REEVES v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

Filing 6

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/21/14. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ARNOLD REEVES,
Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
Respondent.

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Civil No. 13-1795 (JBS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Arnold Reeves, Pro Se
38595-054
FCI Fort Dix
P.O. Box 2000
Fort Dix, NJ 08640
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
Arnold Reeves (“Petitioner”), an inmate incarcerated at FCI
Fort Dix in New Jersey, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Docket Item 1), and a supplemental
“exhibit” to the petition (Docket Item 3). For the following reasons,
this Court will dismiss the petition.

BACKGROUND
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1), as amended by the Second Chance
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, April 9, 2008 (“the Second Chance
Act”), “The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent
practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment
spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12
months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable
opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner
into the community. Such conditions may include a community
corrections facility.”
According to the petition, Petitioner received a 240-month
sentence after conviction in the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York for “various drug offenses.” His
projected release date is February of 2015. (Petition, Docket Item
1, p. 1).

Petitioner argued that he should be immediately considered

for a Residential Re-Entry Center (“RRC”) placement recommendation.
At the time he filed his petition, Petitioner was told that he would
be considered 17 to 19 months prior to his release date. (Pet., p.
1).
In his supplemental exhibit filed over a month after the
original petition, Petitioner stated that the Unit Team had
considered him for RRC placement and awarded him a six-month
placement (Docket Item 3, p. 1). In this exhibit, Petitioner asks
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for immediate release, arguing that the award of six-months was an
abuse of discretion and that his medical problems warrant his
immediate release. (Id. at pp. 1-2).1
Petitioner states that he completed the administrative remedy
process concerning his claims (Docket Item 3, p. 4).
DISCUSSION
A.

Jurisdiction
Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in

relevant part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless... He is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
“Section 2241 is the only statute that confers habeas
jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is
challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.”
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485–486 (3d Cir. 2001). This Court
has subject matter jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider the instant
petition because Petitioner was incarcerated in New Jersey when he
1

Petitioner also argues that his sentence should be reduced due to
participation in the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program
(“RDAP”) and that he should be awarded one year off his sentence,
plus six months RRC placement (Docket Item 3, p. 4). However, at the
time he filed his petition and supplement, Petitioner was on a wait
list for RDAP, and/or was unable to participate in RDAP because of
a disciplinary charge (Id.). As Petitioner did not complete the RDAP
program at the time he filed the petition, his argument is premature
and will not be considered by this Court.
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filed the petition, and he challenges the denial of early release
on federal grounds. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d
235, 241–44 (3d Cir. 2005); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–
79 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, if the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
incorrectly determined his eligibility for early release, this error
carries a potential for a miscarriage of justice that can be corrected
through habeas corpus. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495
(1986); Barden, 921 F.2d at 479.
B.

Standard of Review
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading

requirements.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). Habeas
Rule 2(c) requires a § 2254 petition to “specify all the grounds for
relief available to the petitioner,” “state the facts supporting each
ground,” “state the relief requested,” be printed, typewritten, or
legibly handwritten, and be signed under penalty of perjury. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c), applicable to § 2241 through Rule 1(b).
Habeas Rule 4 requires a judge to sua sponte dismiss a § 2254
petition without ordering a responsive pleading “[i]f it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 Rule 4, applicable to § 2241 through Rule 1(b). Thus,
“[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas

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petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland,
512 U.S. at 856.
Dismissal without the filing of an answer has been found
warranted when “it appears on the face of the petition that petitioner
is not entitled to [habeas] relief.” Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989); see also
McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430,
437 (3d Cir. 2000) (habeas petition may be dismissed where “none of
the grounds alleged in the petition would entitle [petitioner] to
[habeas] relief”); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005).
C.

The Petition Must Be Dismissed.
It is well-established that the Second Chance Act does not

guarantee a one-year RRC placement, but only directs the Bureau of
Prisons to consider placing an inmate in a RRC for up to the final
twelve months of his or her sentence. See Wilson v. Strada, 474 F.
App’x 46, 48-49 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2012); see also Travers v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 2009 WL 4508585 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2009) (Hillman,
J.) (finding that “... nothing in the Second Chance Act entitles
Petitioner to a halfway house placement longer than the 120–150 days
already approved. These pre-release placement decisions are
committed, by statute, to the discretion of the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons . . . .”).

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It is clear that Petitioner does not have a liberty interest
in a vested right to reduction of his sentence by means of his
placement in a RRC; the decision is statutorily reserved to be subject
to the BOP's discretion. Cf. Magnin v. Beeler, 110 F. Supp.2d 338,
340 n.2 (D.N.J. 2000). The statutory or ensuing regulatory enactments
merely created an entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause,
i.e., these provisions merely protect Petitioner's expectation to
be evaluated for such placement. Cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)
(addressing the right to parole consideration); see also Board of
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Prevard v. Fauver, 47 F.
Supp.2d 539, 545 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 202 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1999).
Correspondingly, Petitioner has no vested right in either being
evaluated for RRC placement on a certain date or in being placed in
a RRC on a certain date. Rather, he has a right to be evaluated,
generally, and to be placed in a RRC if the BOP concludes, upon due
evaluation, that Petitioner shall be so placed.
In this case, Petitioner was considered for RRC placement, and
pleads that he received an RRC placement of six months by his Unit
Team at FCI Fort Dix. Petitioner states in his exhibit that he has
“employment set up upon release” and “[a] place to stay.” (Docket
Item 3, p. 2). Although Petitioner argues that “[Bureau of Prisons’]
staff ‘cannot’ say that an inmate whatever the circumstance, is
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automatically ineligible for transfer to RRC as staff at BOP has told
me,” (Docket Item 3, p. 3), he admits that he received a six-month
RRC placement; thus, he was not considered “ineligible.”
As to Petitioner’s request for release on medical grounds, this
Court finds that Petitioner had an opportunity to present his medical
issues to the Unit Team prior to his consideration for RRC placement;
as such, any medical claims would have been considered in the Unit
Team’s recommendation.

Further, this Court notes that 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A)(i) provides that upon motion of the BOP Director with
the sentencing court and a showing of “extraordinary and compelling
reasons”, a federal prisoner may be granted a reduction of sentence.
Were the BOP to file a motion with the sentencing court for such a
reduction, the result would not necessarily impact the duration of
Petitioner's confinement. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under § 2241 to review or reverse a decision by the BOP
to refuse to file a motion. See Richmond v. Ebbert, 2014 WL 279741
at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2014)(citing Quaco v. Ebbert, 2012 WL 1598136
*2 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2012) and Morales v. United States, 353 F. Supp.2d
204, 205 (D. Mass. 2005)(denying Section 2241 petition for
compassionate release on jurisdictional grounds)).
Additionally, a district court lacks the authority to review
or reverse a decision by the BOP concerning compassionate release.
See id.; Crowe v. United States, 430 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011)
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(“the BOP's decision whether or not to file a motion for compassionate
release is judicially unreviewable.”).2
Petitioner has presented no reason to upset the findings of the
BOP. Although Petitioner disagreed with the BOP's decision, it is
clear from the pleadings and supplements that Petitioner was
statutorily considered for RRC placement and received such a
placement, and thus no constitutional violation occurred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is hereby
dismissed.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated: February 21, 2014

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If Petitioner believes that his constitutional rights are being
violated in that he is not receiving adequate medical care for his
ailments, his remedy is not founded in a § 2241 habeas petition, but
rather in a civil action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Petitioner
is of course free, after exhausting available administrative
remedies, to file a civil complaint making such a claim. This Court
cannot address these concerns in the present § 2241 petition.
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