RUIZ v. CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY et al
Filing
14
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/30/2013. (drw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOE RUIZ,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 13-2634(NLH)(JS)
v.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY, and
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY
SEVERANCE PAY PLAN FOR
SALARIED EMPLOYEES
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
MARC A. WEINBERG
SAFFERN & WEINBERG
815 GREENWOOD AVE.
SUITE 22
JENKINTOWN, PA 19046
On behalf of plaintiff
ALISON CHRISTINA MORRIS
DUANE MORRIS LLP
30 SOUTH 17th STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
On behalf of defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint.
For the reasons expressed below,
defendants’ motion will be converted to a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
The remaining arguments raised in defendants’ motion
to dismiss will be denied without prejudice with leave to refile
upon resolution of the summary judgment motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
According to his complaint, plaintiff, Joe Ruiz, began
working for defendant Campbell Soup Company in October 1984.
Plaintiff became eligible for severance benefits under the
Campbell Soup Company Severance Pay Plan for Salaried Employees
(the “Plan”) in the event he was discharged.
plaintiff was terminated.
On March 22, 2010,
Plaintiff claims that although he was
eligible for benefits, he was denied severance benefits.
Plaintiff claims that defendants violated the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by wrongfully excluding
him from the Plan, by violating their fiduciary duties, and by
unlawfully interfering with his ability to receive ERISA
benefits.
Plaintiff also claims, conditionally, for retroactive
benefits under ERISA.
Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to properly plead, or in the alternative, for a more
definite statement.
II.
Plaintiff has opposed defendant’s motion.
JURISDICTION
This Court has federal question jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Sections 404, 405, 502(a) and 510 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1105, 1132(a), and 1140.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard for Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Under the
liberal federal pleading rules, it is not necessary to plead
evidence, and it is not necessary to plead all the facts that
serve as a basis for the claim.
F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 562
However, “[a]lthough the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth
an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for
relief, they do require that the pleadings give defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.”
Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (quotation and citation omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
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the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claim.’”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’
. . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for
the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to federal
complaints before Twombly.”).
Following the Twombly/Iqbal standard, the Third Circuit has
instructed a two-part analysis in reviewing a complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6).
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated; a district court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
S. Ct. at 1950).
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (citing Iqbal, 129
Second, a district court must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.’”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
A complaint must do
more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
Id.;
see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d
Cir. 2008) (stating that the “Supreme Court's Twombly
4
formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus:
‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.
This
‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’
the necessary element”).
A court need not credit either “bald
assertions” or “legal conclusions” in a complaint when deciding
a motion to dismiss.
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997).
The defendant bears the
burden of showing that no claim has been presented.
Hedges v.
U.S., 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages,
Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Finally, a court in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must
only consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, the documents
attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of judicial notice.
S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd.,
181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999).
A court may consider,
however, “an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s
claims are based on the document.”
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
5
1993).
If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented
to the court, and the court does not exclude those matters, a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment
motion pursuant to Rule 56.
B.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
“ERISA itself does not contain an exhaustion requirement,
but it does require covered benefit plans to provide
administrative remedies for persons whose claims for benefits
have been denied.”
Karpiel v. Ogg, Cordes, Murphy & Ignelzi,
LLP, 297 Fed.Appx. 192, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
1133; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 279 (3d
Cir. 2007).
“Accordingly, courts have long held that an ERISA
plan participant must exhaust the administrative remedies
available under the plan before seeking relief in federal court
unless the participant can demonstrate that resort to the plan
remedies would be futile.
Id. (citing Harrow v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 249-51 (3d Cir. 2002); Weldon v.
Kraft, 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990)).
jurisdictional affirmative defense.
Exhaustion is a non-
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2007).
Therefore,
defendants must demonstrate the plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
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Here, defendants argue that all or part (Counts I, II and
IV) of plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because he
failed to exhaust in a timely manner his administrative remedies
when he failed to file an appeal of denial of benefits within 60
days of receipt of the denial pursuant to Section 9.2(c) of the
Plan.
Defendants refer to the letter attached to the complaint
dated April 25, 2013, from Robert J. Centonze, Vice President –
Global Compensation & Benefits for Campbell Soup Company to
plaintiff’s attorney, stating that on October 11, 2011, Robert
Morrissey, Campbell’s Vice President – Human Resources North
America, sent copies of both the Plan and the Summary Plan
Description to Plaintiff’s attorney, and that Mr. Morrissey’s
letter denied plaintiff’s claim for severance benefits.
Further, Mr. Centonze states that he has reviewed plaintiff’s
appeal for severance benefits and concluded that his appeal is
untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of the denial
notification.
Mr. Centonze also states that even if the appeal
were timely, he found it without merit.
Mr. Centonze concludes
“You have completed the administrative appeal process authorized
by the Plan.
If you disagree with my determination of your
appeal, you have the right to file an action in the United
States District Court challenging this determination.”
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Plaintiff responds that he completed the administrative
process and in support of his argument attaches to his
opposition additional letters written by his attorney to
defendants dated September 22, 2011, December 22, 2012, and
February 28, 2012, as well as the October 11, 2011 Morrissey
letter and a letter dated March 22, 2012, from Donald B. Shanin,
Vice President – Corporate Compliance and Deputy General Counsel
for Campbell Soup Company to plaintiff’s attorney.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court only
considers “the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these
documents.”
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260
(3d Cir. 2006).
If matters outside of the pleadings are
considered, then the motion is treated as a motion for summary
judgment.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
When converting a 12(b)(6)
motion to one for summary judgment “all parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent the motion.” Id.
Generally, a court should give
notice of its intent to convert a defendant's motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment so that the plaintiff is not
subjected to “summary judgment by ambush.”
8
In re Bayside Prison
Litig., 190 F.Supp.2d 755, 760 (D.N.J. 2002).
In this case,
plaintiff has presented the additional materials, not defendant.
However, the additional materials address an affirmative defense
raised by the defendants.
Defendants state that the Court
should not consider them because they are outside the pleadings,
but also relies on the letters in support of their argument that
plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies.
In the interest of procedural fairness to all parties, the
Court will convert defendant’s motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment only on the issue of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
In this regard, the parties will have
reasonable opportunity to present all material relevant to a
summary judgment motion on this issue.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d);
Handy v. Varner, No. 12–1091, 2013 WL 1567601, at *2 (W.D.Pa.
Apr. 12, 2013) (converting portion of motion to dismiss raising
failure to exhaust administrative remedies defense to a motion
for summary judgment).
In addition, the parties are directed to address the issue
of whether failure to file a timely administrative appeal simply
completes the administrative process, thereby permitting
plaintiff to file in court, or whether failure to file a timely
administrative appeal forever bars a plaintiff from filing in
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court.
The parties are directed to fully brief this issue, and
include support from case law and citations to the record, and
attach any pertinent affidavits and exhibits.
Accordingly, the Court will enter an Order for the
submission of a summary judgment motion and briefing regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 1
The remaining arguments
raised in defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied without
prejudice with leave to refile should the case go forward after
determination of the exhaustion of administrative remedies
issue. 2
Date:December 30, 2013
s/Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
Defendants are directed to file a formal motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Local Rule 56.1(a)
raising only the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The parties shall follow Local Rule 7.1 with regard to the
filing of a response and reply.
1
All of defendants’ remaining arguments are preserved to be
raised at a later date, and nothing in this Opinion shall be
construed to be a denial on the merits.
2
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