PAULSBORO DERAILMENT CASES

Filing 1214

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 7/18/16. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. No. 10)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
IN RE: PAULSBORO DERAILMENT
:
Master Docket No. 13–0784 (RBK/KMW)
CASES
:
:
ACE PALLET CORPORATION, et al.,
:
Civil No. 16–1614
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
OPINION
v.
:
:
CONSOLIDATED RAIL
:
CORPORATION, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Ace Pallet Corporation, Chester McIntyre, Doreen McIntyre, Cynthia Unger, and Dean
Unger (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against Consolidated Rail Corporation, Norfolk
Southern Railway Company, and CSX Transportation Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), seeking
damages arising out of the November 30, 2012 train derailment in Paulsboro, New Jersey.
Defendants move to partially dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, arguing that this Court should
dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims for strict liability and recklessness and strike Plaintiffs’
request for attorneys’ fees. For the reasons expressed below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The basic facts of this case have been set forth in numerous Opinions issued by the Court.

Plaintiff Ace Pallet Corporation is an entity located in Paulsboro, New Jersey on November 30,
2012. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs Chester McIntyre, Doreen McIntyre, Cynthia Unger, and Dean

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Unger held a financial interest in Ace Pallet Corporation and the property upon which it was
located as of November 30, 2012. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Plaintiffs allege that the November 30, 2012 train
derailment in Paulsboro, New Jersey caused Plaintiffs damages “including but not limited to the
loss of value of the business and diminishment in value of the land.” Id. ¶ 10.
On December 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Gloucester County, Law Division. Notice of Removal ¶ 1 (Doc. No. 1). Defendants were
served with Plaintiffs’ Complaint on March 21, 2016. Id. ¶ 2. Defendants removed the case to
this Court on March 23, 2016. Id. at 6. Defendants then filed this Motion to Partially Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint on April 11, 2016 (Doc. No. 10). Plaintiffs opposed the Motion on May 2,
2016 (Doc. No. 12), and Defendants filed their Reply Brief on May 9, 2015 (Doc. No. 13).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss an action for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a
complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). It is not for courts to decide at this point whether the non-moving party will
succeed on the merits, but “whether they should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in
support of their claims.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002).

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In making this determination, a three-part analysis is needed. Santiago v. Warminster
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitled for relief. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This plausibility determination
is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer
that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

STRICT LIABILITY

Defendants move to dismiss Count II of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which alleges that
Defendants are strictly liable for the damages arising out of the derailment. See Defs.’ Mot. at 3–
6 (citing Compl. at Count II). This Court previously held that Defendants, as common carriers,
are exempted from strict liability because New Jersey would adopt § 521 of the Second
Restatement of Torts. See October 4, 2013 Op. and Order at 6–9 (Civ. No. 13–0784, Doc. Nos.
165–66). That decision is dispositive to resolving Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim here, as
Plaintiffs’ acknowledge. See Pls.’ Opp’n Br. at 2. Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ strict
liability claims is therefore GRANTED.

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B.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under New
Jersey Law. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7. New Jersey law “disfavors the shifting of attorneys’ fees.”
Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009). A prevailing party can recover
attorneys’ fees only “if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract.” Id.
(quoting Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001)). Plaintiffs “do not
contest [D]efendants’ articulation of the law governing this issue.” Pls.’ Opp’n Br. at 2. As
Plaintiffs have not identified any statute, court rule, or contract that provides for attorneys’ fees
in this case, see generally Compl., Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’
fees is GRANTED.
C.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Defendants also move to dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which alleges that
Defendants were reckless and are liable to Plaintiffs for punitive damages. Defs.’ Mot. at 6–7.
Plaintiffs argue that Count III states a claim under the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act,
N.J.S.A. 2A:15–5.12. See Pls.’ Opp’n Br. at 2–4. But New Jersey law does not provide an
independent cause of action for punitive damages. See, e.g., California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle
Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 465, 474 (D.N.J. 1986). Punitive damages are instead “a remedy
incidental to cause of action, not a substantive cause of action in and of themselves.” See, e.g.,
Hassoun v. Cimmino, 126 F. Supp. 2d 353, 372 (D.N.J. 2000). Defendants’ Motion as to
Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims is therefore GRANTED.
IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND
“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant

moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set

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period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). It would be futile for Plaintiffs to amend Count II, as
this Court decides as a matter of law that Defendants, as common carriers, are exempt from strict
liability. It would similarly be futile for Plaintiffs to amend their request for attorneys’ fees. As
such, Count II of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Plaintiffs’
request for attorneys’ fees is STRICKEN WITH PREJUDICE.
Although Count III does not properly state a cause of action, it is possible for Plaintiffs to
allege facts supporting punitive damages incidental to their negligence cause of action. This
Court passes no judgment on the substantive merits of such allegations, but holds only that, at
this procedural posture, Plaintiffs have the right to amend their Complaint to properly request
punitive damages. Count III of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is therefore DISMISSED, but without
prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to move to amend Count I to properly request punitive damages.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. Count II of

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’
fees is STRICKEN WITH PREJUDICE. Count III of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED,
but Plaintiffs may move to amend Count I to request punitive damages.

Dated: 07/18/2016

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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