SANDERS v. LANIGAN
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 1/7/2014. (nz, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
MICHAEL SANDERS,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-3277 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
GARY M. LANIGAN,
:
:
Defendant.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUMB, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s
submission of a civil complaint (“Complaint”), seeking relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff’s application to prosecute
this matter in forma pauperis.
See Docket Entry No. 1.
Based
upon Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant him
in forma pauperis status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and
will order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
In
conjunction with the foregoing, the Court must review the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to
determine whether Plaintiff states cognizable claims or whether
the complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
For the reasons detailed below, the Complaint will be
dismissed as meritless, and no leave to amend will issue.
I.
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
The Complaint is pithy.
All that Plaintiff has alleged is
his belief that his due process rights must have been violated by
the Department of Corrections because: (a) Plaintiff was
sentenced under New Jersey state law pursuant to the “No Early
Release Act” (“NERA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:43-7.2 (which imposes a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment); and (b) he was either
earning or entitled to earn so-called “work credits” which,
because of the operation of the NERA, could not be applied to –
and, thus, reduce – his sentence.
Plaintiff, therefore, asserted
that he was entitled to monetary compensation for the “work
credits” that could not be applied to him by operation of the
NERA.
As a remedy in this action, Plaintiff seeks monetary
compensation for credits earned.
See Docket Entry No. 1, at 3.
He named, as the sole Defendant in this action, the Commissioner
of the Department of Corrections, clarifying that this
designation was made solely on the basis of the Commissioners
supervisory position.
II.
See id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must construe it liberally.
U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
The Court need not, however, credit a pro
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se plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.”
Id. The
Court must“take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009), and
accept as true all of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations, see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11
(3d Cir. 2009), while disregarding any conclusory allegations.
See id.
Once the well-pleaded facts have been distilled and the
conclusory allegations are fully factored out, the Court must
determine whether these well-pled facts “are sufficient to show
that plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’”
Fowler, 578
F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claim cannot be properly assessed without a
brief review of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions.
The “Parole Book” issued by New Jersey State Parole Board
clarifies as follows:
How do I get time off (reduce) my eligibility date?
There are four (4) other kinds of credits that will
take time off (reduce) a parole eligibility date if you
do not have a mandatory-minimum term:
(a)
Commutation Credits (“Good Time” [Credits]):
Commutation credits are determined based on a
statutory schedule [providing a formula for their
calculation]. You can lose some or all of these
credits if you are found guilty of a
disciplinary charge(s). . . .
(b)
Work Credits: For every five (5) days you work,
you earn one work credit [that is, a reduction of
your prison term, not a monetary remuneration].
3
http://www.state.nj.us/parole/docs/AdultParoleHandbook.pdf.1
The statute underlying this rule provides:
Each adult inmate sentenced to a term of incarceration
. . . shall become primarily eligible for parole after
having served [his/her] statutory mandatory minimum
term, or one-third of [his/her] sentence imposed where
no mandatory minimum term has been imposed less
commutation time . . . and credits for . . . .
[C]ommutation and work credits shall not in any way
reduce any . . . mandatory minimum term and such
credits accrued shall only be awarded subsequent to the
expiration of the term.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.51(a).
Hence, the phrase “work credit” is a term of art implying
not a salary-like monetary compensation but a prison-term
reduction allowed to eligible inmates who perform work.
See
Merola v Dep’t of Corr., 285 N.J. Super. 501, 509-510 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 519 (1996)
(“The Legislature has enacted unambiguous statutes prohibiting
the reduction of mandatory minimum sentences through the
application of commutation and work credits. . . .
The
Administrative Code reiterates this statutory mandate [and]
provides that ‘[i]n no case may commutation credits [or] work
credits be used to reduce a maximum sentence to a period of
incarceration that is less than the judicial or statutory
1
Accord N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-92 (“Compensation for
inmates . . . may be in the form of cash or remission of time
from sentence or both. Such remission from the time of sentence
shall not exceed one day for each five days of productive
occupation . . . .”).
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mandatory minimum term’”) (citations and original ellipsis
omitted).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff invites this Court to, de facto: (a) circumvent
the bar imposed by the state statutory regime; and (b) “convert”
the prison-term reduction to which Plaintiff is not eligible into
monetary damages to which Plaintiff would be eligible.
This
Court declines to do so.
To start, a suit by a private party seeking to impose a
liability which must be paid from public funds in a state
treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment,
unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the state itself
or by federal statute.
See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 663 (1974); accord Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Similarly, absent consent by
a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal court suits for
money damages against state officers in their official
capacities, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985), and
Section 1983 cannot override a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Hence, for
this reason alone, Plaintiff’s claim against the Commissioner (or
Department of Corrections, or the State of New Jersey, or its
5
Legislature or Parole Board, if these entities were implied as
defendants in this matter) must be dismissed.2
Next, neither states, nor governmental entities that are
considered arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor
state officers sued in their official capacities for money
damages are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.3
See Will v.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70-71 and n.10
(1989).
Furthermore, the New Jersey state court clarified that only
an inmate, who is subject to a mandatory minimum term who: (a)
earns work credits; and (b) whose mandatory minimum term expires,
“may be entitled to payment for [the] work he performs [if] he
does not receive the benefit of remission of his sentence” on the
basis of these work credits.
Salvador v. Dep’t of Corr., 378
2
In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against the Commissioner,
based solely on the theory of respondeat superior, are facially
deficient and must be dismissed as such. “A defendant in a civil
rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.” Solan v. Ranck, 326 F. App'x 97, 100-01
(3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 884 (2009); see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (same).
3
Hence, Plaintiff’s claim against the Commissioner (or
Department of Corrections, or the State of New Jersey, or its
Legislature or Parole Board, if they entities were implied as
defendants in this matter) must be dismissed on this ground too.
6
N.J. Super. 467, 470 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (citing N.J.S.A.
30:4-92), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 295 (2005).4
Moreover, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to “renegotiate” his terms of employ; in fact, Plaintiff has no
constitutional right in obtaining or retaining any form of prison
employment.
See Mimms v. U.N.I.C.O.R., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20389 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2010), aff’d 386 F. App’x 32 (3d Cir.
2010); see also Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65
F.3d 48 (5th Cir. 1995); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627 (3d Cir.
1989); Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 1982);
Johnson v. Fauver, 559 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (D.N.J. 1983); Merola,
285 N.J. Super. at 513 (relying on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974), for the due process “work credit” analysis).
A
fortiori, Plaintiff has no constitutional right in obtaining an
employment with the set of compensatory terms to his liking.
Finally, while the type of claim raised by Plaintiff here is
an infrequent one, the courts in this District have consistently
rejected it as meritless.
See Geiger v. Balicki, 2012 U.S. Dist.
4
Since, here, the Complaint makes it abundantly clear that
Plaintiff has not served his minimum term, he is not entitled to
the funds under the Salvador rule. Accord https://www6.state.nj.
us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1044419&n=0 (indicating that Plaintiff is
serving a prison term imposed on November 15, 2002, and his
mandatory minimum period under that sentence is 12 years, 9
months and 1 day). Once Plaintiff’s mandatory minimum term is
completed, he may file a new and separate Section 1983 complaint
asserting the facts underlying his Salvador-based claim, if any.
7
LEXIS 53849 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2012); Johnson v. New Jersey Dep’t
of Corr., 2006 WL 1644807 (D.N.J. June 02, 2006); see also Lawton
v. Ortiz, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66905 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2006).
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations will be dismissed as
asserting a challenge against an official immune from the
requested relief or, in alternative, for failure to state a
substantive claim upon which relief can be granted.
V.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Before conclusively dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the courts must consider whether a leave
to amend should issue in light of the facts and claims raised in
each particular matter.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962).
Here, this Court’s issuance of leave to amend would be
futile since his Complaint states all the relevant facts and
makes it abundantly clear that these facts cannot support a
viable challenge.
Therefore, no leave to amend will issue.
See
Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107,
121 (3d Cir. 2000); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514,
519 (3d Cir. 1988).
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VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in this matter in forma pauperis will be granted.
Complaint will be dismissed; such dismissal will be with
prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: January 7, 2014
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His
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