THOMAS v. CHRISTY et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 13-2560. (bdk, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
__________________________
:
BENJAMIN J. THOMAS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
Civil Action No. 13-2560 (NLH)
v.
:
:
OPINION
S/O II CHRISTY et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________:
Plaintiff Benjamin J. Thomas (“Plaintiff”) submitted for
filing a civil complaint (“Complaint”), see Docket Entry No. 1,
and accompanied it with a complete in forma pauperis
application.1

See Docket Entry No. 1-1.

Plaintiff’s allegations

are limited to the following statement:
Officer Christy stopped my vehicle illegally and
threatened me with a weapon putting me in fear of [sic]
my life[,] causing me to flee[,] then taking me into
custody illegally. As a result[,] I am still
incarcerated[,] and my charact[er is] defamed[.]
Docket Entry No. 1, at 4.2
Naming, as Defendants, the Somerdale Police Department and
Officer Christy, id. at 4-5, Plaintiff seeks “damages incurred,
i.e., pain and suffering, mental anguish, psychological

1

The Court, therefore, will grant Plaintiff in forma
pauperis status and will direct the Clerk to file the Complaint.
2

Plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). However, his claims against a state actor are cognizable
under § 1983.

traumatization and lastly monetary compensation for defamation of
characture [sic].”

Id. at 7.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires
a district court to screen the complaint filed in a civil action
where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss
sua sponte any claim found frivolous, malicious, or failing to
state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).

In screening a pleading, the court must be

mindful that
[t]hreadbare recitals [and] conclusory statements do
not suffice . . . . [O]nly a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives [review].
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. [Even] where the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint . . . has not “show[n]” - “that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citations
omitted).3

3

Iqbal hammered the “final nail-in-the-coffin” for the “no
set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957), which was previously applied to determine if a
federal complaint stated a claim. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court, however, is mindful that
a pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The
Erickson rule has remained unaffected by the holding of Iqbal.
2

Here, Plaintiff is asserting: (1) an excessive force claim;
(2) a false imprisonment claim; and (3) a defamation challenge.
As pled, these challenges are subject to sua sponte dismissal.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees an individual’s right to be
free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
amend. IV.

U.S. Const.

Correspondingly, the Fourth Amendment “prohibits a

police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable
cause.”

Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.

1995); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013);
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013); Florida v.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).

Thus, to prevail on a claim for

false arrest, a plaintiff must prove that the officer defendants
lacked probable cause to arrest him.

See Groman v. Township of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995).

Likewise, a claim

for false imprisonment based on the underlying false arrest
requires a plaintiff to prove lack of probable cause.
636.

See id. at

Thus, “[t]he proper inquiry in a Section 1983 claim based

on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact
committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had
probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the
offense.”
1988).

Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.

“[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a person

committed even a minor crime[,] . . . the balancing of private
and public interests is not in doubt [and t]he arrest is

3

constitutionally reasonable.”
171 (2008).

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,

Thus, a plaintiff must state “the facts [showing

that, under the] circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge,
a reasonable officer could not have believed that an offense had
been or was being committed by the person to be arrested.”4
Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 94-5 (3d Cir. 1996); accord Revell
v. Port Authority of New York, New Jersey, 598 F. 3d 128, 137
n.16 (3d Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff merely states that his arrest was “illegal.”
However, such statement presents a purely conclusory allegation
the Court must ignore under the holding of Iqbal.

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s false arrest challenge, as pled, will be dismissed.
However, since he might be able to cure the shortcomings of this
challenge by filing an amended pleading detailing the
circumstances of his arrest, the Court will dismiss this
challenge without prejudice.

See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

182-83 (1962) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may
be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits”).

4

“Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, but
need not be based on evidence sufficient to support a conviction,
nor even a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true
than false.” Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F. 2d 967, 969 (7th Cir.
1989).
4

Plaintiff’s excessive force and defamation challenges will
also be dismissed.

“To state a claim for excessive force as an

unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must
show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable.”
Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999).
judged by the totality of the circumstances.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).

Reasonableness is
See Tennessee v.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he

was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes by being arrested by
Officer Christy.

See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,

269 (3d Cir. 2000) (defining a Fourth Amendment seizure as
occurring when a person is “detained by means intentionally
applied to terminate his freedom of movement”).

However, as

detailed supra, Plaintiff asserts no facts indicative of
probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that
the actions taken by Officer Christy were unreasonable.

In fact,

the Complaint indicates that, after Plaintiff had tried to run
away, Officer Christy merely followed him and took him in custody
without exercising any force, moreover an excessive force.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to enlarge the scope of
its analysis so to include the claim that, prior to taking
Plaintiff into his physical custody, Officer Christy displayed
his weapon, Plaintiff’s excessive force challenge still fails.
See, e.g., United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002)
(an officer’s display of his weapon does not qualify as excessive

5

force if the officer does it when he orders a suspect to stop
because such display results from a reasonable belief that a
weapon might be needed for the officer’s protection).

Since

Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency of his excessive force claim
by repleading, that claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
The foregoing analysis leaves the Court solely with
Plaintiff’s defamation claim.

“[D]efamation is actionable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if it occurs in the course of or is
accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or status
guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.”

Clark v. Twp. of

Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 701-12 (1976)); see also Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d
1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Absent the alteration or
extinguishment of a more tangible interest, injury to reputation
is actionable only under state defamation law”) (internal
citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleged that, following his

arrest, he was criminally charged by the State and remains
incarcerated since his arraignment.5
5

Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists
of detention without legal process, a false
imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant
to such process — when, for example, he is bound over
by a magistrate or arraigned on charges. Thereafter,
unlawful detention forms part of the damages for the
“entirely distinct” tort of malicious prosecution,
which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of
legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal
process. “If there is a false arrest claim, damages
for that claim cover the time of detention up until
6

Because Plaintiff’s arrest is divorced from the State’s
prosecutorial actions or the decisions rendered by Petitioner’s
court at and after his arraignment, Plaintiff failed to state a
federal defamation claim against Officer Christy.6
Alternatively, if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s
defamation challenge as a state law claim, such claim could be
entertained only if Plaintiff establishes a basis for
supplemental jurisdiction.

Supplemental jurisdiction, however,

need not be exercised in the absence of a viable federal cause of
action.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Here, no viable federal claim

issuance of process or arraignment, but not more. From
that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on
a malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful use
of judicial process rather than detention itself.”
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 389-90 (2007) (quoting Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)).
6

To the extent Plaintiff’s challenges could be construed
as asserting a malicious prosecution claim, such claim is unripe.
To state a prima facie case for a § 1983 claim of malicious
prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must establish the elements of the common law tort as it has
developed over time, Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d
Cir. 1996), and that there has been some deprivation of liberty
consistent with a seizure. See Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998); Luthe v. Cape May, 49 F. Supp. 2d 380,
393 (D.N.J. 1999). Under New Jersey law, the common law tort
elements of a malicious prosecution action arising out of a
criminal prosecution are: (1) the criminal action was instituted
by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) it was actuated by
malice, (3) there was an absence of probable cause for the
proceeding, and (4) the criminal proceeding was terminated
favorably to the plaintiff. See Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262
(1975).
Here, the Complaint makes is clear that, thus far,
Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding has not terminated in his favor.
7

has been pled thus far.

Correspondingly, at this juncture, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.7

Tarus v.

Borough of Pine Hill, 105 F. App’x 357, 361 (2004).
For the foregoing reasons, all Plaintiff’s federal
challenges against Officer Christy will be dismissed with
prejudice except for the false arrest challenge, with regard to
which Plaintiff will be granted leave to re-plead.

Plaintiff’s

challenges against the Somerdale Police Department will also be
dismissed with prejudice: for failure to state a cognizable
claim, since a police department is not a “person” subject to §
1983 suit.

See Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dep’t, 541 F.

Supp. 2d 504, 510 (D. Conn. 2008); PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge
Police Dep’t, 832 F. Supp. 808, 825-26 (D.N.J. 1993); see also
Harper v. Franklin & Marshall College, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34298, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2011); Jones v. Vineland

7

Moreover, the factual predicate suggested in the
Complaint does not correlate to the tort of defamation. Under
the state law, a “statement is defamatory if it is false,
communicated to a third person, and tends to lower the subject’s
reputation in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating with him." W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d
1148, 1153 (N.J. 2012) (citations omitted). To prevail on a
defamation claim, a plaintiff must assert: (1) a statement that
(2) was false, (3) the defendant communicated it to another
person, and (4) when the defendant communicated that false
statement, he acted negligently or with actual malice. See G.D.
v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J. 2011). Officer Christy made no
statement whatsoever, much less a false statement. Nor did
Officer Christy communicate any statement to a third party and,
thus, he could not have been negligent in making such a
communication.
8

Police Dep’t, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19671, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 28,
2011).
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: April 25, 2013
At Camden, New Jersey

9