INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL 711 HEALTH & WELFARE AND VACATION FUNDS AND FINISHING TRADES INSTITUTE et al v. COBRA CONSTRUCTION
Filing
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MEMORANDUM ORDER Denying without prejudice 5 Motion for Default Judgment; Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days in which to file supplemental documentation supporting its request for default judgment. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 11/21/14. (js)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[Dkt. Ent. 5]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES
DISTRICT COUNCIL 711 HEALTH &
WELFARE and VACATION FUNDS and
FINISHING TRADES INSTITUTE and
VINCENT M. LANE, as Trustee
and Fiduciary for
International Union of
Painters and Allied Trades
District Council 711 Health &
Welfare and Vacation Funds and
Finishing Trades Institute,
Civil Action No. 13-CV-07495
(RMB/JS)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
COBRA CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant.
BUMB, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs International Union of Painters and Allied
Trades District Council 711 Health & Welfare and Vacation Funds
and Finishing Trades Institute, and Vincent M. Lane, Trustee
(the “Plaintiffs”) have moved for default judgment against
Defendant Cobra Construction (the “Defendant”) pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). For the reasons that
follow, that motion is DENIED without prejudice.
On December 13, 2013, Plaintiffs commenced the abovecaptioned action against Defendant pursuant to Section 301 of
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the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185,
Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and Section 515 of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1145. Plaintiffs assert that, pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Act (“CBA”) to which Defendant was a party
and/or agreed to abide by, that Defendant is obligated to make
certain contributions to Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.) However,
a payroll compliance audit revealed that Defendant has failed to
remit the full amount of the required contributions for the
period January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2012, and it has
refused to submit the payments despite having notice of the
delinquencies. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18 & Ex. A.)
Service of the Summons and Complaint were made upon
Defendant on December 18, 2013. (Dkt. Ent. 3.) The time for
Defendant’s response expired on January 8, 2014, and Defendant
has neither answered nor otherwise responded to the Complaint.
On January 14, 2014, Plaintiffs requested entry of default,
which the Clerk subsequently entered. (See Dkt. Ent. 4.)
Plaintiffs then filed the instant motion on April 3, 2014, which
was served upon Defendant by Regular and Certified Mail. (Dkt.
Ent. 5.) Defendant also failed to respond to the motion.
“Before granting a default judgment, the Court must
determine (1) whether there is sufficient proof of service,
(2) whether a sufficient cause of action was stated, and
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(3) whether default judgment is proper.” Teamsters Health &
Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Dubin Paper Co., No. 11–
7137, 2012 WL 3018062, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) (citations
omitted). Whether default judgment is proper depends on
(1) whether a plaintiff will be prejudiced if default is not
granted, (2) whether a defendant has a meritorious defense, and
(3) whether the defendant’s delay is the result of culpable
misconduct. See N.J. Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund and
Trustees Thereof v. Pulaski Construction, No. 13-519, 2014 WL
793563, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing Chamberlain v.
Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). As noted above, the
docket reflects that the summons and complaint were served
personally upon the managing agent of Defendant. When Defendant
failed to respond to the Complaint, Plaintiffs properly sought
entry of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(a).
“Under ERISA, an employer who is obligated to contribute to
a plan under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement must
make such contributions in accordance with the terms and
conditions of that agreement.” Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am.
Local No. 199 Welfare, Pension, Apprenticeship & Training
Annuity v. RAMCO Solutions, No. 11-4976, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120769, at *9–10 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2013) (“LIUNA”) (citing ERISA
Section 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145). Section 502(a) permits a plan
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fiduciary to sue an employer for failure to make the required
contributions. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). If a court enters judgment
in favor of the plan fiduciary, ERISA section 502(g)(2) requires
the court to award (1) unpaid contributions; (2) interest on the
unpaid contributions; (3) liquidated damages; (4) reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) other relief the court deems
appropriate. Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int’l Ass’n
Local No. 8 v. Specialty Stucco Restoration, No. 05-5879, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92460, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2006) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)); see also LIUNA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120769, at *10.
According to the Complaint, Defendant was a party to and/or
agreed to abide by the terms of a CBA obligating it to remit
fringe benefit contributions to Plaintiffs in a timely manner on
behalf of eligible employees. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.) In connection
with its motion for default judgment, Plaintiffs attached the
CBA entered into by Plaintiffs and the Garden State Council,
Inc., signed on August 29, 2006 and effective for the period May
1, 2006 through March 31, 2011. 2 (Ex. A, Dkt. Ent. 5-2.) Notably,
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“A consequence of the entry of a default judgment is that
‘the factual allegations of the complaint . . . will be taken as
true.’” Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir.
1990) (citation omitted).
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Plaintiffs aver that this CBA is entered into between
Plaintiffs and the New Jersey Glass and Metal Contractors
Associations, to which Defendant is a “signatory employer.”
(Affidavit, Dkt. Ent. 5-1, at ¶ 2.) However, Plaintiffs failed
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the CBA by its terms does not cover the full period for which
Plaintiffs seek damages. Plaintiffs also submitted a signature
page signed on behalf of Defendant and dated December 7, 2000.
(Id.) This signature page provides “THE PARTIES HERETO ARE
DESIROUS OF ENTERING INTO AN AGREEMENT TO SET FORTH CONTROL AND
REGULATE THE WAGES, HOURS, FRINGE BENEFITS, TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF EMPLOYMENT UNDER WHICH THE EMPLOYER WILL EMPLOY PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADE WORKERS.” (Id.) The significance of this signature
page is unclear to this Court as it appears to predate (by six
years) the CBA and also seemingly indicates only that the
parties intend to enter a separate agreement.
Moreover, while Defendant’s default constitutes an
admission of the allegations in the Complaint, “[a] default is
not an admission of the amount of damages claimed.” Specialty
Stucco Restoration, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92460, at *6, 7
(citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that a payroll
compliance audit performed by Novak Francella, LLC revealed that
Defendant has failed to remit and/or has only remitted a portion
of the required contributions for the period January 1, 2010
through December 31, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs submitted
the compliance reports reflecting outstanding contributions in
the amount of $2,153.52. (Ex. D, Dkt. Ent. 5-3.) The accuracy of
to explain or document adequately the connections among these
entities.
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these amounts depends on the contributions Defendant agreed to
make under the applicable CBA. However, because Plaintiffs
failed to submit the CBAs covering the full period for which
they seek damages, or sufficient evidence demonstrating that
Defendant agreed to abide by the terms of the CBAs, this Court
cannot adequately evaluate the amount of damages that may be
owed. Therefore, entry of the default judgment is inappropriate
at this time. See Operative Plasterers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92460, at *7 (“While the factors may weigh in favor of entering
default judgment with regard to liability, the entry of the
default judgment with regard to the amount of damages requested
by Plaintiffs is inappropriate at this time because Plaintiffs
have not provided this Count with sufficient evidence to support
the amounts requested.”).
ACCORDINGLY, FOR THESE REASONS, IT IS on this, the 21st day
of November 2014, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is
DENIED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days in
which to file supplemental documentation supporting its request
for default judgment.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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