COTTRELL et al v. RECREATION CENTER LLC et al

Filing 28

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/28/2016. (dmr)(n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARYANN COTTRELL AND
RICHARD G. HOLLAND,

:
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
RECREATION CENTER LLC, et al.,:
:
Defendants.
:

Civ. A. No. 13-2847(NLH/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
MARYANN COTTRELL
RICHARD HOLLAND
31 S. ACADEMY STREET
GLASSBORO, NJ 08028
Pro Se Plaintiffs

HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is a motion for default judgment.
Plaintiffs served Defendant Recreation Center LLC on January 9,
2015 [Doc. No. 20]. On October 26, 2015, Plaintiffs requested,
and the Clerk entered, default against Defendant Recreation
Center LLC.

On December 11, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the instant

motion for default judgment. For the reasons expressed below,
Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.
I.

JURISDICTION

The Court exercises original jurisdiction pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 1331 over the federal claim asserted in this case under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367 over the state law claim based on an alleged
violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”),
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6–1 et seq.
II.

BACKGROUND

As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiff Maryann Cottrell
(“Cottrell”) is the mother of a severely disabled daughter, and
Plaintiff Richard Holland (“Holland”) serves as a secondary
caregiver to Cottrell's daughter.

Plaintiffs are frequent

litigants in this Court. Typically, Plaintiffs “assess[] and
document parking access at public accommodations that they come
into contact during their daily services.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) After
documenting violations, they bring federal complaints in this
Court, which are generally resolved in the defendant’s favor or
settled. See Cottrell, et al. v. Good Wheels, et al., No. 08-1738
(summary judgment granted for Defendants where Plaintiffs offered
no evidence that Defendants' decision to ban Plaintiffs from
business premises for disrupting customers was pretextual);
Cottrell, et al. v. Rowan University, et al., No. 08-1171
(summary judgment granted for Defendants on Plaintiffs'
retaliation claims (and all other claims) because they did not

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show their ban from campus was a result of their protected
activity, rather ban from campus was based on ten documented
incidents over the course of three months where Plaintiffs acted
hostile, harassing, disruptive, and aggressive to Rowan
University staff, students, and visitors, including a nine year
old child, a diabetic pregnant woman, and a student with spinal
meningitis); Cottrell, et al. v. Heritages Dairy Stores Inc., No.
09-1743 (case settled after retaliation claims were dismissed for
lack of standing; Plaintiffs permitted to amend complaint);
Cottrell, et al. v. Bob’s Little Sport Shop, Inc., No. 09-1987
(Defendant’s motion to dismiss granted because Plaintiffs lacked
standing); Cottrell, et al. v. Duffield’s Inc., et al., No. 143309 (stipulated dismissal); Cottrell, et al., v. Murphy’s Auto
Care and Performance Center, et al., No. 14-4831 (complaint
dismissed in part because Plaintiffs lacked standing); Cottrell,
et al. v. Glassboro Public School, No. 06-1163 (case
administratively terminated); Cottrell, et al. v. Dante J. Masso
& Sons, Inc., 08-1700 (case settled); Cottrell, et al. v. Long
Self Storage Inc., et al., No. 08-2827 (case settled); Cottrell,
et al. v. Zagami, LLC, et al., No. 08-3340 (summary judgment
granted for Defendants because Plaintiffs’ disruption of business
operations was the reason for the property ban and Plaintiffs
could not establish the causal connection prong of their

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retaliation claims); Cottrell, et al. v. J&R Discount Liquor
Gallery, No. 08-5418 (case settled); Cottrell v. Woodbury Nissan,
et al., No. 09-240 (case settled); Cottrell, et al. v. Matt
Blatt, Inc., No. 11-610 (case settled); Cottrell, et al. v.
Fosters, et al., No. 11-6662 (case settled); and Cottrell, et al.
v. Norman, et al., No. 12-1986 (case dismissed, among other
reasons, for lack of standing; motion for sanctions against
Plaintiffs pending); Holland v. Deptford Mall Security, et al.,
No. 09-714 (summary judgment granted for Defendants because they
did not ban Plaintiff from the mall, rather, police asked
Plaintiff to leave); Holland v. Terra Nova, et al., No. 06-4599
(summary judgment sua sponte entered in favor of Defendants);
Holland v. Murphy’s Auto Care and Performance Center, et al., No.
14-4831 (Defendants’ motion to dismiss granted because Plaintiff
lacked standing).1
In many cases, business owners and university campuses
complain of Plaintiffs’ harassing conduct towards customers and
the public while documenting alleged parking violations. See,
e.g., Cottrell, et al. v. Good Wheels, et al., No. 08-1738;

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Additionally, there are four other cases pending: Cottrell
v. Wawa Inc., No. 14-7159; Cottrell, et al. v. Family Practice
Associates at Washington PA, et al., No. 15-2267; Cottrell, et
al. v. Nicolson Properties LLC, et al., No. 12-2128; Cottrell v.
United Park Service, et al., No. 16-1689.
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Cottrell, et al. v. Rowan University, et al., No. 08-1171;
Cottrell, et al. v. Norman, et al., No. 12-1986.
In this case, on May 3, 2011, Plaintiffs observed a truck
parked across four handicapped spaces at the Glassboro Bowl and
Recreation Center. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-22.) Plaintiffs allege that
when documenting this parking violation a man identified himself
as the manager of the property and stated: “I’ll take care of
this, I want you off the property. I want you never to come
back.” (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further allege:
25. Ms. Cottrell has been to Glassboro Bowl and
Recreation Center to inquire regarding Birthday Party
information[.]
26. Ms. Cottrell would like to go bowling and visit
Kegler’s bar.
27. Mr. Holland has been a past customer[.]
28. Mr. Holland would like to go bowling and visit
Kegler’s bar.
(Compl. ¶¶ 25-28.).
III. DISCUSSION
Before the Court can reach the question of whether Plaintiffs
are entitled to default judgment, it must be determined whether
this case satisfies the threshold jurisdictional requirement of
standing. Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium

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Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997). A plaintiff
must establish his or her standing to bring a case in order for
the court to possess jurisdiction over his or her claim. Id. The
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing standing “in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages
of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
To establish standing, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1)
they “suffered an injury in fact, an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural, or hypothetical”; (2)
there is a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be fairly ... traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court”; and
(3) “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see
also Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“Standing is established at the pleading stage by setting forth
specific facts that indicate that the party has been injured in
fact or that injury is imminent, that the challenged action is
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causally connected to the actual or imminent injury, and that the
injury may be redressed by the cause of action.”)
To establish a real and immediate threat of future injury,
courts in this Vicinage require Plaintiffs to adequately allege
both “prior patronage of and a concrete desire to continue to
patronize Defendants[']” business establishment.” See, e.g.,
Cottrell v. Matt Blatt, Inc., No. 11–610, 2011 WL 2975482, at *4
(D.N.J. July 21, 2011) (concluding that Holland and Cottrell
“demonstrated that they suffered an injury in fact” where they
asserted (1) prior patronage of a car dealership for their own
shopping needs and to accompany friends purchasing cars, and (2)
a concrete desire to continue to patronize the dealership in
order to browse inventory, compare pricing, or make an offer on a
car); see also Cottrell v. Zagami, LLC, No. 08–3340, 2010 WL
2652229, at *2 (D.N.J. June 23, 2010) (finding that “[b]ecause
Plaintiffs have alleged past patronage [(previously dining at
that establishment)] and a concrete desire to dine at Defendant's
nearby establishment in the future [(including to accompany
friends who dine there)], the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs
have standing to bring this suit”).
However, in circumstances where Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege facts supporting the real and immediate threat
of future injury, several courts have dismissed these complaints

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without prejudice for lack of standing with respect to one or
both Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Bobs Little Sport Shop, 2010 WL
936212, at *3–4 (D.N.J. March 11, 2010) (dismissing Plaintiffs'
retaliation claims under the ADA and the NJLAD without prejudice
based, in part, on Plaintiffs' failure to allege concrete plans
to return to the sports shop); Cottrell v.. Good Wheels, No. 08–
1738, 2009 WL 3208299, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2009)
(dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice as to
Cottrell because the court was “not satisfied that [she] suffered
an injury in fact as a result of having her business-invitee
status revoked” since she failed to alleged that she “ever
entered the Good Wheels facility at any time in the past” or that
“she intend[ed] to do so at any time in the future”); see also
Heritages Dairy Stores, 2010 WL 3908567, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2010) (dismissing Cottrell and Holland's retaliation claims
without prejudice for lack of standing relying on Bobs Little
Sport Shop); Cottrell v. Nicholson Properties, LLC, No. 12-2128,
2013 WL 6860821, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2013) (dismissing
Cottrell and Holland’s retaliation claims without prejudice
because their plans to return to the business were “simply
conclusory ‘some day’ intentions”).
Here, Plaintiffs' complaint alleges: (1) Cottrell once
visited the Glassboro Bowl and Recreation Center to inquire about

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a birthday party; (2) Holland has been “a past customer”; and (3)
Cottrell and Holland would like to go bowling and visit Kegler’s
bar. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-28.) For the same reasons articulated in
Nicholson Properties, Plaintiffs have alleged only the
nondescript, unspecified “some day” intentions that the Supreme
Court rejected in Lujan. 504 U.S. at 564 (rejecting “affiants'
profession of an ‘inten[t]’ to return to the places they had
visited before — where they will presumably, this time, be
deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered
species — [as] simply not enough [to allege injury]. Such ‘some
day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do
not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our
cases require.”). Plaintiffs fail to describe actual specific
plans for future patronize the Glassboro Bowl and Recreation
Center.
Further, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding past patronizing
of the Glassboro Bowl and Recreation Center also lack sufficient
detail and specificity.

For these reasons, as currently alleged

in Plaintiffs’ complaint, the alleged revocation of Plaintiffs’
business invitee status has not caused Plaintiffs “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent injury.”

Plaintiffs have

thus not met their burden of demonstrating that they have

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standing to bring these claims.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion

for default judgment will be denied because the Court does not
have jurisdiction to hear this case as currently alleged in the
complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Consequently, for the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs’
motion for default judgment against Defendant Glassboro Bowl and
Recreation Center [Doc. No. 27] will be denied. An appropriate
Order will be entered wherein Plaintiffs must show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of standing.

Date: April 28, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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