DEAN v. DEPTFORD TOWNSHIP et al
Filing
159
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/2/2016. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
TAHARQU DEAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 13-5197 (NLH/KMW)
v.
OPINION
GLOUCESTER COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________
APPEARANCES:
David Andrew Berlin
Matthew Benjamin Weisberg
Weisberg Law
7 South Morton Avenue
Morton, Pennsylvania 19070
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Patrick J. Madden
Timothy R. Bieg
Madden & Madden, PA
108 Kings Highway East
Suite 200
P.O. Box 210
Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033-0389
Attorneys for Defendants Gloucester County, Gloucester
County Department of Correctional Services, and Sergeant
Jesse Yamada
HILLMAN, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court by way of motion [Doc.
No. 138] of Defendants Gloucester County, Gloucester County
1
Department of Correctional Services, and Sergeant Jesse Yamada
(collectively, the “Gloucester Defendants”) seeking summary
judgment.
The Court has considered the submissions of the
parties and decides this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
For the reasons that follow, the Gloucester Defendants’
motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns the pretrial detention of Plaintiff
Taharqu Dean from December 27, 2011 to December 30, 2011.
Plaintiff suffers from a seizure disorder and has undergone
multiple brain surgeries.
(Defs.’ Ex. D, Pl.’s Dep. 141:19-
142:21 [Doc. No. 149-5].)
Plaintiff alleges that on December
27, 2011 he was walking in a deli parking lot in Deptford, New
Jersey when he experienced a severe seizure.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)
A Gloucester County detective observing Plaintiff believed he
was breaking into a car in the parking lot, and after a
struggle, Plaintiff was arrested by Deptford Township Police
Officers.
8.)1
(Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 7; Am. Compl. ¶
The Deptford Township Police report states that during the
struggle Plaintiff kicked an officer in the chest. (Defs.’ Ex.
D, Police Report [Doc. No. 138-2].)
Plaintiff testified that he
1
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against Deptford
Township and the arresting officers on October 1, 2015 [Doc. No.
153].
2
does not remember kicking an officer because he often doesn’t
remember what occurs during a seizure.
24.)
(Pl.’s Dep. 55:1-2, 13-
After being processed and charged with attempted burglary
and resisting arrest,2 Plaintiff was transported to Kennedy
Hospital and thereafter to Gloucester County Correctional
Facility.
(Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff alleges that because he kicked a Deptford officer
in the chest during his arrest, when he arrived at the
Gloucester County Correctional Facility, Sergeant Jesse Yamada
stated to him, “oh, we’ve been waiting on you. You like to hit
on cops, huh[?]”.
Plaintiff further alleges Sergeant Yamada
took him to the shower room and along with three other
corrections officers beat him up.
(Pl.’s Dep. 54:14-55:10.)
He
claims he was assaulted a total of three times while in
handcuffs.
After the second alleged assault, Plaintiff alleges
he was seen by the correctional facility’s medical staff. (Id.
111:8-19; Defs.’ Ex. G, Intake Receiving and Screening Form
[Doc. No. 138-2].)
It is noted on Plaintiff’s medical form that
he claimed “altercation on admission” to the medical staff.
(Id.)
Nurse Judy Muhlbaier, who performed Plaintiff’s medical
examination, noted on Plaintiff’s progress notes that when she
2
All of Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed.
Record [Doc. No. 149-4].)
3
(Pl.’s Ex. C, Court
asked Plaintiff if he was suicidal he tried to conceal a history
of suicidal attempts or thoughts.
Additionally, Nurse Muhlbaier
noted that Plaintiff first told her he was feeling suicidal and
then changed his answer. (Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Progress Notes
[Doc. No. 138-2].)
Based on this information, Nurse Muhlbaier
recommended that Plaintiff be placed in a suicide prevention
suit, also known as a “turtle suit”.
Dep. 42:21-43:8 [Doc. No. 138-2].)
(Defs.’ Ex. I, Muhlbaier
Plaintiff disputes that he
was suicidal or that he articulated he was suicidal to the
medical staff. (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff argues that the medical staff failed to give him two
out of three of his seizure medications which caused him to
suffer more seizures while detained.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-32.)
Plaintiff testified that during the third assault
corrections officers took Plaintiff to the shower room and
forced him into the suicide prevention suit. (Pl.’s Dep. 114:14115:8.)
Sergeant Yamada stated in his December 27, 2011
incident report that Corrections Officers C. Finnegan and S.
Borden reported to him that when they tried to place Plaintiff
in the suicide prevention suit Plaintiff assaulted them and they
were forced to spray Plaintiff with pepper spray.
J, Sgt. Yamada’s Report [Doc. No. 138-2].)
(Defs.’ Ex.
Sergeant Yamada
further stated in his report that Plaintiff was also placed in a
restraint chair due his aggressive behavior and because
4
Plaintiff made threats to the corrections officers that he had
friends in the military and would come back with explosives to
blow them up. (Id.)
Corrections Officers Finnegan and Borton’s
December 27, 2011 supplemental reports are consistent with
Sergeant Yamada’s version of events.
(Defs.’ Exs. J, L.)
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of being assaulted three
times by corrections officers he suffered injuries to his
shoulder, face, neck, and back, and received two black eyes.
(Pl.’s Dep. 141:9-142:4.)
Plaintiff alleges he sought
rehabilitative care and psychological treatment for his
injuries.
(Pl.’s Dep. 166:17-21, 176:11-22.)
Plaintiff further
alleges one doctor recommended shoulder surgery.
(Pl.’s Dep.
174:1-11.)
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on August 29, 2013.
Pursuant to an Order dated April 29, 2014, Plaintiff was granted
leave to file an amended complaint, which was filed on May 8,
2014.
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff added Corrections
Officers Borton and Finnegan as parties and asserted four causes
of action against the corrections officers.
13.)
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12,
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 16, 2015, the
Court found that the claims against these new corrections
officers were barred by the statute of limitations and did not
relate back to the filing of the original complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. 15(c).
The Court therefore dismissed all claims
5
against Corrections Officers Borton and Finnegan.
(June 16,
2015 Op. and Order [Doc. Nos. 134, 135].)
The instant motion for summary judgment was filed by the
remaining Defendants, Gloucester County, Gloucester County
Department of Corrections, and Sergeant Yamada.
Counts I is an
excessive force claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Count II is a Monell claim.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-48.)
Count III
alleges a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act under
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2.
(Id. ¶¶ 49-51.)
Count VII contains
common law tort claims for assault and battery.
II.
(Id. ¶¶ 69-70.)
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which
provides in relevant part, “[I]n any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.”
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is
satisfied that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
6
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving
party’s favor.
248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
A fact is “material” if, under the governing
substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the
outcome of the suit.
Id.
In considering a motion for summary
judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;
instead, the non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Initially, the
moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
Once the moving party has met this
burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or
otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.
Id.
Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific
facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by
7
the moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
A party
opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere
allegations, general denials, or vague statements.
Saldana v.
Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Count II: Monell Claims Against Gloucester County,
Gloucester County Department of Corrections and
Sergeant Yamada in his Official Capacity
Generally, “a municipality cannot be held liable under §
1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Marvel v. Cnty. of Del.,
397 F. App'x 785, 790 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)).
A municipality may
be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “‘only ... when the
alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a
policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the
governing body or informally adopted by custom.’”
Mulholland v.
Gov't of the Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d
Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, “there are two ways that a plaintiff
can establish municipal liability under § 1983: [either] policy
or custom.”
Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir.
2007).
“Under Monell, a plaintiff shows that a policy existed when
a decision maker possess[ing] final authority to establish
8
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict.”
Watson, 478 F.3d at 155
(citation and internal quotations omitted).
Alternatively, “[a]
plaintiff may establish a custom ... by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.
In other words, custom may be established by
proving knowledge of, and acquiescence to, a practice.”
Id. at
155–56 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Where
municipal liability is premised on an unofficial custom, the
plaintiff must “produce facts tending to show the [municipality]
knew of a pattern of constitutional violations or that such
consequences were so obvious the [municipality's] conduct can
only be characterized as deliberate indifference.”
Pelzer v.
City of Phila., 656 F. Supp. 2d 517, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
“In
addition to proving that an unlawful policy or custom existed, a
plaintiff also bears the burden of proving that such a policy or
custom was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered.”
Watson, 478 F.3d at 156.
Here, Plaintiff’s two Monell theories are that: (1)
Defendants fail to recognize the medical needs of pretrial
detainees, and (2) Defendants place inmates in suicide
prevention suits, also known as “turtle suits”, for punishment.
Plaintiff appears to premise these theories on an unofficial
9
custom.
The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff has not
produced facts tending to show that there was a pattern of
constitutional violations or that the custom was the proximate
cause of the injuries suffered.
As to Plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive two out of
his three seizure medications, he has not submitted evidence of
a custom of depriving detainees of medication.
In support of
his argument, Plaintiff cites to Nurse Muhlbaier’s deposition
testimony where she stated she was conscious of cost-cutting and
was often pressed for time.
¶¶ 15-16.)
(Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts
However, Nurse Muhlbaier’s testimony was not in the
context of being able to provide detainees and inmates with
needed medication.
Further, Nurse Mulbaier could only recall
one time when she believed an inmate should have been sent to
the hospital for treatment related to his diabetes and was not.
(Muhlbaier Dep. 22:3-6 (“Q: Do you recall other times when there
was a failure to provide needed medical care at the prison? A:
No.”)
The treatment of one other detainee is not sufficient to
infer a custom of failing to provide detainees and inmates with
needed medication.
Nurse Muhlbaier testified that the reason Plaintiff only
received one of his three medications is because the facility’s
doctor, Dr. Ash, who is not a county employee, only ordered that
medication to control Plaintiff’s seizures.
10
(Muhlbaier Dep.
34:6-10; Cert. of Lynn Heiss, R.N. ¶¶ 2, 3, 10, 22, 26 [Doc. No.
157-1].)
Moreover, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that
the fact that he did not receive two of his three medications
caused his behavior or his seizures.
Watson v. Abington Twp.,
478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (a plaintiff
must show that the unofficial custom was the proximate cause of
the injuries suffered).
Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest that there was a
custom of depriving detainees and inmates with medication or
that the absence of a particular medication “created”
Plaintiff’s aggressive condition or his seizures.
As such,
Plaintiff’s first theory of Monell liability fails.
Plaintiff’s second theory of Monell liability is that
Defendants used the suicide prevention suits for purposes of
punishment.
Defendants, in turn, assert that Plaintiff was
placed in a suicide prevention suit because Nurse Muhlbaier
believed he was suicidal.
Nurse Muhlbaier testified that she
evaluated Plaintiff and noted that when she asked if he was
suicidal he said yes, then changed his answer to no.
Dep. 43:5-8).
(Muhlbaier
Based on her evaluation of Plaintiff she
recommended that he be placed in the suicide prevention suit
until he could be seen by the psychiatrist because she felt
“dual answers are a red flag[.]”
(Muhlbaier Dep. 43:13-44-6.)
Plaintiff’s intake form also noted that Plaintiff felt “hopeless
11
and helpless and that he concealed a suicidal history.” (Defs.’
Ex. G, Intake Form [Doc. No. 138-2].)3
While Plaintiff alleges he did not give Nurse Muhlbaier a
reason to believe he was suicidal on December 27, 2011, that is
not a disputed issue of material fact.
Rather, Plaintiff must
show that Defendants used the suicide prevention suit as a means
of punishment as Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 42.)
Plaintiff’s only evidence that
Defendants used the suicide prevention suit as punishment is
Corrections Officer Finnegan’s deposition testimony that
Defendants used the suicide prevention suits “all the time.”
(Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 14.)
However, Officer Finnegan’s full
testimony states that the suit was utilized often because
inmates often present as suicidal:
Q. One second. How many times have you ever put
somebody in a turtle suit?
A. Many.
Q. Many. It's pretty common?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you do it weekly, monthly, can you give me -A. Daily.
Q. Daily. So on a daily basis people threaten to
commit suicide?
3
Plaintiff cites to a Mental Health Progress Note from December
30, 2011, which states that Plaintiff was not suicidal, however
this note was made three days after his initial intake. (Pl.’s
Ex. E, Dec. 30, 2011 Progress Note at 6 of 6 [Doc. No. 149-6].)
Further, Plaintiff does not allege he was placed in the
protective suit after the first night of his detention.
12
A. Yes.
(Finnegan Dep. 16:4-14 [Doc. No. 149-10].)
Without any evidence
suggesting that Defendants used suicide prevention suits as
punishment, Plaintiff’s second theory of Monell liability also
fails as a matter of law.
Summary judgment will be granted to
the Gloucester Defendants on Count II.
B. Count I: Excessive Force Against Sergeant Yamada and
the Defense of Qualified Immunity
For Plaintiff's claims against Sergeant Yamada in his
individual capacity, the qualified immunity doctrine governs the
analysis. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time
of the challenged conduct.”
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct.
2088, 2093, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2012).
In order to determine
whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity,
two questions are to be asked: (1) has the plaintiff alleged or
shown a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) is the
right at issue “clearly established” at the time of the
defendant's alleged misconduct?
223, 236 (2009).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first.”
13
Id.
It is the
defendant's burden to establish entitlement to qualified
immunity.
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff's excessive force claim is analyzed under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the
Eighth Amendment because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee
during the relevant time period.4
Tapp v. Proto, 404 F. App'x
563, 566 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting that plaintiff's
claims that arise when he was a pretrial detainee are prosecuted
under the Due Process Clause); Ewing v. Cumberland Cty., No. 095432, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2015 WL 1384374, at *14 (D.N.J. Mar.
25, 2015) (“Plaintiff, who had just been arrested that day,
should be afforded the greater constitutional prevention that is
offered by the Due Process Clause”).5
4
The Third Circuit has recognized an exception to this general
rule where the excessive force claim arises from a riot or
prison disturbance. Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir.
2000). The Court finds the Fuentes exception inapplicable here
because Plaintiff alleges he was handcuffed every time he was
assaulted and did not pose a genuine safety threat to the four
corrections officers handling him. See Jackson v. Phelps, 575
Fed. Appx. 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he purportedly unlawful
actions in this case occurred when Jackson was isolated in an
observation room . . . [while] Jackson was effectively
immobilized in full restraints. There is no evidence that
Jackson could have incited a prison riot or other widespread
disruption under these circumstances, let alone that he did. We
therefore agree with the District Court that Jackson's claim is
most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause [and not the
Eighth Amendment].”) (internal citation omitted).
5
Even if the Court were to apply the Eighth Amendment standard,
the result would be the same here and summary judgment would be
14
As the Supreme Court held in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
520-21, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1864, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979), absent a
showing of an expressed intent to punish, the inquiry under the
Due Process Clause is whether “a particular condition or
restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental objective[.]”
Here, Plaintiff alleges Sergeant
Yamada intended to punish him.
Plaintiff testified that because
he unknowingly kicked a police officer in the chest during his
arrest6 when he arrived at the Gloucester County jail Sergeant
Yamada stated to him, “oh, we’ve been waiting on you. You like
to hit on cops, huh” and then immediately took him to the shower
room and with the help of three other corrections officers beat
him up.
(Pl.’s Dep. 54:14-55:10.)
Plaintiff further testified
he was assaulted two other times while he was handcuffed.
(Pl.’s Dep. 106:16-18.)
Plaintiff additionally argues that
denied. The less stringent Eighth Amendment standard “only
prohibits punishment that is cruel and unusual, or force that is
imposed ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Ewing v.
Cumberland Cty., 2015 WL 1384374, at *13 (citing Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156
(1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89
L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)). Here, there is also a material question
of fact as to whether Sergeant Yamada used force maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.
6
To be clear, Plaintiff testified that he does not remember
kicking an officer during the arrest because he often can’t
remember what occurs during a seizure.
However, Plaintiff
acknowledges the police report reflects that he kicked a
Deptford officer. (Pl.’s Dep. 55:1-2, 13-24.)
15
Sergeant Yamada had a duty to treat him differently due to his
seizure disorder.7
Plaintiff testified that the total injuries he suffered
from the three assaults include a bruised back, neck and face, a
partial tear in his rotator cuff, and black eyes.
166:10-13.)
(Pl.’s Dep.
His medical intake form reflects that he reported
to Nurse Muhlbaier that he was assaulted.
Receiving and Screening Form.)
(Defs.’ Ex. G, Intake
Additionally, the pictures taken
of Plaintiff after his release on or around January 6, 2012 show
injuries to his face.
(Pl.’s Ex. K-1 [Doc. No. 149-12].)
As a
result of his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he sought
rehabilitative care and psychological treatment.
166:17-21, 176:11-22.)
(Pl.’s Dep.
Plaintiff testified that one doctor
recommended shoulder surgery.
(Pl.’s Dep. 174:1-11.)8
Sergeant Yamada disputes that he made a statement that he
was waiting for Plaintiff or that he knew Plaintiff kicked a
7
Plaintiff has cited no case law to support his proposition that
Sergeant Yamada had what is essentially a heightened duty with
respect to Plaintiff because he suffered from a seizure
disorder. Further, under Sergeant Yamada’s version of events,
he applied only what force was necessary to restrain Plaintiff
in order to prevent him from assaulting corrections officers.
8
Additionally, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that
Plaintiff’s injuries are de minimis. As held in Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002), even if Plaintiff’s
injuries were de minimis, "de minimis injuries do not
necessarily establish de minimis force.”
16
police officer and argues that any force used on Plaintiff was
in response to Plaintiff’s assault on corrections officers.
(Pl.’s Ex. Yamada Dep. 14:6-12, 23:12-22 [Doc. No. 149-8].)
Sergeant Yamada’s incident report states, in relevant part,
While he was in the holding cell, inmate Dean yelled
obscenities towards me and stated, “I’ll fuck you up
when I get out.” I removed inmate Dean from the
holding cell at 1940 hours and as I proceeded to
remove the handcuffs, he was arguing and not being
compliant. I assisted escorting him to the shower
room to strip and search him. As I started to remove
his handcuffs, he grabbed my arm and attempted to turn
towards me, stating that he was going to kill as many
officers as he could. I grabbed his left arm and
placed a compliance hold on him to gain better control
of him. A brief struggle ensued and I was forced to
take him to the ground to gain control and re-apply
his handcuffs. . . Inmate Dean was escorted from cell
309 by C/O Finnegan and C/O Borton to the lower level,
shower room one, to be placed in a suicide gown to go
in holding four. I heard a commotion in the shower
room and as I opened the door, Officer[s] Finnegan and
Borton stated that inmate Dean assaulted them and they
were forced to spray him with [pepper] spray. Inmate
Dean was allowed to decontaminate himself, then he was
placed in the Emergency Restraint Chair due to his
aggressive behavior. While in the chair, he continued
with threats, stating that he had friends in the
military and would come back with explosives to blow
us all up.
(Sgt. Yamada’s Report, Defs.’ Ex. J.)
Sergeant Yamada’s Report
further describes the injuries he suffered as a result of the
altercation with Plaintiff.
The incident reports of Corrections
Officers Borton and Finnegan corroborate Sergeant Yamada’s
version of events.
(Defs.’ Exs. J, L.)
he ever assaulted a corrections officer.
17
Plaintiff disputes that
(Pl.’s Dep. 207:5-12.)
As Plaintiff and Sergeant Yamada present conflicting
evidence regarding the use of force, the Court finds there is a
genuine issue of material fact which cannot be resolved on
summary judgment.
The Court cannot make credibility
determinations at the summary judgment stage, and the facts here
are disputed in significant and material ways that prevent the
Court from accurately assessing Sergeant Yamada’s entitlement to
qualified immunity.
Accordingly, Sergeant Yamada’s motion for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity must be
denied without prejudice at this time.
In this case, the Court must employ the special
interrogatory procedure for the jury to resolve the disputed
facts regarding Plaintiff's excessive force claims.
Whether the
force used against Plaintiff was excessive in light of the
circumstances involving his pretrial detention and medical
issues must be resolved by a jury.
For the same reasons,
Defendants' motions with regard to Plaintiff's New Jersey Civil
Rights Act claims contained in Count III of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint and assault and battery claim contained in Count VII
must also be denied.
Martin v. Unknown U.S. Marshals, 965 F.
Supp. 2d 502, 548 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he New Jersey Civil Rights
Act is interpreted analogously to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
18
V.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment will be granted to the Gloucester
Defendants as to the Monell claims in Count II of Plaintiff’s
amended complaint.
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against
Sergeant Yamada contained in Count I of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint raises genuine disputes of material fact, and as such,
summary judgment will be denied.
For the same reasons, summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s New Jersey Civil Rights Act claims
contained in Count III and assault and battery claims contained
in Count VII will also be denied.
An Order accompanying this Opinion will be entered.
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated: March 2, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
19
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