COSTANTINO v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY et al

Filing 137

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: ORDER that Atlantic's City's request 121 to stay the entire case until the resolution of Caesar's bankruptcy is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 2/17/2015. (tf, )

[Doc. No. 121]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
JANINE COSTANTINO,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY,
:
ET AL.,
:
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________:

Civil No. 13-6667 (RBK/JS)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the letter application
(“Def.’s App.”) of the City of Atlantic City (“Atlantic City”)
requesting that the case be stayed because of the bankruptcy
filing

of

(“Caesar’s”).
Caesar’s

co-defendant
[Doc.

filed

a

No.

Caesar’s
121].

voluntary

Entertainment

Having

petition

received
of

Corporation
notice

bankruptcy,

that
which

triggered an automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the
Court

administratively

terminated

Caesar’s

as

a

defendant

without prejudice to the right of any party to argue the entire
case should be stayed. See Jan. 26, 2015 Order [Doc. No. 120].
Plaintiff opposes Atlantic City’s application (“Pl.’s Opp.”).
[Doc. No. 128]. The Court exercises its discretion not to hold
oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L. Civ. R. 78.1. For the

1 

reasons to be discussed, Atlantic City’s application to stay the
case is DENIED.
Background
In sum and substance, plaintiff alleges that on July 21,
2012, she was assaulted by security personnel and Atlantic City
police officers at the Dusk nightclub in Atlantic City, New
Jersey. Although Dusk is physically located inside the Caesar’s
hotel/casino,

Dusk

and

Caesar’s

are

separate

legal

entities.

Plaintiff alleges the incident at issue began when her brother
and brother-in-law were escorted out of the Dusk nightclub and
into an elevator leading to the casino level of Caesar’s. Am.
Compl. ¶ 23 [Doc. No. 90]. Plaintiff alleges the officers and/or
security guards began to “manhandle” and assault the two men in
the elevator. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 28. In response, plaintiff began
to record the incident on her cell phone. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.
Plaintiff alleges that after she exited the elevator and entered
the

casino

level

Sterling

Wheaten

destroy

of

evidence

Caesar’s,

assaulted
of

the

her

Atlantic
and

City

took

incident.

her

Am.

Police
cell

Compl.

Officer

phone
¶¶

to

32-39.

Plaintiff’s cell phone has not been recovered.
Plaintiff alleges that Wheaten handcuffed her on the floor
while her breasts were exposed and stated, “now you are going to
jail,

you

f------

b----.”

Am.

Compl.

¶

41.

After

she

was

escorted to the police station and processed, plaintiff alleges
2 

Wheaten admitted he had “taken care of” her cell phone. Am.
Compl.

¶

suffering

43.

Plaintiff

from

injuries

alleges
while

that

even

incarcerated

though
she

she

was

was

denied

medical attention. Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges Wheaten
and

other

Atlantic

City

Police

Officers

prepared

false

statements and complaints related to the incident which resulted
in her being charged with several felony offenses. Am. Compl. ¶¶
47-48. All charges against plaintiff were eventually dropped.
Wheaten denies plaintiff’s allegation.
On January 15, 2015, Caesar’s filed a voluntary petition
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the
United

States

Bankruptcy

Court

for

the

Northern

District

of

Illinois. See Notice of Suggestion on Pendency of Bankruptcy
[Doc. No. 110].
all

actions

Pursuant to Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,

against

Caesar’s

were

automatically

stayed.

On

January 26, 2015, the Court ordered Caesar’s administratively
terminated from the case without prejudice to the right of the
other defendants to apply to stay the entire case. See Jan. 25,
2015 Order [Doc. No. 120].
Atlantic

City

requests

that

the

entire

case

be

stayed

pending Caesar’s bankruptcy because Caesar’s role as a thirdparty defendant is “central” to the case. See Def.’s App. at 4.
Plaintiff steadfastly denies that Caesar’s has any material role
in the case. In fact, plaintiff not only opposes Atlantic City’s
3 

characterization
Caesar’s

filed

of
for

Caesar’s

role

bankruptcy

in

the

plaintiff

case,
agreed

but
to

before
dismiss

Caesar’s with no objection from Dusk. Pl.’s Opp. at 1.
Discussion
1. The Automatic Stay Provision of Section 362
The parties do not dispute that the stay as to Caesar’s is
appropriate.

The

Bankruptcy

Code

contains

a

provision

which

imposes an automatic stay of actions by creditors following:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including
the issuance or employment of process, of a
judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim
against
the
debtor
that
arose
before
the
commencement of the case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The automatic stay protects the debtor in
several ways. It provides the debtor “a breathing spell from
creditors by stopping all collection efforts, all harassment,
and

all

foreclosure

actions,”

thus

permitting

the

debtor

an

opportunity to create a repayment or reorganization plan, and
prevents “creditors from acting unilaterally in self-interest to
obtain

payment

from

a

debtor

to

the

detriment

of

other

creditors.” Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194,
1204 (3d Cir. 1991).
Absent
actions

“unusual

against

the

circumstances”
debtor

only

and

Section
may

not

362(a)(1)
be

stays

invoked

by

solvent codefendants, even if they are in a similar legal or
4 

factual nexus with the debtor. Travelodge Hotels, Inc. v. Patel,
C.A. No. 13-3719 (WHW), 2013 WL 4537906, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 27,
2013) (citing McCartney v. Integra Nat. Bank N., 106 F.3d 506,
509-10 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Mar. Elec. Co., 959 F.2d at
1205.

The

Third

Circuit

has

identified

two

“unusual

circumstances” in which automatic stays may be extended to nondebtor parties such as Atlantic City: (1) where the debtor is
the real party in interest such that a judgment against the
third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding
against the debtor and (2) where stay protection is essential to
the debtor’s reorganization efforts. McCartney, 106 F.3d at 510.
These two recognized exceptions accomplish the same goal as the
automatic stay- protecting the debtor during pendent bankruptcy
proceedings. Stanford v. Foamex L.P., C.A. No. 07-4225, 2009 WL
1033607,

at

*4

(E.D.

Pa.

Apr.

15,

2009)

(“the

‘unusual

circumstances’ exception is geared toward protecting the debtor
during

the

(emphasis

pendency
in

“[m]ultiple

crossclaims
when

the

original).

claim

disaggregated

of

so

and

determining

and

Absent

multiple

that

of

bankruptcy
“unusual

party

particular

third-party
which

debtor's

claims
their

circumstances”

litigation

claims,
are

proceeding”)

be

counterclaims,

treated

respective

must

independently

proceedings

are

subject to the bankruptcy stay.” Mar. Elec. Co., 959 F.2d at
1204-05.
5 

Atlantic

City

does

not

argue

that

a

stay

would

impact

Caesar’s reorganization or that Caesar’s is the real party in
interest. Because Atlantic City has not asserted that “unusual
circumstances” exist as the term is used in the context of the
bankruptcy statute, a stay is not warranted pursuant to the
automatic stay provision of Section 362. See Travelodge Hotels,
Inc. v. Patel, C.A. No. 13-3719 (WHW), 2013 WL 4537906, at *7
(D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2013) (denying stay application where “unusual
circumstances” were not present); Kirtley v. Wadekar, C.A. No.
05-5383 (JAG), 2007 WL 1963018, at *6 (D.N.J. July 2, 2007)
(same).
2. Discretionary Stay
Although the Court holds that “unusual circumstances” do
not exist to warrant a stay pursuant to Section 362, that does
not end the Court’s analysis. Even if a stay is not required by
the bankruptcy statute, the Court still has discretion to stay
the case. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (“The
District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an
incident to its power to control its own docket.”). The court
may

“hold

one

lawsuit

in

abeyance

to

abide

the

outcome

of

another which may substantially affect it or be dispositive of
the

issues.”

Akishev

v.

Kapustin,

23

F.

Supp.

3d

440,

446

(D.N.J. May 28, 2014) (citations omitted) (quoting Bechtel Corp.
v. Local 215, Laborers' Int'l Union, 544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d
6 

Cir. 1976)). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating
a stay is warranted. Hertz Corp. v. Gator Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d
421, 424–25 (D.N.J. 2003). In determining whether to grant a
stay courts consider a number of factors, including: (1) whether
a

stay

would

unduly

prejudice

or

present

a

clear

tactical

disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether denial of the
stay would create a clear case of hardship or inequity for the
moving party; (3) whether a stay would simplify the issues and
the trial of the case; and (4) whether discovery is complete
and/or a trial date has been set. Akishev v. Kapustin, 23 F.
Supp. 3d at 446.
Although a court has the discretion to stay a case if the
interests of justice require (U.S. v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12
n.27 (1970)), the stay of a civil proceeding is an extraordinary
remedy. Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp.
2d 523, 526 (D.N.J. 1998). When deciding whether to stay an
action the court must “weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936).
The court should consider whether the stay would prejudice the
non-moving

party

and

if

it

would

further

the

interest

of

judicial economy. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Chiorazzo, 529 F.
Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D.N.J. 2008) (Irenas, J.) (denying motion to
stay,

finding

that

plaintiff

would

be

prejudiced);

see

also

Gerald Chamales Corp. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc., 247 F.R.D.
7 

453, 457 (D.N.J. 2007) (denying motion for a stay of discovery,
finding that non-moving party would be prejudiced). As noted,
the burden is on the party requesting the stay to “make out a
clear

case

of

hardship

or

inequity

in

being

required

to

go

forward[.]” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. The moving party “must
state a clear countervailing interest to abridge a party’s right
to litigate.” CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriot Int’l, Inc.,
381 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2004) (denying stay and finding no
hardship where moving party argued it would be forced to defend
itself twice). After weighing the parties’ competing interests,
the Court finds that all relevant factors weigh in favor of
denying Atlantic City’s request for a stay.
With

respect

to

the

first

factor

to

consider,

whether

plaintiff will be prejudiced by a stay, it is clear to the Court
that a stay would unduly prejudice and disadvantage plaintiff.
If

a

stay

is

granted

plaintiff’s

efforts

to

promptly

and

efficiently prosecute her case would be hampered. There is no
question

that

a

stay

would

substantially

delay

plaintiff’s

efforts to “diligently proceed to sustain [her] claim.” Forrest
v. Corzine, 757 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 (D.N.J. 2010) (citation
omitted).

This

substantially

prejudices

plaintiff.

Golden

Quality Ice Cream Co., 87 F.R.D. at 56 (“Any plaintiff in the
federal courts enjoys the right to pursue his [or her] case and
to vindicate his [or her] claim expeditiously.”); accord Gold v.
8 

Johns-Manville

Corp.,

723

F.2d

1068,

1075-76

(3d

Cir.

1983)

(denying request for a stay even though the main defendant filed
for bankruptcy and stating, “[i]n these cases, the clear damage
to the plaintiffs is the hardship of being forced to wait for an
indefinite and, if recent experience is any guide, a lengthy
time before their causes are heard.”).
Further, plaintiff is pursuing a civil rights action which
implicates
relevant
because

numerous

documents.
the

witnesses
Plaintiff

passage

of

time

and

a

substantial

will

be

prejudiced

creates

a

risk

number
by

that

a

of
stay

relevant

witnesses will scatter or disappear. In addition, discovery has
revealed

that

documents,

most

if

including

not

its

all

of

internal

Atlantic
affairs

City’s

relevant

files,

are

not

computerized. Atlantic City’s documents, therefore, are at risk
of being lost or misplaced.1 Plaintiff is prejudiced because any
significant delay in the case could hinder her ability to prove
her claims. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 707-08 (“delaying trial
would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss
of

evidence

including

the

inability

of

witnesses

to

recall

specific facts, or the possible death of a party”); New York v.
Hill,

528

U.S.

110,

117

(2000)

(“Delay

can

lead

to

a

less

accurate outcome as witnesses became unavailable and memories

1 To be sure, the Court makes it clear that no evidence
exists that Atlantic City has or will purposely mislay any
documents. However, the fact that only physical copies exist
creates a risk of inadvertent loss or destruction.
9 

fade.”); Worldcom Techs., Inc. v. Intelnet Int’l, Inc., C.A. No.
00-2284,

2002

WL

(“Motions

to

stay

1971256,

at

discovery

*6

(E.D.

are

not

Pa.

Aug.

favored

22,

2002)

because

when

discovery is delayed or prolonged it can create case management
problems

which

impede

and

cause

discovery

the

court’s

responsibility

unnecessary

litigation

to

expedite

expenses

and

problems.”) (citation omitted); In re Health Mgmt., Inc., C.A.
No. 96-0889, 1999 WL 33594132, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999)
(“The ability of courts to avoid undue delay is essential to
assur[e] that justice for all litigants be neither delayed nor
impaired.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the first relevant factor
to consider weighs in favor of denying Atlantic City’s request
for a stay.
It does not go unnoticed that Atlantic City provides no
factual support for its main argument for why the case should be
stayed. Atlantic City argues:
If Caesar’s indeed failed to preserve any video with
some notice of the claim, or was otherwise responsible
for the cell phone not being recovered if left on
Caesar’s premises, then Caesar’s would have third
party liability relating to the claim for spoliation
of evidence, which may very well be the most
potentially valuable claim in the case with the most
potential for a big verdict.
Def.’s

App.

speculation.

at

3.

This

Although

argument

discovery

is

is

based
not

on

conjecture

complete,

and

substantial

discovery has been taken in the case. Despite this discovery,
Atlantic

City

has

not

cited

any
10 

evidence

that

Caesar’s

is

responsible

for

plaintiff’s

lost

phone.

Plaintiff

will

be

substantially prejudiced if the case grinds to a halt based on
an argument for which no factual support presently exists.
With respect to the second factor, Atlantic City has not
demonstrated that denying its request for a stay would create
“clear hardship” or “inequity.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (absent
a “clear case of hardship or inequality,” a stay may not be
issued if there is “even a fair possibility” that a stay would
work damage on another party); Akishev, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 447
(citing Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., C.A. No. 12-5743
(NLH/AMD),

2013

WL

5524078,

at

*4

(D.N.J.

Sept.

6,

2013)).

Atlantic City argues it would suffer a hardship if its crossclaim against Caesar’s is held in abeyance. Def.’s App. at 5.
The Court disagrees. Every fact and legal defense available to
Atlantic City may still be asserted whether or not Caesar’s is
present at trial. Despite Caesar’s bankruptcy Atlantic City may
still argue, assuming supporting facts exist, that Caesar’s is
responsible for plaintiff’s lost phone.
Atlantic
separately

City

would

be

argues

that

inefficient

pursuing
and

may

its

require

cross-claim
duplicative

discovery. Id. at 6. The fact that Atlantic City may have to
pursue its cross-claim in a separate action in the future does
not

warrant

arguments

a

stay

regarding

of

the

the

entire
potential
11 

case.

Considering

result

of

similar

duplicative

litigation,

the

Sixth

Circuit

observed

that

“duplicative

or

multiple litigation which may occur is a direct by-product of
bankruptcy law. As such, the duplication, to the extent that it
may exist, is congressionally created and sanctioned.” Lynch v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1199 (6th Cir. 1983);
see also CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 381
F.3d

131,

hardship

139

(3d

where

Cir.

moving

2004)

party

(denying

argued

it

that

the

stay

and

would

finding

have

no

to

defend

a

strong

itself twice).
It

is

interest

not

in

insignificant

not

staying

the

has

Anthony

case.

public

v.

City

of

Philadelphia, C.A. No. 00-5905, 2001 WL 118964, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 9, 2001) ("the public has an equally strong interest in
deterring

abuses

of

civil

rights

through

civil

litigation”)

(citing Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651,
(1980)).
its

The public has a paramount interest in assuring that

citizens’

exist,

constitutional

Atlantic

accountable.

If

appropriately,

City

and

Atlantic
the

rights

public

its

City

and

should

are

protected.

officers

should

its

this

abuses

be

held

officers

police

know

If

acted

as

well.

These

answers cannot be known unless discovery continues and the jury
hears and evaluates all relevant evidence. Plaintiff’s interest
in

having

the

jury

promptly

hear

her

case

substantially

outweighs Atlantic City’s right to pursue a cross-claim that at
12 

present

has

no

factual

support.

See

Young

Jewish

Leadership

Concepts v. 939 HKH Corp., C.A. No. 93-2643, 1994 WL 583260, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1994) (denying defendant’s request for a
stay

and

holding

that

a

bankrupt

co-defendant

is

not

indispensable simply because it might be jointly liable on a
prospective judgment in the plaintiff’s favor).
Atlantic
alleged

City

spoliation

overstates
of

the

relative

plaintiff’s

importance

phone.

of

Important?

the
Yes.

Dispositive? No. Central? Absolutely not. This case is about the
alleged

unconstitutional

Department
involves

and

its

actions

police

allegations

of

the

officers.

Atlantic

The

regarding

crux

City
of

plaintiff’s

Police

the

case

alleged

unconstitutional arrest and prosecution, the use of excessive
force, and Atlantic City’s alleged sham internal affairs process
that allowed and acquiesced in the habitual use of excessive
force and the filing of false or trumped up charges. The “cell
phone issue” in the case is not determinative on these issues.
Atlantic City argues the “cell phone issue” may “inflame” the
jury. Def.’s App. at 3. Aside from this being pure conjecture,
Atlantic City misses the mark. The trial will focus on excessive
force and false arrest issues. If anything has the potential to
incite the jury, it is the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint
if proven true, not just the cell phone issue.
Atlantic

City

has

failed

to

state
13 

“a

clear

Thus, because
countervailing

interest to abridge a party's right to litigate,” the second
factor weighs in favor of denial of Atlantic City’s request. CTF
Hotel Holdings, 381 F.3d at 139.
With respect to the third factor, Atlantic City has not
shown how a stay would “simplify the issues and the trial of the
case.”

Id.

(citing

Actelion,

2013

WL

5524078,

at

*5).

This

argument is based on Atlantic City’s contention that Caesar’s
role as a third-party defendant is “central” to the case. See
Def.’s App. at 4. Atlantic City is badly mistaken. The only
connection Caesar’s has to the case is the theory proffered by
Atlantic City that Caesar’s video of plaintiff’s arrest is lost
or that Caesar’s recovered plaintiff’s cell phone and failed to
produce it. Def.’s App. at 3. Even if Atlantic City is correct,
its

supposition

has

no

connection

to

the

crux

of

the

case.

Plaintiff alleges that Atlantic City and its officers violated
her

constitutional

rights

by

assaulting

her,

maliciously

prosecuting her, and using excessive force against her. Whether
Caesar’s is responsible for the spoliation of plaintiff’s cell
phone,

a

available

contention
evidence,

that
does

is
not

far-fetched
materially

based
impact

on

currently

these

issues.

Akishev, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 446. Thus, the third factor weighs in
favor of denial of Atlantic City’s request.
The final factor, which considers the status of the case,
also weighs in favor of denial of a stay. To date the parties
14 

have engaged in substantial discovery and there is “light at the
end of the tunnel.” Moreover, the parties have already engaged
in substantial motion practice that has delayed the case. There
is no justifiable reason to stay the case for an indefinite time
while

the

especially
Caesar’s

Caesar’s
true

is

bankruptcy

when

easily

Atlantic

severed

from

sorts

itself

City’s
the

out.

cross-claim

case

with

no

This

is

against
material

prejudice to Atlantic City.
In support of its position that the entire case should be
stayed

Atlantic

City

primarily

relies

on

the

decision

in

Morgenstern v. Fox Television Stations of Philadelphia, C.A. No.
08-0562, 2010 WL 678113, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2010) which
involved

a

private

defamation

action.

After

the

newspaper

defendant filed for bankruptcy the court had to decide whether
the entire case should be stayed. In reaching its decision the
court relied upon a five factor test derived from the criminal
context. See id. at *2 (citing Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v.
Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc. et al., 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa.
1980)). Although the relevant factors Morgenstern analyzed are
essentially the same as what this Court examined, the case is
plainly distinguishable.2 The ruling in Morgenstern was almost

2
The five factors are: “(1) the interest of the plaintiffs
in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or any
particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to
plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular
aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the
15 

entirely based on the fact that the parties could not conduct
needed depositions of party defendants and key witnesses while
the debtor co-defendant was engaged in bankruptcy proceedings.
Because

of

this

the

plaintiff

conceded

the

case

was

at

a

“standstill”. Morgenstern, 2010 WL 678113, at *2. Due to this
fact, the court found that the defendants would be prejudiced
and would suffer duplicative expenses by having to re-depose
witnesses after the automatic bankruptcy stay was lifted. The
court also considered the fact that the cross-claims against the
debtor co-defendant would have to be stayed. While it is true
that Atlantic City may have to pursue its cross-claims against
Caesar’s at a later time, this case is not at a “standstill.”
Substantial

discovery

has

taken

place

and

will

continue.

Atlantic City has not argued that any of its discovery efforts
will be thwarted if the case is not stayed. Nor has Atlantic
City identified any key witness who has not already been deposed
or

whose

Morgenstern

deposition
decision

cannot
accorded

be

easily

little

taken.

weight

to

Further,
the

the

public’s

interest in the parties’ private dispute. Id. at *4. For the
reasons already discussed, the public has a significant interest
in the outcome of this civil rights action.

convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the
efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of
persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the
interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal
litigation.” Morgenstern, 2010 WL 678113, at *2.
16 

In

denying

mindful

that

Atlantic

the

City’s

interests

stay

of

request

justice

the
the

and

Court

is

efficient

management of the Court’s docket favor denying Atlantic City’s
application. The Court has an interest in efficiently moving its
docket,

especially

in

cases

where

allegations

are

made

of

serious civil rights violations. Further, plaintiff has a right
to proceed without inordinate delay to the resolution of her
civil rights claims. See Worldcom Technologies, 2002 WL 1971256,
at *6 (“Motions to stay discovery are not favored because when
discovery is delayed or prolonged it can create case management
problems

which

discovery

impede

and

cause

the

court's

unnecessary

responsibility
litigation

to

expedite

expenses

and

problems.”) (citation omitted).
Not too long ago the Court had occasion to decide whether
another

civil

rights

case

should

be

stayed.

See

Forrest

v.

Corzine, supra. In that case the plaintiffs sued rogue police
officers employed by the City of Camden. Camden argued the case
should be stayed until the completion of the police officers’
criminal trial.

The Court’s reasoning for denying a stay in

Forrest is applicable here:
The interests of justice demand that the case be
managed to protect all parties’ rights and to assure a
reasonably prompt resolution. Plaintiff argues that
his civil rights were violated by rogue former Camden
police officers . . . . Plaintiff is entitled to find
out what happened to him and why. In the absence of
good cause or material prejudice to a party, plaintiff
is entitled to his discovery sooner rather than later
17 

. . . . The party seeking a stay “must make out a
clear case of hardship or inequity in being required
to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility
that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else.”
Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. Camden has not satisfied this
burden.
757 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (footnote omitted). Therefore, for the
reasons set forth above, the Court finds that a discretionary
stay of the entire case is inappropriate. Atlantic City’s stay
request is denied.3
Conclusion
The automatic stay provision under § 362(a)(1) applies only
to debtors. It is only in “unusual circumstances” that courts
may extend the stay to solvent codefendants. The Court finds
that

none

of

Atlantic

City’s

arguments

present

“unusual

circumstances” warranting a stay. Atlantic City does not allege
that it is necessary to Caesar’s reorganization efforts or that
Caesar’s

is

the

“real

party

in

interest”

as

to

plaintiff’s

claims against it. Further, the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to impose a stay after balancing the interests of the

3 The Court emphasizes that it expresses no opinion and does
not address the merits of plaintiff’s claims. That issue is not
before the Court.
18 

parties.
ORDER
Accordingly, and for all the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 17th day of February, 2015, that
Atlantic’s City’s request [Doc. No. 121] to stay the entire case
until the resolution of Caesar’s bankruptcy is DENIED.

/s/ Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge

19