ADAMS et al v. MUNIAK et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/20/2014. (bdk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
QUINCELL ADAMS, RICHARD
TORO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROSELLEN G. MUNIAK, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 13-4523 (JBS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Quincell Adams, Pro Se
287178D/653151
Richard Toro, Pro Se
311162E
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Road South
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
Plaintiffs, Quincell Adams and Richard Toro, confined at the
South Woods State Prison, Bridgeton, New Jersey, submitted this
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their
constitutional rights.
Each Plaintiff has provided an in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) application and account statement.
Based on the
IFP applications, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ IFP requests
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to
file the complaint.
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it should be dismissed as
frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed,
without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs state that on September 13, 2012, defendant Rosellen
Muniak, the Law Librarian and defendant Sargeant M. Sheppard,
employees of the South Woods State Prison, along with a John Doe
defendant, violated their constitutional rights by reading and
inspecting and confiscating their legal materials, writing a “bogus”
disciplinary report to have legal materials confiscated, restricting
Plaintiffs’ access to courts by correspondence, limited use of law
reference materials, “deprived the Plaintiffs his [sic]
responsibility to use the service of an attorney honest[ly] and
fairly,” deprived them of the right to assist other prisoners,
deprived them of use of photocopying services, “not informing the
Plaintiffs of the rules and procedures concerning the operation of
the correctional facility,” and conspired under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and
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1986. (Complaint, Docket Item 1 at p. 19).
In particular, Plaintiffs state that a violation of their First
Amendment rights occurred when Defendants allegedly violated New
Jersey Administrative Code 10A:18-3.2. This allegation appears to
be based on Defendants’ statement on a disciplinary report, which
said, “During a review of data on disk, . . . .” (Complt. at p. 4).
Plaintiffs state that the disk contained legal materials and was
confiscated.
They allege:
The defendant has violated the Plaintiff’s First Amendment
Rights by confiscating the Plaintiff’s legal materials.
A disc that contains legal materials of legal petitions
addressed to the Monmouth County Superior Courts and
Camden Municipal Courts to redress of grievances. By the
defendant to confiscate legal materials from the
Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs were unable to petition the
courts for a redress of grievances. The Plaintiffs has
[sic] outstanding warrants [in] Monmouth County Superior
Courts and Camden Municipal Courts.
(Id.). They also allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
state that Plaintiffs were “unable to work on his legal petitions
for a redress of grievances that he was preparing to the courts, so
that his incarceration would not restrict his liberty.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs seek monetary relief for these alleged violations
of their First Amendment rights. (Complt. at p. 21).
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DISCUSSION
1.
Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a
district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against
a governmental employee or entity.
The Court must identify
cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiffs are prisoners proceeding as
indigents.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court
must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also United States v. Day,
969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.2d 868 (2009).
The Court
examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
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provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Fed.
Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the proposition that “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that,
to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(citing
Iqbal, supra).
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are plausible.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 677-679.
See also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, &
n.3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011);
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012).
“A complaint must
do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
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Fowler,
578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)).
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2.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania,
36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d
560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
3.
Plaintiffs’ Claims
The Constitution guarantees inmates a right of access to the
courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that “the fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
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assistance from persons trained in the law.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346
(quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (internal
quotations omitted)). This right is not, however, unlimited. Inmates
may only proceed on access to court claims with respect to (1)
challenges to their sentences (direct or collateral), (2) conditions
of confinement cases, and (3) pending criminal charges. See Lewis,
518 U.S. at 354–55 (recognizing inmates' right to access courts “to
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement”); Hargis v. Atl. Cnty.
Justice Facility, Civ. No. 10–1006, 2010 WL 1999303, *6 (D.N.J. May
18, 2010) (recognizing inmate's additional right to access courts
“with respect to legal assistance and participation in one's own
defense against pending criminal charges”) (citing May v. Sheahan,
226 F.3d 876, 883–84 (7th Cir. 2000) and Caldwell v. Hall, Civ. No.
97–8069, 2000 WL 343229 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2000)).
Additionally, an inmate must show that the lack of meaningful
access to the courts caused him past or imminent “actual injury”.
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350–52; Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177–
78 (3d Cir. 1997); Hargis, 2010 WL 1999303, *6. To do this, he must
identify an “arguable,” “nonfrivolous” underlying cause of action,
either anticipated or lost, and show that the prison's deficient
program frustrated his efforts to litigate that action. See Lewis,
at 351–53; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing
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Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3)). To satisfy the “actual injury”
requirement,
[An inmate] might show, for example, that a complaint he
prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some
technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in
the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not
have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable
harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was
so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was
unable to file even a complaint.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Conclusory allegations that an inmate
suffered prejudice will not support an access-to-courts claim. See
Arce v. Walker, 58 F. Supp.2d 39, 44 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal
citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint is unclear as to which Plaintiff
was affected by the alleged wrongdoing, and whether or not either
Plaintiff suffered “actual injury.”
As noted above, a plaintiff’s
constitutional claim under § 1983 for denial of access to the courts
may only proceed if the interference relates to the plaintiff's
challenges to his criminal sentences (direct or collateral), a
conditions of confinement claim, and/or pending criminal charges.
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354–55. In this case, Plaintiffs allege that
either one or both of them were subject to outstanding warrants, but
do not allege that the confiscation of the disk somehow caused “actual
injury” to any criminal case. Throughout the complaint, Plaintiffs
toggle between use of the word “plaintiff” and “plaintiffs,” making
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it difficult for this Court to ascertain whether or not either or
both of their claims should proceed.
Further, as to Defendants’ alleged violation of New Jersey’s
Administrative Code, the Code cited by Plaintiffs, 10A:18-3.2,
states only that outgoing legal correspondence from prisoners must
be clearly marked with the inmate’s name and number, that the inmate
is responsible for clearly marking the mail as “legal mail” or must
be addressed so as to clearly indicate that it is being sent to a
legal correspondent.”
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-3.2 (Identification of
outgoing legal correspondence). This Code does not infer a duty on
the prison staff, but rather on the inmate. Further, Plaintiffs do
not offer that the legal mail in question was clearly marked.
Consequently, Plaintiffs have neither shown actual injury nor
otherwise stated a cognizable claim for relief. Therefore, the
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state
a claim.1
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Likewise, all claims alleged by Plaintiffs in this complaint
fail to state a claim, as they do not pass muster under Iqbal;
Plaintiffs do not assert “sufficient factual matter” to show that
the claims are facially plausible. Nor do they specify which claim
concerns which Plaintiff and which Defendant. Plaintiffs may
revisit these claims in an amended complaint, should they decide to
file one in accordance with the Order accompanying this Opinion.
However, Plaintiffs are urged to respect the rules of joinder
concerning federal actions.
Rule 20(a)(2) controls the permissive joinder of defendants in
pro se prisoner actions as well as other civil actions.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ complaint must be
dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated: February 20, 2014
Persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law. or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a); See also, e.g., Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252
Fed. App’x 436 (3d Cir. 2007); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th
Cir. 2007).
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