GOODSON v. HOLMES et al

Filing 5

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/10/13. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
:
MARC GOODSON,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-3026 (RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
CHRISTOPHER HOLMES et al.,
:
:
Respondents.
:
_______________________________________
:
Petitioner Marc Goodson (“Petitioner”) filed the instant
Petition ("Petition"), seeking a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

He is challenging his judgment of conviction

rendered by the Superior Court of New Jersey.1
No. 1.

See Docket Entry

Since the record located by this Court indicates that the

Petition is untimely and, in addition, Petitioner’s claims might
have become moot, the Court will dismiss the Petition and decline
to issue a certificate of appealability.
Petitioner’s

pro

se

litigant

status,

However, mindful of

the

Court

will

retain

jurisdiction over this matter for ninety days to allow Petitioner
an opportunity to address these issues.

See

United States v.

Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc).
1

Petitioner’s application to proceed in this matter in
forma pauperis (IFP) was granted and a notice (“Mason”) was
issued pursuant to Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000).
See Docket Entries Nos. 2 and 3. However, no statement in the
IFP or Mason orders reflected on the substantive or procedural
validity or invalidity of Petitioner’s § 2254 application. See
id.

I.

BACKGROUND
The Petition asserted that, on the charges under attack,

Petitioner was convicted in the Law Division on August 12, 2003,
and

sentenced

ineligibility.2

to

a

ten-year

term,

See Docket Entry No.

with

five-year

1, at 3.

parole

That conviction

was affirmed by the Appellate Division on March 24, 2006. See id.;
accord State v. Goodson, Crim. App. No. A–3968–03 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Mar. 24, 2006) (state records cited in State v. Goodson,
2012 WL 1672877, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2012)).
The Petition acknowledged that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
denied him certification as to the direct appeal.

The records of

the Supreme Court of New Jersey indicate that the denial order was
issued on September 21, 2006.
(2006).

See State v. Goodson, 188 N.J. 356

Petitioner stated that he sought no certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court. See Docket Entry No. 1, at 4.
While Petitioner indicated that he sought post-conviction
review (“PCR”), he did not provide the date when he filed that PCR

2

Petitioner’s public record maintained by the New Jersey
Department of Corrections indicates four different convictions,
rendered on August 12, 2002; August 12, 2003; June 22, 2004; and
January 28, 2008. See https://www6.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/
details?x=1066171&n=0. The sentences corresponding to these
convictions indicate that Petitioner could now be incarcerated
solely pursuant to the judgment of conviction rendered on January
28, 2008, which imposed an eight-year term yielding Petitioner’s
current maximum release date of August 26, 2016. See id. In
contrast, all Petitioner’s other sentences expired, including the
one ensuing from the judgment rendered on August 12, 2003, that
is challenged in this matter: that sentence could have expired as
early as on August 11, 2008, under the built-in parole clause.
2

application.

The

records

of

the

state

courts

fill

this

informational gap, indicating that the PCR application at issue was
filed on January 10, 2008.

See Goodson, 2012 WL 1672877, at *2.

The Law Division denied Petitioner PCR first on July 22, 2008,
without holding an evidentiary hearing.

See id. at 3.

Upon

Petitioner’s appeal, the Appellate Division remanded for a PCR
review with an evidentiary hearing.
trial court again denied PCR.

On November 10, 2010, the

Id. at 4.

That denial was affirmed

by the Appellate Division on May 15, 2012, see Goodson, 2012 WL
1672877, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification
as to Petitioner’s PCR challenges on November 16, 2012.
v. Goodson, 212 N.J. 456 (2006).

See State

The Petition at bar was executed

on April 26, 2013, see Docket Entry No. 1, at 16.

Thus, it is

evident that the Petition could not have been handed by Petitioner
to his prison officials for mailing to the Court prior to that
date.
II.

DISCUSSION
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant

to

2244(d)(1).

the

judgment

of

a

State

court.”

28

U.S.C.

§

The limitations period runs from “the date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

3

expiration of the time for seeking such review.”

28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).
A state-court criminal judgment becomes “final,” within the
meaning of §2244(d)(1), by the conclusion of direct review or by
the expiration of time for seeking such review, including the
90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court.

See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417,

419 (3d Cir. 2000); Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 337 n.1 (3d Cir.
1999); accord Arriaza Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (Jan. 10,
2012); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.
Since

the

New

Jersey

Supreme

Court

denied

Petitioner

certification as to his direct appeal on September 21, 2006,
Petitioner's AEDPA period of limitations was triggered 90 days
later, i.e., on December 20, 2006, when Petitioner's time to seek
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court expired.

See id.

Hence, his one-year AEDPA period began running on December 21,
2006, and expired one year later, on December 20, 2007, that is,
about six and a half years prior to execution of the Petition at
bar.

Therefore, unless the Petition qualifies for a tolling

exception, it is facially untimely and should be dismissed as such.
The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to two distinct
tolling exceptions, one is statutory and another is equitable. See
Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003); Miller v. N.J.

4

State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1998).

Here,

however, neither tolling exception applies.
While Section 2244(d)(2) requires statutory tolling for “[t]he
time

during

which

a

properly

filed

application

for

State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),
Petitioner’s filing of his PCR application on January 10, 2008,
could not have triggered the statutory tolling since his PCR filing
took place after the December 20, 2007, date, that is, the date
when Petitioner’s AEDPA period expired.

See Long v. Wilson, 393

F.3d 390, 394-95 (3d Cir. 2004) (a PCR filing made after expiration
of the AEDPA period cannot render the § 2254 petition timely);
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 78-79 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).3

3

An application is deemed “properly filed” if it was
accepted for filing by the addressee court and such acceptance
occurred within the time limits prescribed by the governing state
law. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005); see also
Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). Here, the Court presumes,
without making a factual finding to that effect, that
Petitioner’s PCR application and all appeals from denial of PCR
were properly filed under the state law. Correspondingly, at
this juncture, the Court does not concern itself with the
possibility that Petitioner’s PCR appeals, either with the
Appellate Division or with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, were
filed out of time, under the state courts’ “nunc pro tunc” model
which, if utilized, adds the periods of delayed filings to the
calculation of the AEDPA period. See Jenkins v. Superintendent
of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Webster
v. Ricci, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88945, at *15-17 and nn. 13-15
(D.N.J. June 25, 2013) (detailing the Jenkins rule as applied to
the § 2254 claims raised by New Jersey state prisoners).
5

The AEDPA statute of limitations is also subject to equitable
tolling.

See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010); Miller, 145

F.3d at 618.

“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the

burden of establishing two elements: (a) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (b) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; see also Holland, 560

U.S. 631. Unlike in the state forum with regard to PCR limitations
period, a litigant’s excusable neglect cannot trigger equitable
tolling under the AEDPA.

See Merritt, 326 F.3d at 168; Jones v.

Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

Rather, equitable

tolling could be triggered only when “the principles of equity
would make the rigid application of a limitation period unfair,
such as when a state prisoner faces extraordinary circumstances
that prevent him from filing a timely habeas petition and the
prisoner

has

exercised

reasonable

investigate and bring his claims.”

diligence

in

attempting

to

LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271,

275-276 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Holland, 560 U.S. at ___; 130 S.
Ct. at 2562 (relying on Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).
where

extraordinary

circumstances

do

exist,

Moreover, even

“[i]f

the

person

seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in
attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the
link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the
failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary circumstances
therefore did not prevent timely filing.”
6

Brown v. Shannon, 322

F.3d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d
129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Here, Petitioner’s submission is silent as to any basis for
equitable tolling.

While the Court recognizes that the gap-time

between the expiration of Petitioner’s AEDPA period and his filing
of PCR application was a relatively short time span of three weeks,
i.e., from December 20, 2007, to January 10, 2008, the facts that:
(a) Petitioner failed file a “protective” § 2254 application prior
to December 20, 2007, or – at the very least – right upon
recognizing that the filing of his PCR application took place after
the expiration of his AEDPA period;4 and, moreover, (b) Petitioner
waited at least six and a half months after the Supreme Court of
New Jersey denied him certification as to his PCR application on
November 16, 2012, before executing the instant Petition on April
26, 2013,5 prevent the Court from finding a viable basis for
equitable tolling.

See Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 89 (equitable tolling

4

The Supreme Court observed that, in the event that a
state prisoner is “reasonably confused” as to whether his
petition would be timely, that prisoner could file a protective §
2254 petition. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-417. “A prisoner . . .
might avoid [dismissal of his federal habeas petition on the
grounds of untimeliness] by filing a 'protective' petition in
federal court.” Id. (citation omitted).
5

The Clerk received the Petition only on May 10, 2013.
See Docket Entry No. 1. However, without making a factual filing
to that effect, the Court presumes that the Petition was
submitted to Petitioner’s prison officials on April 26, 2013, and
thus became subject to the prisoners’ mail-box rule the same day.
7

is warranted only where the inmate’s actions show that he “has not
been “sleeping on his rights’” throughout both the state direct and
PCR process, as well as in seeking § 2254 habeas review) (quoting
Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 331 (3d Cir. 2012)).
In

light

of

the

foregoing,

dismissal as facially untimely.6

the

Petition

is

subject

to

However, out of an abundance of

caution, the Court will allow Petitioner an opportunity to state
his grounds for equitable tolling, if any, and to show that he is
subjected to such continuing collateral consequences that prevent
his Petition from being rendered moot.7
III.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be
taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

6

Moreover, even if Petitioner has grounds for equitable
tolling which he, inadvertently, omitted to state in his
Petition, the Petition appears moot since Petitioner’s sentence
under attack expired, the latest, on August 11, 2013, even if
Petitioner was never paroled on that sentence. Thus, unless
Petitioner establishes “continuing collateral consequences” of
the expired sentence he is attacking in this proceedings, his
Petition should be dismissed as moot. The collateral
consequences cognizable in such a scenario are limited to a
showing of a “wrongful criminal conviction.” Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998). Notably, the probation or parole effects
cannot amount to “continuing collateral consequences” preventing
dismissal on the mootness grounds. See United States v.
Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2002).
7

Since Petitioner is a pro se litigant, he need not make a
formal response to this Court’s order, and a written statement
detailing all relevant Petitioner’s facts shall suffice.
8

A

certificate

of

appealability

may

issue

“only

if

the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

“A petitioner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason
could

disagree

with

the

district

court’s

resolution

of

his

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues
presented

are

adequate

to

deserve

encouragement

to

further.”

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).

proceed
“When the

district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a
COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000).
Here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that this
Court was correct in its finding that the Petition, as drafted, is
untimely and, in addition, suggests that Petitioner’s claims might
have

been

rendered

moot.

Accordingly,

no

certificate

of

appealability will issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition will be dismissed with

prejudice.

No certificate of appealability will issue.
9

The Court

will retain temporary jurisdiction over this matter to address
Petitioner’s written statement as to the untimeliness and mootness
issues.

An appropriate Order follows.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: October 10, 2013

10