RAMIREZ v. CITY OF CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/17/2015. (tf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALICE M. RAMIREZ,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No.
13-1502 (JBS/KMW)

CITY OF CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY,
CHIEF OF POLICE J. SCOTT
THOMSON, POLICE OFFICER M. M.
MATHEWS, POLICE OFFICER JAMES
MELTON, CAMDEN POLICE OFFICERS
JOHN DOE 1-6,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants,

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this case, Defendants City of Camden, Chief of Police J.
Scott Thomson, Police Officer M.M. Mathews, Police Officer James
Melton, and Camden Police Officers John Doe 1-6 (hereinafter,
“Defendants”), move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order,
entered March 26, 2015 [Docket Item 24], denying Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow,
Defendants’ motion will be denied. The Court finds as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Alice Ramirez filed the initial Complaint in

this action on March 12, 2013, alleging that Defendants Mathews
and Melton violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
when they made a warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home in an
attempt to arrest her son, Raymond. [Docket Item 1.] Defendants
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts,
1 

arguing that the warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because it was made in the course of a “hot pursuit.”1
Specifically, Defendants argued (1) the testimony of Officer
Melton and Officer Mathews combined with the police report
showed that the officers were in “hot pursuit” of Plaintiff’s
son, Raymond Ramirez; and (2) the officers were protected by
qualified immunity. (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket Item 19] at
9-10, 12.) This Court denied summary judgment, concluding that
there was a genuine dispute of material fact on the present
record whether Raymond was being pursued by the police before
the officers entered, and that Defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity. See (Op. Denying Summ. J. (“Op.”) [Docket
Item 23] at 10-11.)
2.

Defendants now move for reconsideration of the denial

of summary judgment. They contend that the Court incorrectly
applied the standard under the Fourth Amendment when denying
Defendants’ motion. (Defs. Mot. for Recons. (“Defs. Br.”)
[Docket Item 27] at 2-3.) They also assert that the evidence

1

As will be discussed below, one well-recognized exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies when police
officers enter a premise in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect.
See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); Kentucky
v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011). When officers attempt to
make a warrantless arrest in a public place but the suspect
flees into a dwelling, the officers do not need a warrant to
pursue the suspect and carry out the arrest. United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).
2 

when viewed as a whole did not contain any genuine dispute of
fact over whether the officers entered Plaintiff’s house in “hot
pursuit.” Id. Plaintiff, in turn, submits that Defendants’
motion lacks merit because they “merely disagree with the
Court’s ruling.” (Pl. Opp’n [Docket Item 30] at 2.)
3.

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides that a party moving

for reconsideration must set forth “concisely the matter or
controlling decisions which the party believes” the Court
“overlooked” in its prior decision. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). “As such,
a party seeking reconsideration must satisfy a high burden, and
must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not
available previously; or (3) the need to correct a clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Cafe ex
rel. Lou–Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999); N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218
(3d Cir. 1995)).
4.

A motion for reconsideration, however, constitutes an

extremely limited procedural vehicle, and does “not provide the
parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple,”
Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J. 1998),
nor “may [it] be used to relitigate old matters, [or] to raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.” Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
3 

Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §
2810.1. Mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to
show that the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling
law, United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339,
345 (D.N.J. 1999), and should be dealt with through the normal
appellate process. S.C. ex rel. C.C. v. Deptford Twp Bd. of
Educ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 368, 381 (D.N.J. 2003). Therefore, in
order for reconsideration to be warranted, the party seeking
reconsideration must specifically rely upon one of the
qualifying bases, see L. Civ. R. 7.1(i), and not merely a
recapitulation of prior cases and arguments, nor an expression
of disagreement with the Court's earlier decision. See Arista
Records, Inc. v. Flea World, 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (D.N.J.
2005).
5.

Although Defendants’ brief is less than clear,

Defendants do not appear to argue that there was “an intervening
change in controlling law” or the presence of new, previously
unavailable, evidence. Instead, Defendants contend that
reconsideration is warranted in order to correct a clear error
of law, because the Court did not analyze whether the officers’
actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
(See Defs. Br. at 2). Likewise, Defendants contend that the
Court failed to use the “reasonable objective police officer”

4 

standard in its discussion of qualified immunity. (Id.) The
Court finds no merit with either argument.
6.

The Court applied the correct Fourth Amendment

standard in reviewing Defendants’ summary judgment motion, and
Defendants have not demonstrated that reconsideration is
warranted based on a clear error of law. Defendants cite no
cases in support of their argument that “[t]he standard to be
applied . . . is what an objective police officer would do under
these circumstances.” (Id.) However, the Court recites the wellestablished Fourth Amendment standard here for the sake of
completeness.
7.

It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980). Thus, warrants are generally required to search a
person’s home “unless the exigencies of the situation make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978). An action is
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the
individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’”
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
5 

8.

The Court stated the correct Fourth Amendment standard

in its opinion. Citing to Brigham, it stated that warrantless
searches and seizures were presumptively unreasonable, but that
warrantless entries were reasonable under certain circumstances,
such as when officers are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,
where “there is compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant.” (Op. at 8-9) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).
9.

The Court was also correct in analyzing Plaintiff’s

claim under the legal standard applicable on a motion for
summary judgment. Defendants argued that the evidence on the
record showed that Officers Melton and Mathew entered
Plaintiff’s home in pursuit of Raymond Ramirez and thus their
warrantless entry was objectively reasonable. The Court
disagreed, noting that at summary judgment, the evidence must be
viewed in light most favorable to the plaintiff, and that
summary judgment must be denied if, on the evidence presented,
there is a material factual dispute and a reasonable jury could
find in the plaintiff’s favor. After examining the evidence,
including the deposition testimony of Plaintiff and two other
witnesses, which contradicted the officers’ accounts, the Court
held that a reasonable jury could find that Officers Melton and
Mathews did not pursue Raymond to Plaintiff’s home when they
entered. (Op. at 10.) The Court took particular note of the fact
6 

that Plaintiff and two other witnesses inside the house, Marisol
Babilonia and Maria Vargas, all testified, in sum and substance,
that Raymond had been inside the house all afternoon and none of
them saw him leave. (Id. at 5-6.) Thus, if those statements are
believed, a reasonable fact finder could conclude there was no
“hot pursuit” at all.
10.

Citing a string of cases, the Court correctly

explained that while officers may enter a home while pursuing a
suspect without stopping to announce their intentions, a
warrantless entry not preceded by an immediate or continuous
pursuit falls outside the “hot pursuit” exception and is not
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (See Op. at
10-11) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984);
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, n.3 (1976); Hazleton
v. Trinidad, 488 Fed. App'x 349, 352 (11th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Dawkins, 17 F.3d 399, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus,
contrary to Defendants’ contention, the Court specifically
concluded that a rational jury could find on the evidence that
Defendants Melton and Mathews violated Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights because under the case law, if they were in the
act of hot pursuit of Raymond, their actions were not
objectively reasonable. Defendants take no issue with any of the

7 

cases cited by the Court, and the Court finds no error of law in
the Fourth Amendment analysis that would require reversal.
11.

Defendants’ second argument, that the Court did not

apply the “reasonable objective police officer standard” in its
discussion of qualified immunity, is also incorrect. (See Defs.
Br. at 2.)) The Court correctly stated that qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability as long as their
conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” (Op. at 12) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982) and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253
(3d Cir. 2010)). The Court also correctly recited the two-prong
qualified immunity test: whether a constitutional violation
occurred, and whether “reasonable officials could fairly have
known that their alleged conduct was illegal.” (Op. at 12)
(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001) and Larsen v.
Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa, 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir.
1998)).
12.

Whether reasonable officials could have known that

their conduct was illegal requires a court to examine case law
prior to the time Defendants acted to determine whether it was
“clearly established” at the time that Defendants’ actions were
illegal. (See Op. at 13); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088,
2093 (2012). The Court thus specifically examined and cited to
8 

case law from the Third Circuit and this district before
concluding that it was clearly established at the time of the
incident that a warrantless home entry was unlawful unless
exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit were present, and that
“[a]ny reasonable official would []have known [that] invading a
home in order to carry out an arrest for a petty offense . . .
in the absence of any exigent circumstance, was unlawful.” (Op.
at 14-16) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990);
United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006);
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006); Davis v. Twp.
of Paulsboro, 421 F. Supp. 2d 835, 850-51 (D.N.J. 2006)).
Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
Court concluded that qualified immunity was not warranted
because under the circumstances claimed by Plaintiff2, a
reasonable police officer could not “have believed that this was
a case of hot pursuit excusing the requirement of a warrant.”
(Op. at 16.) The opinion specifically addressed the qualified
immunity question of whether a reasonable official “could fairly
have known” that his entry under the circumstances was illegal.
The Court finds no clear error in either the legal standard used
or its application.

2

 Again, upon this summary judgment motion, the Court was obliged to credit the
designated facts in the version most favorable to the Plaintiff, namely, that
the person who was the alleged object of the police search was in fact the
Ramirez residence the entire afternoon and that he never left.

9 

13.

To the extent Defendants contend that the Court

incorrectly denied summary judgment because there was a factual
dispute, that argument must firmly be rejected. Defendants state
that “[t]he application of the ‘factual dispute’ standard . . .
is inappropriate” and a factual dispute is “not dispositive” of
whether qualified immunity applies, because “[t]he standard for
determining qualified immunity is the ‘reasonable objective
police officer standard.’” (Def. Br. at 2-3.) Defendants’
argument is far from clear, but they appear to contend that the
standard for summary judgment – whether a genuine dispute of
material factual exists on the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff – is inapplicable to the qualified
immunity inquiry. They also appear to suggest, indirectly, that
Plaintiff is not entitled to favorable factual inferences,
because the evidence must be viewed from the perspective of an
“objective police officer,” arguing that “despite the claimed
factual differences, the overall circumstances viewed by an
objective reasonable police officer demonstrate actions which
fall under the protection of qualified immunity.” (Def. Br. at
4.) Defendants’ position is unsupported and plainly contradicted
by the case law.
14.

It is well-settled that courts are required at the

summary judgment stage to view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
10 

summary judgment motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “In
qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting . . . the
plaintiff's version of the facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 378 (2007). When the defense of qualified immunity is
raised at the summary judgment stage, the inquiry is the
following: Taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show that the
officer’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional
right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Third Circuit has
specifically stated that although the question of qualified
immunity is generally a question of law, “a genuine issue of
material fact will preclude summary judgment on qualified
immunity.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009);
see also Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that “a decision on qualified immunity will be premature
when there are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant
to the immunity analysis.”). Thus, the court must deny summary
judgment if on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, defendants
violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional
rights. Giles, 571 F.3d at 327.
15.

The Court’s opinion explicitly addressed whether

qualified immunity was warranted when the facts were “viewed in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.” (Op. at 12.)
11 

Applying that standard, the Court first held that on Plaintiff’s
version of the facts, see Scott, 550 U.S. at 378, a reasonable
jury could find that the warrantless entry did not fall within
the “hot pursuit” exception. (Op. at 13) (“[T]here is sufficient
evidence in the testimony of Plaintiff, Babilonia, and Vargas
from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’
forcible entry was not based upon a hot pursuit.”) The Court
then examined the existing case law and determined that a
reasonable official would have known at the time that such
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. (Op. at 13-14.)
16.

Defendants also attempt to argue that the Court erred

in not giving more credit to the official police reports
describing the incident. (See Def. Br. at 2-3.) They contend,
for example, that the Court was wrong to draw a negative
inference from the inconsistencies in the narrative given in the
police Incident Report and the police Arrest Report, because
officers are not required to include every detail in every
report, and multiple reports must be read together in order to
form a fully informed opinion. (See Defs. Br. at 3.) As already
discussed, supra, “[a] motion for reconsideration is improper
when it is used solely to ask the court to rethink what it has
already thought through rightly or wrongly.” Christiansen v.
Camden Cnty., Civ. No. 07-2749, 2007 WL 4440387, at *1 (D.N.J.
Dec 18, 2007). A party seeking reconsideration “must show more
12 

than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and
‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the
court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the
moving party’s burden.’” G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275
(D.N.J. 1990) (quoting Carteret Savings Bank, F.A. v. Shushan,
721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)). As Defendants’ argument
amounts to nothing more than an attempt to relitigate its
summary judgment motion on the same facts, it is not a proper
basis for reconsideration. Further, there is no support for the
notion that even perfectly consistent police reports would cause
the court, at the summary judgment stage, to disregard competent
eyewitness testimony to the contrary.
17.

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration will be denied. An accompanying order will be
entered.

July 17, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

13