TUCKER v. SHARTLE

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/18/13. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________________
:
EDWARD TUCKER,
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
WARDEN J.T. SHARTLE,
:
:
Respondent.
:
_______________________________________:

Civil Action No. 13-1590 (RMB)

OPINION

This matter comes before this Court upon Petitioner’s submission of his filing fee. See
Docket Entry dated April 15, 2013. The Court, therefore, will direct the Clerk to reopen this
matter. In addition, for the reasons detailed below, the Court will: (a) dismiss Petitioner’s habeas
challenges with prejudice, for failure to assert a violation of his rights; and (b) dismiss his nonhabeas challenges for lack of habeas jurisdiction.
I.

Background
Petitioner, a federal inmate confined at the FCI Fairton, Fairton, New Jersey, filed a

Section 2241 petition challenging disciplinary sanctions imposed upon him. See, generally,
Docket Entry No. 1. Petitioner concedes that he was using marihuana; such usage was
determined by his prison officials after his urinary test was taken. See id. at 8 and 23. He was
sanctioned to a certain period of disciplinary segregation, a certain monetary penalty, suspension
of commissary privileges, as well as temporary loss of email, telephone and visitation privileges
and, in addition, to forty days loss of good-conduct-time credits (“GCT”). See id. at 3.

He maintains that the discipline imposed was disproportionately severe, and the code
provision relied upon by his prison officials was unduly vague; he seeks relief in the form of
reimbursement of the monetary penalty, restoration of his commissary, visitation and analogous
privileges and “reinstate[ment of] other sanctions.” Id. at 3-4 and 9.
II.

Standard of Review
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements.” McFarland v.

Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A petition must “specify all the grounds for relief” and must set
forth “facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.” See Rule 2(c) of the Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases, applicable to § 2241 petitions through Rule 1(b). A court presented
with a petition for writ of habeas corpus “shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order
directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears
from the application that the applicant or person confined is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. §
2243. Thus, “[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that
appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; see also Lonchar v.
Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996); United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.

Scope of Habeas Jurisdiction
A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “fact or

duration” of his confinement, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973), including
challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the length of confinement, such as loss
of GCT. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004), Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641

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(1997).1 In contrast, a prisoner’s challenges to his conditions of confinement cannot be
entertained in a habeas matter, since these conditions do not affect the “fact or duration” of the
prisoner’s confinement. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002); accord Ganim v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 235 F. App’x. 882 (3d Cir. 2007); Castillo v. FBOP FCI Fort Dix,
221 F. App’x. 172 (3d Cir. 2007) (habeas is a proper vehicle to challenge disciplinary
proceeding resulting in loss of GCT, but claims regarding sanctioned loss of phone and visitation
privileges not cognizable in habeas). Since neither the monetary penalty imposed upon
Petitioner nor his loss of telephone, visitation, commissary, etc. privileges can affect the fact or
duration of his confinement, these challenges are subject to dismissal for lack of habeas
jurisdiction. Moreover, the thirty-day segregation period did not subject Petitioner to a
“quantum change” in the level of custody that could give rise to habeas jurisdiction. Accord
Ganim, 235 F. App’x. 882 (collecting cases). Therefore, all Petitioner’s challenges – other than
his GCT-related claim – will be dismissed without prejudice to raising them in a civil matter.2
Here, the sole issue properly raised is Petitioner’s challenge to his loss of the GCT credits.3

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The Court of Appeals also held that habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism to
challenge the execution of a prisoner’s sentence. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485-86
(3d Cir. 2001); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990). Analogously, where a
prisoner seeks a “quantum change” in the level of custody, for example, where a prisoner claims
to be entitled to probation or bond or parole, habeas is the appropriate form of action. See, e.g.,
Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2005).
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No statement made in this Opinion or accompanying Order shall be construed as
expressing this Court’s position as to validity or invalidity of such challenges.
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A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed liberally
and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v.
Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, the Court construes the
Petition as setting forth an implied challenge to petitioner’s loss of forty days of GCT.
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IV.

Challenges to Lost GCT
Here, Petitioner conceded that he used marihuana, and such usage was detected by his

prison officials upon taking his urinary test. See generally, Docket Entry No. 1. He was charged
with a violation of Code 112.4 See id. at 24. That provision prohibits “[u]se of any narcotics,
marijuana, drugs, alcohol, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia, not prescribed for the individual
by the medical staff.” See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. While Petitioner maintains that the provision is too
vague, the Court detects neither any ambiguity in the language that any use of non-medicallyprescribed marihuana is prohibited to prisoners nor any abuse of the BOP’s discretion in reading
the provision as barring all non-medically-prescribed controlled substances. Accord Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (directing deference to an
agency’s interpretation in the event a provision is ambiguous).
Pursuant to Table 1 of 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, a disciplinary officer is permitted to issue a
sanction in the form of “[f]orfeit[ure] and/or withhold[ing of] non-vested good conduct time (up
to 100%)” and to “[d]isallow ordinarily between 50% and 75% (27-41 days) of good conduct
time credit available for a year.” See id.; see also http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/541.3.
Here, Petitioner was sanctioned with the loss of 40 days of GCT, a disciplinary measure falling
within the allowed range of sanctions. Accord Wallace v. Ebbert, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23875
(3d Cir. Nov. 20, 2012) (affirming district court’s denial of a habeas petition filed by a prisoner

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The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has specific guidelines for inmate
disciplinary procedures, which are codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.10 et seq. Prohibited acts are
categorized according to the severity of the conduct. Code Level 100s are deemed the
“greatest,” and the Prohibited Acts Code and Disciplinary Severity Scale is detailed in 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.13 Tables 3-5.
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whose sanctions were enhanced, on the basis of more-than-two year-old offenses to loss of fiftyfour GCT credits). Therefore, the sanction of forty lost GCT credits did not violate his rights.
Correspondingly, he is not entitled to restoration of his lost GCT credits, and his habeas
challenges will be dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s habeas challenges will be dismissed with

prejudice for failure to assert a violation of his rights, while his non-habeas challenges will be
dismissed for lack of habeas jurisdiction without prejudice to raising these claims in a civil
matter.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 18, 2013

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