NAVARRO v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying Petitioner's applications, 6 , 7 , 8 , seeking reduction of her sentence. The Clerk shall ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE this case. Petitioner shall submit a clear and concise written statement stating the exact legal provision and the exact factual predicate in support of her claim that her sentence violates her legal rights, w/in 60 days to reopen, etc. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 12/4/2014. (drw)n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
________________________________
:
YAJAIRA NAVARRO,
:
: Civ. Action No. 13-6424 (RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
:
UNITES STATES,
:
:
Respondent.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUMB, District Judge:
This
matter
comes
before
the
Court
upon
Petitioner’s
submission of her so-designated “follow-up” and two letters, see
Docket Entries Nos. 6, 7 and 8, which prompted restoration of this
matter to the Court’s active docket.
See Docket Entry No. 9.
Underlying Petitioner’s instant civil matter is her criminal
conviction on July 2, 2010.
See Docket Entry No. 1, at 1
(detailing the same and discussing the later procedural history,
including denial of her appeal).
She is currently serving her
sentence at FCI Danbury, Danbury, Connecticut, see generally,
Docket, and her projected release date is July 9, 2015.
See
http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
On July 30, 2013, that is, more than three years after her
conviction and sentence, Petitioner moved for a sentence
reduction relying on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013), and
citing her accomplishments in the prison setting.
See id. at 1-2.
This Court, therefore, directed her to clarify
whether she wished to have her motion construed as a § 2255
application.
See id. at 2.
In response, Petitioner: (a) declined such construction,
citing the fact that her § 2255 motion would be untimely and
procedurally defaulted; and (b) requested review of her motion
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582.
See id.
Accordingly, this Court
examined Petitioner’s application and found no nexus between
§
3582 (or Alleyne) and Petitioner’s desire for sentence reduction.
See id. at 2-3 and n.1 (detailing the same at length).
The Court
closed by stating:
While [Petitioner’s] desire to have her sentence
modified downwards is apparent, this Court cannot piece
together either [her] substantive arguments or her
jurisdictional bases, if any . . . . A fortiori, the
Court cannot hypothesize or foster the facts or law
that might qualify [her] for the relief she desires.
[T]he Court . . . is obligated to limit the amount
of guidance or assistance it provides to Plaintiff
in connection with pleading his claims. See
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231-32 (2004)
(“District judges have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants”); see
also Reeves v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23289, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 23,
2012) (“the Court’s legal assistance to Plaintiff
would render the Court biased") (citing, inter
alia, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860
(1988), and In re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368
F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Id. at *3-4 (quoting Kitchen v. Essex County Corr. Facility, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68976, at *5-6 (D.N.J. May 15, 2013)).
2
With that, this Court dismissed Petitioner’s motion as
drafted.
See id. at 4.
However, out of an abundance of caution,
the Court alternatively construed the motion as an application
filed under the All Writs Act so to allow Petitioner an
opportunity to further clarify her claims.
n.3.
See id. at 4-5 and
Correspondingly, the Court directed the Clerk to commence
the instant matter, see id. at 5-6, and ordered Petitioner to
file her “written statement clarifying the factual,
jurisdictional and substantive legal grounds upon which she
[sought] relief.”
Id. at 6.
In response, Petitioner filed her first letter.
Entry No. 4.
See Docket
The letter verified Petitioner’s desire not to
raise § 2255 challenges but indicated her confusion as to the
Court’s directive to commence the instant matter under the All
Writs Act.
See id. (“By all means if [the Court wishes to] order
the 540 mandamus & other motion review and feel[s] is better
suited [to provide Petitioner with the relief she seeks], please
pursue as such”).
The letter closed with the statement, “I am
only seeking any relief under the law/cases [that could help me]
so that I may return to my family . . . as soon as possible. . .
.
I pray humbly upon the courts for their relief and
assistance.”
Id.
3
This Court thereafter extended “Petitioner's time to file
and serve a written statement detailing specific legal bases of
Petitioner's claims and facts in support of the same.”
(emphasis in original).
Id. at 7
The three submissions at bar followed,
each indicating Petitioner’s confusion as to the role of this
Court.
Petitioner’s submissions fail to state a viable legal claim
and contain no facts that could be read as suggesting her
entitlement to the relief she desires.1
IT IS, therefore, on this 4th day of December 2014,
ORDERED that Petitioner’s applications, Docket Entries Nos.
6, 7 and 8, seeking reduction of her sentence, are denied as
without merit; and it is further
1
Petitioner’s latest submission, with her “reminder” to
this Court to “consider[] the impending law change for S 1410
Smarter Sentencing Act,” fails to state a claim.
The Smarter
Sentencing Act is not a legislation: it is merely a proposed bill
(introduced to the United States Senate on July 31, 2013, and to
the House of Representatives on October 30, 2013); it aims to
adjusts – rather than to eliminate – federal mandatory sentencing
guidelines. See https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/113/hr3382; https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/s1410. If enacted, the bill would reduce the mandatory
sentences for drug offenses, expand the ability of non-violent
offenders to reduce their sentences under the federal “safety
valve” and enable retroactive sentence adjustment under the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010. See id. Because the Act is not law,
this Court cannot “consider prospectively complying with the
pending Smarter Sentencing Act” because the future of this
proposed bill is “just too speculative.” United States v.
Paz-Castillo, 561 F. App’x 765, 766-67 (10th Cir. 2014).
4
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this
matter by making a new and separate entry on the docket reading,
“CIVIL CASE TERMINATED”; and it is further
ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner desires to have this
matter reopened, Petitioner shall submit a clear and concise
written statement stating the exact legal provision and the exact
factual predicate in support of her claim that her sentence, as
imposed or executed, violates her legal rights.
Such written
statement shall be filed within sixty days and shall be free of
any irrelevant claims or facts; and it is further
ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner persists at filing
irrelevant submissions, sanctions might be applied to Petitioner,
if warranted, for abuse of legal process; and it is further
ORDERED that this Court retains jurisdiction over this
matter for the period of ninety days, subject to extension, if
warranted; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion
and Order upon Petitioner by regular U.S. mail.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
5
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