DOBRON v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
60
MEMORANDUM OPINION dismissing w/ prejudice Pltf's claims. The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS MATTER. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 3/18/2014. (drw)N.M.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
LOIS DOBRON, individually and
on behalf of L.D., a minor,
M.D., a minor, and E.D., a
minor,
Civil Action No. 13-CV-02353
(RMB)
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION
OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,
KIMBERLY DINENBERG, CHRIS
CHRISTIE, PAT YOUNG, BRENDA
HINES, SONYA WAGNER, JOHN
DORAN, MERYL NADLER, MARILYN
GONZALEZ, PATRICIA WILD,
MICHELE WAKEFIELD, KATHERINE
BIERWAS, JOHN DOES 1-10, and
ABC CORPS. 1-5,
Defendant.
BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter is before the Court upon its own motion. On
April 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”)
against the Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”),
Kimberly Dinenberg (“Dinenberg”), Marilyn Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”),
and several fictitious parties, seeking to recover for conduct
arising out of an action brought against Plaintiff Lois Dobron
(the “Plaintiff”) for educational neglect. (Dkt. Ent. 1.) The
named defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
1
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) on grounds
that Plaintiff’s claims–to the extent they could be ascertained—
are barred by several doctrines of immunity, as well as the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1
On January 8, 2014, in an effort to give Plaintiff an
opportunity to explain her pleading in light of her pro se
status, this Court held oral argument on the defendants’ motion.
During that hearing, it became apparent that Plaintiff’s claim
centered on allegations not clearly set forth in the Complaint.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant Gonzalez made
certain intentional misrepresentations to the judge in the
underlying state family court proceeding and that Defendant
Dinenberg withheld certain evidence in that proceeding. (See
Dkt. Ent. 15.) Although the Court indicated its belief that
those claims were still subject to dismissal for the same
reasons articulated by the defendants’ motion, in an abundance
of caution the Court permitted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend
her complaint to set forth particularized allegations specific
to her claims as explained to the Court. In doing so, however,
the Court noted that the amended complaint could not attempt to
attack the decisions of the family court, which would raise
1
These defendants also moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)
based on defective service but later withdrew this argument once
they were properly served.
2
issues under Rooker-Feldman. The Court then dismissed the
defendants’ motion as moot and granted Plaintiff 30 days to file
an amended complaint. 2 (Dkt. Ent. 39.)
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint
(the “Amended Complaint”), adding several new parties and
asserting eight causes of action: fraud in the imposition of
improper restraint, fraud in acquiring improper restraint
affecting minor plaintiffs, abuse of process in denying
Plaintiff the right to advocate for her disabled son’s
education, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, malicious prosecution, and intentional administrative
indifference. (Dkt. Ent. 56.) The gestalt of the Amended
Complaint is that Plaintiff challenges the state family court’s
determination that Plaintiff educationally abused and neglected
her son, and its issuance of a restraining order pending
Plaintiff’s compliance with a court-ordered psychiatric
evaluation. 3 Based upon Plaintiff’s own submissions, she appears
2
Upon Plaintiff’s request, the Court subsequently granted
Plaintiff an additional 30 days to amend. (Dkt. Ent. 43.)
3
Plaintiff principally takes issue with the failure of
numerous individuals (e.g., the case worker, the attorney
representing DYFS) to provide the family court with medical
records for L.D., which Plaintiff contends demonstrate that L.D.
suffers from a severe medical condition. Plaintiff further
contends that the failure to provide these medical records
caused the family court to determine that Plaintiff’s view of
her son’s condition is merely “fantasy”. (See Tr. 17:21-18:6.)
However, she now alleges that she herself provided Judge Wild
3
to have appealed the family court decision, which was affirmed
by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. (See
Dkt. Ent. 12.)
The Amended Complaint asserts that this Court has federal
question subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims as
they concern Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
homeschool or otherwise raise her children as she sees fit. (Am.
Compl. at 1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff also makes the following
allegations, inter alia:
•
Defendants Dinenberg and Gonzalez “made up facts in an
effort to portray Plaintiff as an imminent risk to her
children,” including purported abuse such as “being
loud, vacuuming while [the children] were trying to
sleep, and ostensibly throwing shoes up at them” (Am.
Compl. at p. 3 ¶ 2, p. 4 ¶ 8);
•
Defendants Hinds, Young, Wakefield, Wagner, and
Dinenberg were given medical records documenting
L.D.’s severe asthma but Defendant Wagner represented
to the family court that L.D. did not have a medical
condition that prevented him from attending school
(id. at p. 5 ¶¶ 13-15);
•
“Defendants negligently investigated, and ignored the
medical reports pertaining to plaintiff [L.D.],
presented and or available to them, in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights” (id. at p. 10
¶ 2);
•
“Defendant’s prosecution of plaintiff was without
probable cause, and not well founded in law or fact”
(id. at p. 11 ¶ 2);
•
Plaintiff informed Defendant, Governor Chris Christie,
of the state workers’ alleged misconduct and “he
promised to ‘fix’ the effects” of the misconduct and
with those medical records prior to the family court decision.
(Am. Compl. at p. 14 ¶ 8, p. 15 ¶ 17.)
4
“advised he gave a ‘package’ to Glenn Grant’s office
from which Mr. Grant would take action” but Defendant
Meryl Nadler, counsel to Mr. Grant, denies any such
package was received (id. at p. 12 ¶¶ 5-6);
•
Defendant John Doran, who is Defendant Wagner’s
supervisor, “refused to do any investigation” into his
employee’s alleged misconduct (id. at p. 13 ¶ 7);
•
Defendant, the Honorable Patricia Wild, refused to
recuse herself although she represented a defendant in
an action in which Plaintiff had sued (id. at p. 13
¶¶ 3-4); and
•
Plaintiff provided Judge Wild with medical records
demonstrating L.D. had a medical condition but Judge
Wild ignored those records and entered several orders
with which Plaintiff disagrees and contends constitute
a misuse of Judge Wild’s authority (id. at pp. 13-16).
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees and
costs. 4 The Court has gone out of its way to provide Plaintiff
with an opportunity to cogently set forth a viable claim, but it
is now clear that she cannot. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte
dismisses Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See Huafeng Xu v.
Arpert, 2014 WL 200262, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2014) (“The Court
has the power to dismiss claims sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
(citing Bintliff–Ritchie v. Am. Reins. Co., 285 F. App’x 940,
930 (3d Cir. 2008); Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 621 F.2d
556, 559 (3d Cir. 1980))).
4
It is unclear on what basis Plaintiff seeks attorneys’
fees as she is proceeding in this action pro se.
5
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. “[A]n unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully harmed-me accusation” does not suffice to survive a
motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)). In reviewing a plaintiff’s allegations, the district
court “must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations as
well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,
and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 358 n.1 (3d Cir.
2012). Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
requires that a complaint contain:
(1) [A] short and plain statement of the grounds for
the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has
6
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;
(2) [A] short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) [A] demand for the relief sought, which may
include relief in the alternative or different types
of relief.
The Amended Complaint is dismissed for the following
reasons. 5
A. Defendants are Not “Persons” Under § 1983
As to Plaintiff’s claims against DYFS, and any Defendant
sued in his/her official capacity, these individuals are not
“persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g.,
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
(“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”); Delbridge v.
Schaeffer, 569 A.2d 872, 889 (1989) (“[N]either a state nor its
alter ego is a person for purposes of § 1983 regardless of
whether the action is brought in state or federal court.”). 6
Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed.
5
The Court also notes that certain immunity principles,
such as litigation or prosecutorial immunity, may also apply to
bar Plaintiff’s claims but the Court need not address these
principles in light of the numerous other reasons dictating
dismissal.
6
It is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint whether she is
suing the individual defendants in their official or individual
capacities. The Amended Complaint only specifically addresses
the nature of the claims against Defendant Dinenberg, who is
7
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In addition, the claims for money damages against DYFS, and
any Defendant sued in his/her official capacity are barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66
(noting that § 1983 “provides a federal forum to remedy many
deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a
federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State
for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh
Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its
immunity”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)
(reaffirming “that a suit in federal court by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public
funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment immunizes state agencies
from suit in federal court when the state is the real party in
interest. See, e.g., Pena v. Div. of Child & Fam. Servs., No.
08-1168, 2010 WL 3982321, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2010). Here,
because the state is the real party in interest, sovereign
immunity protects DYFS, a state agency. Id. Moreover,
“[s]overeign immunity extends to cover individual officials sued
in their official capacities because ‘a judgment against a
public servant ‘in his official capacity’ imposes liability’ on
explicitly sued “personally and in her official capacity.” (Am.
Compl. at p. 3, ¶ 1.)
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the state, which sovereign immunity was meant to prevent in the
first place.” Id.; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985);
Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
Hussein v. New Jersey, No. 09-1291, 2010 WL 376609, at *4
(D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2010) (“Immunity also extends to state agents,
like Governor Corzine, when the ‘action is in essence one for
the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,
substantial party in interest and is entitled to sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants.’”).
C. Rooker-Feldman
Plaintiff’s claims against the parties are also precluded
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine
deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction to review,
directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication.” Judge v.
Canada, 208 F. App’x 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)). This doctrine precludes
courts from evaluating “constitutional claims that are
inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decision in a
judicial proceeding.” FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common
Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations
omitted). “State and federal claims are inextricably intertwined
(1) when in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief
9
sought, the federal court must determine that the state court
judgment was erroneously entered [or] (2) when the federal court
must . . . take action that would render [the state court’s]
judgment ineffectual.” ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l, 366 F.3d
205, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “In other words, Rooker–Feldman precludes a federal
action if the relief requested in the federal action would
effectively reverse the state decision or void its ruling.”
FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 (quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater,
47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995)).
The Third Circuit has consistently affirmed district court
determinations that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits suits
brought in federal court pursuant to Section 1983 where, as
here, plaintiffs challenge the judgments of state family courts.
See, e.g., Gass v. DYFS Workers, 371 F. App'x 315, 315–16 (3d
Cir. 2010) (affirming district court dismissal under Rooker–
Feldman of claims asserted against state court judge, DYFS, DYFS
officials, deputy attorneys general, and public defender
attorney in underlying termination of parental rights action to
the extent plaintiff challenged family court orders regarding
custody of two minors); Johnson v. City of New York, 347 F.
App’x 850, 851–52 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court
determination that claims were prohibited by Rooker–Feldman to
the extent plaintiff sought review of family court decisions
10
regarding emergency removal of children from his home); McKnight
v. Baker, 244 F. App’x 442, 444–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming
district court finding that the court lacked jurisdiction under
Rooker–Feldman to review Section 1983 claims where crux of
plaintiff’s complaint was that defendants conspired to have the
family court suspend his visitation rights with his daughter);
McAllister v. Allegheny Cnty. Family Div., 128 F. App’x 901, 902
(3d Cir. 2005) (affirming district court dismissal of federal
constitutional claims where plaintiff “plainly [sought] to void
or overturn adverse rulings entered in the child-custody
litigation” by state family court because such relief required
“a finding that the state court ... made incorrect factual or
legal determinations”).
Similarly, courts within this District have repeatedly
recognized that they lack subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain claims which challenge adjudications made by state
family courts. See, e.g., Reed v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs., Civ. No. 09-3765, 2012 WL 1224418, *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 10,
2012) (collecting cases); Severino v. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs., Civ. No. 11–3767, 2011 WL 5526116, *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 14,
2011) (dismissing sua sponte pro se plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims against defendants, including DYFS, DYFS caseworker, New
Jersey State Court Judges, and a deputy attorney general, under
Rooker–Feldman which challenged state court proceeding
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terminating plaintiff’s parental rights); Wilson v. Atl. Cnty.
DYFS, Civ. No. 10–202, 2010 WL 2178926, at *5–6 (D.N.J. May 25,
2010) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint against local DYFS
agency and state court judge and finding that Rooker–Feldman
claims relating to the family court's issuance of a restraining
order which effectively barred plaintiff from seeing his son
because the claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the
restraining order and amounted to a “prohibited appeal” from the
family court adjudication); Kwiatkowski v. De Francesco, Civ.
No. 01–6145, 2006 WL 2347831, *4–5 (D.N.J. Aug.11, 2006)
(concluding that Rooker–Feldman barred constitutional claims
because they were “a direct result of the actions taken by DYFS
and the state courts” and were “so inextricably intertwined with
the state court proceedings that federal review [was] precluded
as it would be tantamount to appellate review of state court
determinations.”).
All of Plaintiff’s claims directly or indirectly challenge
the validity of the family court’s determination that Plaintiff
educationally abused and neglected her children and thus are
barred by Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., McKnight, 244 F. App’x at
444-45 (“Despite McKnight’s argument to the contrary, it is
abundantly clear that the crux of his complaint is that
Middleton and others conspired to have the Family Court suspend
his visitation rights and have subsequently acted in accordance
12
with that Family Court order. It is hard to imagine a case which
more directly asks a district court to review the actions of a
state court. In order for McKnight to prevail, the District
Court would need to conclude that the Family Court erred in its
suspension of McKnight's visitation rights, or that the various
defendants have violated his constitutional rights in adhering
to the dictates of that order. The District Court does not have
jurisdiction to so conclude.”) (emphasis added).
D. Judicial Immunity
In Count VIII, Plaintiff seeks money damages from Judge
Wild for various alleged acts of misconduct, including her
refusal to consider the medical records, her order instructing
Plaintiff to produce a psychiatric report, her entry of a
restraining order against Plaintiff, and her refusal to “put”
the restraining order in the “system.” (Am Compl. at pp. 13-16.)
This claim is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, which
which protects a judge performing her judicial functions from
suit for money damages, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10
(1991), or for injunctive relief except in limited circumstances
not satisfied here, Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d
Cir. 2006). Immunity is available even if a judge acts
erroneously, corruptly, or in excess of her jurisdiction.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 35154 (1871) (noting judges are not liable for judicial acts done
13
maliciously or corruptly); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 35557 (1978) (same). Moreover, “judicial immunity is not overcome
by allegations of bad faith or malice.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
Plaintiff’s complaints against Judge Wild amounts to a
disagreement with the orders and decisions rendered by her in
the state court action. The appropriate method for addressing
such a disagreement is to appeal the relevant decisions. Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (“Any errors made by a judge
may be corrected on appeal.”). Indeed, it appears from other
documentation submitted by Plaintiff that at least some of these
orders were appealed to the Appellate Division and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. (See Dkt. Ents. 12, 53 (indicating
intention to appeal to United States Supreme Court).) Thus, this
claim must be dismissed.
E. Failure to State a Claim
In addition to the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution and intentional administrative
indifference claims must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. To establish a claim for malicious prosecution pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment and § 1983, the complaint must allege
that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the
proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the
defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing
14
the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as
a consequence of a legal proceeding. Camiolo v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Estate
of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). 7 Here,
Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that “Defendant’s prosecution of
plaintiff was without cause,” but she has failed to identify a
criminal proceeding as required. Rather, the “prosecution” to
which she refers seems to be the DYFS “prosecution” of the
educational neglect complaint against Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Am
Compl. p. 9 ¶ 13 (“Defendants wrongfully prosecuted Plaintiff
Lois Dobron for ‘educational neglect’ of [L.D.] . . . .”).) Even
assuming she had satisfied the first element, she cannot
establish that any such proceedings terminated in her favor in
light of the decisions of both the family court and Appellate
Division. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.
Plaintiff also asserts a claim for “intentional
administrative indifference” against all Defendants except Judge
Wild and Defendant Bierwas for their refusal to supervise their
employees or prevent their wrongful misconduct. No such cause of
action exists and, therefore, this count must be dismissed.
7
Under New Jersey law, the tort of malicious prosecution
requires only the first four elements. See Lind v. Schmid, 337
A.2d 365, 368 (N.J. 1975).
15
Moreover, the Court finds that, as it has already provided
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint in an effort to
set forth a viable claim, and in light of the reasons set forth
above, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. See,
e.g., DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., No. 08-2753, 2009
WL 2989537, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2009) (“A third opportunity
to amend, allowing Plaintiff a fourth opportunity to file a
complaint in this action, is unlikely to remedy this.
Plaintiff’s three bites at the apple are sufficient.”); see also
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1487 (2013) (“In
a similar vein, if the court determines that plaintiff has had
multiple opportunities to state a claim but has failed to do so,
leave to amend may be denied.”); Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2008).
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY on this 18th day of March 2014,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this
matter.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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