HOPKINS v. DICRISTI et al

Filing 66

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/30/2015. (drw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

SHANE HOPKINS,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 13-5490 (JBS/KMW)

v.
CASSANDRA DICRISTI, et al.,

OPINION
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
SHANE HOPKINS
111265-C/684706
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Plaintiff, Pro Se
JAMES T. DUGAN, ATLANTIC COUNTY COUNSEL
ATLANTIC COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAW
1333 Atlantic Avenue, 8th Floor
Atlantic City, New Jersey 08401
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Bondiskey
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Joseph
Bondiskey’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry 39). Pro se Plaintiff Shane
Hopkins (“Plaintiff”) did not file an opposition to Defendant’s
motion. This motion is being considered on the papers pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below,

Defendant’s motion shall be granted as Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed this complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) were
violated by Joseph Bondiskey, the Warden/Administrator of the
Atlantic County Justice Facility (“ACJF”), and other New Jersey
Department of Corrections employees. (Docket Entry 1).
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on December 12, 2013, (Docket Entry 9), and
Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 30, 2013, (Docket
Entry 13). Before this Court ruled on the Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint on June 2, 2014.
(Docket Entry 26). Magistrate Judge Karen M. Williams granted
the motion and filed the amended complaint on July 18, 2014.
(Docket Entries 35 and 36). By Order dated September 16, 2014,
this Court dismissed Defendant’s dismissal motion as moot.
(Docket Entry 53).
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on August 5,

2

2014. (Docket Entry 39). Plaintiff did not refile his opposition
to the motion.1
B. Factual Background
1.

Allegations in the Pleadings

Plaintiff, a convicted prisoner presently incarcerated in
the New Jersey State Prison, was arrested and detained in the
ACJF on January 14, 2011, pending trial on charges of burglary.
(Docket Entry 36 ¶ 16). Shortly after Plaintiff’s arrival, John
Doe ACJF officials ran Plaintiff’s name through the National
Crime Information Center database and learned there were
outstanding warrants for Plaintiff’s arrest from Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and South Carolina. (Docket Entry 36 ¶¶ 17-18). An
unidentified ACJF official informed Plaintiff about these
charges on or about January 20, 2011. (Docket Entry 36 ¶ 19). On
that same date, Plaintiff requested “a list of all outstanding
warrents [sic] and detainers” filed against him. (Docket Entry
36 ¶ 20). Plaintiff received a response to his request on
February 1, 2011, stating “records does not provide system
checks of outstanding matters.” (Docket Entry 36 ¶ 21).

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Plaintiff has not filed opposition addressed to this second
dismissal motion. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s opposition
to the first motion to dismiss, (Docket Entry 13). The Court
deems Plaintiff’s opposition as refiled with regard to the
renewed motion to dismiss.
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Plaintiff pled guilty to two counts of third-degree
burglary, N.J. STAT. ANN. ¶ 2C:18-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015,
c. 24); and two counts of third-degree theft, N.J. STAT. ANN. ¶
2C:20-3 (West, Westlaw through 2015, c. 24), on March 2, 2011.
(Docket Entry 36 at 39-45). As part of the plea bargain, the
prosecutor agreed to recommend that “if extradited – [Hopkins]
to be entitled to all lawful credit in NJ.” (Docket Entry 36 at
41). On April 27, 2011, the trial court sentenced Plaintiff to
three years on each count to run concurrently with each other
and the Pennsylvania charges. (Docket Entry 36 at 43).
Plaintiff alleges that while detained in the ACJF,
Defendant Bondiskey failed to notify him of his right to request
final disposition of the out of state detainers pursuant to the
IAD. He was transferred out of ACJF to the Central Reception and
Assignment Facility (“CRAF”) on May 5, 2011. (Docket Entry 36 ¶
28).
2.

Defendant’s Statement of Facts

Defendant Bondiskey argues that during Plaintiff’s period
of detention at ACJF, he was a pretrial detainee and not a
convicted state prisoner. (Docket Entry 39 ¶ 1). He states that
he had no obligations to Plaintiff under the IAD as the
agreement does not apply to pretrial detainees. (Docket Entry 9
at ¶ 8). In addition, he asserts Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

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administrative remedies at ACJF, thereby precluding judicial
review of Plaintiff’s claims. (Docket Entry 39 at ¶ 9).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Although a court must
accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint, that
tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[a] pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). However
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.”

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
IV.

DISCUSSION
The IAD is an interstate compact entered into by the

majority of states, including New Jersey, for the purposes of
“creat[ing] uniform procedures for resolving one State's pending
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charges against an individual imprisoned by another State.”
United States v. Hornick, 491 Fed. Appx. 277, 281-82 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001); New
York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000)), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1290 (2013); see also 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:159A-1 et seq. (West, Westlaw current through L. 2015, c.
24). Article III of the IAD extends to “person[s] . . .
enter[ing] upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party State,” and against whom a
detainer is lodged by another state, the right to demand final
disposition on the pending charges within 180 days of release to
the charging jurisdiction unless good cause exists for a
continuance. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. III(a).
The IAD also imposes obligations upon prison officials to
assist in the orderly and efficient transfer of prisoners for
disposition of out-of-state detainers. Upon learning of a
detainer lodged against a prisoner in their custody, the
official having custody of a prisoner “shall promptly inform
[the prisoner] of the source and contents of any detainer lodged
against him and . . . of his right to make a request for final
disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on
which the detainer is based.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art.
III(c).

The IAD further provides:

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Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner .
. . shall operate as a request for final disposition of
all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on
the basis of which detainers have been lodged against
the prisoner from the State to whose prosecuting
official
the
request
for
final
disposition
is
specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of
corrections, or other official having custody of the
prisoner
shall
forthwith
notify
all
appropriate
prosecuting officers and courts in the several
jurisdictions within the State to which the prisoner's
request for final disposition is being sent of the
proceeding being initiated by the prisoner.
18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. III(d). Plaintiff claims Defendant
Bondiskey failed in these obligations. (Docket Entry 36 ¶¶ 24-27).
Although

Plaintiff

is

presently

a

serving

a

term

of

imprisonment on his 2011 charges, at the time he was in the ACJF
he was a pretrial detainee. “Courts have consistently have held
that the IAD applies only to convicted prisoners and not to
pretrial detainees.” United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518,
528 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55,
58 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Harris, 566 F.2d 610, 613 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665, 669 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909
(1979); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:10-4.3(a)(2) (stating IAD
may be used by New Jersey state prisoner provided “the inmate
against whom the detainer has been filed is serving a term of
imprisonment for a criminal conviction”). Therefore even assuming
Plaintiff’s

allegations

regarding

the

conduct

of

Defendant

Bondiskey are true, the IAD does not provide Plaintiff a basis for
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relief. See United States v. Hornick, 491 F. Appx. 277, 283 (3d
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1290 (2013) (noting IAD was
not triggered during pretrial detention). Defendant’s motion to
dismiss is therefore granted as the amended complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
is granted. An accompanying Order will be entered.

March 30, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

2

As the IAD does not apply to pretrial detainees, it is
unnecessary to address Defendant’s affirmative defense thpat
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
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