ESTATE OF JAMES A. RUSSICK et al v. KOENIG et al
Filing
11
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 9/25/2014. (drw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ESTATE OF JAMES A. RUSSICK,
GAIL RUSSICK, Executrix
on behalf of the
Estate of James A. Russick,
and GAIL RUSSICK,
individually,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TOM KOENIG and
ANNE MARIE KOENIG,
Defendants.
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Civ. A. No. 13-7773(NLH)(AMD)
OPINION
APPEARANCES
RICHARD T FAUNTLEROY
RICHARD T. FAUNTLEROY, P.C.
1525 SOUTH MAIN ST.
PLEASANTVILLE, NJ 08232
On behalf of plaintiffs
MICHAEL W. KULAKOWSKI
POWELL, TRACHTMAN, LOGAN, CARRLE & LOMBARDO, P.C.
1814 EAST ROUTE 70
SUITE 350
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08003
On behalf of defendant Tom Koenig
HILLMAN, District Judge
In this case that concerns an unpaid loan, presently before
the Court is the motion of defendant, Tom Koenig, to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims against him for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
For the reasons expressed below, defendant’s
1
motion will be denied without prejudice, and the parties will be
directed to undertake a limited period of jurisdictional
discovery.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, the estate of James A. Russick and Mr.
Russick’s wife, Gail Russick, who is the executrix of her late
husband’s estate, filed suit against Tom and Anna Marie Koenig,
husband and wife, jointly, severally, and in the alternative,
regarding a $188,000 loan the Russicks provided to the Koenigs
in September 2007.
According to plaintiffs’ complaint, the
Koenigs required additional funding to complete the new house
they were building in Tennessee, and they requested the loan
from the Russicks at the Russick’s home in Oaklyn, New Jersey.
In order to provide the Koenigs with the requested amount of
$188,000, the Russicks obtained a home equity loan on their
Oaklyn, New Jersey home.
The Koenigs received four checks in
various amounts from September 28, 2007 through November 19,
2007 totaling $188,000.
In December 2007, Mr. Koenig signed a notarized note
attesting to the loan, and at some point the Koenigs began
making monthly payments of interest only to the Russicks, and
they continued to do so until August 2010.
On January 20, 2009,
Mr. Russick died, and plaintiffs claim that from that point on,
2
the Koenigs’ payments became irregular until they defaulted on
the loan.
In September, October, and November 2009, the estate
and Mrs. Russick demanded payment of the loan in full and any
accrued interest, and repeated demands have been made since
then.
Plaintiffs claim that the defendants have refused to pay.
Based on these allegations, plaintiffs have lodged claims for
breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and
“fraud based on bad-faith promise.”
Defendant Tom Koenig has filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ complaint against him pursuant to Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and
plaintiffs have opposed Mr. Koenig’s motion.
In the motion
papers, it is revealed that Anna Marie Koenig is the daughter of
the Russicks, and Tom Koenig is Anna Marie’s husband.
Mr.
Koenig, however, disavows any involvement with the loan.
In his
affidavit in support of his motion, Mr. Koenig states that his
wife unilaterally negotiated and obtained the loan without his
knowledge, he has never received any of the money from the loan,
the money was never deposited into any bank accounts over which
he was an authorized user, he never spent the money, and he
never made any payments.
Mr. Koenig further states:
The first time that I learned that the Loan had been
requested or made was in December 2007, after the Loan
had apparently already been made and fully funded. At
3
that time, my wife told me that she had requested and
obtained the Loan from her parents and had used the
Loan proceeds to pay the contractor constructing our
home. She also informed me that she had been making
interest payments to her parents on the Loan. My wife
further informed me that Mr. Russick desired for us to
send him something in writing acknowledging that we
had taken advantage of the Loan. Aside from these
representations by my wife, I had and continue to have
no actual knowledge that the Loan was requested, made,
or funded.
In December 2007, Mr. Russick unilaterally contacted
me via telephone and requested that my wife and I send
him something in writing acknowledging that we had
taken advantage of the Loan. In response to Mr.
Russick's request, and in reliance upon my wife's
representations that the Loan had been requested,
made, and funded, I sent Mr. Russick a document
acknowledging that my wife and I had taken advantage
of a $188,000.00 loan from Mr. Russick and his wife.
However, at the time I sent Mr. Russick that document,
I still had no actual knowledge that the Loan had been
requested, made, or funded. Rather, the only
information I had was the prior representations made
to me by my wife.
Prior to Mr. Russick's unilateral phone call to me in
December 2007 requesting written acknowledgment that
my wife and I had taken advantage of the Loan, I never
communicated with him or Mrs. Russick about the Loan.
(Def. Ex. A, ¶¶ 10-12, Docket No. 7-1.)
Based on Mr. Koenig’s affidavit regarding his lack of
involvement with the loan – and correspondingly his lack of
involvement with New Jersey – other than to send the Russicks
the December 2007 document acknowledging the loan, Mr. Koenig
argues that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction
over him to resolve plaintiffs’ claims.
4
In opposition to Mr. Koenig’s motion, plaintiffs have
submitted an affidavit from Gail Russick, wherein she “cannot
believe” that Mr. Koenig would disavow any knowledge of the
loan.
She states that Mr. Koenig made several telephone calls
to Mr. Russick, and she participated in one of the calls, which
lasted more than an hour.
In addition to the December 2007
notarized document from Mr. Koenig to the Russicks, Mrs. Russick
attaches an August 2009 letter from her financial advisor, Jack
Carini, to Mr. Koenig.
In that letter, Mr. Carini states that
in the process of assisting Mrs. Russick with the estate, he
discovered a signed affidavit with your signature
stating a loan transaction between you and James &
Gail Russick. This has become a problem for Gail due
to the changes she would like to make in her life at
this time. The home has a loan/lien against it and it
must be removed so the personal residence can be sold,
placed in a trust or resided in without incumbency.
To make this agreement binding and much clearer for
all parties concerned, there is a Promissory Note
enclosed for you to review and make effective.
The enclosed agreement must be signed, dated,
notarized and returned with the first installment
payment by September 15th, 2009. If the signed
agreement is not returned by the deadline of September
15th, 2009, the entire amount of the note will become
due by September 30, 2009. A formal lien will be
placed on all your properties to protect Gail
Russick's interests.
(Pl. Ex. B, Docket No. 9-1 at 7.)
Mr. Koenig responded back with a letter to the financial
5
advisor on September 11, 2009:
This is in response to your letter to me
concerning a request for a promissory note to your
client, Gail M. Russick. I have checked with my wife
and she indicates she is completely unaware of any
such request. I would hope that you will be able to
consult further with Ms. Russick to make certain of
her intentions in this matter.
In any event, the unfortunate fact is that my
wife and I are not in a position at this time to alter
the agreements previously made and execute the note
you requested. The monthly payments you have asked for
are simply not in a range that we could even begin to
accommodate. The terms of repayment agreed to when
these funds were provided were that interest only
payments would be all that was necessary for a number
of years in order to allow for completion of the home
and an extended period after that until we could get
out from under the significant indebtedness we were
incurring to build our home. The home is still not
complete and will require significant additional funds
in order to finish. We are in a position to, and we
will, continue to make the agreed upon interest only
payments.
Please also understand that at no time was any
mortgage or other lien ever discussed. As a result,
you would have no right or ability to validly place
any lien on any property I or my wife and I own. Any
attempt to do so would have serious repercussions, not
the least of which is it would give the construction
lender a basis for calling its loan, which would have
catastrophic consequences for all concerned.
(Pl. Ex. B, Docket No. 9-1 at 8.)
Mrs. Russick’s affidavit further states that money from the
loan was sent in draws to Mr. Koenig from New Jersey to
Tennessee, and the money was deposited into an account
controlled by Mr. Koenig at Oakridge Lab Credit Union.
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Checks
were then drawn off of that account to pay the contractors.
In response to Mrs. Russick’s affidavit, Mr. Koenig asks
the Court to completely disregard it because it contains
statements not based on personal knowledge, as well as arguments
of fact and law.
Mr. Koenig also argues that even if the Court
were to consider Mrs. Russick’s affidavit, its contents still do
not support personal jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the parties and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.
Plaintiffs, Gail Russick and
her late husband James Russick, are citizens of New Jersey,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (the legal representative of the
estate of a decedent is deemed to be a citizen of the same
state as the decedent), and defendants Anna Marie Koenig
and Tom Koenig are citizens of Tennessee.
B. Standard for Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for
dismissal of an action when the Court does not have
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
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“Once challenged,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction.”
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496
F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001)).
In deciding a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
Court must “accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as
true and construe disputed facts in favor of the
plaintiff.”
Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141,
142 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992)
(citations omitted). 1
A defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a United
States district court if the defendant “is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located[.]”
1
Fed. R. Civ. P.
There is a “significant procedural distinction” between a
motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and a motion pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd.,
735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984). “A Rule 12(b)(2) motion,
such as the motion made by the defendants here, is inherently a
matter which requires resolution of factual issues outside the
pleadings, i.e. whether in personam jurisdiction actually lies.
Once the defense has been raised, then the plaintiff must
sustain its burden of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts
through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence. . . .
[A]t no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone
in order to withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to
dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Once the motion
is made, plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere
allegations.” Id. (citation omitted).
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4(k)(1)(A).
“A federal court sitting in New Jersey has
jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New
Jersey state law.”
Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d
93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004)(citations omitted).
The New Jersey long-
arm statute “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to
the fullest limits of due process.”
IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert
AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Under the Due Process clause, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate when
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
A defendant establishes minimum contacts by “‘purposefully
avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State,’” thereby invoking “‘the benefits and
protections of [the forum State’s] laws.’”
Asahi Metal Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
This “purposeful availment” requirement assures that
the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court
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in the forum and is not haled into a forum as a result of
“random,” “fortuitous” or “attenuated” contacts with the forum
state.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980); see also Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472,
475 (internal citations omitted).
In deciding whether a defendant’s contacts with a forum are
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over that party, the
Court must consider whether such contacts are related to or
arise out of the cause of action at issue in the case.
The
Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the cause of action is related to or arises out
of activities by the defendant that took place within the forum
state.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
If the cause of action has no
relationship to a defendant’s contacts with a forum state, the
Court may nonetheless exercise general personal jurisdiction if
the defendant has conducted “continuous and systematic” business
activities in the forum state.
Id. at 416.
Once the Court determines that the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state, it must also consider whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
“comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial justice’” to satisfy
the due process test.
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476
10
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
In this regard, it must
be reasonable to require the defendant to litigate the suit in
the forum state, and a court may consider the following factors
to determine reasonableness: the burden on the defendant, the
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining
an efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.
Id. at 477 (citing World Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
C.
Analysis
The main argument advanced by Mr. Koenig to defeat this
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him is that the
Court must consider each defendant’s contacts with the forum
independently, plaintiffs’ complaint refers to the Koenigs
collectively, and his affidavit proves that had nothing to do
with the loan, other than sending two letters to New Jersey,
which is insufficient to establish the constitutionally
acceptable minimum contacts with New Jersey to be hailed into
this forum.
In response, plaintiffs argue that their
allegations in their complaint must be accepted as true, and
those allegations concerning Mr. Koenig demonstrate his
11
purposeful availment to New Jersey regarding the request for the
loan, the receipt of funds from the loan, his repayment of some
of the loan, and his two letters confirming the existence of the
loan.
2
One of Mr. Koenig’s arguments is correct:
other than the
allegation concerning Mr. Koenig’s December 2007 notarized
letter, the amended complaint does not contain allegations
specifically regarding Mr. Koenig’s contacts with New Jersey.
Instead, plaintiffs’ complaint asserts allegations collectively
against “the Koenigs.”
This is not fatal to the Court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Koenig, because
plaintiffs’ allegations are that Mr. Koenig (and Mrs. Koenig)
requested the loan in New Jersey, Mr. Koenig (and Mrs. Koenig)
received the proceeds from New Jersey, Mr. Koenig (and Mrs.
2
The Court notes that, standing alone, the two letters Mr.
Koenig sent to New Jersey may not form the basis for specific
jurisdiction. See Rosato v. Walt Disney Co., 2012 WL 4464030,
*8 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding that the two letters sent to the
plaintiff from the defendant did not support a basis for
specific jurisdiction in New Jersey) (citing IMO Indus., 155
F.3d at 260 (holding that the weight of authority among the
courts of appeal is that minimal communication between the
defendant and the plaintiff in the forum state, without more,
will not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
state's court system.); Rodi v. Southern New England School of
Law, 255 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350–51 (D.N.J. 2003); Jakks Pacific,
Inc., v. Conte, No. 11–479, 2011 WL 6934856, at *6 (D.N.J.
December 30, 2011) (holding that the law is clear that a ceaseand-desist letter alone does not satisfy the personal
jurisdiction requirements)).
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Koenig) made payments to New Jersey, et cetera.
It
demonstrates, however, that there are several missing pieces to
this personal jurisdiction puzzle that must be addressed before
a determination on personal jurisdiction is made.
See Mellon
Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d
Cir. 1992) (“The fact that a non-resident has contracted with a
resident of the forum state is not, by itself, sufficient to
justify personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. The
requisite contacts, however, may be supplied by the terms of the
agreement, the place and character of prior negotiations,
contemplated future consequences, or the course of dealings
between the parties.”).
The first missing piece is sadly incurable.
It appears
that most of the conversations regarding the loan were between
Mr. Russick and either or both Mrs. Koenig and Mr. Koenig.
Mrs.
Russick states in her affidavit that Mr. Koenig called Mr.
Russick in New Jersey on several occasions and spoke with Mr.
Russick, which Mr. Koenig denies.
Because of the unavailability
of Mr. Russick, the Court cannot credit either party on this
point, as the absence of Mr. Russick’s version of events could
equally benefit or hinder each party’s position.
The second missing piece is defendant Anna Marie Koenig.
Mrs. Koenig is plaintiff Gail Russick’s daughter, and she is
13
defendant Tom Koenig’s wife.
No attorney has made an appearance
on her behalf in the case, she has not expressed her intention
to proceed pro se, she has not answered the complaint or
otherwise attempted to respond to it, and although she is the
center of the controversy, she is currently a phantom litigant.
Mr. Koenig contends that his wife unilaterally asked for a
$188,000 loan from her parents, she negotiated the loan’s terms,
she accepted the money, paid the contractors, and paid interest
payments for two years to her parents, all without him having
any involvement or awareness of his wife’s actions relating to
the loan.
The Court cannot opine on the veracity of Mr.
Koenig’s representations at this point and will accept his
affidavit as truthful for the purposes of his motion. 3
But even
accepting as true his lack of involvement with the loan, his
3
The Court questions whether a self-serving affidavit from a
defendant challenging personal jurisdiction, without any other
supporting proof, constitutes a proper challenge. See Arrington
v. Colortyme, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
(“[T]he Court finds that this quantum of evidence--a short selfserving affidavit with no supporting documentation--cannot
itself sustain a factual attack on the Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction.”) (citing Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340,
346–47 (3d Cir. 2011); De Cavalcante v. C.I.R., 620 F.2d 23, 26–
27 (3d Cir. 1980) (when charged with making evidentiary
determinations, court may find that self-serving affidavits
absent evidentiary support are insufficiently probative)). The
court-ordered jurisdictional discovery in this case will
hopefully provide more proof to either establish or prevent
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Koenig.
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request that this Court disregard his relationship with his wife
and view him as a separate entity is unpersuasive.
Legally married spouses maintain a special status as a
single unit in many areas of the law, and the actions of a
husband and wife cannot be separated from one another as
concretely as unrelated people or entities.
For example,
spouses filing joint federal income tax returns are generally
jointly and severally liable for the full amount of tax due on
their combined incomes.
A requesting taxpayer, however, who
files a joint tax return may qualify for Innocent Spouse Relief
and be relieved of joint and several liability for unpaid sums
if the requesting spouse only had a nominal ownership of an
item, or if the spouse did not know, and had no reason to know,
that funds intended for the payment of tax were misappropriated
by the nonrequesting spouse for the nonrequesting spouse's
benefit.
See Maluda v. C.I.R., 431 Fed. Appx. 130, 131-132,
2011 WL 2686278, 1 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing I.R.C. §
6013(d)(3) and § 6015).
Mr. Koenig is advancing a similar
“innocent spouse” argument in this case, but the resolution of
the cited tax case illustrates the high burden placed on proving
an “innocent spouse” defense.
In Maluda, the court denied the spouse’s request to be
relieved from the tax liability based on nominal ownership and
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fraud:
The parties stipulated the Maludas' income came
almost exclusively from John's business and was held
jointly by John and Cathy. While John claims Cathy
“handled all financial matters” for the household, the
record does not clearly support that conclusory
assertion. Furthermore, even if Cathy did exercise
exclusive control over the income, John voluntarily
acceded to Cathy's controlling the Maludas' income.
“[I]ncome earned by one person is taxable as his, if
given to another for the donor's satisfaction.”
Accordingly, John cannot deny ownership of income
because his wife controlled the family finances while
he earned the income. . . .
John also contends he meets condition 7(c) of
section 4.01 because he alleges Cathy produced false
tax returns and misappropriated funds earmarked for
tax payments. John insists he did not know of Cathy's
misdeeds, nor could he have known. Again, the record
does not clearly support these conclusions. The
stipulated facts demonstrate only that the Maludas'
joint tax returns between 1998 and 2002 were never
filed with the IRS, and the Valley National Bank
passbook in the Maludas' name is a complete
fabrication. John maintains Cathy is responsible for
these transgressions. However, the record identifies
no actor responsible for any misrepresentations or
misappropriations. The parties never agreed, nor does
the documentary record clearly demonstrate, that Cathy
bore sole responsibility for underreporting income to
the IRS or diverted funds to her own use.
Even if Cathy did misrepresent the couple's
income, John presents no evidence she acted without
his knowledge. Had the Tax Court conducted a trial,
John might have demonstrated Cathy's culpability and
his own innocence. Because the parties submitted the
case on the basis of a stipulated record, John had no
such opportunity. Therefore, the court did not clearly
err in concluding the record “does not establish that
Ms. Maluda misappropriated funds intended for tax
payments.”
16
Maluda, 431 Fed. Appx. at 132-33 (internal citations
omitted).
Mrs. Koenig holds the key to many of the representations
made by Mrs. Russick and Mr. Koenig concerning Mr. Koenig’s
contacts with New Jersey.
She can provide proof as to whether
Mr. Koenig was as involved with the loan as plaintiffs’
complaint and affidavit maintain, or she can support Mr.
Koenig’s statement that he had no part in the loan.
Her silence
in this case may be due to conflicting familial pressures, but
she is a party to the action and may be compelled to
participate.
The third missing piece of the personal jurisdictional
puzzle is the documentation relating to the loan funds.
Mr.
Koenig argues that because Mrs. Russick has not attached
cancelled checks, bank statements, or evidence of transferred
funds to her complaint or affidavit, it proves that none of
those documents exist to connect Mr. Koenig to the loan, and to
New Jersey.
Although Mr. Koenig’s argument is flawed logic, his
point is well-taken.
A home equity loan for $188,000,
disseminated to the Koenigs in four large increments and then
paid over to a building contractor, must have a paper trail.
Considering the three issues overshadowing this case, the
Court will direct the parties to a brief period of
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jurisdictional discovery in order to enable the Court to
properly assemble the personal jurisdictional puzzle.
Plaintiffs have presented factual allegations that suggest with
reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite
contacts between Mr. Koenig and New Jersey. 4
Toys "R" Us, Inc.
v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is well
established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiff's
allegations as true, and is to construe disputed facts in favor
of the plaintiff.”).
As a result, plaintiffs’ “right to conduct
jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.”
Toys "R" Us,
Inc., 318 F.3d at 456 (“Although the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating facts that support personal jurisdiction,
courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional
discovery unless the plaintiff's claim is ‘clearly frivolous.’”
(citations omitted)).
Accordingly, the Court will deny Mr. Koenig’s motion
without prejudice to his right to refile his motion upon the
conclusion of jurisdictional discovery.
The parties will be
afforded ninety days to gather documents and testimony regarding
4
At this time, the Court does not need to address how
plaintiffs’ tort claim affects the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Koenig.
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Mr. Koenig’s contacts with New Jersey, and this limited
discovery will be monitored by the Magistrate Judge to whom this
matter is referred.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date: September 25, 2014
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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