CASTELLANI v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY et al

Filing 343

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Plaintiff's 219 Motion to Quash Defendants' subpoena; granting non-party Jill Houck's 238 Motion to Quash Defendants' subpoena. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio on 3/31/2017. (dmr)

[D.I. 219, 238]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

DAVID CONNOR CASTELLANI,

Civil No. 13-5848 (JBS/AMD)

Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently pending before the court is a motion [D.I.
219] filed by Plaintiff David Connor Castellani (hereinafter,
“Plaintiff”) seeking to quash a second subpoena served upon nonparty Jill Houck, the Director (hereinafter, the “Director”) of
the Atlantic-Cape May County Superior Court Pretrial Intervention
Program (hereinafter, “PTI”) for documents related to Plaintiff’s
entry into the PTI program following an indictment on a number of
charges stemming from an arrest on June 15, 2013. (See Plaintiff’s
Motion to Quash Subpoena (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Mot.”) [D.I. 219].)
The Director has also filed a Motion to Quash [D.I. 238] in support
of Plaintiff’s motion. (See Second Motion to Quash Pursuant to FED.
R.

CIV.

P.

45

(hereinafter,

“Director’s

Mot.”)

[D.I.

238].)

Defendant Officers Darren Lorady, Avette Harper, Kevin Law, Scott
1

Sendrick, and Matthew Rogers (hereinafter, “Defendant Officers”)
oppose the motions of Plaintiff [D.I. 244] and the Director [D.I.
245]. (See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Second Motion to
Quash Subpoena to PTI Director (hereinafter, “Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.”)
[D.I. 244]; see also Defendants’ Opposition to Non-Party Jill
Houck’s Motion to Quash Subpoena to PTI Director (hereinafter,
“Defs.’ Opp’n to the Director”) [D.I. 245].) Defendant Officer
Sterling

Wheaten

joins

in

Co-Defendants’

opposition.

(See

Statement of Intention to Join in Opposition by Defendants [D.I.
246].) For the reasons set forth herein, the motions by Plaintiff
[D.I. 219] and the Director [D.I. 238] are granted.
These motions seek to quash a second subpoena served
upon the Director in this matter. The Court previously granted
motions to quash a previous subpoena served upon the Director by
Order dated June 30, 2016. See Castellani v. City of Atlantic City,
No. 13-5848, 2016 WL 7131578, at *1 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016). The
Court will therefore restate the background of this case pertinent
to these motions as set forth in the prior Order:
In
this
action,
Plaintiff
David
Connor
Castellani seeks damages for injuries he
sustained when he was arrested by police
officers of the Atlantic City Police Department
on June 15, 2013 following an incident at the
Tropicana Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City,
New Jersey. (See generally Amended Complaint
[D.I. 7].) While Plaintiff admits that he was
intoxicated at the time, he asserts that
certain officers physically assaulted him and
that one officer directed a canine to attack
2

him. (See id.) Plaintiff has asserted claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendant
Officers, as well as Defendant Sergeant Daryl
Hall and Defendant City of Atlantic City
(hereinafter, “Defendant Atlantic City”). (See
generally id.)
In February 2015, a New Jersey state grand jury
sitting in Mays Landing, New Jersey, indicted
Plaintiff on three criminal counts relating to
the June 15, 2013 incident: “(1) aggravated
assault upon a police officer; (2) resisting
arrest; and (3) infliction of harm upon an
enforcement animal.” (See Defs.’ Opp. [D.I.
115], 5.) Thereafter, on July 23, 2015
Plaintiff was granted admission to the PTI
program. Id. On or about September 23, 2015,
the Director was served with a subpoena which
sought the production of “[a]ny and all
documents related to and/or referring to David
Connor Castellani’s application to the State of
New Jersey Pre-Trial Intervention Program
related to criminal charges as a result of an
incident that occurred on or about June 15,
2013.” (See Pl.’s Motion, Ex. A [D.I. 104-2],
2.)
Id.
In

the

Court’s

prior

order,

the

Court

granted

the

Defendant Officers leave to serve a revised subpoena setting forth
specifically the categories of information Defendants sought from
the PTI application. See id. at *5. On August 1, 2016, the Director
was served via certified mail with a second subpoena. (See Brief
in

Support

of

Non-party

Jill

Houck’s

Motion

to

Quash

Second

Subpoena (hereinafter, “Director’s Br.”) [D.I. 238-2], 5-6.) The
second
Officers

subpoena

demanded

“Plaintiff’s

the

Director

statement

3

in

produce

connection

to
with

Defendant
his

PTI

application;

any

witness

statements

offered

in

support

or

connection with Plaintiff’s PTI application; any character witness
statement

offered

in

support

of

Plaintiff;

and

any

written

responses to questions provided by Plaintiff in connection with
his PTI application.” (See Pl.’s Motion, Ex. A [D.I. 219-2], 2.) 1
As set forth previously by the Court in its prior Order:
Under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
26(b)(1), as amended, “[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues
at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties' relative access to
relevant information, the parties' resources,
the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) 2. Under Rule
26, a party may seek to avoid production of
otherwise relevant information on the basis
that the production is protected by a
privilege. Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65
(3d Cir. 2000). In the context of discovery
served upon a non-party, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45, the court “must quash or
modify a subpoena that . . . (iii) requires
disclosure of privileged or other protected

1

Exhibit A is the second subpoena served by defense counsel for
the Defendant Officers.
2 The Court finds that it is just and practicable to review the
Plaintiff’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 as
most recently amended. See 2015 US ORDER 0017 (setting forth the
2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and stating
“the foregoing amendments . . . shall take effect on December 1,
2015, and shall govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter
commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings
then pending”).
4

matter, if no exception or waiver applies.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii).
Castellani, 2016 WL 7131578 at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016).
At the outset, and for the reasons set forth in the
Court’s previous Order granting the motion to quash, Plaintiff has
standing to file the current motion because “Plaintiff claims a
personal right or privilege with respect to the documents sought
by the subpoena.” Id.
Under
“federal

Rule

privileges

501
apply

of
to

the

Federal

federal

law

Rules

of

claims,

Evidence, 3
and

state

privileges apply to claims arising under state law[,]” but “‘when
there are federal law claims in a case also presenting state law
claims, the federal rule favoring admissibility, rather than any
state law privilege, is the controlling rule.’” Pearson, 211 F.3d
at 66 (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671
F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982)). Thus, “[w]here ... there are both

3

FED. R. EVID. 501 provides:
The common law--as interpreted by United
States courts in the light of reason and
experience--governs a claim of privilege
unless
any
of
the
following
provides
otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
But in a civil case, state law governs
privilege regarding a claim or defense for
which state law supplies the rule of decision.
5

federal and state law claims, federal privileges rather than state
privileges apply to all claims.” Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 94
(D.N.J. 1989) (citing Wm. T. Thompson Co., 671 F.2d at 104). As
noted by the Court in the prior Order, as Plaintiff in this case
has alleged both federal and state law claims, the Court will apply
the federal law of privilege to all claims. See Castellani, 2016
WL 7131578 at *2 (citing Wei, 127 F.R.D. at 94).
The Court previously found that the PTI file is “clearly
protected from disclosure in civil matters under New Jersey law.”
Id. at *4. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(f) provides “that no statements by a
PTI participant undergoing supervisory treatment be admitted into
evidence

in

any

participant.’” 4

civil
Id.

at

or
*3

criminal

proceeding

(quoting

N.J.S.A.

‘against

the

2C:43-13(f)).

Similarly, N.J. Ct. R. 3:28(c), the state court rule governing
pretrial intervention programs, provides:

Specifically, the provision states “[n]o statement or other
disclosure by a participant undergoing supervisory treatment made
or disclosed to the person designated to provide such supervisory
treatment shall be disclosed, at any time, to the prosecutor in
connection with the charge or charges against the participant, nor
shall any such statement or disclosure be admitted as evidence in
any civil or criminal proceeding against the participant. Nothing
provided herein, however, shall prevent the person providing
supervisory treatment from informing the prosecutor, or the court,
upon request or otherwise as to whether or not the participant is
satisfactorily responding to supervisory treatment.” N.J.S.A.
2C:43-13(f).
4

6

(5) No statement or other disclosure regarding
the charge or charges against the participant
made or disclosed by a participant in pretrial
intervention to a person designated to provide
supervisory treatment shall be disclosed by
such person at any time, to the prosecutor,
nor shall any such statement or disclosure be
admitted as evidence in any civil or criminal
proceeding against the participant, provided
that the criminal division manager shall not
be prevented from informing the prosecutor, or
the court, on request or otherwise, whether
the participant is satisfactorily responding
to supervisory treatment.
N.J. Ct. R. 3:28(c)(5). Moreover, pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule
1:38-3(c)(5), “[r]ecords relating to participants in drug court
programs and programs approved for operation under R. 3:28 (Pretrial Intervention), and reports made for a court or prosecuting
attorney pertaining to persons enrolled in or applications for
enrollment in such programs,” are excluded from public access,
with the exception of “the fact of enrollment and the enrollment
conditions imposed by the court.” N.J. Ct. R. 1:38-3(c)(5). 5 For
the reasons set forth by the Court in the prior Order, which are
incorporated herein, the Court finds that the PTI file is clearly
protected from disclosure in civil matters under New Jersey law.
The Court concludes as set forth in the prior Order, that while
the “2C:43-13(f) prohibition refers to admissibility in civil or

This provision has been relaxed by the New Jersey Supreme Court
order dated December 6, 2016 with respect to certain records
concerning risk assessments and pretrial release or pretrial
detention, but such changes do not impact the Court’s decision
here.

5

7

criminal proceedings against the participant” and while “the New
Jersey court rule is silent when the PTI applicant is a plaintiff
in a civil action” the Court “does not read the prohibition so
strictly when viewed in the context of the policy behind the PTI
program.

The

Court

concludes

that

under

New

Jersey

law,

the

prohibition against disclosure applies in both civil and criminal
actions.” Castellani, 2016 WL 7131578 at *4. Thus, Plaintiff’s PTI
file is “clearly protected from disclosure in civil matters under
New Jersey [state] law.” Id.
The

Court

must

next

determine

whether

to

give

controlling effect to that state privilege in federal court. When
the information sought is protected by a state privilege, “the
case for recognizing a particular federal privilege is stronger.”
Pearson, 211 F.3d at 67. “[T]he policy decisions of the States
bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new
privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one.” Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1996). If a state privilege does not
affect

or

interfere

with

federal

substantive

and

procedural

policy, a federal court may recognize a state privilege. See
Pearson, 211 F.3d at 67 (observing that “‘[a] strong policy of
comity between state and federal sovereignties impels federal
courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished
at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural

8

policy’”) (quoting United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105
(E.D.N.Y. 1976)).
As noted by the Third Circuit, the Court “must determine
‘granting due respect to [New Jersey’s] protections, whether a
privilege of the kind sought . . . promotes sufficiently important
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence, where the
need

for

probative

consideration

evidence

indeed–to

the

is

viewed

extent

that

as

a

only

very
the

weighty
strongest

considerations on the other side of the scale are capable of
outweighing it.’” Swanger v. Warrior Run School District, 659 Fed.
Appx. 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pearson, 211 F.3d at 69).
In making that determination, the Court conducts a balancing
analysis considering a number of factors including:
1) the need for the information to enforce
federal substantive and procedural policies;
2) the importance of the state policy that
supports the rule of privilege and the
likelihood that recognizing the privilege will
advance the state policy; 3) the special need
of the litigant who seeks the information; and
4) any adverse impact on local policy if the
privilege is not recognized.
Sabharwal v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 09-1950, 2011 WL 477693,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011) (citing King, 73 F.R.D. at 105).
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled January 21, 1981, 535 F.
Supp. 537, 541 (D.N.J. 1982) (“the principles of comity suggest
generally

that

the

federal

courts

should

recognize

state

privileges ‘where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost
9

to federal substantive and procedural policy’”) (quoting King, 73
F.R.D. at 105); see also Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79, 8789 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (citing the King factors and applying them in
determining whether to recognize Pennsylvania’s peer review state
privilege in federal court); cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation,
918 F.2d 374, 388 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[i]n analyzing whether [a
clergy-communicant] privilege exists under federal common law, we
have also considered the balancing process described by Judge
Weinstein in United States v. King”).
The Court first considers whether there is a need for
Defendants to have the statements contained in Plaintiff’s PTI
file in order to enforce any federal substantive or procedural
policies. Defendants argue there is an “extremely compelling need”
for the statements contained in Plaintiff’s PTI file, as the
statements “are needed to develop a full complete and accurate
record[.]” (Defs.’ Opp’n to the Director [D.I. 245], 7-8.) Both
Plaintiff and the Director argue Defendants have no compelling
need for the statements because Defendants have already had an
opportunity to depose Plaintiff, as well as Plaintiff’s family and
friends. (See Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion to Quash
Subpoena (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Br.”) [D.I. 219-1], 5; see also
Director’s Br. [238-2], 15.) Plaintiff and the Director also point
to

Plaintiff’s

responses

to

written

interrogatories

and

Defendants’ access to the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office’s
10

“extensive” investigation as further evidence that no compelling
need exists. Id. The Court notes that the federal interest in
developing a complete factual record “serves the ‘paramount public
interest in the fair administration of justice.’” Skibo v. City of
New York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Lora v. Bd.
of Educ. of the City of New York, 74 F.R.D. 565, 578 (E.D.N.Y.
1977)). The Court recognizes that statements made by Plaintiff and
other witnesses to the incident giving rise to this litigation are
probative and relevant. However, Plaintiff’s PTI records are not
the only source of this information and Defendants acknowledge as
much as they seek the information for impeachment purposes, having
already had ample opportunity to develop the factual record and
depose Plaintiff and numerous witnesses. 6 Thus, the Court finds
that recognition of the state privilege in this case will not
detrimentally impact the federal interest of ensuring a complete
factual record.
Turning next to the importance of the state policy
underlying the privilege, the Court considers the likelihood that
recognizing the privilege will advance the state policy. The
Director

asserts

that

“the

privilege

...

that

prohibits

the

To the extent Defendants assert the PTI files are necessary to
reveal undisclosed witnesses, (see Defs.’ Opp’n to the Director
[D.I. 245], 9), the Court rejects that argument. There has been no
showing that Plaintiff has failed to identify any witnesses
required to be identified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26.
6

11

disclosure of the materials from Plaintiff’s PTI file is based
upon

policies

that

promote

significant

State

and

public

interests[.]” (See Director’s Br. [D.I. 238-2], 13.) Specifically,
the Director cites the PTI program’s rehabilitative role in the
identification and referral of defendants in need of treatment, as
well as PTI’s provision of addressing the problems of congestion
and backlog in criminal courts. See id. at 11. The Director further
asserts

that,

because

admission

into

the

PTI

program

is

not

predicated on any admission of guilt, “the often counterproductive
stigma of conviction, which accompanies parole and probation, does
not attach to participants in a PTI program.” Id. at 11-12 (citing
State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 98-99 (1976)). Similarly, Plaintiff
asserts the confidentiality of Plaintiff’s PTI file is necessary
to counter “‘the often debilitating effects on a suspect from
introduction to the criminal process[.]’” (Pls.’ Br. [D.I. 2191], 5 (quoting Leonardis, 71 N.J. at 93).) Defendants counter that
only “certain statements” in Plaintiff’s PTI file are sought, and
assert that “[t]he state policy is not harmed if the statements
are disclosed.” (See Defs.’ Opp’n to the Director [D.I. 245], 8.)
As noted by the Court in its prior Order,
[t]he reasoning behind New Jersey's law
prohibiting the distribution [of] PTI files to
third parties is to “protect the integrity of
the PTI process.” Szczech v. Carluccio, 665
A.2d 798, 802 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
In order to protect the PTI process, the PTI
files are not disclosed to third parties so
12

“the government[ ] [may] conduct its affairs
with skill, with sensitivity to the privacy
interests involved, and in an atmosphere of
confidentiality that encourages the utmost
candor.” Id.
Castellani, 2016 WL 7131578 at *4. However, Defendants’ subpoena,
which

seeks

statements

of

Plaintiff,

witnesses,

and

written

responses to questions, is not limited and conflicts with the state
policy of encouraging candid participation in the PTI program.
Indeed,

such

underlying

a

policy

is

consistent

confidentiality

of

with

federal

the

federal

pretrial

policy

diversion

information. See infra. The Court thus finds that recognizing the
privilege would likely advance the rehabilitative and judicially
economic goals of the state law.
The Court next considers whether there is any special
need by Defendants for the PTI information they seek. Defendants
argue they are “entitled to investigate a deponent’s credibility
with other statements made regarding the incident and Plaintiff’s
conduct,”

and

that

“the

statements

[may]

lead

to

additional

witnesses that have yet to be identified.” (See Defs.’ Opp’n to
the Director [D.I. 245], 9.) Plaintiff argues in response that
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s friends were all deposed and “[t]he only
other witnesses to the incident were the defendants themselves.”
(See Pl.’s Br. [219-1], 5). As noted above, there is no compelling
need

for

Defendants

to

have

the

statements

in

light

of

the

extensive discovery already conducted in this case. See Komlosi v.
13

New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities,
No. 88-1792, 1992 WL 77544, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1992) (finding
that documents collected during an investigation by the New York
State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled were
protected

under

New

York

state

law

where

the

individuals

interviewed by the Commission were available for deposition). The
Court

finds

that

Defendants

do

not

have

a

special

need

for

Plaintiff’s PTI documents.
The Court next turns to consideration of whether there
is any adverse impact on the state policy if the privilege is not
recognized.

Plaintiff

asserts

that

“the

important

goal

of

rehabilitating non-violent offenders in an inexpensive way will be
subverted if this Court disregards the state privilege.” (See Pl.’s
Br. [D.I. 219-1], 6.) Plaintiff further asserts that “failure to
recognize this important state privilege would ... deter would-be
applicants from participating in the Program.” Id. at 7. The
Director asserts that “confidentiality of PTI files and their
contents

encourages

candor

on

the

part

of

applicants

and

participants, efficient and successful rehabilitation, and the
proper functioning of the PTI Program.” (See Director’s Br. [D.I.
238-2], 14.) As stated supra, the Court finds that the moving
parties have articulated a sufficient concern that participants in
the PTI program may be less likely to participate in the PTI
program if a party could procure the statements made for use in a
14

civil

action

and

further

finds

that

factor

as

well

supports

recognition of a PTI privilege.
Although evidentiary privileges are “strongly disfavored
in federal practice and must be narrowly drawn[,]” the Court may
in the interest of comity recognize a state privilege “to the
extent that doing so will not impose a substantial cost on federal
policies.” Freed v. Grand Court Lifestyles, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d
610, 618 (S.D. Ohio 1998). Here, the Court finds that recognizing
a privilege with respect to state pretrial diversion records is
consistent with federal policy as it relates to federal pretrial
diversion records. Federal pretrial diversion is “an alternative
to

prosecution

which

traditional

criminal

supervision

and

seeks

to

justice

services

divert

certain

processing

administered

into

by

the

offenders
a

program

U.S.

from
of

Probation

Service.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual
§ 9-22.010 (1997) available at 1997 WL 1944677. The objectives of
federal pretrial diversion include “prevent[ing] future criminal
activity

among

certain

offenders

by

diverting

them

from

traditional processing into community supervision and services,”
as well as “sav[ing] prosecutive and judicial resources.” Id. The
confidentiality

of

pretrial

services

information

including

pretrial diversion reports is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(1).
This subsection provides that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph
(2) of this subsection, information obtained in the course of
15

performing pretrial services functions in relation to a particular
accused shall be used only for the purposes of a bail determination
and shall otherwise be confidential.” 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(1). 7
Subsection 2 provides for the Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts to “issue regulations establishing the
policy for release of information made confidential” to allow
access in certain enumerated exceptions, and specifically, as it
relates to pretrial diversion reports, to permit access to the
attorney for the accused and the attorney for the Government. 18
U.S.C. § 3153(c)(2)(D). The statute does not authorize civil
litigants to access pretrial diversion records.

In Apex Tool

Group, LLC v. Dmtco, LLC, No. 13-372, 2015 WL 8489388, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio

Dec.

presumptive

11,

2015),

right

to

the
public

court

found

access

to

that

the

judicial

common-law
records

was

“overridden by a federal statute,” and denied the plaintiff’s
request

to

unseal

the

defendant’s

federal

pretrial

diversion

documents. Significantly, the Apex court found that in drafting 18

The confidentiality of pretrial services information “is
preserved primarily to promote a candid and truthful relationship
between the defendant and the pretrial services officer in order
to obtain the most complete and accurate information possible for
the judicial officer.” The Administrative Office of the United
States Courts Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8A, App’x 5A:
Confidentiality Regulations § 1(C) (citing H. Conf. Rep. 97-792,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8). “Disclosure … for purposes other than for
the determination of pretrial release … would deter defendants
from cooperation with pretrial services officers and deprive the
court of necessary information.” Id.
7

16

U.S.C. § 3153(c), Congress deliberately “did not adopt as an
exception providing such information when it might be useful to
impeach a diverted defendant in a civil case, even one brought by
the victim of the crime.” Id. at *1. The Apex court further noted
that “by providing for certain specified exceptions, the Congress
has impliedly excluded” exceptions for the release of pretrial
diversion

information

in

civil

matters,

even

for

impeachment

purposes. Id. The Court agrees with the Apex court and finds that
the statute governing the confidentiality of pretrial diversion
records does not permit access by civil litigants. This finding
therefore further supports the Court’s conclusion that the motions
to quash should be granted.
Consequently, the Court recognizes the state privilege
prohibiting the disclosure of Plaintiff’s PTI file as a matter of
federal common law.
factors

set

forth

Such a privilege is not only supported by the
in

King,

but

also

consistent

with

federal

confidentiality law governing federal pretrial diversion records.
Accordingly, the motions to quash are granted.
For the reasons set forth herein, and for good cause
shown:
IT IS on this 31st day of March 2017,
ORDERED that the motion of Plaintiff [D.I. 219] seeking
to quash Defendants’ subpoena, shall be, and is hereby, GRANTED;
and it is further
17

ORDERED that the motion of non-party Jill Houck [D.I.
238], seeking to quash Defendants’ subpoena, shall be, and is
hereby, GRANTED.

s/ Ann Marie Donio
ANN MARIE DONIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: Hon. Jerome B. Simandle

18