SMART v. TOWNSHIP OF WINSLOW et al

Filing 18

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/16/2015. (TH, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SALAHUDDIN F. SMART,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF WINSLOW, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 13cv4690 (RMB)
OPINION

BUMB, District Judge:
I.

BACKGROUND
When Plaintiff submitted this pro se civil rights action on

August 5, 2013, he was a prisoner at Jones Farm in West Trenton,
New Jersey. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) was denied without prejudice
after he was released from prison on October 3, 2013, because it
was unclear whether Petitioner’s ability to pay the filing fee
had changed. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff submitted a new IFP
application, but he then filed a Notice of Change of Address,
indicating that he was again incarcerated. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) The
Honorable Robert B. Kugler denied Plaintiff’s IFP application
without prejudice because Plaintiff had not submitted his
certified prison trust account statement with his IFP

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application. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff has now submitted his
certified prison trust account statement in support of his IFP
application. (ECF No. 13). Subsequently, Plaintiff was released
from prison. (ECF Nos. 14-17.)
Plaintiff has established his inability to pay the filing
fee, and the Court will grant his IFP application. (ECF No. 13.)
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), and dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
II.

THE COMPLAINT
In his Statement of Claims, Plaintiff alleged the

following:
Defendant Walter Schilling on 8/1/13
expressed his desire to have Plaintiff open
the front door of the house to record his
information. Plaintiff did not consent
therefore based on his race § 1981 claim
defendant without a warrant walk on the side
of property made a visual observation
through a window invading my privacy.
Observing no indications of a possible
burglary in progress he contacted backup
thereafter making a warrantless search of
the home. The searches both separate of the
property was not justified by exigent
circumstances. Subsequently without a
reasonable belief that warrantless entry in
response to a generalized assertion of
possible scene of burglary plaintiff was
subjected to illegal investigative detention
followed by a unlawful patdown frisk.
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Thereafter a fourth illegal search by
breaking in rooms of the home and searching
the computer used by plaintiff. There was
also a unlawful seizure of (110) one hundred
ten lawfully prescribed prescription pills.
Than finally false arrest based on false
charges without probable cause and malicious
abuse of prosecution.
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9.)
As to the parties, Plaintiff alleged that on August 1,
2012, Patrolman Walter Schilling, Patrolman M. Clark, Sergeant
C. Dobler and two “John Doe” officers of the Winslow Township
Police Department conducted a series of unlawful warrantless
searches leading to Plaintiff’s arrest on false charges, and
unlawful seizure of Plaintiff’s property. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 7,
8.) Plaintiff also sued Robert Shimelski, in his official
capacity as the Chief of Police at Winslow Township Police
Department, alleging Shimelski failed to properly train and
supervise police officers regarding searches and seizures. (Id.
at 5.) Plaintiff claimed Shimelski personally directed the
actions of his subordinates with respect to the unlawful
searches, seizures and arrest on August 1, 2012. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff sued Assistant Camden County Prosecutor Raul
Rivera, in his individual capacity, alleging a civil RICO claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also alleged
constitutional claims against Rivera, in his official capacity,
for unlawful seizure of Plaintiff’s property on May 2, 2013, and

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for malicious prosecution. (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff alleged
Camden County Prosecutor Warren Faulk is liable in his
supervisory capacity because he personally directed the unlawful
seizure of Plaintiff’s personal property. (Id.)
As to his civil RICO claim, Plaintiff alleged Faulk
conspired with Rivera, at Plaintiff’s March 22, 2013, and May 3,
2013 court hearings, to take Plaintiff’s lawful property by
extortion in the guise of a global plea deal, and this
constituted racketeering activity in violation of RICO. (Id. at
6, 9-10.) Plaintiff alleged the Camden County Office of the
Prosecutor is the enterprise used in the racketeering activity.
(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff also brought a § 1983 claim against the Camden
County Office of the Prosecutor, alleging that the “Office knew”
prosecutors would frequently involve themselves in illegal
global plea deal practices; and “a final policymaker had
knowledge or constructive knowledge of a policy or custom on
unconstitutionally inadequate training or supervision of the
Office of the Prosecutor.” (ECF No. 1 at 3, 9.)
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
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must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
“[A] court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint.” Id. A court need not accept legal
conclusions as true. Id. Legal conclusions, together with
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not
suffice to state a claim. Id. Thus, “a court considering a
motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. “While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If a complaint can be
remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the
complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Grayson
v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B.

Section 1981 Claim

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides:
(a) Statement of equal rights
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All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
“To state a claim under § 1981, a party must allege facts
sufficient to show: ‘(1) [he] is a member of a racial minority;
(2) intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the
defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the
activities enumerated in the statute . . .’” Gross v. R.T.
Reynolds, Inc., 487 F.App’x 711, 716 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(quoting Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted in
original)). A complaint that fails to state any facts in support
of the conclusion that the wrongful acts by the defendants were
motivated by discriminatory animus fails to state a plausible §
1981 claim. Id. at 716-17.
Plaintiff alleged only that Defendant Walter Schilling
asked Plaintiff to open the front door of his home, and when he
did not consent, based on Plaintiff’s race, Schilling made a
visual observation through a window, and then conducted a
warrantless search of the home. Plaintiff has not alleged any

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facts in support of his claim that Schilling’s conduct was
motivated by racial discrimination. Therefore, the Court will
dismiss the § 1981 claim without prejudice.
C.

Section 1983 Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 “does not create substantive rights.”
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 n. 11 (1980).

It provides,

in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any
citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . .
“[T]o state a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) the alleged wrongful conduct was committed
by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Nicini
v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000). A plaintiff,
therefore, must establish violation of an underlying
constitutional or statutory right. Id. The first step in
analyzing such a claim is to “identify the exact contours of the
underlying right said to have been violated.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5 (1998).

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1.

Unlawful Search and Seizure

Plaintiff alleged Patrolman Walter Schilling, Patrolman M.
Clark, Sergeant C. Dobler, John Doe (female officer), and John
Doe (Lieutenant) entered the home where Plaintiff was staying
without a warrant, and conducted an unlawful warrantless search
of Plaintiff’s room and his computer. Warrantless searches of a
home are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 587–88 (1980)). Plaintiff further alleged
the officers did not observe anything suspicious for burglary to
justify warrantless entry. The Court will proceed the unlawful
search and seizure claims against Defendants Schilling, Clark,
Dobler and Does, in their individual capacities.1 See Broadwater
v. Fow, 945 F.Supp.2d 574, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (proceeding §
1983 unlawful search claim based on allegation of warrantless
entry into home).
Plaintiff further alleged that Robert Shimelski, the Chief
of Police of Winslow Township Police Department, as a
supervisor, personally directed the warrantless entry by the
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Plaintiff also sued these Defendants in their official
capacities. Claims against municipal employees in their official
capacities are tantamount to claims against the entity, and
should be addressed as Monell claims against the entity.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (a suit under
Section 1983 against a municipal officer in his or her official
capacity is, in actuality, a suit against the municipality that
the officer represents). The official capacity claims against
these police officers will be dismissed with prejudice.
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subordinate officers. Plaintiff sued Shimelski in his official
capacity. “Because a claim against a municipal official in an
official capacity is tantamount to a claim against the entity,
it is not necessary to bring official capacity actions against
local governmental officials.” Marshal v. Borough of Ambridge,
798 F.Supp. 1187, 1198 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Schwartz &
Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees,
vol. 1, p. 320)). Plaintiff has not pled that Shimelski was
acting under a municipal policy or custom when he directed the
subordinate officers to make a warrantless search of the home
where Plaintiff was staying; therefore, he has not pled a viable
Monell claim related to Shimelski’s actions. See Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 511, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (under §
1983 local governments are responsible only for their own
illegal acts, they are not vicariously liable for their
employees’ actions). Robert Shimelski, in his official capacity,
will be dismissed as a party in this matter.2
2.

False Arrest

To state a false arrest claim in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must plead that the arresting officers
lacked probable cause to arrest. Wright v. City of Philadelphia,
409 F.3d 595, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff never asserted what
he was arrested for or how the charges are false. Plaintiff’s
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Plaintiff did not sue Shimelski in his individual capacity.
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conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for
false arrest. See Basile v. Township of Smith, 752 F.Supp.2d
643, 657-58 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (dismissing claim where allegations
that officers lacked probable cause to arrest and that they
falsified affidavit of probable cause were threadbare and
conclusory). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s false arrest
claims without prejudice.
3.

Monell3 Claims

In support of his claim of municipal liability against the
Township of Winslow, Plaintiff alleged:
[F]ailure to train or supervise police
officer(s) (1) contemporaneous knowledge and
(2) subjective recklessness which is
deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom these employees will come
into contact. The circumstances in this case
approximate the predictably recurring
scenarios discussed in [illegible] case law.
The [Township] knew of moral certainty that
police would frequently enter homes without
a warrant . . . The outcome of the encounter
between plaintiff and officers were highly
predictable likely to recur. The [Township]
failed to arms its officers with training to
allow them to accomplish the task of exigent
circumstances justification for warrantless
entr[ies]. There is failure to train claim
based on substantially similar incidents to
the warrantless entry here that could have
put the supervisory authorities on notice
that specific training was necessary to
avoid 8/1/2012 constitutional violation.
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See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“it is when execution of a government's
policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”)
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There are patterns of substantially similar
constitutional violations as opposed to
merely similar violations. The final policy
maker had knowledge or constructive
knowledge of a policy or custom of
unconstitutionally inadequate training or
supervision of [illegible] Township police
officers.
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-3.)
“A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under
section 1983 must demonstrate that the violation of rights was
caused by the municipality's policy or custom.” Thomas v.
Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)).
For liability, the municipal policy or custom must be “the
‘moving force’ behind the constitutional tort of one of its
employees.’” Id. (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d
1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). If the policy or custom relates to a
failure to train municipal employees, the plaintiff must show
that “the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the
rights of persons with whom those employees will come into
contact.” Id. (quoting Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339,
357 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris
(“Canton”), 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Furthermore, “‘the
deficiency in training [must have] actually caused’ the

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constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at
391)).
To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove
“̔that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.’” Id. at 223 (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown (“Bryan Cnty”), 520 U.S.
397, 410 (1997)). “Ordinarily, ‘[a] pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees’ is necessary
‘to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure
to train.’” Id. (quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360). “A pattern
of violations puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new
program is necessary, and ‘[t]heir continued adherence to an
approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent
tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious
disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate
indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.’” Id.
(quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407.))
Deliberate indifference may also be established in certain
situations where the need for training is “‘so obvious,’ that
failure to do so could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate
indifference’ to constitutional rights, even without a pattern
of constitutional violations.” Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at
390 n. 10.)) This is referred to as “single-incident” liability,
and it is based on “̔[t]he likelihood that the situation will
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recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific
tools to handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights.”
Id. (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409)).
First, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts pointing to
prior instances of unjustified warrantless entry into a person’s
home that would support a claim of deliberate indifference. See
Gaymon v. Esposito, Civ. Action No. 11–4170 (JLL), 2013 WL
4446973, at *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2013) (dismissing claim for
failure to allege prior instances of use of deadly force).
Plaintiff’s allegations of prior instances are purely conclusory
and unsupported.
Second, regarding single-incident claims of deliberate
indifference, the Court assumes that there is a need for police
training regarding exigent circumstances for warrantless entry
into a home, but there are no facts in the Complaint alleging
the Township of Winslow does not train police officers on
exigent circumstances. Alternatively, there are no allegations
that the Township of Winslow’s specific training program is
deficient. See Gaymon, 2013 WL 4446973, at *13 (dismissing
Monell claim based on lack of factual allegations in complaint
concerning the nature of a municipality’s training program for
police officers); Benhaim v. Borough of Highland Park, Civ. No.
11–cv–2502 (KM), 2015 WL 105794, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2015)
(liability does not “arise on the tautological grounds that the
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injury in question would not have occurred if officers had been
trained to avoid that particular injury; such a claim ‘could be
made about almost any encounter resulting in injury.’” (quoting
Canton, 489 U.S. at 391)). Therefore, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Township of Winslow without
prejudice.
Plaintiff also alleged failure to train by the Camden
County Office of the Prosecutor. This claim fails because
Plaintiff’s allegation is wholly conclusory. Plaintiff alleged
the “Office knew” prosecutors would frequently employ the global
plea deal; and “a final policymaker had knowledge or
constructive knowledge of a policy or custom of
unconstitutionally inadequate training or supervision by the
Office of the Prosecutor.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff
did not provide any supporting facts describing his global plea
deal, or how it violated a constitutional right to offer a
compromise in exchange for dropping criminal charges. Therefore,
this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
4.

Malicious Prosecution

“To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983 when the
claim is under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the
defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4)
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the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Johnson v.
Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). “The second
element of a malicious prosecution claim, favorable termination
of the criminal proceeding, is established when the plaintiff is
‘innocent of [the] crime charged in the underlying
prosecution.’” Pittman v. Metuchen Police Dept., Civil Action
No. 08–2373 (GEB), 2010 WL 4025692, at * 7 (D.N.J. Oct. 13,
2010) (quoting Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir.
2000)). “If the prosecutor drops the charges as part of a
compromise with the accused, the accused will fail the favorable
termination prong necessary to maintain a malicious prosecution
claim under § 1983.” Id. (citing Marable v. West Pottsgrove
Twp., No. Civ.A.03–CV–3738, 2005 WL 1625055, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
July 8, 2005) (additional citations omitted).
It appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff agreed to
civil forfeiture of his property in order to have the criminal
charges against him dismissed. Dismissal of charges as part of a
compromise with the accused is not a favorable termination of a
criminal proceeding for purposes of a malicious prosecution
claim. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the malicious
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prosecution claim without prejudice, allowing Plaintiff to amend
the complaint only if he can plead facts supporting favorable
termination of the criminal charges.
5.

Unlawful Seizure of Property by Prosecutors

In analyzing a § 1983 claim against a prosecutor, a Court
must determine whether the prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity for the conduct alleged. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (“the same considerations of public policy
that underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance absolute
[prosecutorial] immunity under s[ection] 1983.”) A prosecutor’s
conduct in initiating a civil forfeiture action is entitled to
absolute prosecutorial immunity. Schrob v. Catterson, (“Schrob
I”) 948 F.2d 1402, 1412 (3d Cir. 1991); but see Giuffre v.
Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing
Schrob I because prosecutor’s conduct of advising the Chief of
Police how to handle a challenged forfeiture proceeding was not
in writing or subject to judicial oversight with attendant
safeguards). Negotiating a plea deal is also protected by
absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Stankowski v. Farley, 487
F.Supp.2d 543, 552 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (negotiating a plea bargain
is conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430); Cady v.
Arenac County, 574 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[c]onduct
associated with plea bargains has long been held by this court
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to be so intimately associated with the prosecutor's role as an
advocate of the State in the judicial process as to warrant
absolute immunity” (internal quotations omitted)); Doe v.
Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he negotiation
of a plea bargain is an act within a prosecutor's jurisdiction
as a judicial officer.”); Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
929 F.2d 1484, 1492 (10th Cir. 1991) (absolute immunity attaches
to plea bargaining activity “due to its intimate association
with the judicial process.”)
Rivera and Faulk are entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity for the conduct of bringing a civil forfeiture action
and negotiating a plea deal. Thus, the Court will dismiss, with
prejudice, Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claims against Rivera
and Faulk.
D.

Civil Rico Conspiracy

County Prosecutor Offices, as municipal entities, are
immune from civil RICO claims. Kadonsky v. New Jersey, 188
F.App’x 81, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Genty v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 914 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff’s RICO claim against the Camden County Prosecutor’s
Office will be dismissed with prejudice.
“[T]o plead a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
[conspiracy], [a plaintiff] must allege (1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”
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District 1199P Health and Welfare Plan v. Janssen L.P., 784
F.Supp.2d 508, 518-19 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Sedima v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1985)). “A RICO enterprise is ‘an entity
[made up of] a group of persons associated together for the
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” Id. at 526
(quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
“To establish the existence of an enterprise, a plaintiff must
prove that (1) the enterprise is an ongoing organization with
some sort of framework or superstructure for making or carrying
out decisions; (2) the members of the enterprise function as a
continuing unit with established duties; and (3) the enterprise
must be separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which
it engages.” Id. (citing Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost
Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 789–90 (3d Cir. 1984)). Because the
core of a RICO civil conspiracy is an agreement to commit
predicate acts, a RICO civil conspiracy complaint, at the very
least, must allege specifically such an agreement. Hecht v.
Commerce Clearing House Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2nd Cir. 1990);
See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff
must plead agreement to commit predicate acts and knowledge that
those acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity in
violation of section 1962(a)–(c)).
Here, Plaintiff did not plead any plausible facts stating
that the prosecutors agreed to commit extortion as part of a
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continuing scheme to unlawfully seize personal property. The
civil RICO claims against Rivera and Faulk will be dismissed
without prejudice.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s IFP application will be granted. In the

accompanying Order filed herewith the Court will: (1) dismiss
the § 1981 claim against Defendant Schilling without prejudice;
(2) proceed the unlawful search claims against Defendants
Schilling, Clark, Dobler, and Does in their individual
capacities; (3) dismiss the false arrest claims without
prejudice; (4) dismiss the Monell claims without prejudice; (5)
dismiss the malicious prosecution claim(s) without prejudice;
(6) dismiss with prejudice the unlawful seizure claims against
Rivera and Faulk; (7) dismiss with prejudice the civil RICO
claim against the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office; and (8)
dismiss without prejudice the civil RICO claims against Rivera
and Faulk.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 16, 2015

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