RODRIGUEZ v. THEWS et al
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/23/2013. (tf, n.m.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
:
JEAN EMMANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-4101 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,:
APPLIES TO ALL ACTIONS
:
Defendants.
:
_______________________________________
:
:
JEAN EMMANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-5866 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BERNARD E. DELURY, JR., et al., :
:
Defendants.
:
_______________________________________
:
:
JEAN EMMANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-6131 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
THE CITY OF SOMERS POINT,
:
:
Defendant.
:
_______________________________________
:
:
JEAN EMMANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-6132 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BERNARD E. DELURY, JR.,
:
:
Defendant.
:
_______________________________________
:
. . . continued
________________________________
:
JEAN EMMANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-6178 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
STEPHANIE K. THEWS, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_______________________________________
:
:
JEAN EMMANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
:
: Civil Action No. 13-6179 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
_______________________________________
:
OPINION
APPLIES TO BOTH ACTIONS
These six civil matters come before the Court upon the
Clerk’s receipt of an informal notice and four civil complaints
executed by Jean Emmanuel Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”), a litigant who
already commenced two prior civil actions in this District, with
regard to one of which the Court granted in forma pauperis status
and directed re-pleading and terminated the other as potentially
duplicative.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s in forma
pauperis status will be temporarily suspended in the matter where
such status was granted, with leave to seek restoration of the
same.
All Plaintiff’s pleadings submitted in these six matters
2
will be dismissed with leave to amend the claims Plaintiff wishes
to litigate, if any.1
Plaintiff’s history of litigation in this District began on
July 2, 2013, when the Clerk received his civil complaint that
gave rise to Rodriguez v. State of New Jersey (“Rodriguez-I”),
Civil Action No. 13-4101 (RMB) (D.N.J.).2
Plaintiff accompanied
that complaint with an application to proceed in forma pauperis,
in support of which he submitted his affidavit of poverty, see
Rodriguez-I, Docket Entry No. 1-1,3 and designated his address as
“100 New Road, Apt. F3, Somerset Point, New Jersey 08244.”
Id.,
Docket Entry No. 1, at 2.
Therefore, the Court construed Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis
application as that filed by an individual not held in pre-trial
or post-conviction custody and, correspondingly, granted him in
1
The informal notice received from Plaintiff indicates his
substantial confusion as to the procedural posture of his actions
since the notice read, “I am trying to amend 13-4101. . . .
[T]hat matter was dismissed . . . , as well as all of the matters
I have recently sent. Please disregard all those matters and
focus on this one.” See notice docketed in Civil Action No. 135866, Docket Entry No. 4, page 9.
2
The Court cannot rule out that Plaintiff had commenced
other litigations in this District prior to Rodriguez-I.
3
That application asserted, somewhat puzzlingly, that New
Jersey Institute of Technology owed Plaintiff $2,231 and an
unspecified body owed him $15,000 in “student loans.” See
Rodriguez-I, Docket Entry No. 1-1, at 3. In light of this, the
Court concluded that Plaintiff: (a) misread the question posed in
the affidavit; (b) intended to assert that he owed these amounts;
and, thus, (c) qualified under the statute.
3
forma pauperis status without directing submission of his prison
account statement.
See id., Docket Entry No. 2.
In conjunction
with the same, the Court screened Plaintiff’s Rodriguez-I
complaint.
The complaint raised a panoply of vaguely articulated
challenges and named a long list of defendants with regard to
whom Plaintiff omitted to detail any facts indicating their
personal involvement in any wrongs.4
4
Therefore, the Court
Plaintiff named, as defendants in Rodriguez-I, the State
of New Jersey, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, United States
Senator Jeffery S. Chiesa, numerous individuals who, the Court
surmised, might have been employed by New Jersey Attorney General
Office (i.e., Alan B. Handler, James R. Zazzali, Edward J.
Dauber, Theodore Z. Davis, John J. Farmer Jr., Theresa M. Kiuck,
Alice Click, Richard W. Roper, M. Karen Thompson), the Atlantic
County and numerous individuals who, the Court surmised, were
performing certain functions for that county or for the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County vicinage
(i.e., Dennis Levinson, Judge Mark H. Sandson, Judge James E.
Isman, Judge Joseph 1. Marczyk, Judge Nelson C. Johnson, Theodore
F. L. Housel, Eric Shenkus, Erica Halayko, Jessica Ramirez), the
City of Atlantic City and numerous individuals who, the Court
surmised, were performing certain functions for that City or for
its municipal courts (i.e., Lorenzo T. Langford, Judges Bruce F.
Weekes, Braun Littlefield, Kelly Hasson Blanchet, Michelle Funk,
Ernest Jubilee, John Devlin, Tim Friel, Sgt. Hendricks, Arthur
Freedman and unspecified “staff), the County of Essex County and
two individuals who, the Court surmised, were performing certain
functions for that county or the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County vicinage (i.e., Joseph N. DiVincenzo,
Jr. and Judge Hutchins Henderson), the City of Newark, its thenserving Mayor, Corey Booker, and certain individual (Natasha
Purvey) who, the Court surmised, performed certain functions for
that City, as well as two individuals whose connection to the
above-listed entities or individuals, or even to Plaintiff, the
Court could not surmise (i.e., certain Tracy L. Riley and Pat
Hallman). Plaintiff’s patchy allegations made mention of certain
arrest(s) that were followed by certain criminal proceeding(s)
and numerous penal convictions. Those multiple transactions
seemingly took place during the period from 2006 to 2012. The
Rodruguez-I complaint concluded with the following demand:
4
dismissed the Rodriguez-I complaint without prejudice to filing
an amended pleading stating Plaintiff’s facts.
Entry No. 2.
See id., Docket
To assist Plaintiff with that task, the Court
summarized for him the pleading requirement.
See id. at 2-3.
In response, Plaintiff submitted his amended Rodriguez-I
pleading.
See id., Docket Entry No. 3.
That pleading named, as
defendants, the same entities and individuals, made the same
demands and allegations and, in addition, included a mentioning
of a certain “fraudulent hearing” conducted by the Advisory
Committee on Judicial Conduct (that is, an arm of the Supreme
The State of New Jersey shall over[]turn every
conviction [entered against [Plaintiff], and refund
all monetary assets falsely acquire, from [Plaintiff
as a result of his arrests, multiple criminal
prosecutions and numerous penal convictions, such as]
(time, money, social credibility, and all assets . . .
. The fraudulent entities in the Cities of Atlantic
City and Newark, and the Counties of Atlantic and
Essex shall be disbarred and brought up before the
proper authorities to answer for their actions. The
State of New Jersey and all participating entities
shall pay every debt acquired by [Plaintiff] during
these transgressions. The State of New Jersey shall
provide free room, board, and tuition [to Plaintiff]
at New Jersey Institute of Technology, so that [he
could] obtain two bachelor degrees of his choice. The
State of New Jersey shall [also] provide tuition,
room, and board at Rutgers University, so [that
Plaintiff could] obtain a degree in law and enter a
master’s program [of unspecified specialization]. The
Cities of Atlantic City and Newark shall contribute
the sum $500,000.00 [British] pounds to [ensure] the
well-being of [Plaintiff].
Rodriguez-I, Docket Entry No. 1, at 2.
5
Court of New Jersey) in response to what, seemingly, was
Plaintiff’s filing of a grievance against one of the Superior
Court judges who presided either over his criminal proceeding or
his appeal.
See id.
The Court screened that amended pleading and, taking notice
of the incoherence and factual insufficiency of Plaintiff’s
allegations, dismissed that pleading too while providing a
detailed explanation of the pleading standard and issuing
Plaintiff another leave to amend.
See id., Docket Entry No. 4.
The second amended complaint followed.
Entry No. 5.
See id., Docket
It, too, named the same list of entities and
individuals as defendants, made the same demands and asserted,
without a specification, the wrongs of “arresting Plaintiff
without probable cause,” “detaining Plaintiff for an extended
period of time without probable cause,” “ransoming Plaintiff’s
freedom without probable cause,” “continuously summoning
Plaintiff without probable cause,” “denying Plaintiff proper
counsel,” “prosecuting Plaintiff with fraudulent accusations,”
“denying Plaintiff equal rights under the law,” “conspiring
against the civil rights of Plaintiff,” “breach of verbal
contract and defamation of Plaintiff’s character.” Id. at 3.
The Court screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and,
once again, dismissed it while re-explaining, at great length,
the pleading standard.
See id., Docket Entry No. 6. at 2-4.
6
Out of an abundance of caution, the Court allowed Plaintiff
one more opportunity to submit a viable civil complaint in
Rodriguez-I within thirty days from the date of entry of the
Court’s order.
See id. at 4.
submissions in Rodriguez-I.5
Plaintiff, however, made no
Rather, on October 2, 2013, he
submitted another civil complaint that gave rise to Rodriguez v.
DeLury (“Rodriguez-II”), Civil Action No. 13-5866 (RMB) (D.N.J.).
See Rodriguez-II, Docket Entry No. 1.
The Rodriguez-II complaint indicated that Plaintiff was held
in either pre-trial or post-conviction confinement, see id. at 2,
but did not provide the Court with any information as to the date
when his confinement commenced.6
Moreover, the Rodriguez-II
complaint arrived unaccompanied by the applicable filing fee or
by Plaintiff’s application to prosecute Rodriguez-II in forma
pauperis.
See id., Docket Entry No. 1.
Being uncertain as to the connection, if any, between
Plaintiff’s allegations raised in Rodriguez-I and the claims
5
In light of Plaintiff’s informal notice, see note 1,
supra, the Court has no clarity as to whether Plaintiff still
wishes to continue with prosecuting Rodriguez-I or prefers to
withdraw all Rodriguez-I claims.
6
For the purposes of Rodriguez-I, Plaintiff merely
mentioned his “place of residence.” The complaint in RodriguezII mentioned that address while indicating that Plaintiff has
been subject to certain criminal proceedings for a substantial
period of time and was confined in connection with those
proceedings. Hence, it appears now that Plaintiff was a confined
individual at the time he commenced Rodriguez-I.
7
raised in Rodriguez-II, and mindful of the possibility that, in
the event Plaintiff proved to be a confined individual, he would
be assessed separate filing fees and exposed to the risk of
incurring two “strikes” in connection with these two matters, the
Court construed the pleading docketed in Rodriguez-II as
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint in Rodriguez-I.
Hence, the
Court clarified to Plaintiff the filing fee requirement, as well
as the requirement associated with obtaining in forma pauperis
status in the event one is a pre-trial detainee or postconviction prisoner.
See id. Docket Entries Nos. 2 and 3
(explaining that the filing fee was $400 but a confined
individual could qualify for incremental assessment of only $350
fee upon submission of an affidavit and prison account statement
establishing his status as a pauper).
The Court, therefore, extended Plaintiff’s time to file a
viable pleading in Rodriguez-I and deemed Rodriguez-II an action
presumptively duplicative of Rodriguez-I.7
See id., Docket Entry
No. 3.
7
The complaint in Rodriguez-II named, as defendants, state
court judge Bernard DeLury, Jr., state prosecutor James McClaim
and certain Geraldine Cohen (“Gohen”), and alleged that the judge
and prosecutor “operate[d] an inferior court,” while Cohen had
Plaintiff “physically confined on a warrant” issued by an entity
Plaintiff did not know. Rodriguez-II, Docket Entry No. 1, at 1.
8
Plaintiff however, did not file anything in Rodriguez-I.
Nor did he make any submissions in Rodriguez-II.
Rather, he sent
the Clerk four civil complaints that gave rise to Rodriguez v.
City of Somers Point (“Rodriguez-III”), Civil Action No. 13-6131
(RMB) (D.N.J.) (filed on Oct. 16, 2013); Rodriguez v. DeLury
(“Rodriguez-IV”), Civil Action No. 13-6132 (RMB) (D.N.J.) (filed
on Oct. 16, 2013); Rodriguez v. Thews (“Rodriguez-V”), Civil
Action No. 13-6178 (RMB) (D.N.J.) (filed on Oct. 17, 2013);
Rodriguez v. State of New Jersey (“Rodriguez-VI”), Civil Action
No. 13-6179 (RMB) (D.N.J.) (filed on Oct. 17, 2013).8
As in
Rodriguez-II, each of these four complaints arrived unaccompanied
by Plaintiff’s filing fee or his in forma pauperis application.
The complaint in Rodriguez-III: (a) asserted, again (and
just as in Rodriguez-I) that Plaintiff was residing at “100 New
Road, Apt. F3, Somerset Point, New Jersey 08244”; but,
simultaneously, (b) stated Plaintiff’s mailing address at prison
(hence indicating that he was a confined individual); (c) alleged
that the City of Somers Point and its municiple court, as well as
8
These four new matters were assigned to the undersigned
pursuant to Rule 40.1, the District’s anti-judge-shopping
provision. See U.S. Dist. Ct. NJ. L. Civ. R. 40.1(c) (“A
subsequent case or application filed by a pro se plaintiff shall
. . . be assigned to the Judge to whom the first prior case or
application of the plaintiff was assigned”); cf. Selkridge v.
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 168 (2004) (“[Had]
the rule [been] otherwise . . . [j]udge-shopping would then
become an additional and potent tactical weapon in the skilled
[litigant’s] arsenal”).
9
the City’s police department, were “depriv[ing] Plaintiff . . .
of life and liberty by false accusations, violation of probable
cause, and . . . den[ial of] due process”; and (d) sought an
“audio-video evidence from the holding cell [on the already past
date of] August 12, 2013, between the hours of 12:00 a.m. and 4
p.m.,” a deposition of a certain police officer, this Court’s
verification of “the validity of the inferior” Superior Court of
New Jersey, and $1 million in damages for Plaintiff’s “emotional
distress, psychological abuse and social degradation.”
Rodriguez-III, Docket Entry No. 1.
The complaint in Rodriguez-IV indicated that Plaintiff held
sovereign citizenship/redemptionist beliefs and wished to assert
claims based on those beliefs, but see Bey v. Hillside Twp. Mun.
Court, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28397 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2012)
(detailing, at great length, the nature and facial legal
invalidity of such beliefs and facial frivolity of all claims and
allegations based on such beliefs).
This complaint asserted that
Judge DeLury violated Plaintiff’s rights by asking him about his
status and by declining what seemed to be Plaintiff’s request for
verification of the Superior Court’s jurisdictional mandate to
prosecute Plaintiff.9
See Rodriguez-IV, Docket Entry No. 1.
9
Plaintiff’s reference to the Uniform Commercial Code
after his name and his statement that he questioned the Superior
Court’s jurisdictional mandate indicate that he wished to raise
so-called “Marrakush” challenges. See Bey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10
Plaintiff closed by requesting: (a) this Court’s “dismissal” of
all state penal statutes; and (b) $1 million in damages for
Plaintiff’s “emotional distress, psychological abuse, social
degradation and physical discomfort.”
Id. at 1.
The complaint in Rodriguez-V: (a) named Stephanie K. Thews,
John G. Barbieri, Howard Freed, Mark G. Mcelwee, Jr., Shawn G.
Mckelvey and John J. Miller as defendants; (b) asserted that
these defendants “deprived” Plaintiff “of life and liberty”“ by
entering certain testimony that Plaintiff deemed fraudulent;10
(c) requested certain evidentiary rulings to be made for the
purposes of Plaintiff’s current criminal prosecution in the state
court; and (d) sought compensatory damages in the amount of
$1,000 for each day of his incarceration, as well as “dismissal”
of all state penal statutes that served as bases for the penal
charges underlying his current prosecution.
See Rodriguez-V,
Docket Entry No. 1.
28397, at *5, 10-11 (relying on Marrakush Soc’y v. N.J. State
Police, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009), and
its progeny to detail invalidity of such challenges).
10
The Court surmises that Plaintiff might have had a
recent grand jury proceeding or a hearing conducted in connection
with what seems to be his currently ongoing criminal prosecution,
and the testimonies at issue were offered during those
proceedings. Hence, it appears that the persons named as
defendants in Rodriguez-V were the prosecutor(s) and testifying
witnesses.
11
Finally, in his Rodriguez-VI complaint, Plaintiff named the
State of New Jersey and the Governor’s Office as defendants and,
upon asserting “depriv[ation] of life, liberty, property and due
process,” requested $5 million for his “emotional distress,
psychological abuse, social degradation,” as well as $10,000 per
each hour of incarceration.
Rodriguez-VI, Docket Entry No. 1.
Since, at this juncture, Plaintiff neither prepaid the $400
filing fee nor qualified for in forma pauperis status with regard
to his Rodriguez-II, Rodriguez-III, Rodriguez-IV, Rodriguez-V,
and Rodriguez-VI, reaching the merits of his allegations would be
premature.
See Izquierdo v. State, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15533,
at *2-3 and n.1 (3d Cir. July 25, 2013).11
Moreover, Plaintiff’s
qualification for in forma pauperis status in Rodriguez-I has
become questionable in light of his later-made submissions
suggesting that Plaintiff migfht have been incarcerated at the
time he commenced Rodriguez-I.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s in forma
pauperis status in Rodriguez-I will be suspended, subject to
restoration in the event he provides the Court with proof that,
on July 2, 2013, he was not in custody.12
11
In light of Plaintiff’s informal notice, the Court is in
no position to determine which of these five matters Plaintiff is
interested in prosecuting.
12
In light of Plaintiff’s informal notice, the Court is in
no position to determine whether Plaintiff is still interested in
trying to mount a viable claim in Rodriguez-I.
12
With regard to each of the remaining actions, he will be
directed to prepay his $400 filing fee or duly apply for in forma
pauperis status.
(Since the Court already detailed to Plaintiff
the requirements, obligations and consequences associated with
obtaining in forma pauperis status, another recital of the same
appears superfluous.)
In conjunction with the foregoing, Plaintiff will be allowed
one final opportunity to amend his claims scattered among his
many complaints; such final amended pleading(s) shall be executed
in strict compliance with the pleading requirement the Court
already explained to Plaintiff time and again.
The Court
stresses that Plaintiff’s amended pleadings, if filed, shall be
free of any sovereign citizenship, redemptionist, “Marrakush” and
akin allegations, see Bey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28397,13 since
such claim, if asserted, would be deemed frivolous and make a
mockery of this Court and may result in sanctions.
Moreover, taking notice other deficiencies of Plaintiff’s
submissions made in the above-captioned six matters, the Court
finds it warranted to clarify to Plaintiff the requirements of
Rule 18 and 20, the prohibition on duplicative litigations, the
limitation on the scope of amended pleadings (ensuing from Rule
13
The Court will attach the opinion entered in Bey, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28397, to the Order accompanying this Opinion.
13
15), as well as the unavailability of habeas relief in civil
matters and insufficiency of pleading respondeat superior claims.
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
joinder of defendants, while Rule 18 governs the joinder of
claims.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2).
Specifically, Rule
20 provides that “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as
defendants if . . . any right to relief is . . . arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
Rule 18, in turn, provides that
“[a] party asserting a claim . . . may join . . . as many claims
as it has against an opposing party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), and
Wright and Miller's treatise on federal civil procedure explains
that, where multiple defendants are named, the analysis under
Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18.
See Charles Allen Wright,
Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
Civil 3d § 1655; see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S.
128, 143 (1965); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F. 2d 646, 650 n.5 (3d Cir.
1981), overruled on other grounds by, Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (joinder of defendants is not permitted by
Rule 20 unless both commonality and same transaction requirements
are satisfied).
Consequently, a civil plaintiff may not name
more than one defendant in his original or even amended complaint
unless one claim against each additional defendant is
transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant
14
and involves a common question of law or fact.
P. 20(a)(2).
See Fed. R. Civ.
Notably, claims by incarcerated individuals are not
exempt from the reach of Rules 18 and 20.
See George v. Smith,
507 F. 3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A [scatter]shot complaint
that would be rejected if filed by a free person . . . should be
rejected if filed by a prisoner”).
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot
litigate in a single action the events of his arrest, his
prosecution, his grievance proceedings, etc., since each arrest
presents its own transaction, each criminal proceeding conducted
in courts is necessarily done by actors other than those who
performed the arrest (i.e., neither the judges, nor prosecutors
or defense counsel act as arresting officers), and a grievance
process before an arm of the New Jersey Supreme Court is a
transaction as distinct and different from a criminal proceedings
as one criminal prosecution is distinct from another.
In other
words, each transaction Plaintiff asserted in his diary-like
Rodriguez-I complaint (which covered the period from 2006 to
2012) should be challenged in a separate complaint, and these
transactions cannot be stitched together since such a “hodgepodge” of claims facially violates Rules 18 and 20.
Furthermore, federal courts bar attempts to commence
“duplicative litigations”; such bar “foster[s] judicial economy .
. . [ensures] ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation,’” and
“protect[s] parties from ‘the vexation of concurrent litigation
15
over the same subject matter.’”
Porter v. NationsCredit Consumer
Disc. Co., 295 B.R. 529, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 933, at *33 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133,
138 (2d Cir. 2000), and quoting Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v.
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)), Adam v.
Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Thus, Plaintiff cannot
commence numerous actions challenging the same transaction, that
is, the same transactional set of events compiling his current
criminal prosecution cannot be challenged in two, three, four or
five actions.
Next, Plaintiff cannot “amend” his prior pleading by
asserting claims wholly unrelated to those asserted in the
original pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); a fortiori,
he cannot “amend” his prior complaint by asserting claims
unrelated and non-existing at the time of his submission of the
prior pleading.
Hence, Plaintiff cannot stitch his current
criminal prosecution to such transactions as his arrests,
prosecutions and convictions that took place between 2006 and
2012.
His amended pleading challenging his current criminal
prosecution should be submitted in the action where he challenged
the same or related transactions originally.
Id. (“An amendment
to a pleading relates back [if] the amendment asserts a claim . .
. that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out – or attempted to be set out – in the original pleading”).
16
Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot seek invalidation of his
convictions in a civil action since such challenges are,
necessarily, of habeas nature and can be raised only in a proper
habeas petition.14
Finally, in light of Plaintiff’s tendency to name, as
defendants, executive officers, supervising officers, counties,
municipalities, etc., the Court finds it warranted to point out
that § 1983 claims cannot be based on a defendant’s supervisory
position or on the fact of being the employing entity.
This is
so because employers and supervisors cannot be held liable for
the actions of their subordinates unless the litigant asserts
facts showing these employers’ or supervisors’ personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs.
14
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
In a series of cases beginning with Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court analyzed the
intersection of civil rights and habeas corpus. In Preiser,
state prisoners brought a § 1983 action seeking injunctive relief
to compel restoration of their jail credits, which would have
resulted in their speedier release. See id. at 476. The Supreme
Court pointed out that a prisoner must bring challenges to “the
fact or duration of confinement” as a habeas corpus petition.
See id. at 500; see also Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the
‘core of habeas’ - the validity of the continued conviction or
the fact or length of the sentence - a challenge, however
denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought
by way of a habeas corpus petition”). Hence, Petitioner’s
attacks on his convictions could be raised in the state forum
only by a timely and duly exhausted habeas corpus petition. The
Court, however, stresses that no statement made in this Opinion
or accompanying Order shall be construed as expressing the
Court’s position as to procedural or substantive validity or
invalidity of Plaintiff’s habeas challenges, if filed.
17
U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior”).15
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis
status will be suspended with regard to Rodriguez-I and denied
with regard to all other above-captioned matters.
Plaintiff will
be allowed an opportunity to show that he was not in custody at
the time he submitted seek in forma pauperis application in
Rodriguez-I and he would be permitted to seek in forma pauperis
status as to his five other above-captioned actions.
In the
alternative, he will be allowed to prosecute these actions by
prepaying $400 fee with regard to each matter he elects to
prosecute.
In the event Plaintiff elects to seek restoration of in
forma pauperis status in Rodriguez-I or obtain the same in any of
his remaining matters (or in the event he prepays $400 fee in any
of these matters), Plaintiff will be directed to submit in that
matter his amended pleading: (a) stating solely the facts of his
claims in accordance with the pleading requirement posed by Rule
15
Furthermore, § 1983 claims seeking damages from the
State or its agencies/agents acting in their official capacity
(and, thus, payable from the State’s treasury) are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Lavia v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000);
Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990).
18
8; (b) naming the defendants personally implicated by the alleged
wrongs Plaintiff would assert; (c) avoiding duplication of these
claims in different actions; (d) avoiding conflation of claims in
violation of Rules 18 and 20; (e) not raising challenges
unrelated to the original challenges, in violation of Rule 15;
and (f) omitting any references to Plaintiff’s sovereign
citizenship/redemptionist or Marrakush beliefs.16
An appropriate
Order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: October 23, 2013
16
Plaintiff is reminded that this leave to cure the
deficiencies of his pleadings will be final, and no further leave
will issue. Therefore, the Court urges Plaintiff to select his
claims thoughtfully, state the facts of his claims clearly and
concisely, without resorting to meaningless conclusory statement
or generalities, such as assertions that “defendants deprived
Plaintiff of life, liberty and property,” or that defendants
subjected Plaintiff to “cruel and unusual punishment,” etc. Cf.
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999)
(plaintiff must state “‘the who, what, when, where, and how: the
first paragraph of any newspaper story’” ) (quoting DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)); accord Clauso
v. Glover, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139205, at *21-22 (D.N.J. Sept.
26, 2012) (“[Plaintiff’s] ‘poetic license’ [statements] are not a
basis for relief. Simply put, dry facts stated in a clear and
concise pleading speak volumes for the purposes of any legal
proceeding, while eloquent poetic ‘nothings' are invariably
dismissed as pure rhetoric”); In re Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536,
580 (D.N.J. 2010) (“The courts in this nation stand ready to
address challenges brought by litigants in good faith. Which, in
turn, means that the judiciary — including the Judges in this
District — expect litigants to treat their litigation with utmost
seriousness, without abusing legal process and without unduly
testing of the resolve or common sense of the judiciary”).
19
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