HOPKINS v. DICRISTI et al
Filing
68
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/30/2015. (TH, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHANE HOPKINS,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 13-5490 (JBS-KMW)
v.
CASSANDRA DICRISTI, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
SHANE HOPKINS, Plaintiff pro se
#111265-C/684706
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
GREGORY R. BUENO, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
25 Market Street
P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Attorney for Defendants Cassandra DeCristi, Gary Lanigan,
Kenneth Nelson, Donna Sweeney, and Crystal Raupp.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of
Defendants Cassandra DeCristi, 1 Gary Lanigan, Kenneth Nelson,
Donna Sweeney, and Crystal Raupp (“State Defendants”) to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry 58). Pro se
1
Improperly pled as “DiCristi.”
Plaintiff Shane Hopkins (“Plaintiff”) filed opposition to
Defendants’ motion. (Docket Entry 60). This motion is being
considered on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For
the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion shall be granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed this complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his rights under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) and the United States
Constitution were violated by Joseph Bondiskey, the
Warden/Administrator of the Atlantic County Justice Facility
(“ACJF”), and the State Defendants. (Docket Entry 1). He also
filed a request for an order directing the State Defendants to
conform to the provisions of the IAD by informing the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that he wanted to resolve his
pending charges in that state. (Docket Entry 2). Plaintiff
withdrew this request on December 23, 2013 after Defendant
DeCristi assisted Plaintiff with contacting the Delaware County
Prosecutor’s Office in Pennsylvania. (Docket Entry 12).
Defendant DeCristi filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for summary
judgment on April 16, 2014. (Docket Entry 23). On June 2, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint. (Docket Entry
2
26). Magistrate Judge Karen M. Williams granted the motion and
permitted the amended complaint to be filed on July 18, 2014.
(Docket Entries 35 and 36). By Order dated September 16, 2014,
this Court dismissed Defendant DeCristi’s motion as moot due to
the filing of the amended complaint. (Docket Entry 53).
The State Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on September 23, 2014. 2 (Docket Entry 58).
Plaintiff filed his opposition on October 9, 2014. (Docket Entry
60).
B. Factual Background
1.
Allegations in the Pleadings
Plaintiff Shane Hopkins alleges he was arrested and
detained in the ACJF on January 14, 2011, pending trial on
burglary charges. (Docket Entry 36 ¶ 16). Shortly after
Plaintiff’s arrival, John Doe ACJF officials ran Plaintiff’s
name through the National Crime Information Center database and
learned there were outstanding detainers against Plaintiff in
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. (Docket Entry 36 at
¶¶ 17-18). An unidentified ACJF official informed Plaintiff
about these charges on or about January 20, 2011. (Docket Entry
2
This Court granted Defendant Bondiskey’s motion to dismiss the
amended complaint against him on March 31, 2015. (Docket Entry
67).
3
36 at ¶ 19). On that same date, Plaintiff requested “a list of
all outstanding warrents [sic] and detainers” filed against him.
(Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 20). Plaintiff received a response to his
request on February 1, 2011, stating “records does not provide
system checks of outstanding matters.” (Docket Entry 36 at ¶
21).
Plaintiff pled guilty to two counts of third-degree
burglary, N.J. STAT. ANN. ¶ 2C:18-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015,
c. 24); and two counts of third-degree theft, N.J. STAT. ANN. ¶
2C:20-3 (West, Westlaw through 2015, c. 24), on March 2, 2011.
(Docket Entry 36 at 39-45). As part of the plea bargain, the
prosecutor agreed to recommend that “if extradited – [Hopkins]
to be entitled to all lawful credit in NJ.” (Docket Entry 36 at
41). On April 27, 2011, the trial court sentenced Plaintiff to
three years on each count to run concurrently with each other
and Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania charges. (Docket Entry 36 at 43).
Plaintiff was transferred to the Central Reception and
Assignment Facility (“CRAF”) and South Woods State Prison
(“SWSP”) thereafter. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 28-30). Plaintiff
received notification of the outstanding detainers against him
at each facility. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 28-34). Plaintiff
inquired of an unidentified SWSP social worker as to the meaning
of the detainers, and was told that he would be extradited to
4
one of the states upon the conclusion of his New Jersey prison
term. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 35-36).
During Plaintiff’s time at SWSP, he was accepted into the
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (“HVAC”) Training
Program. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 37). When the instructor learned
of the outstanding detainers against Plaintiff, however, he
removed Plaintiff from the program as the program was meant for
prisoners who were expected to be released within four years.
(Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 38). Plaintiff also alleges he was denied
minimum custody classification as the result of having the
unresolved detainers. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 39).
On January 31, 2012 while Plaintiff was being housed at
ACJF for a court appearance, Plaintiff escaped from custody.
(Docket Entry 36 ¶ 42). He was captured and transferred to New
Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”) on February 1, 2012. (Docket Entry
36 at ¶¶ 43-44). Shortly after his arrival at NJSP, Plaintiff
learned from an inmate paralegal that he could request
resolution of his detainers under the IAD. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶
45). After conducting some preliminary research, Plaintiff spoke
with Defendant Raupp, a social worker at NJSP, regarding his
desire to resolve his Pennsylvania detainers under the IAD.
(Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 46-47). Defendant Raupp informed
Plaintiff that NJSP did not arrange for prisoners to resolve
their out-of-state charges, and that he would have to contact
5
the individual prosecutors himself. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 4849). Plaintiff continued to ask Defendant Raupp how to resolve
his Pennsylvania charges during the course of his incarceration
at NJSP. (Docket Entry 36 ¶ 51).
On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Remedy
Form (“IRF”) requesting a list of all detainers lodged against
him and the prosecutors’ contact information. (Docket Entry 36
at ¶ 52). NJSP’s Classification Department responded with a list
of the detainers and the relevant contact information. (Docket
Entry 36 at ¶ 53). Plaintiff again asked Defendant Raupp for
assistance in resolving his detainers on November 29, 2012, and
the NJSP Classification Department responded with another list
of Plaintiff’s detainers, but no contact information. (Docket
Entry 36 at ¶ 54). Defendant Raupp did not provide contact
information for the Delaware County Prosecutor’s Office until
April 17, 2013. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 55). Plaintiff wrote to
the Pennsylvania prosecutor but received no response. (Docket
Entry 36 at ¶ 56).
Plaintiff contacted various New Jersey officials regarding
his inability to resolve his detainers, including Defendant
Warren, the NJSP Administrator at the time, and Defendant
Lanigan, the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (“DOC”). (Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 57-58). Plaintiff
additionally called the DOC’s Office of the Ombudsman on June
6
16, 2013, in an effort to resolve his complaints. (Docket Entry
36 at ¶ 63). The Ombudsman’s office responded via letter dated
July 24, 2013, with a list of Plaintiff’s detainers and a
suggestion to submit another IRF. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 64). A
few days later, Defendant Sweeney wrote to Plaintiff and
indicated that Plaintiff’s letter had been forwarded to
Defendant DeCristi, who would interview him shortly in order to
begin the process of resolving the detainers. (Docket Entry 36
at ¶ 65).
On July 28, 2013, Plaintiff wrote another letter to the
Ombudsman’s Office as he had still had not received any response
from anyone at NJSP regarding his desire to resolve his
detainers. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 69). He filed another IRF on
July 29, 2013, (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 70), and did not receive a
response until September 4, 2013, (Docket Entry 36 at 65). In
the meantime, Plaintiff sent another letter to Defendant Sweeney
complaining about the lack of response from Defendant DeCristi.
(Docket Entry 36 ¶ 72). Plaintiff wrote to Defendant DeCristi
directly on August 10, 2013, and requested that she forward his
request for resolution to the relevant Pennsylvania officials.
(Docket Entry 36 ¶ 73; Docket Entry 36 at 68). He followed up
this letter with an IRF on August 12, 2013. (Docket Entry 36 ¶
74). Defendant DeCristi did not respond to Plaintiff’s letter or
IRF, but Defendant Sweeney wrote to Plaintiff on August 12, 2013
7
indicating that a member of Defendant DeCristi’s staff would “be
interviewing [Plaintiff] soon, to begin [his] demand under the
IAD.” (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 76; Docket Entry 36 at 70).
Unsatisfied with this response, Plaintiff spoke with NJSP
Administrator Defendant Nelson on August 15, 2013, regarding the
difficulties incurred in pursuing his rights under the IAD.
(Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 77). Defendant Nelson assured Plaintiff
that Defendant DeCristi would “be told to take care of it.”
(Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 77). Plaintiff did not receive responses
to his IRFs, except in the form of verbal assurances that his
concerns would be addressed by the proper people. (Docket Entry
36 at ¶ 80). Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 12,
2013 after continuing to receive no assistance from the State
Defendants. (Docket Entry 1). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff
received responses to two previously filed IRFs indicating he
would be interviewed. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶¶ 82-83). On November
26, 2013, however, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Sweeney again,
stating that no further action on his IAD requests had been
taken. (Docket Entry 36 ¶ 85).
Plaintiff was finally interviewed by Defendant DeCristi on
or about December 3, 2013. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 86). Defendant
DeCristi repeatedly denied responsibility for completing IAD
requests and told Plaintiff that he had to do it himself.
(Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 87). She further stated that Plaintiff was
8
“‘brought here because [he] escaped and [he was] not eligible to
go to Pennsylvania.’” (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 87). By letter dated
December 4, 2013, NJSP informed the Delaware County Prosecutor
that Plaintiff requested disposition of his Pennsylvania charges
under the IAD. (Docket Entry 36 at 74). Plaintiff was extradited
to Pennsylvania on January 30, 2014, and was convicted and
sentenced on April 4, 2014. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 97). On May 7,
2014, Plaintiff was returned to New Jersey. (Docket Entry 36 at
¶ 97).
In his amended complaint, filed after the resolution of the
Pennsylvania charges, Plaintiff asserts Defendants Nelson,
DeCristi, and John Doe officials violated the IAD by failing to
promptly inform him of his right to request disposition of the
out-of-state charges, and by delaying relying his requests to
Pennsylvania once made. 3 He further asserts Defendant DeCristi
violated his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment, his right of access to the courts
under the First Amendment, and his right to a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment by acting with
deliberate indifference towards his constitutional rights.
3
Plaintiff also claimed Defendant Warren violated the IAD, as
well as acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s
IAD rights, and violated his Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Speedy Trial rights. It appears Defendant Warren was never
served with the amended complaint. (Docket Entry 44).
9
(Docket Entry 36 at 28). He claims Defendant Lanigan failed to
train and supervise Defendants DeCristi and Does in the
requirements of the IAD, and his “failure to exercise his
authority to investigate and rectify repeated violations of [the
IAD] after being notified of the violations amounts to
deliberate indifference along with violations of the
Plaintiff[‘]s rights to Due Process under the 8th and 14th
Amendments . . . .” (Docket Entry 36 at 29). Plaintiff further
alleges Defendants Nelson, Sweeney, and Raupp acted with
deliberate indifference to his IAD rights in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. (Docket Entry 36 at ¶ 81-82).
2.
Defendants’ Motions
The State Defendants assert Plaintiff’s complaint should
be dismissed on several grounds. They first argue that all
claims against Defendants DeCristi and Lanigan in their official
capacities should be dismissed as they are not “persons” within
the meaning of § 1983. (Docket Entry 58-1 at 1). They also argue
that Plaintiff has failed to set forth a claim that the State
Defendants violated the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Docket Entry 58-1 at 17-29). Defendant Lanigan
argues that the claims against him should be dismissed as they
are based on an impermissible theory of respondeat superior.
(Docket Entry 58-1 at 29). Finally, they argue that Plaintiff’s
10
demands for punitive damages should be dismissed. (Docket Entry
58-1 at 31).
3. Plaintiff’s Response
In his response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff asserts
only violations of the IAD and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. He further asserts that Defendant Lanigan failed to
supervise Defendants DeCristi and Sweeney, making him personally
liable to Plaintiff. (Docket Entry 60 at 17).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Although a court must
accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint, that
tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[a] pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). However
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
11
complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional and statutory
rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011);
Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Defendants Not “Persons” Under § 1983
Defendants Lanigan and DeCristi assert that all claims
against them in their official capacities must be dismissed as
they are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. A suit
against a public official “‘in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
12
official's office . . . .’” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 930–31 (1997) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). In this instance, a suit against
Defendants Lanigan and DeCristi in their official capacities
would in actuality be a suit against the DOC and NJSP.
Neither
the DOC nor NJSP are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See
Adams v. Hunsberger, 262 F. App'x 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (District Court properly dismissed Section 1983 claims
against state department of corrections as it is not a “person”
within the meaning of Section 1983) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at
71); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537,
538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person”
under § 1983).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Defendant
Lanigan and DeCristi in their official capacities is granted
with prejudice. Individual liability of those two defendants
must still be assessed, however.
B. Interstate Agreement on Detainers
The IAD is an interstate compact entered into by the
majority of states, including New Jersey, for the purposes of
“creat[ing] uniform procedures for resolving one State's pending
charges against an individual imprisoned by another State.”
United States v. Hornick, 491 F. App’x 277, 281-82 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001); New
13
York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000)), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1290 (2013); see also 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:159A-1 et seq. (West, Westlaw current through L. 2015, c.
61). Article III of the IAD extends to “person[s] . . .
enter[ing] upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party State,” and against whom a
detainer is lodged by another state, the right to demand final
disposition on the pending charges within 180 days of release to
the charging jurisdiction unless good cause exists for a
continuance. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. III(a). As a statute of
the United States, violations of the IAD are redressable under §
1983. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 450 (1981); see also
Shack v. Attorney Gen. of the State of Pennsylvania, 776 F.2d
1170, 1173-74 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1030
(1986); Coffey v. N. Carolina Dep't of Corr., 846 F.2d 70 (4th
Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (unpublished). Construing the complaint
liberally in Plaintiff’s favor, United States v. Day, 969 F.2d
39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992), Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts
to asserts claims against Defendants Raupp, DeCristi, Nelson,
and Sweeney for violations of the IAD. 4
The IAD imposes obligations upon prison officials to assist
in the orderly and efficient transfer of prisoners for
4
Defendant Lanigan’s liability is assessed separately infra Part
IV.H.
14
disposition of out-of-state detainers. Upon learning of a
detainer lodged against a prisoner in their custody, the
official having custody of a prisoner “shall promptly inform
[the prisoner] of the source and contents of any detainer lodged
against him and . . . of his right to make a request for final
disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on
which the detainer is based.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. III(c)
(emphasis added). The IAD further provides:
Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner .
. . shall operate as a request for final disposition of
all untried indictments, informations, or complaints .
. . . The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other
official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith
notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts
in the several jurisdictions within the State to which
the prisoner's request for final disposition is being
sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner.
18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. III(d) (emphasis added).
The Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff did
not raise violations of the IAD itself until his opposition
papers. Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true,
Plaintiff made several requests for disposition of his
Pennsylvania charges over the course of two years. Under the
terms of the IAD, the officials of NJSP were required to
promptly inform the Pennsylvania prosecutors and courts of
Plaintiff’s demand. Ibid. Defendants Raupp, DeCristi, Nelson,
and Sweeney were each personally informed by Plaintiff that he
wanted to resolve the out-of-state charges against him, yet no
15
action was taken until this lawsuit was initiated, over two
years since Plaintiff’s initial inquiry as to the meaning of the
detainers. (See Docket Entry 36 ¶¶ 34-35). Plaintiff “may be
unable to prove any actual damages flowing from the alleged
failure to inform him of his rights[,]” Coffey, 846 F.2d at 70,
however he has pled sufficient facts to withstand the present
motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss this claim is denied as
to Defendants Raupp, DeCristi, Nelson, and Sweeney.
C. Denial of Access to the Courts
Plaintiff further claims Defendants’ violations of the IAD
constituted a violation of his right to access the courts under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Monroe v. Beard, 536
F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354–55 (1996)). “To establish a cognizable
claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that he has suffered an
actual injury to his ability to present a claim. A prisoner can
show an actual injury only when a nonfrivolous, arguable claim
is lost.” Henry v. Moore, 500 F. App'x 115, 117 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis,
518 U.S. at 352–54). Additionally, “the claim must relate to
either a direct or collateral challenge to the prisoner's
sentence or conditions of confinement [and] a prisoner must
demonstrate that no other remedy will potentially compensate for
the lost claim.”
Ibid. (internal citations omitted); see also
16
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (“Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly
constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.”).
The amended complaint only asserts Defendant DeCristi
impaired Plaintiff’s access to the courts, (Docket Entry 36 at
28), however even interpreting Plaintiff’s claims liberally to
include all the State Defendants, he has failed to set forth a
viable claim. The complaint may be broadly read to constitute an
attack on the conditions of his confinement, but Plaintiff has
not identified what claim was lost as a result of Defendants’
conduct. Indeed, the record of this matter indicates that
Plaintiff has not lost any opportunity: his Pennsylvania charges
have been resolved, and he has been actively and competently
pursuing this litigation before this Court, including motion
practice for injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 2). In
other words, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prejudice
resulting from Defendants’ alleged violations. His access to the
courts claim is therefore dismissed in its entirety for failure
to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).
D. Due Process
Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights by their alleged violations of the
17
IAD. 5
The Third Circuit has consistently noted that a violation
of the IAD “is not an infringement of a constitutional right.”
Cooney v. Fulcomer, 886 F.2d 41, 46 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing
Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 979 (1988)); see also United States v. Black, 609 F.2d
1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980);
Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he
IAD amounts to nothing more than a statutory set of procedural
rules which clearly do not rise to the level of constitutionally
guaranteed rights.”). Plaintiff’s “due process rights are not
implicated when he asserts that [the State Defendants] violated
various provisions of the IAD.” Cooney, 886 F.2d at 46 n.8. This
claim must therefore be dismissed.
E. Equal Protection
5
In his opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff changes his
due process challenge to assert New Jersey’s administrative
provision outlining the procedures correctional facilities are
to take upon receiving a detainer from another state, N.J.A.C. §
10A:10-4.4, “constitutes a state created liberty interest . . .
.” (Docket Entry 60 at 13). This is a wholly different claim
than is contained in the amended complaint, which bases the Due
Process claim on violations of the federal IAD. (See, e.g.,
Docket Entry 1 at 28). A complaint cannot be amended or
supplemented by way of an opposition brief. See Com. of Pa. ex
rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.
1988) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by
the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”) (citation
omitted). The proper way to add this claim is by a motion to
amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a) and Local Civil Rule 7.1.
18
Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ failure to timely apprise
him of the detainers against him and relay his demands for
resolution to the proper Pennsylvania authorities violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection. “The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Thus,
to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff
must allege that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; and
(b) he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates.
See ibid. Where the plaintiff does not claim membership in a
protected class, he must allege arbitrary and intentional
discrimination in order to state an equal protection claim. See
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Specifically, he must state facts showing that: “(1) the
defendant treated him differently from others similarly
situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there
was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v.
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006).
19
Plaintiff cites to paragraphs 102, 103, and 104 as evidence
that his complaint pleads sufficient factual matter. (Docket
Entry 60 at 13). Those paragraphs state:
When detainers are lodged against other inmates in New
Jersey or in any other state that signed the [IAD] they
will be notified of the detainer, its contents, and what
their rights are.
As a result of Defendants[’] failure to notify the
Plaintiff of his rights to request final disposition the
Plaintiff suffered extensive delays in the resolution of
outstanding detainers and was forced to learn what his
rights under the [IAD] [were] on his own.
The Plaintiff has the right to have outstanding criminal
charges in other jurisdictions brought to a final
resolution.
(Docket Entry 36 ¶¶ 102-04). Plaintiff also cites Defendant
DeCristi’s statement that he was “‘brought [to NJSP] because
[he] escaped and [he was] not eligible to go to Pennsylvania.’”
(Docket Entry 36 ¶ 87).
It is unclear from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint who
are the similarly situated persons to whom Plaintiff compares
his treatment. 6 “To be ‘similarly situated,’ parties must be
‘alike in all relevant aspects.’ At the motion to dismiss stage,
[Plaintiff] must allege facts sufficient to make plausible the
6
The complaint itself would suggest that out of all the inmates
in the country, presumably including those with convictions for
escape, only Plaintiff is being denied the ability to resolve
his out-of-state detainers. (Docket Entry 36 ¶ 102). His
opposition papers attempt to narrow that field to only those
inmates in the custody of the New Jersey DOC. (Docket Entry 60
at 13).
20
existence of such similarly situated parties.” Perano v. Twp. Of
Tilden, 423 F. App'x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Startzell
v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008)); see
also Mann v. Brenner, 375 F. App'x 232, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2010)
(finding that district court properly dismissed “class of one”
equal protection claim where plaintiff's allegations amounted
“to nothing more than ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements'
of a constitutional discrimination claim.”). Plaintiff’s
complaint is devoid of any such facts, as well as facts
suggesting each defendant intentionally discriminated against
him. This claim must be dismissed at this time, however
Plaintiff may seek leave to amend this claim in order to address
the deficiencies if he presents a factual basis for doing so.
F. Speedy Trial
Plaintiff further alleges Defendant DeCristi’s violations
of the IAD led to a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a
Speedy Trial on his Pennsylvania charges. Defendant disputes the
merits of that argument, but this Court may not reach the merits
of Plaintiff’s claim as it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that
in
order
to
recover
damages
for
allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
21
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. at 486–87. The Court similarly noted in Wilkinson v.
Dotson that a state prisoner’s § 1983 claims are “barred (absent
prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit
(state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” 544
U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (emphasis in original).
If this action were to result in a determination that
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to a speedy trial on his
Pennsylvania charges, “the remedy must be discharge from custody
with prejudice to retrial.” Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d
1208, 1220 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Strunk v. United States, 412
U.S. 434, 440 (1973) (holding dismissal is the “only possible
remedy” for violations of the right to a speedy trial). 7 A
7
This distinguishes Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated
the IAD, which may go forward at this time, from his claim that
said violations of the IAD resulted in a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, which is barred under Heck. Even if Plaintiff were to
establish that Defendants violated the IAD’s notice provisions,
he would not be entitled to dismissal of his Pennsylvania
charges. See Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 49-52 (1993) (holding
IAD’s 180-day “clock” does not begin until prosecutor receives
22
determination that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s speedy trial
rights on his Pennsylvania charges would therefore necessarily
imply the Pennsylvania convictions are invalid. Absent proof
that his Pennsylvania convictions have been “reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus,” Plaintiff cannot seek relief under § 1983 for any
alleged violations of his speedy trial rights. Heck, 512 U.S. at
487. This claim must be dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiff
may not seek to amend his Speedy Trial claim unless he is able
to first demonstrate that his Pennsylvania convictions have been
set aside, as above.
G. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff’s complaint additionally alleges Defendants
DeCristi, Nelson, Sweeney, and Raupp acted with deliberate
demand from sending state); United States v. Lualemaga, 280 F.3d
1260, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The IAD does not state what
remedy, if any, is available if the prisoner is not informed of
his right to demand a trial. This suggests dismissal is not an
appropriate sanction for such a violation.”), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 949 (2002); see also United States v. Walker, 255 F.3d 540,
542–43 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pena-Corea, 165 F.3d
819, 821–22 (11th Cir. 1999); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 243
(5th Cir. 1998) (“[D]ismissal because of negligence on the part
of the sending state is not a part of the IAD”), mod. on other
grounds, 149 F.3d 1226 (5th Cir.1998); Pero v. Duffy, 2013 WL
6579758 at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2013). Therefore his IAD claim
may go forward while his Sixth Amendment claim may not.
23
indifference to his Eighth Amendment rights. It appears from the
face of the complaint that Plaintiff is asserting the conditions
of his confinement violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment.
It is well settled that “the treatment a prisoner receives
in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Gause v. Diguglielmo,
339 F. App’x 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2009). “To make out an Eighth
Amendment claim, the prisoner must show that the alleged
deprivation was sufficiently serious and that the prison
official acted with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health
and safety.’” Gause, 339 F. App’x at 134 (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “‘[D]eliberate indifference’
is ‘the equivalent of recklessly disregarding [a] risk’ of
serious harm to the prisoner.” Ibid. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 836). Plaintiff has not shown that any violations of the IAD
rose to the level of being “sufficiently serious” to make out an
Eighth Amendment violation. Furthermore, “a successful
deliberate indifference claim requires showing that the
defendant knew of the risk to the plaintiff before the
plaintiff's injury occurred.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d
120, 137 (3d Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not shown that the
actions of the State Defendants acted with indifference,
24
deliberate or otherwise, to a previously known risk to his
health or safety.
Moreover, Plaintiff specifically alleges Defendants Nelson
and Sweeney violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to exercise
their “authority to investigate and rectify repeated violations”
of the IAD. (Docket Entry 36 at 30). He would therefore appear
to be asserting a form of supervisory liability as to those
defendants, specifically the failure to supervise those below
them. The Third Circuit has set forth a four-part test for
determining whether an official may be held liable on a claim
for a failure to supervise:
The plaintiff must identify a supervisory policy or
practice that the supervisor failed to employ, and then
prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at
the time of the alleged injury created an unreasonable
risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendantofficial was aware that the policy created an
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to
that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused
by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or
procedure.
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir.
2014), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.
Ct. 2042 (2015). Plaintiff has not established that any actions
by the State Defendants resulted in the violation of a
constitutional right, 8 therefore he cannot show that any policy
8
As previously noted, a violation of the IAD “is not an
infringement of a constitutional right.” Cooney v. Fulcomer, 886
25
or procedure created an unreasonable risk of constitutional
violations. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims must be
dismissed as failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
H. Defendant Lanigan
Defendant Lanigan, the DOC Commissioner, argues the claims
against
him
must
be
dismissed
as
they
are
premised
on
an
impermissible theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff opposes,
arguing that Defendant Lanigan has been designated as the official
in charge of overseeing compliance with the IAD, and therefore he
is personally responsible supervising and training those tasked
with addressing prisoners’ requests for resolution of out-of-state
detainers. (Docket Entry 60 at 17).
A supervisory defendant may be liable if he, “with
deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused
the constitutional harm.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316. “Claims
alleging a failure to train, failure to discipline, or failure
to supervise are a subset of such policy or practice liability.”
Womack v. Moleins, 2015 WL 420161 at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2015)
(citing Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316). “A pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily
F.2d 41, 46 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d
439, 442 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979 (1988)).
26
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes
of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360
(2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). “Policymakers' ‘continued
adherence to an approach that they know or should know has
failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish
the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action —
the “deliberate indifference” — necessary to trigger’”
supervisory liability. Ibid. (quoting Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at
407). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in
a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have
deliberately chosen a training program that will cause
violations of constitutional rights.” Ibid.
Even if violations of the IAD were considered
constitutional violations, Plaintiff has not established there
has been a pattern of similar violations such that would provide
notice to Defendant Lanigan that NJSP required training in IAD
matters. 9 His failure to train claim therefore is legally
insufficient.
His failure to supervise claim against Defendant Lanigan is
likewise deficient. Plaintiff has not established that any
9
Indeed according to Plaintiff’s Equal Protection argument, he
is the only inmate in the State of New Jersey who has had
difficulty in resolving his out-of-state detainers.
27
constitutional violations occurred, and therefore he cannot show
that any policy or procedure created an unreasonable risk of
constitutional violations. Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766
F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds sub nom
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). He also has not
established that Defendant Lanigan knew of any risk created by
the policies. The fact that Plaintiff sent letters to Defendant
Lanigan after the alleged violations does not indicate Defendant
Lanigan was aware of any risk before the alleged violations. See
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 137 (3d Cir. 2001). It
is unnecessary to reach the final two factors as Plaintiff has
not established the first two factors under the Third Circuit’s
test. The failure to supervise claim against Defendant Lanigan
must also be dismissed.
Government officials “may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009). State actors are under § 1983 liable only for their own
unconstitutional conduct. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366
(3d Cir. 2012). As Plaintiff has not met the legal standard for
imposing supervisory liability under a failure to train or
failure to supervise theory, he has failed to sufficiently
allege Defendant Lanigan’s individual liability. The claims
against Defendant Lanigan must be dismissed.
28
I. Punitive Damages
Defendants assert Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages
must be dismissed as he has failed to establish any misconduct
was motivated by “evil motive or intent.” (Docket Entry 58-1).
Although the Court agrees Plaintiff has not sufficiently
alleged evil motive or intent, it is not necessary for Plaintiff
to do so in order to recover punitive damages. “‘[T]he
defendant's conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous.
Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is
intentional or motivated by evil motive, but the defendant's
action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.’”
Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege good grounds that
Defendants acted with “reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others.” Brennan v. Norton, 350
F.3d 399, 428 (3d Cir. 2003). As Plaintiff may seek leave to
amend his complaint to address other deficiencies, however, he
may be able to set forth a basis for punitive damages in the
future. The dismissal of Plaintiff’s request for punitive
damages is therefore without prejudice.
29
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
is granted in part and denied in part.
If Plaintiff seeks to
cure any of the deficiencies in his pleadings noted herein, he
may attempt to do so by filing a motion to amend, attaching a
proposed Second Amended Complaint, within thirty (30) days of
the entry of this Opinion and Order.
An appropriate order shall
follow.
June 30, 2015
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
30
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