ADAMS et al v. MUNIAK et al
Filing
56
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 11/21/2016. (tf, n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
QUINCELL ADAMS, RICHARD TORO,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 13-04523 (JBS/AMD)
v.
ROSELLEN G. MUNIAK, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Quincell Adams
South Woods State Prison
215 South Burlington Road
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
PRO SE
Richard Toro
South Woods State Prison
215 South Burlington Road
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
PRO SE
Matthew Jon Lynch
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
Division of Law
25 Market Street
P.O. BOX 112
Trenton, NJ 08624
Attorney for Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant
Rosellen Muniak and Defendant Sargent M. Sheppard’s
(collectively “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). [Docket Item No. 53.] Plaintiffs
appearing pro se have not opposed this motion. There was no oral
argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons stated below, the
motion is granted.
Plaintiffs Quincell Adams (“Plaintiff Adams”) and Richard
Toro (“Plaintiff Toro”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that
on September 13, 2012, Defendant Rosellen Muniak, the Law
Librarian, and Defendant Sargent M. Sheppard, employees of the
South Woods State Prison (“Defendants”), violated their
constitutional rights by reading and inspecting and confiscating
their legal materials, writing a frivolous disciplinary report
in order to have legal materials confiscated, restricting their
access to courts, and depriving Plaintiffs of their Sixth
Amendment rights by denying them the service of an attorney.
(Complaint, Docket Item 1 at p. 19.) This Court dismissed
without prejudice Plaintiff’s original Complaint, filed July 26,
2013, [Docket Item 1] for failure to state a claim for which
relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
and § 1915A(b)(1). [Docket Item 2.]
Plaintiffs filed an amended Complaint on May 27, 2014,
alleging Defendants violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by (1) interfering with access to courts, (2) illegally seizing
property, and (3) interfering with Sixth Amendment right to
2
counsel. [Docket Item 6.] This Court issued an Order and Opinion
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims
except for their denial of access to the courts claim. Adams v.
Muniak, No. 13-4523, 2014 WL 7404536, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
2014). The Court permitted the denial of access to courts claim
because Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged “that the seizure of
materials affect[ed] their custody status.” Id. Discovery has
been concluded and Defendants now move for summary judgment on
this claim.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are both inmates incarcerated at South Woods
State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey. (Adams Dep. 12:4-6; Toro
Dep. 28:6.) Plaintiff Adams is currently serving a twelve year
and nine month sentence for Conspiracy to Commit Murder. (Adams
Dep. 12:4-6; 15:25-16:7.) Plaintiff Toro is currently serving a
ten year sentence on four counts of Robbery in the First Degree.
(Toro Dep. 28:3-5.)
A. Confiscation of Legal Materials
Plaintiffs allege that during the pendency of their
criminal charges, they worked with Keith Ashley-Drake, an inmate
paralegal at the South Woods State Prison.1 [Docket Item 6.] On
1
It is unclear whether Ashley-Drake was actually a paralegal, but
the record reflects that he was not officially working in that
position at the time of the incident. (See Def. Ex. E, New
Jersey Department of Corrections Disciplinary Report dated Sep.
3
September 10, 2012, Ashley-Drake filled out a form requesting to
borrow a floppy disk from one of the law libraries at South
Woods State Prison. (Def. Ex. D, Personal Computer Request Form
executed by Keith Ashley-Drake dated Sep. 10, 2012.) The form
stated that “[t]he disk is for your work only,” that the
“Librarian will review all material at his/her discretion,” and
that “[a]ny inappropriate material found will result in a
charge.” (Id.) Under the section of the form asking what legal
work the disk was being used for, Ashley-Drake wrote “motions.”
(Id.) On September 13, 2012, Ashley-Drake was issued a
disciplinary infraction charge for possession of another’s
property. (Def. Ex. E, New Jersey Department of Corrections
Disciplinary Report dated Sep. 13, 2012.) As a result of this
charge, the disk Ashley-Drake borrowed from the law library was
confiscated. (Id.) The disciplinary report stated that Defendant
Muniak, as law librarian, reviewed the data on the disk when
Ashley-Drake submitted the disk for printing. (Id.) The report
stated that Ashley-Drake was “not working on the paralegal
detail at this time.” (Id.) Neither Plaintiff Adams nor Toro
were present in the law library when the disk was confiscated.
(Adams Dep. 28:11-18; Toro Dep. 40:10-24.)
13, 2012 stating that Ashley-Drake was “not working on the
paralegal detail at this time.”).
4
Plaintiff Adams claims that the confiscated disk had legal
work related to his open detainer for failure to pay a traffic
fine, but he testified that he does not actually know what was
on the disk. (Adams Dep. 36:15-20; 38:21-24.) Plaintiff Toro
alleges that that the disk contained legal work by Ashley-Drake
related to his outstanding detainers for drug and DUI offenses,
but he does not recall what type of court submission AshleyDrake was allegedly writing on his behalf. (Toro Dep. 102:20104:2.) Toro testified that he never actually knew what was on
the confiscated disk, or whether any material he alleges might
have been on there would have made a difference in his custody
status. (Toro Dep. at 103:7-104:14.)
B. Plaintiff Adams’ Detainers & Disposition of Warrants
In September 2012, the time at which the disk was
confiscated from Ashley-Drake, Plaintiff Adams had an
outstanding bench warrant for failure to pay a traffic fine for
the offense of driving without a license. (Adams Dep. 18:18-22;
19:22-25.) The bench warrant was issued by Asbury Park
municipality for failure to pay a fine for driving without a
license. (Adams Dep. 18:9-14; 20:1-2.)
In response to confiscation of the disk, on March 14, 2013,
six months after the incident, Plaintiff Adams filed an Inmate
Remedy System Form on March 14, 2013. (Adams Dep. 29:15-24, Dep.
Ex. Adams-1.) The South Woods State Prison Administration
5
responded to Adams’ form by advising him to fill out a Claim for
Lost or Damaged Property. (Adams Dep. 34:1-12, Dep. Ex. Adams2.) Plaintiff Adams testified that he never filed a Claim. (Id.
at 34:4-12.) Plaintiff Adams took no further action to resolve
his Asbury Park bench warrant. (Id. at 23:21-25.) Adams
testified he had never inquired whether this bench warrant was
still active. (Id. at 24:1-3.) The records indicate that the
bench warrant was not issued until three months after the disk
was confiscated, on December 13, 2012. (Def. Ex. F, New Jersey
Automated Traffic System Printout.) The warrant is no longer
active. (Id.)
Plaintiff Adams’ custody status is currently “full
minimum.” (Def. Ex. H, Final Approval for Reduced Custody From
dated May 12, 2015.) Adams is currently housed in a camp (Adams
Dep. 24:11-14) and if he maintains his full minimum custody
status, he will be eligible to live in a halfway house when he
is two years away from his maximum release date. (Id. at 24:1725.)
C. Plaintiff Toro’s Detainers & Disposition of Warrants
At the time the disk was confiscated, September 2012,
Plaintiff Toro had outstanding detainers related to pending outof-state criminal charges on drug and DUI offenses. (Def. Ex. C,
First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Court Summary for
Richard Toro.) The Disposition dates for these offenses were
6
respectively March 17 and March 13, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff Toro
mistakenly claims he had a Fugitive From Justice charge pending
at the time of the incident (See Toro Dep. 30:7-20). His court
records show the charge was actually dismissed on April 9, 2010.
(Toro Dep., Ex. Toro-1.)
Plaintiff Toro filed two inmate remedy forms in an attempt
to obtain the disk that was confiscated from Ashley-Drake. (Toro
Dep. 54:11-16.) In response to his second form, the prison
administration sent Toro a form to file a “Claim for Lost or
Damaged Property,” which Toro testified to never filing. (Toro
Dep. 55:25-56:3-6.) Plaintiff Toro applied for relief under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IAD”) and testified that
he did not need any assistance to fill out the form because he
“didn’t have to do anything regarding the law or any research.”
(Toro Dep. 33:5-15.) Despite knowing there were inmate
paralegals in the law libraries at South Woods State Prison
whose job is to assist other inmates with their legal matters,
Plaintiff Toro admitted that he never asked for help from any of
these paralegals. (Toro Dep. 131:14-24.)
As a result of his IAD application, Toro was able to
transfer to Philadelphia County jail in order to address his
pending criminal charges for drug and DUI offenses. (Toro Dep.
30:21-32:8.) Plaintiff Toro stayed in the Philadelphia County
jail from October 2013 to March 2014. (Toro Dep. 31:21-32:5.) In
7
March 2014, Toro pled guilty to two controlled dangerous
substance offenses and two driving under the influence offenses
in Philadelphia Municipal Court. (Def. Ex. C, First Judicial
District of Pennsylvania Court Summary for Richard Toro.) For
his drug related offenses, Toro was sentenced to six to twentythree months with four years of probation with time served.
(Id.) For his DUI pleas, Toro was sentenced to seventy-two hours
to six months. (Id.)
Plaintiff Toro’s current custody status is medium because
he is still serving his ten year sentence on four counts of
Robbery in the First Degree. (Toro Dep. 28:3-5; Def. Ex. G,
South Woods State Prison Face Sheet Report for Richard Toro
dated Nov. 16, 2015.) Toro began his ten year maximum and eight
year five month and thirty day mandatory minimum sentence on
March 26, 2010. (Id.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine
whether “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment of law.”
Abraham
v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)). The party opposing summary judgment, here, Plaintiffs
Adams and Toro, “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.”
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If a
8
plaintiff fails to oppose the motion by evidence as required by
Rule 56(e), the court “will accept as true all material facts
set forth by the moving party with appropriate record support.”
Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d
168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17,
21 (1st Cir. 1989)). When, as in this case, a motion for summary
judgment is supported by competent affidavits and documentary
evidence, “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the
adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If the
nonmoving party has failed to establish a triable issue of fact,
summary judgment will be granted only if “appropriate” and only
if movants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 175.
IV.
DISCUSSION
For the following reasons, it is clear that Plaintiffs do
not have standing to bring their claim of denial of access to
courts because neither has suffered an actual injury. Therefore,
the Court will dismiss their claim and grant Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs allege they were denied access to the courts in
violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendments when
9
Defendants confiscated the floppy disk from Ashley-Drake because
they lost an opportunity to alter the condition of their
confinements. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996)
(recognizing inmates’ right to access courts “to attack their
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge
the conditions of their confinement.”). In sum, Plaintiffs argue
that they had pending criminal charges, that the confiscated
disc contained material they needed to send to the courts
regarding these charges, that such legal materials could resolve
their cases, and that so long as the municipal court matters
were pending and unresolved, Plaintiffs were held in higher
security classification. Defendants have brought this motion for
summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims should be
dismissed because neither suffered an actual injury, and thus do
not have the requisite standing to bring a claim in federal
court. (Def. MSJ at 7.) The Court agrees with Defendants;
Plaintiffs did not suffer, nor could they imminently suffer, any
harm as the result of their detainers. As such, without
suffering an actual injury, Plaintiffs have not met the standing
requirement that all federal court plaintiffs must possess.
Summary judgement is warranted.
To prove a denial of meaningful access to the courts,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) “’actual injury’ such as the
loss or rejection of a legal claim” and (2) that the lost or
10
rejected legal claim is not frivolous. Saunders v. Phila. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, 546 Fed. Appx. 68, 72 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997), and citing
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also
Ward v. Aviles, 2016 WL 1461753, at *2 (D.N.J. April 13, 2016).
Neither Plaintiff Adams nor Plaintiff Toro is able to show
he suffered an actual injury as required for an access-to-the
courts claim because (1) Plaintiff Adams’ municipal detainer
could never have prevented him from obtaining full minimum
custodial status since it was only a bench warrant, and (2)
Plaintiff Toro’s detainers never prevented him from obtaining
full minimum status because he had yet to serve half of the
mandatory minimum sentence for his robbery offense. Thus, even
if the disk had legal material that was relevant to Plaintiffs’
ability to challenge their detainers, which nothing in the
record suggests is in fact the case, Plaintiffs’ conditions of
confinement would not have changed. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
suffered no actual harm as a result of their detainers and have
no standing to bring this suit.
A. Adams’ Municipal Detainer Did Not Prevent Him From Obtaining
Full Minimum Custody Status
Plaintiff Adams’ ability to change the condition of his
confinement by challenging his detainers was not possible. At
the time the disk was seized, in September 2012, Plaintiff
Adams’ detainer from the Asbury Park Municipality had not yet
11
been issued. (See Def. Ex. F, New Jersey Automated Traffic
System Printout.) The Asbury Park bench warrant, issued as a
result of Adams’ unpaid fine for driving without a license, was
not issued until December 13, 2013, three months after the disk
was seized from Ashley-Drake. (Id.) Therefore, the confiscation
of the disk could in no way have contained legal information
related to Adams’ ability to challenge his detainer, as alleged,
since the detainer did not yet exist.
Regardless, even if the detainer had been issued at the
time the disk was seized, the detainer would not have caused any
injury to Plaintiff since a bench warrant does not impede an
inmate from obtaining full minimum status. Under the Department
of Corrections Regulations (“DOC”), N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.6(m), full
minimum custody status will not be affected by “[m]unicipal open
charges and detainers . . . provided that they are not in the
process of being increased in severity.” The Regulations
importantly note that “a reduction in custody status is a
privilege and not a right.” N.J.A.C. 10A9-4.2. Moreover, Adams
currently does possess and live in the full minimum security
camps. (Adams Dep. 22:24-24:14; Def. Ex. H, Final Approval for
Reduced Custody Form dated May 12, 2015.) As such, Plaintiff
Adams has not shown an actual injury to his custodial status and
cannot assert the requisite federal court standing. See Lewis,
518 U.S. at 354.
12
B. Toro’s Detainers Did Not Affect His Custody Status Because
He Had Yet to Serve Half of His Mandatory Minimum Sentence
None of Plaintiff Toro’s detainers were capable of
affecting his condition of confinement. First, the detainer for
his Fugitive from Justice Charge in Camden County had been
dismissed on April 9, 2010, two years prior to when the disk was
confiscated. (Toro Dep. at Exhibit Toro-1, “New Jersey Charge
Disposition Printout.”) Second, Plaintiff’s pending out-of-State
drug and DUI charges could not have affected his status.
Regardless of any detainers, Toro would not have been eligible
for full minimum status at the time the disk was confiscated
because he had yet to serve half of his mandatory minimum
sentence. According to N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.6(f), an inmate who is
sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence greater than 24 months
is not eligible for full minimum custody status unless he has
already served half the mandatory minimum sentence. Plaintiff
Toro began serving his sentence on March 26, 2010 and his
mandatory minimum sentence was for eight years, five months, and
thirty days. (Toro Dep at Exhibit Toro-1, “New Jersey Charge
Disposition Printout.”) Meaning Toro was not eligible for full
minimum custody status until around June 2014, when Toro had
already pled guilty to his out-of-State drug and DUI offenses.
(Def. Ex. C, First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Court
Summary for Richard Toro.) Thus, Plaintiff Toro has not suffered
13
actual harm sufficient to have standing in federal court. See
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
In sum, neither Plaintiff Adams nor Plaintiff Toro can
reasonably claim he suffered actual injury to his confinement
condition amounting to a meaningful denial of access to the
courts as a result of Defendants’ confiscation of Ashley-Drake’s
floppy disk. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983
claim is thus appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and
dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. An appropriate
order accompanies this Opinion.
November 21, 2016
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?