STADLER v. ABRAMS et al

Filing 325

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 4/5/2023. (alb, )

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 1 of 8 PageID: 9700

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
:
STEVEN M. STADLER,
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil No. 13-2741 (RBK/AMD)
:
v.
:
Opinion
:
CITY OF OCEAN CITY, et al.,
:
:
Defendants. :
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon letters filed by the parties in accordance with
the Court’s Order dated December 12, 2022 (ECF No. 322). Defendant City of Atlantic City
requests reimbursement for the costs and fees associated with its Motion to Mark Judgment
Satisfied (ECF No. 318) in the amount of $4,602.00. Ms. Jennifer Bonjean, counsel for Plaintiff,
objects to this amount on the basis that the number of hours billed is unreasonable. (ECF No.
321).
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case originated on April 29, 2013, when Plaintiff filed his complaint. A jury found

in favor of the Plaintiff on March 15, 2018. Post-judgment motions and appeals followed. After
post-judgment motions for attorneys’ fees were resolved in July of 2020, no further motions
were filed until October 20, 2022, when Defendant City of Atlantic City filed a Motion to Mark
Judgment as Satisfied (ECF No. 318). In support of that Motion, Defendant attached as exhibits
email threads between Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s counsel. In these emails, counsel for
Defendant, Mr. Fairborn, first requested that Ms. Bonjean sign a warrant of satisfaction of

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 2 of 8 PageID: 9701

judgment on July 16, 2021. (ECF No. 318-11). After a few back-and-forth emails, Ms. Bonjean
failed to respond to Mr. Fairborn’s multiple follow-up requests. (Id.). On August 8, 2021, Ms.
Bonjean stated that she had no obligation to sign the warrant of satisfaction, despite
acknowledging that she had “no reason to believe that the judgment has not been satisfied.” (Id.).
On December 12, 2022, this Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Mark Judgment
Satisfied and agreed with Defendant that it was entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees and costs
of filing the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (ECF No. 322). We ordered the parties to file
documents regarding the amount of fees and costs to be rewarded. (Id.).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.

We determined in our previous Order that Ms. Bonjean’s conduct multiplied the proceedings in
this case unreasonably and vexatiously. (ECF No. 322 at 2). Therefore, the only issue remaining
is the determination of “the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.”
The burden of proving that a request for attorney’s fees is reasonable rests on the party
seeking the fees. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). To satisfy this
burden, the petitioner must “submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.” Id.
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The district court is afforded a “great deal of discretion” to
adjust the awarded fee in light of the opponent’s objections. Id. However, “[t]he court may not
reduce an award sua sponte; rather, it can only do so in response to specific objections made by

2

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 3 of 8 PageID: 9702

the opposing party.” Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell Intern’l Inc., 426 F.3d
694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005).
The starting point of a district court’s analysis is the lodestar amount, which is “the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433); see also Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey,
Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995). “The Court may not make a finding of
reasonableness based on a generalized sense of appropriateness, but must rely on the record.”
Acosta v. Nat’l Packaging, Inc., No. 09-701, 2010 WL 3001191, at *8 (D.N.J. July 28, 2010)
(citing Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001)). In fact, “it is
necessary that the Court go line, by line, by line through the billing records supporting the fee
request” in order to satisfy the required reasonableness inquiry. Evans, 273 F.3d at 362 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Due Process Requirements

Before addressing the parties’ arguments as to the amount of attorneys’ fees to be
awarded, we will address the due process arguments raised by Ms. Bonjean in a footnote. (ECF
No. 324 at 1 n.1). Ms. Bonjean asserts that “notice is required if a Court is going to sanction a
lawyer for failing to carry out a task that she had no reason to believe she was obligated to
complete.” (Id.). Ms. Bonjean is correct as to the requirement for notice, but her implication that
she did not receive notice prior to being sanctioned is incorrect.
As with other types of sanctions, “attorney’s fees certainly should not be assessed lightly
or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a

3

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 4 of 8 PageID: 9703

federal court to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed on a
litigant or attorney.” Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Eash v.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1985). Due process requires the party against
whom sanctions are considered to be given “particularized notice including, at a minimum, 1) the
fact that . . . sanctions are under consideration, 2) the reasons why sanctions are under
consideration, and 3) the form of sanctions under consideration.” Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d
58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994). The notice given must provide the party “the opportunity to mount a
meaningful defense.” In re Tutu Wells Contamination Lit., 120 F.3d 368, 380 (3d Cir. 1997)
(overruled on other grounds by Comuso v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 267 F.3d 331, 338–39
(3d Cir. 2001).
Here, Ms. Bonjean was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to our Order
imposing sanctions. Ms. Bonjean was first notified that a motion for attorneys’ fees would be
filed against her via an email from Defendant’s counsel on August 6, 2021. (ECF No. 318-11 at
1–2). Ms. Bonjean again received notice of the motion for sanctions against her when Defendant
filed its Motion to Mark Judgment Satisfied on October 20, 2022, which included a request for
attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (ECF No. 318). Ms. Bonjean responded to the Motion on
December 1, 2022, and presented her arguments opposing Defendant’s request for imposition of
sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees. (ECF N0. 321 at 1–2). We note that Ms. Bonjean did not
request a hearing before the Court on the matter of attorneys’ fees. Because Ms. Bonjean
received notice and an opportunity to be heard, we find that she received sufficient notice to
satisfy the requirements of due process.
B.

Attorneys’ Fees Calculations

4

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 5 of 8 PageID: 9704

Defendant seeks a total of $4,602.00 in attorneys’ fees in relation to the preparing and
filing of the motion. (ECF No. 323-1 at 2). In support of this amount, Defendant submitted
Exhibit A, which includes billing statements apparently sent by counsel to Defendant, as well as
a list of hours performed (but apparently not yet billed) in December 2022. Defendant’s
counsel’s hourly rate of $130.00 is established by resolution of the City Council (ECF No. 323-1
at 1), and Ms. Bonjean does not challenge this rate. Defendant provides evidence of a total of
33.30 hours spent litigating the Motion to Mark Judgment Satisfied. (ECF No. 323-2). Billed at
the rate of $130.00 per hour, the total amount of attorneys’ fees sought by Defendant comes to
$4,329.00.
Ms. Bonjean challenges the number of hours spent litigating this matter as excessive. She
argues that “defense counsels’ consultations among themselves and their consultations with their
clients are not related to the filing of a motion.” (ECF No. 321 at 2). She notes that these
consultations total 3.00 hours. (Id.). She also takes issue with a November 28, 2022 billing entry
of 1.20 hours for “communicating with Plaintiff’s attorney via email,” which Ms. Bonjean argues
is exaggerated. (Id. at 2–3). She argues that the hours spent on the tasks identified are generally
excessive; for example, she argues that it does not take half an hour to review a Court’s Order of
Judgment. (Id. at 3). Similarly, she points out that defense counsel “claim that they spent over 13
hours researching this issue,” which resulted in the submission of a five-page brief. (Id.). She
points out that defense counsel billed over 24 hours total for researching, drafting, and filing
their motion. (Id.). She argues that only 90 minutes would have been sufficient to conduct the
research and writing needed for this motion. She urges the court to award attorneys’ fees for only
four hours total – a reduction of over 88%. (Id. at 4).

5

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 6 of 8 PageID: 9705

The number of hours used to calculate the lodestar must reflect the amount of time
“reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Excessive, redundant, or
unnecessary hours are not reasonably expended and should be excluded from the calculation. Id.
at 434. We can only reduce hours “in response to specific objections made by the opposing
party.” Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 711. We agree with some of Ms. Bonjean’s specific objections to
the hours billed by Defendant’s attorneys. The table in the Appendix (“App.”) reflects the
reductions to the hours of fees we will award to Defendant’s attorneys, for the reasons we
discuss below.
We agree with Ms. Bonjean that conferences with the attorney’s client, and related
communications regarding those conferences, were not reasonably expended in preparing and
filing the motion. We therefore reduced the award by 0.50 hours, or $65.00 (App. Rows 8–9).
Likewise, the attorneys’ communications with the Clerk of this Court regarding the “status of
decision on [the] motion,” as well as the letter requesting expedited adjudication, were not
necessary to the litigation. Accordingly, we reduced the award by 0.50 hours, or $65.00 (App.
Rows 26, 31). We agree with Ms. Bonjean that it was not necessary for Defendant’s attorneys to
spend 1.20 hours writing emails to opposing counsel, as billed in a November 28, 2022 entry.
We reduced that entry by one hour, or $130.00 (App. Row 28). We also agree that it was not
necessary for Defendant’s attorneys to spend 0.50 hours reviewing a clerk’s letter and order
certifying judgment, as billed in an August 11, 2021 entry. We reduced that entry by 0.30 hours,
or $39.00 (App. Row 3). All hours expended after we granted the Motion to Mark Judgment
Satisfied on December 12, 2022, were not necessary to litigate that Motion. We therefore
reduced the award by 5.00 hours, or $650.00 (App. Rows 34–40).

6

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 7 of 8 PageID: 9706

As to the number of hours expended researching and drafting the motion, Ms. Bonjean
requests a significant reduction to the 22.00 hours billed. She “is confident 90 minutes would
have been sufficient to conduct the necessary research and writing of this simplistic and
straightforward motion.” While we agree it was not reasonable to expend 22.00 hours
researching and preparing a five-page brief and four-page attorney certification on a relatively
simple motion, we are not convinced, based solely on counsel’s promise that she could have
done it in less time, that we should reduce the time to only 1.50 hours. We find it was reasonable
to spend one hour per page, that is, nine hours total. We therefore reduce the hours billed by
13.00 hours, or $1,690.00 (App. Rows 1, 5–7, 13, 16–18).
In total, we reduced the award by 20.30 hours, or $2,639.00. We award Defendant
$1,690.00 in attorneys’ fees, reflecting the 13.00 hours reasonably expended as a result of Ms.
Bonjean’s bad faith conduct.
IV.

APPENDIX

Row
No.
1

Date

Description (First Words)

8/9/2021

“Legal research . . .”

1.20

2

8/9/2021

“Reviewed file and emails . . .”

0.50

$65.00

--

$65.00

“Reviewed clerks letter . . .”

0.50

$65.00

0.30

$26.00

3

8/11/2021

Hours

Original
Reduced
Reduction
Cost
Cost
$156.00
1.00
$26.00

4

8/11/2021

“Research regarding satisfaction . . .”

0.50

$65.00

--

$65.00

5

8/12/2021

“Research regarding motion . . .”

2.30

$299.00

2.00

$39.00

6

8/12/2021

“Research and reviewed . . .”

1.40

$182.00

1.00

$52.00

7

8/12/2021

“Prepared motion . . .”

2.40

$312.00

2.00

$52.00

8

9/27/2021

“Communicated with client . . .”

0.30

$39.00

0.30

$0.00

9

9/29/2021

“Conferenced with client . . .”

0.20

$26.00

0.20

$0.00

“Reviewed email . . .”

0.20

$26.00

--

$26.00

$26.00

--

$26.00

10

10/7/2021

11

10/13/2021

“Conferenced with . . .”

0.20

12

10/19/2021

“Communicated with . . .”

0.20

$26.00

--

$26.00

13

10/21/2021

“Continued preparation . . .”

1.80

$234.00

1.00

$104

14

10/21/2021

“Reviewed file . . .”

0.30

$39.00

--

$39.00

15

10/22/2021

“Prepared certification . . .”

0.40

$52.00

--

$52.00

16

10/25/2021

“Continued research . . .”

2.30

$299.00

2.00

$39.00

7

Case 1:13-cv-02741-RBK-AMD Document 325 Filed 04/05/23 Page 8 of 8 PageID: 9707

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

11/2/2021
11/3/2021
12/13/2021
8/25/2022
8/25/2022
8/25/2022
8/29/2022
8/29/2022

“Prepared and researched . . .”

3.60

$468.00

3.00

$78.00

“Continued review . . .”

2.20

$286.00

1.00

$156.00

“Continued preparation . . .”

0.80

$104.00

--

$104.00

“Reviewed email . . .”

0.20

$26.00

--

$26.00

“Reviewed and continued . . .”

2.50

$325.00

--

$325.00

“Prepared exhibits . . .”

0.50

$65.00

--

$65.00

“Continued to draft . . .”

0.30

$39.00

--

$39.00

“Prepared and finalized . . .”

0.40

$52.00

--

$52.00

$26.00

--

$26.00

25

8/29/2022

“Finalized draft . . .”

0.20

26

11/23/2022

“Spoke with court . . .”

0.20

$26.00

0.20

$0.00

27

11/23/2022

“Emailed . . .”

0.20

$26.00

--

$26.00

28

11/28/2022

“Communicated with . . .”

1.20

$156.00

1.00

$26.00

29

11/28/2022

“Reviewed . . .”

0.20

$26.00

--

$26.00

30

12/1/2022

“Revised brief . . .”

0.30

$39.00

--

$39.00

31

12/1/2022

“Drafted letter . . .”

0.30

$39.00

0.30

$0.00

32

12/1/2022

“Reviewed . . .”

0.30

$39.00

--

$39.00

33

12/1/2022

“Communicated with . . .”

0.20

$26.00

--

$26.00

34

12/14/2022

“Reviewed order . . .”

0.20

$26.00

0.20

$0.00

“Emailed client . . .”

0.20

$26.00

0.20

$0.00

“Communicated with . . .”

0.20

$26.00

0.20

$0.00

“Reviewed email . . .”

0.10

$13.00

0.10

$0.00

“Drafted declaration . . .”

1.50

$195.00

1.50

$0.00

“Reviewed billing . . .”

1.80

$234.00

1.80

$0.00

“Researched relevant rules . . .”

1.00

$130.00

1.00

$0.00

35
36
37
38
39
40

V.

12/15/2022
12/15/2022
12/15/2022
12/29/2022
12/29/2022
12/29/2022

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Defendant is awarded $1,690.00 in attorneys’ fees. An

Order follows.

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United State District Judge

Dated: 4/4/2023

8