ADAMS et al v. MUNIAK et al

Filing 11

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 12/30/2014. (drw)n.m.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

QUINCELL ADAMS, RICHARD
TORO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROSELLEN G. MUNIAK, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 13-4523 (JBS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Quincell Adams, Pro Se
#287178D/653151
Richard Toro, Pro Se
#311162E/654777
South Woods State Prison
215 South Burlington Rd
Bridgeton, NJ 08302

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
On February 20, 2014, this Court filed an Opinion and Order
dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, without prejudice, and closing
this case (Docket Items 2, 3).

Plaintiffs Quincell Adams and

Richard Toro were given the opportunity to refile. On May 27,
2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend, including a proposed
Amended Complaint (Docket Item 6) to address deficiencies as
stated in this Court’s February 20, 2014 Opinion. The case was
reopened on June 5, 2014 (Docket Item 7).

This Court must now screen the Motion and proposed Amended
Complaint to determine if Plaintiffs’ renewed claims should
proceed or be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). For the following reasons,
the Court finds that the claims shall be dismissed in part as to
claims for illegal seizure of property and interference with
Sixth Amendment rights, while the claim for interference with
access to courts will be permitted to proceed.
BACKGROUND
In Plaintiffs’ original complaint, they pled the following
facts, as set forth in this Court’s dismissal Opinion:
Plaintiffs state that on September 13, 2012,
defendant Rosellen Muniak, the Law Librarian and
defendant Sargeant M. Sheppard, employees of the South
Woods State Prison, along with a John Doe defendant,
violated their constitutional rights by reading and
inspecting and confiscating their legal materials,
writing a “bogus” disciplinary report to have legal
materials confiscated, restricting Plaintiffs’ access
to courts by correspondence, limited use of law
reference materials, “deprived the Plaintiffs his
[sic] responsibility to use the service of an attorney
honest[ly] and fairly,” deprived them of the right to
assist other prisoners, deprived them of use of
photocopying services, “not informing the Plaintiffs
of the rules and procedures concerning the operation
of the correctional facility,” and conspired under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. (Complaint, Docket Item 1 at
p. 19).
In particular, Plaintiffs state that a violation
of their First Amendment rights occurred when
defendants allegedly violated New Jersey
Administrative Code 10A:18-3.2. This allegation
appears to be based on Defendants’ statement on a
2

disciplinary report, which said, “During a review of
data on disk, . . . .” (Complt. at p. 4). Plaintiffs
state that the disk contained legal materials and was
confiscated. They allege:
The defendant has violated the Plaintiff’s
First Amendment Rights by confiscating the
Plaintiff’s legal materials. A disc that
contains legal materials of legal petitions
addressed to the Monmouth County Superior
Courts and Camden Municipal Courts to
redress of grievances. By the defendant to
confiscate legal materials from the
Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs were unable to
petition the courts for a redress of
grievances. The Plaintiffs has [sic]
outstanding warrants [in] Monmouth County
Superior Courts and Camden Municipal Courts.
(Id.). They also allege a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and state that Plaintiffs were “unable to
work on his legal petitions for a redress of
grievances that he was preparing to the courts, so
that his incarceration would not restrict his
liberty.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs seek monetary relief for these alleged
violations of their First Amendment rights. (Complt.
at p. 21).
(Opinion, Docket Item 2 at pp. 2-3).
This Court dismissed the claims without prejudice, finding
that Plaintiffs had not stated a claim for a constitutional
violation of denial of access to courts. This Court noted:
“Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint is unclear as to which Plaintiff
was affected by the alleged wrongdoing, and whether or not
either Plaintiff suffered ‘actual injury.’” (Opinion, Docket
Item 2 at p. 8).
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In the submission intending to cure these deficiencies,
Plaintiffs state that during the pendency of their criminal
charges, they worked with an inmate paralegal at the South Woods
State Prison. In the course of the legal work, the inmate
paralegal received a disciplinary report, and a disk with
Plaintiffs’ legal material was confiscated and read by
Defendants Muniak (the law librarian) and Sheppard (a Sergeant).
Because the disk was confiscated, it could not be sent to the
courts in connection with Plaintiffs’ pending criminal charges.
Proof that the legal material was read is found in the inmate
paralegal’s discipline report, which states that the data on the
disk was reviewed. (Amended Complaint, Docket Item 6-1 and
Exhibit B).
Plaintiffs assert that their right to access the courts,
their property rights, and their right to counsel were violated
by the actions of Defendants. In response to this Court’s prior
Opinion ordering that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint show “actual
injury,” Plaintiffs state:
In this complaint, the plaintiffs [were] harmed by
these defendants’ actions by the following:
A) Based on the advantage defendants and others gained
by reading the plaintiffs’ confiscated legal
materials.
B) These defendants used the plaintiffs’ confidential
legal materials as evidence for a disciplinary report
for a paralegal that was assisting these plaintiffs .
. . .
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C) The defendants stopped the Plaintiff from being
able to assert “non frivolous claim” by the
confiscation of the plaintiffs’ confidential legal
materials. The plaintiffs has or have outstanding
pending criminal charges that they will be unable to
go to camps or the ½ house with these pending criminal
charges . . . .
The plaintiff has suffered arguable actionable harm
when the plaintiff wished to bring their petitions
before the courts, but the plaintiff stymied by the
inadequacies by the defendants.
The defendants also caused the plaintiffs Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress . . . .
(Am. Complt. at pp. 8-9).
Plaintiffs ask for monetary and other relief.
DISCUSSION
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§

801-810,

110

Stat.

1321-66

to

1321-77

(April

26,

1996)

(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e.

The

PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant

who

is

immune

from

such
5

relief.

This

action

is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) and § 1915A because Plaintiffs are prisoners and are
proceeding as indigents.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
screening

for

failure

to

state

a

To survive sua sponte

claim,1

the

complaint

must

allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible.
(3d

Cir.

2009)

plausibility
allows

the

Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

(citation

when
court

the
to

omitted).

plaintiff
draw

the

“A

pleads

claim

factual

reasonable

Partners,

(quoting

Iqbal,

Inc.,

708

556

U.S.

F.3d
at

470,
678).

483

n.17

Moreover,

facial

content

inference

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Inv.

has

that

that

the

Belmont v. MB
(3d

Cir.

while

2012)

pro

se

pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must

1

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.
App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
2.

Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
3.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Amended Complaint
Applying the framework set forth in this Court’s Opinion

filed on February 20, 2014, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint cures
the deficiencies of the original complaint with respect to their
claim for denial of access to the courts, which may proceed, but
not with respect to their claim that the disk was improperly
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seized and their claim that their Sixth Amendment rights were
violated.
a. Denial of Access to the Courts
First, as set forth in the February 20, 2014 Opinion,
inmates may only proceed on access to court claims with respect
to (1) challenges to their sentences (direct or collateral), (2)
conditions of confinement cases, and (3) pending criminal
charges. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354–55 (1996)
(recognizing inmates' right to access courts “to attack their
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge
the conditions of their confinement”); Hargis v. Atl. Cnty.
Justice Facility, Civ. No. 10–1006, 2010 WL 1999303, *6 (D.N.J.
May 18, 2010) (recognizing inmate's additional right to access
courts “with respect to legal assistance and participation in
one's own defense against pending criminal charges”)(other
citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
indicates that they had pending criminal charges; that the disk
contained material they needed to send to the courts regarding
their charges; that the legal materials could resolve their
cases; and that so long as the municipal court matters are
pending and unresolved they are held in a higher security
classification and are “unable to go to the camps or 1/2 house.”
Because the Plaintiffs allege that the seizure of these
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materials affects their custody status, their claim for
interference with access to the courts may proceed. Plaintiffs
will each have the burden of coming forward with admissible
evidence that proves these allegations of actual harm from
interference with access to the courts; the Court at this time
merely holds that such a claim is plausible and may proceed.
b. Improper Seizure of Property
As to Plaintiffs’ claims that the disk was improperly
seized, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim turns on whether they had
an available post-deprivation process and remedy. See Revel v.
Port Auth., 598 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2010). Revel stands for the
legal proposition that if a pre-deprivation hearing is not
required and a plaintiff fails to avail himself of the state's
constitutionally adequate post-deprivation procedures, there is
no deprivation of procedural due process rights. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (finding that when a state
officer randomly and without authorization departs from
established state procedures, the state need only provide postdeprivation procedures); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543
(1981) (holding that a state tort claim (e.g., replevin) was an
adequate remedy for a prisoner aggrieved by prison officials'
actions of depriving the prisoner of his property). Here,
Plaintiffs state that they were not given any confiscation
9

sheets when the legal disk was taken from the paralegal;
however, they also do not offer any steps they took to get the
material back, or whether or not the material was, or could, be
duplicated.
In fact, attached to the Amended Complaint is a Remedy Form
wherein Plaintiff Adams was advised to fill out the appropriate
form for Lost or Damaged Property. (Am. Complt., Exhibit D).
Plaintiffs do not submit evidence that they did so. Thus, this
Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants’
actions rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Their
claim for improper seizure of property without due process will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
c. Violation of Sixth Amendment Rights
In addition, to the extent Plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment that their Sixth Amendment rights were violated, see 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (Federal Declaratory Judgment Act), they are not
entitled to such relief. Where a state criminal prosecution has
begun before initiation of a federal declaratory judgment
action, equitable principles preclude the granting of
declaratory relief that might disrupt state criminal proceedings
except in very unusual circumstances, where the plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law in the state criminal proceeding or where
necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury. See Samuels
10

v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). Again, Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that would
justify the granting of declaratory relief that might interfere
with their pending criminal proceedings. Their claim for
violation of Sixth Amendment rights will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons discussed in
this Court’s Opinion filed February 20, 2014, Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted as to alleged improper seizure
of property without due process and violation of Sixth Amendment
rights, while the Amended Complaint may proceed with regard to
alleged denial of access to the courts. As such, Plaintiffs’
Motion to Amend is granted in part (denial of access to the
courts) and otherwise is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated:

December 30, 2014

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