NGUYEN v. LOURY
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/6/2015. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 13-4919 (NLH)
10571 Lexington Street
Stanton, CA 90680
Petitioner Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner Toan Nguyen, formerly a state prisoner confined
at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey, files this
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the
constitutionality of his detention. (ECF No. 1).
paid the required filing fee.
At this time, the Court must
conduct a preliminary review of the Petition pursuant to Rule 4
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (amended Dec. 1,
2004), made applicable to § 2241 petitions through Rule 1(b) of
the Habeas Rules. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
For the reasons
set forth below, the Petition will be administratively
THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE
This matter involves Petitioner’s request for trial
pursuant to Article III of the Interstate Agreement on
Petitioner has filed the Petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1).
However, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined, based on
canons of statutory construction, that because § 2254 is more
specific and § 2241 more general, a state prisoner must
generally seek relief via a § 2254 petition and not via a § 2241
petition. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2001);
accord BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1:34 (May 2013) (“The
vast majority of courts have concluded that, although the texts
of § 2241 and § 2254 appear similar in their grant of
jurisdiction, § 2254 is the exclusive avenue for a state
prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his detention.
Section 2254 is properly understood as in effect implementing
the general grant of habeas corpus authority found in § 2241,
even if the petitioner is not challenging the underlying state
court conviction (such as challenges to parole determinations),
so long as the person is in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a state court.”) (original emphasis removed, alternative
emphasis supplied); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“Our authority to
grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.”).
Therefore, the Petition is more appropriately filed as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
THE APPROPRIATE FORM
Local Civil Rule 81.2(a) requires use of the Court’s form
unless the petition is prepared by counsel. See AO 241
(modified): DNJ-Habeas-008 (Rev.01-2014).
not submitted on the court-provided forms.
Here, the Petition is
Petition does not comport with the requirements of Rule 2 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
Among other things, Rule 2
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a petitioner
to specify all grounds for relief and to state the facts
supporting each ground in the petition. See Habeas Rule 2(c)(1),
Requiring Petitioner to resubmit his Petition on the
appropriate Court-provided form will benefit both him and the
Court. See Habeas Rule 2(c) advisory committee’s note
(“Administrative convenience, of benefit to both the court and
the petitioner, results from the use of a prescribed form. . . .
The requirement of a standard form benefits the petitioner as
His assertions are more readily apparent, and a
meritorious claim is more likely to be properly raised and
Finally, the Court notes that the Petition submitted by
Petitioner in this case does not include language certifying
that Petitioner has been advised, consistent with Mason v.
Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), of the consequences of
filing such a petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), and that Petitioner is aware of his
obligation to file one all-inclusive § 2254 petition.
Court-provided form includes this language and, by executing
same, Petitioner will be so advised.
For the foregoing reasons, the case will be
administratively terminated 1 and Petitioner will be required to
resubmit his Petition using the forms provided to him by the
Clerk of the Court.
An appropriate Order will follow.
___s/ Noel L. Hillman_____
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Date: October 6, 2015
At Camden, New Jersey
Petitioner is informed that administrative termination is not a
“dismissal” for purposes of the statute of limitations, and that
if the case is reopened, it is not subject to the statute of
limitations time bar if it was originally filed timely, see
Papotto v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265, 275
(2013) (distinguishing administrative terminations from
dismissals); Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705
F.3d 80, 84 n.2 (2013) (describing prisoner mailbox rule
generally); Dasilva v. Sheriff's Dep’t., 413 F. App’x 498, 502
(3rd Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[The] statute of limitations is
met when a [petition] is submitted to the clerk before the
statute runs . . . ”).
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