AL-XI ALI et al v. CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/12/2014. (drw)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TRUTH AL HAQQ AL-XI ALI,
et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 13-2940 (JBS)

OPINION

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge

Petitioners filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on behalf of QuinzEl Terron Eloah AkilBey, challenging Akil-Bey’s confinement in state custody. For
the following reasons, this Court will dismiss the petition.1

1

Petitioners neither prepaid the $5.00 filing fee for a
habeas petition as required by Local Civil Rule 54.3(a), nor
submitted a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). An incomplete application for IFP status was submitted
by Quinzelle Bey (Docket Item 1-1). Thus, the petition is
subject to administrative termination for failure to pay the
filing fee. Further, this Court notes that under the “next
friend” doctrine, standing is allowed to a third person to file
and pursue a claim on behalf of someone who is unable to do so.
See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990). Here,
Petitioners do not assert their basis for standing.
Nevertheless, the petition is meritless and will be dismissed.

BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2013, Petitioners Truth Al Haqq Al-Xi Ali,
Princebadi Ali Ajamu-Bey, Cynthia English El-Bey, Honesti Ali,
Sekou Menelik El, and Princehadi Ajamu Bey (“Petitioners”) filed
a document labeled “Emergency Petition for Constitutional Writ
of Habeas Corpus Affidavit in Support and Demand for Due Process
of Law.” The Clerk of the Court docketed the petition as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Docket Item 1).
In the IFP application, Petitioner is listed as “Moorish
National Republic” and states that the nature of the petition is
to “demand release of kidnapped Moorish National.” (Docket Item
1-1, Caption and ¶ 2). Likewise, in the petition, Petitioners
argue that QuinzEl Terron Eloah Akil-Bey was arrested by the
Camden County Sheriff’s Department and detained at the
Correctional Facility. They argue that Akil-Bey’s rights were
violated during the criminal process in that there was no lawful
indictment and no due process. (Docket Item 1 at p. 3). As a
“Moorish National of the Moorish National Republic Federal
Government,” they argue that the court has no jurisdiction over
Akil-Bey. (Id. at p. 6).

2

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading
requirements.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A
petition is required to specify all the grounds for relief
available to the petitioner, state the facts supporting each
ground, state the relief requested, and be signed under penalty
of perjury. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c), applicable to § 2241
petitions through Rule 1(b). “Federal courts are authorized to
dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally
insufficient on its face.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; Siers v.
Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985). Habeas Rule 4 accordingly
requires the Court to examine a petition prior to ordering an
answer and, if it appears “that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4, applicable through Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
A district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to entertain a pre-trial petition for habeas
corpus brought by a person who is in custody pursuant to an
untried state indictment. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490
(1989); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410

3

U.S. 484 (1973); Mokone v. Fenton, 710 F.2d 998, 999 (3d Cir.
1983); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442, 443 (3d Cir. 1975).
Petitioners ask this Court to grant pre-trial habeas relief
to Akil-Bey based on grounds related to his arrest and state
pre-trial proceedings thus far. The problem with the petition is
that “federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special
circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative
defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of
conviction by a state court.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 (quoting
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886)). Indeed, “for
purposes of pre-trial habeas relief ... a denial of speedy trial
alone, and without more, does not constitute an ‘extraordinary
circumstance’” warranting habeas relief. See Moore, 515 F.2d at
448. Moreover, the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), forbids federal court interference in pending state
criminal proceedings. As the Supreme Court explained over 100
years ago,
We are of the opinion that while the ... court has the
power to do so, and may discharge the accused in
advance of his trial if he is restrained of his
liberty in violation of the national constitution, it
is not bound in every case to exercise such a power
immediately upon application being made for the writ.
We cannot suppose that congress intended to compel
those courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in
the first instance, the control of all criminal
prosecutions commenced in state courts exercising
authority within the territorial limits, where the
accused claims that he is held in custody in violation
of the constitution of the United States. The
4

injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon
‘to dispose of the party as law and justice require,’
does not deprive the court of discretion as to the
time and mode in which it will exert the powers
conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised
in the light of the relations existing, under our
system of government, between the judicial tribunals
of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of
the fact that the public good requires that those
relations not be disturbed by unnecessary conflict
between courts equally bound to guard and protect
rights secured by the constitution.
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.
The proper procedure for Akil-Bey to challenge his
confinement is to personally exhaust his constitutional claims
before all three levels of the New Jersey courts and, if he is
unsuccessful, to thereafter present the exhausted grounds to
this Court in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 449. As the Third
Circuit observed in regard to a pretrial § 2241 petition
asserting violation of the right to a speedy trial,
Petitioner ... will have an opportunity to raise his
claimed denial of the right to a speedy trial during
his state trial and in any subsequent appellate
proceedings in the state courts. Once he has exhausted
state court remedies, the federal courts will, of
course, be open to him, if need be, to entertain any
petition for habeas corpus relief which may be
presented. These procedures amply serve to protect
[Petitioner]'s constitutional rights without pre-trial
federal intervention in the orderly functioning of
state criminal processes.
Moore, 515 F.2d at 449; see also United States v. Castor, 937
F.2d 293, 296–297 (7th Cir. 1991); Dickerson v. State of

5

Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225–227 (5th Cir. 1987); Atkins v.
State of Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 545–547 (6th Cir. 1981); Carden
v. State of Montana, 626 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980). As exceptional
circumstances of peculiar urgency do not exist in this case,
Petitioner is not entitled to a pretrial Writ of Habeas Corpus
and this Court will summarily dismiss the petition.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
This Court denies a certificate of appealability because
Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). See
Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court will dismiss the
petition without prejudice and deny a certificate of
appealability.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated:

May 12, 2014

6