ROCHE et al v. AETNA, INC. et al
Filing
178
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/11/2017. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAY MINERLEY, individually
and as class representative,
1:13-cv-1377 (NLH/KMW)
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
AETNA, INC., AETNA HEALTH,
INC., AETNA HEALTH INSURANCE
CO., AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
CO., and THE RAWLINGS
COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH ARMSTRONG
MATTHEW D’ANNUNZIO
DON P. FOSTER
OFFIT KURMAN P.A.
1801 MARKET STREET, SUITE 2300
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
On behalf of Plaintiff
CHARLES KANNEBECKER
LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES KANNEBECKER
104 W. HIGH STREET
MILFORD, PA 18337
On behalf of Plaintiff
RICHARD W. COHEN (ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE)
GERALD LAWRENCE (ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE)
URIEL RABINOVITZ
LOWEY DANNENBERG COHEN & HART, P.C.
ONE NORTH BROADWAY, SUITE 509
WHITE PLAINS, NY 10601-2310
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff moves for leave to file a late jury demand.
Having already determined that Plaintiff waived a jury trial,
the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request to order a jury trial
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b).
Instead, the Court
will have an advisory jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 39(c).
I.
The Court takes the following facts from its May 5, 2017
Opinion.
Plaintiff filed his original putative class action
complaint in New Jersey state court on January 25, 2013.
The
state court complaint undisputedly contained a jury demand.
The
state court complaint asserted thirty-three counts, all
asserting state law causes of action.
On March 7, 2013, Defendants removed the case to federal
court, asserting federal question jurisdiction on the basis of
ERISA complete preemption, as well as diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Plaintiff moved to remand.
Prior to the Court’s ruling,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, mooting the asserted basis
for the motion to remand.
motion.
Consequently, Plaintiff withdrew the
The first amended complaint was substantially similar
to the original complaint, also asserting thirty-three state law
claims and containing a jury demand.
2
Defendants moved for summary judgment.
This Court granted
the motion in part, finding all of Plaintiff’s claims were
completely preempted by ERISA.
Plaintiff was then granted leave
to amend the complaint to state a claim under ERISA.
This
prompted the filing of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint,
asserting six counts under ERISA and containing no jury demand.
Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Jury Demand.
In an
April 11, 2017 Order, this Court determined Defendants’ Motion
to Strike Jury Demand was moot and thus denied the motion, as
“neither the Second Amended Complaint, nor Defendants’ Answer
thereto, contain[ed] a jury demand.”
The Court’s May 5, 2017
decision denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
considered Plaintiff’s argument that the Court committed legal
error in that Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed in state
court, contained a jury demand.
The Court found this of no
consequence and denied the motion. 1
On May 10, 2017, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a late
jury demand.
1
The Court will not reconsider the waiver issue here. As
stated at the June 26, 2017 hearing: “I’m not retreating on my
rulings as it relates to the waiver . . . .” Plaintiff’s
counsel further stated: “We’re not asking you to reconsider or
change any prior ruling. Your prior ruling was based on the
concept of waiver. We accept that.”
3
II.
Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to permit a jury trial
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b).
“Rule 39(b)
governs when a proper jury demand under Rule 38 has not been
made.”
Microbilt Corp. v. Fidelity Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc.,
No. 14-03284, 2014 WL 6804465, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2014).
It
provides: “Issues on which a jury trial is not properly demanded
are to be tried by the court.
But the court may, on motion,
order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been
demanded.”
Under this rule, “a district court may still grant a
jury trial, even where the demand was untimely made.”
U.S. SEC
v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).
In considering whether to grant an untimely jury demand,
courts consider the following factors:
1) whether the issues are suitable for a jury; 2) whether
granting the motion would disrupt the schedule of the
Court or the adverse party; 3) whether any prejudice
would result to the adverse party; 4) how long the party
delayed in bringing the motion; and 5) the reasons for
the failure to file a timely demand.
Id. at 196.
“The decision whether to grant a Rule 39(b) motion
for jury trial rests with the sound discretion of the trial
court.”
Scharf v. Blackstone Grp. L.P., No. 13-4089, 2015 WL
1975439, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2015).
The Court finds the first factor – whether the issues are
suitable for a jury – dispositive here.
4
Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint brings six counts.
These consist of two
counts for violation of ERISA pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and four counts for breach of
fiduciary duty pursuant to section 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A), and section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that “[a] civil action may be
brought . . . by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan.”
Section 502(a)(3)
provides for a civil action
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
title or the terms of the plan.
The Third Circuit has addressed section 502(a)(1)(B) and
section 502(a)(3) and has found they do not entitle an employee
to a jury trial.
“[E]mployees who sue[] under ERISA to receive
benefits under an applicable plan [are] not entitled to a jury
trial under section 502(a)(1)(B).”
Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co.,
894 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 1990); accord Pane v. RCA Corp., 868
F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]e held that the section
502(a)(1)(B) cause of action for the recovery of benefits was
equitable in nature.
In so holding, we joined other courts of
5
appeals which had previously rejected the claim that in a suit
for the recovery of benefits under an ERISA employee benefit
plan a litigant was entitled to a jury trial.”).
“[A] section
502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits [i]s equitable in nature,
and . . . hence [a] plaintiff [i]s not entitled to a jury
trial.”
Cox, 894 F.2d at 650.
“A close examination of the language of subsection
[503](a)(3) reveals that it is meant to provide only equitable
relief and as such Congress can be said to have intended that
there be no right to a jury trial under subsection (a)(3).”
Cox
v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1988); accord
Pane, 868 F.2d at 636 (“Those causes of action authorized by
section 502(a)(3) are by its terms explicitly equitable, and we
have held that there is no right to a jury trial for them.”).
This Court follows that precedent.
The Court further finds
section 404(a)(1)(A) does not provide an entitlement to a jury
trial, as Plaintiff claims relief through section 502(a)(3). 2
In
In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, No. 91-3067, 1995 WL 29048
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
2
Section 404(a)(1)(A) provides that “a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the
exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and . . . defraying reasonable expenses
of administering the plan.”
6
74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996), 3 the plaintiffs brought three claims
against the defendants: the first claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, the second for breach of duty to make adequate
disclosures, and the third claim under 301 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
Id. at *1.
The court
found that, for “Counts I and II of the complaint, the ERISA
counts, a jury trial is not available because the relief sought
is equitable only.”
Id. at *5; accord Senn v. United Dominion
Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
“injunctive relief [is provided for] pursuant to Sections
404(a)(1), 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) of ERISA”); Bauer-Ramazani
v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am.-Coll. Retirement &
Equities Fund, No. 09-190, 2013 WL 6189802, at *10 (D. Vt. Nov.
27, 2013) (“ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims are equitable
in nature . . . .”). 4
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Great-West Life
& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) is
controlling here.
Plaintiff quotes the following passage from
Knudson in his brief:
3
“The plaintiffs did not appeal the court’s . . . decision
to strike the jury trial demand on Counts I and II.” Meinhardt
v. Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig.), 74 F.3d 420,
432 n.8 (3d Cir. 1996).
4
The Court notes that the counts in Unisys fell under
section 404(c) and section 404(a)(1)(B), not section
404(a)(1)(A).
7
Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose
personal liability on respondents for a contractual
obligation to pay money – relief that was not typically
available in equity. “A claim for money due and owing
under a contract is ‘quintessentially an action at
law.’” “Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether
by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the
defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are
suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has
traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than
compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s
breach of legal duty.”
And “money damages are, of
course, the classic form of legal relief.”
Id. at 210 (citations omitted) (first quoting Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401
(7th Cir. 2000); then quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 918-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); and then quoting
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993)).
“Knudson was not a case about the right to a jury trial;
the Supreme Court did not address this issue.”
Canestri v.
NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund & Plan, No. 07-1603, 2009 WL 3698111,
at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2009).
In Canestri, the plaintiff’s
“claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) s[ought] the payment of benefits,
money, she claims [wa]s owed to her.”
Id.
The plaintiff argued
“Pane appear[ed] to base its holding on a finding that the
relief she s[ought was] equitable in nature and that Knudson
states that claims for money damages are not equitable, but
instead are legal, triggering a right to a jury trial.”
*2.
Id. at
The court found “Knudson was not analyzing a right to a
jury trial or even a claim for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B); it
8
was analyzing whether a claim was appropriate under
§ 502(a)(3).”
Id.
Further, “Third Circuit district courts
continue to apply Pane and its predecessors post-Knudson.”
Id.
Accordingly, the Court does not find this case suitable for
a jury trial.
Further, even where a case “may be tried before a
jury,” this does not necessarily mean “the circumstances of
th[e] case are ‘particularly suited to a jury.’”
See Ballas v.
City of Reading, No. 00-2943, 2001 WL 683805, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
June 15, 2011) (quoting Infinity Group, 212 F.3d at 196).
The
Court, in its discretion, denies Plaintiff’s motion and will not
order a jury trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
39(b).
III.
Having denied Plaintiff’s request to order a jury trial
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b), the Court
finds this is an appropriate case for an advisory jury pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c).
“Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 39(c) governs requests for jury trials in cases
in which the parties do not have a jury trial as of
right . . . .”
Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, 865 F.2d
49, 52 (3d Cir. 1988).
Rule 39(c) provides: “In an action not
triable of right by a jury, the court, on motion or on its own:
(1) may try any issue with an advisory jury . . . .”
9
“District courts are free to use advisory juries, even
absent the parties’ consent.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 249 (3d Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, pursuant to its
discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), this
Court will order an advisory jury in this matter.
The Court
finds this the most appropriate way to respect Plaintiff’s
request while abiding by Third Circuit precedent.
At this
juncture, the scope of the issues to be considered by the
advisory jury cannot yet be defined.
As trial approaches,
counsel and the Court will draft special interrogatories on
factual points relevant to the Court’s ruling for consideration
by the advisory jury.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date: December 11, 2017
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?