF
:
COUNTY OF BURLINGTON, et al.,
:
:
Defendant(s). :
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Salahuddin F. Smart is proceeding pro se on claims under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution against Defendants Board of Chosen Freeholders
of County of Burlington, Burlington County Department of Corrections, Captain McDowell,
John Doe Officer, and John Doe Warden. Currently before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was an inmate at Burlington County Detention Center (“BCDC”). See Compl. at

2. Sometime around June 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to Burlington County Work Release
Center (“BCWRC”). Id. Upon transfer, Plaintiff was subject to a strip search that included a
visual body cavity examination of his anal and genital areas. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges this search
violated the Fourth Amendment, because BCDC had already conducted a strip search of

1

Plaintiff, held him in segregation, knew his contacts with persons outside the institution, and
limited his contact to other detainees. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff brought a Complaint on January 18, 2013 asserting violations of the Fourth
Amendment and N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:31-8.5(b) (Doc. No. 1). The Court dismissed the
Complaint for failure to state a claim on January 24, 2013 and permitted Plaintiff an opportunity
to file an amended complaint (Doc. Nos. 2, 3). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on
May 15, 2014 alleging only a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Doc. No. 22). The Court
allowed the Complaint to proceed past screening on April 7, 2015 (Doc. No. 28), and Defendants
brought the present Motion to Dismiss on December 14, 2016 (Doc. No. 58).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss an action for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). A complaint survives a
motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). It
is not for courts to decide at this point whether the non-moving party will succeed on the merits,
but “whether they should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of their
claims.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). While
“detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

2

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations
omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
III.

DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons

. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Reasonableness
“requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
that the search entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). In Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, the Supreme Court held that an institution’s policy
of subjecting every incoming detainee who would enter into the general population to a strip
search, regardless of whether there was reasonable suspicion that the detainee may be in
possession of contraband, drugs, or weapons, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 566 U.S.
318, 339 (2012). Emphasizing the serious health and safety concerns that inmates and officers
face in potentially allowing contraband or undetected disease into prisons, the Court found that
the policies at issue were constitutional because they were necessary to meet the needs of the
institution. Id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). Furthermore, “courts must defer to the judgment of
correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.” Id. at 322–23. Applying
Florence, the Third Circuit has since held a search policy to be unconstitutional where inmates
were required to submit their anal and genital regions to visual inspection three times a day,
regardless of whether they had been contact with others. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 327
(3d Cir. 2016). Unlike in Bell, the court reasoned, there was not even a low probability an inmate
would obtain contraband; it was “virtually impossible.” Id. at 328.

3

Plaintiff here advances several theories for why the strip and visual body cavity search
conducted prior to his admittance to BCWRC was unconstitutional. He first notes that he was
placed in segregation in BCDC with no substantial contact with other inmates and thus had no
opportunity to access contraband prior to his arrival at BCWRC. As the Third Circuit points out,
however, inmates can fashion dangerous contraband while in locked cells or smuggle in
contraband following contact with others, including personnel like nurses. See id. at 327–28.
Plaintiff pleads no facts suggesting that these probabilities were “vanishingly small” as the court
had found in Parkell. Id. at 328. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to show the BCWRC’s search policy
constituted an “unnecessary or unjustified response” to ensuring security, Florence, 566 U.S. at
322–23, and the Court must defer to the correctional officers’ expertise.
Plaintiff also notes that BCWRC had full access to his criminal history record and lacked
reasonable suspicion to believe he may have contraband. The Supreme Court has categorically
rejected the proposition that corrections officers need individualized suspicion in order to
conduct a strip search and previously found that “the seriousness of an offense is a poor predictor
of who has contraband.” See id. at 334. Thus, these theories do not render Plaintiff’s claim
plausible and it is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for
failure to train or supervise because of the failure to properly plead a constitutional violation.
However, because Plaintiff is pro se and could conceivably amend the Complaint to plead facts
sufficient to make out a claim for relief, the Court will permit Plaintiff one last opportunity to
amend.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED

4

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated:

6/28/2017

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United State District Judge

5