PADILLA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 15

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/6/2015. (dmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LUIS ALBERTO PADILLA,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-007 (JBS)

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

OPINION

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Alan H. Polonsky, Esq.
512 S. White Horse Pike
Audubon, N.J. 08106
Attorney for Plaintiff
Paul J. Fishman
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By: M. Jared Litman
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
Social Security Administration
Office of the General Counsel
P.O. Box 4177
Philadelphia, P.A. 19101
Attorney for Defendant
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:

Contents
I. 

INTRODUCTION .............................................. 2 

II.  BACKGROUND ................................................ 5 
A. 

Factual and Procedural History .......................... 5 

B. 

ALJ’s Decision ......................................... 12 

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................... 15 
IV.  DISCUSSION ............................................... 16 

1. 

The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Intellectual Disability

Plaintiff’s Sole Severe Impairment ........................ 18 
2. 

The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding that Plaintiff’s Condition

Did Not Meet or Equal Listing 12.05C ...................... 25 
3. 

The ALJ Properly Relied Upon the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines and SSR 85-15 in Finding Plaintiff Able to Perform
“Other Work” .............................................. 31 
V. 

CONCLUSION ............................................... 41 

I.

INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Luis A. Padilla (hereinafter,

“Plaintiff”), an approximately forty year old male with no
history of medical or psychiatric treatment, seeks review
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration’s (hereinafter, “Defendant”) denial of
his application for disability benefits pursuant to Titles II
and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 13811385.
On September 11, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge
(hereinafter, the “ALJ”) issued a fourteen page written decision
denying Plaintiff, who purports to suffer from a learning
disability, mental challenges, sleep apnea, and obesity, Social
Security benefits for the period beginning May 3, 2009, the
alleged onset date of disability to September 11, 2012. (See R.
at 15-28.) Critically, although the ALJ found that Plaintiff

2

suffered from a severe intellectual disability,1 the ALJ found
Plaintiff able to meet the basic mental demands of unskilled
work at all exertional levels, and therefore concluded that
Plaintiff could obtain other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. (See id.)
In the pending appeal, Plaintiff insists that the ALJ’s
decision must be reversed on three grounds.

First, Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ committed reversible error at step two of
the five-step sequential analysis, by finding that Plaintiff’s
intellectual disability constituted his sole severe impairment,
without appropriately considering Plaintiff’s obesity and
emotional limitations. (Pl.’s Br. at 12-14.)

Second, Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s limitations
at step three, by concluding that Plaintiff’s intellectual
impairment did not meet or medically equal one of the listed
1

The record in this action repeatedly refers to Plaintiff’s
“mental retardation.” (See, e.g., Def.’s Br. at 8; R. at 15,
17, 21, 27, 49.) However, on August 1, 2013, the Social Security
Administration replaced the term “mental retardation” with
“intellectual disability” in their Listing of Impairments, in
order to reflect the widespread adoption of the term
“intellectual disability” by Congress, government agencies, and
various public and private organizations. See Bethea v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 13-3961, 2014 WL 4798815, at *5 n.4 (D.N.J.
Sept. 26, 2014). Despite the modification in terminology, the
Listing itself remains substantively identical. See Hampton v.
Colvin, No. 14-543, 2015 WL 222346, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14,
2015) (noting that the “substance of the Listing did not
change”) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court will conform
its reference to Plaintiff’s impairment to the modern
convention.
3

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(hereinafter, the “Listing of Impairments”), without adequately
discussing Plaintiff’s alleged limitation to only occasional
social contact. (Id. at 14-15; Pl.’s Reply at 3-4.)

Finally,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance upon the MedicalVocational Guidelines and Social Security Ruling (hereinafter,
“SSR”) 85-15 without vocational testimony at step five,
contravenes the procedural requirements of Sykes v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000) and the related administrative
acquiescence ruling, Social Security Ruling AR 01-1(3). (Pl.’s
Br. at 15-19.)
The principal issues before the Court are whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion at step two
that “limited intellectual capacity” constituted Plaintiff’s
only severe impairment; whether the ALJ adequately considered
Plaintiff’s alleged “other impairments” in connection with the
Listing of Impairments at step three; and whether the ALJ
appropriately relied upon the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in
finding at step five, without the benefit of vocational expert
testimony, that Plaintiff could perform “other work.”
For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations, and will
affirm the ALJ’s decision.

4

II.

BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History2
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance

benefits and supplemental security income on January 6, 2011.3
(See R. at 149-161.)
In connection with the Social Security Administration’s
(hereinafter, the “SSA”) review of Plaintiff’s initial
application, the New Jersey Division of Disability Services
conducted a face-to-face interview of Plaintiff on January 21,
2011. (See R. at 185-194.) During the interview, Plaintiff
indicated that his previous employer, Pep Boys Auto Parts Store
(hereinafter, “Pep Boys”), laid him off “due to [his]
disability.” (R. at 190.) The examiner, however, noted that
Plaintiff “did not exhibit any obvious physical impairment” and
“appeared highly functional.” (R. at 187.) Indeed, Plaintiff
2

The record in this action contains no medical history that
predates Plaintiff’s disputed application for Social Security
benefits. Indeed, Plaintiff conceded on various occasions
throughout the administrative process that he had never seen a
physician or any other health care professional for any physical
and/or medical condition. (See, e.g., R. at 193, 223, 236.)
Therefore, the Court will discuss the factual predicate and
procedural circumstances of this litigation in unison.
3 Plaintiff previously received Supplemental security income and
disability insurance benefits based upon impairments of
intellectual incapacity and a learning disorder. (See R. at 15,
32-33.) The Social Security Administration, however, terminated
Plaintiff’s benefits in 2005, because his earnings purportedly
exceeded the regulatory maximum for Social Security benefits
(i.e., his employment qualified as substantial gainful
activity). (R. at 33.) As noted by the ALJ (R. at 15), these
procedural circumstances do not impact the pending appeal.
5

specifically stated that his conditions had not required any
medical treatment, and asserted that he had “not been to any
doctors other than for a cold.” (R. at 194.)
Following the interview, the claims adjudicator requested
additional evidence concerning the manner in which Plaintiff’s
alleged conditions limited his daily activities. (R. at 197216.)

In connection with this functional audit, Plaintiff

identified a lengthy twelve-year history of employment in
“Customer Service” jobs—all of which required lifting at various
weights, and prolonged periods of standing and/or walking. (R.
at 207-15.) Plaintiff, however, stated that his alleged
disability affected his ability to concentrate, complete tasks,
and follow instructions. (R. at 202.)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff

indicated that such condition caused no impact to his ability to
lift, walk, sit, climb stairs, understand, communicate, and/or
to get along with others. (R. at 201-02.)

Nor did such

condition affect Plaintiff’s ability to engage in an array of
household chores (including mowing the lawn) and social
activities (including bowling, going to movies with friends, and
playing video games). (R. at 200-01.)
Thereafter, Dr. Wm. Dennis Coffey, a consultative examiner
with South Jersey Psychology, conducted an intellectual
evaluation of Plaintiff on February 21, 2011, in order to assess
his level of functioning. (R. at 248-53.)
6

At that time, Dr.

Coffey observed that Plaintiff’s height of 5’8” and weight of
255 pounds placed his body mass index in the obese range. (R. at
249.)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff presented with a “normal” gait,

no “oddities” in posture, and participated in the examination
without difficulty. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff represented
that, although he spends a typical day at home,4 he “usually
run[s] around the block with a bike, work[s] out, [] job
search[es],” attends church every Sunday, sees friends multiple
times a month, and goes to the casino twice a year. (Id.)
With respect to the intellectual assessment, Dr. Coffey’s
testing revealed that Plaintiff’s full scale IQ of 63 placed him
in the “Mildly Deficient range of intellectual functioning.” (R.
at 250.)

However, he maintained normal speech quality and

stream of conversation throughout the course of the examination,
and otherwise exhibited “no evidence of a thought disorder.”
(Id.) Dr. Coffey therefore concluded that Plaintiff possessed an
“adequate understanding and memory,” but limited mental pace and
concentration. (R. at 250.)

Dr. Coffey, accordingly, found

Plaintiff’s condition “to be 100% mental.” (Id.)
In so concluding, Dr. Coffey noted that the results of
Plaintiff’s intellectual and interpersonal assessment “do not
support” the “normal level of functioning” suggested by

4

As a result, Dr. Coffey found that Plaintiff had limited social
interactions. (R. at 250.)
7

Plaintiff’s job history. (Id.) Rather, Dr. Coffey found
Plaintiff “likely to require regular supervision” in a role
“limited to simple, rote labor.”5

(Id.)

However, Dr. Coffey

found Plaintiff “able to maintain regular employment,” provided
that he received the necessary supervision and limitations in
required tasks, namely, that the work be sufficiently simple.
(Id.)

As a result, Dr. Coffey indicated that Plaintiff “may

benefit from a referral to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation Services.” (R. at 251.)
In light of Dr. Coffey’s findings, the state agency
psychological consultant concluded that, despite Plaintiff’s
mild intellectual capacity, Plaintiff’s prior work history
suggested a higher functional capacity, particularly given his
professed ability “to prepare simple meals, clean house, drive,
manage his finances ... socialize with friends, and shop.” (R.
at 57.)

The psychological consultant therefore found Plaintiff

able to perform basic unskilled jobs, particularly if such jobs
consisted primarily of “simple, repetitive tasks.” (R. at 53,
55, 58.) Consequently, because Plaintiff’s mental limitations
did not preclude him from obtaining some work (even if not work
in his past relevant field), the SSA found Plaintiff “not

5

For the same reason, Dr. Coffey recommended that a beneficiary
be appointed to manage any benefits ultimately assigned to
Plaintiff. (R. at 251.)
8

disabled,” and denied his application for Social Security
disability benefits on March 11, 2011. (R. at 58.)
Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the SSA’s initial
determination on May 13, 2011. (R. at 77.)

In so requesting,

however, Plaintiff did not report any change in his physical
and/or mental limitations, nor provide any additional medical
evidence. (R. at 60-61.) Rather, Plaintiff merely relied upon
the same information submitted in connection with his initial
application. (Id.)

Given the absence of any new allegations, in

addition to the functional abilities reflected by Plaintiff’s
work history, the SSA found the initial determination that the
“evidence suggest[ed] a higher level of functioning than”
indicated by Plaintiff’s IQ scores, “consistent with the overall
evidence,” and denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration.
(R. at 61, 105-06 (finding the original determining denying
Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits “proper under the
law”).) On August 17, 2011, Plaintiff requested a de novo
hearing before an ALJ, on the basis that Plaintiff’s mental
limitations render him unable to perform substantial gainful
employment, but again stated that he had “no additional evidence
to submit.”

(R. at 102-10.)

The SSA scheduled the hearing for

August 7, 2012. (R. at 126.)
In advance of the hearing, Nancy Mari Purcell, Ed.D, a
learning disability teacher/consultant, conducted an educational
9

evaluation on November 28, 2011, at the referral of the Division
of Vocational Rehabilitation. (R. at 254-61.) With respect to
Plaintiff’s demeanor during testing, Dr. Purcell observed that
Plaintiff spoke in “clear sentences, maintained consistent eye
contact, [and] demonstrated fair concentration,” despite his
limited academic abilities. (R. at 254-55.) Throughout the
tasks, however, Plaintiff “required constant praising and
encouragement [in order] to continue on challenging items.” (R.
at 255.)
With regard to the intellectual assessment, Dr. Purcell’s
assessments revealed results consistent with those reported by
Dr. Coffey. (See R. at 255-57.) Plaintiff’s test scores
specifically depicted reading comprehension, mathematical
reasoning, and written skills at levels between 1st and 3rd
grade, all of which collectively confirmed Plaintiff’s limited
cognitive abilities. (See id.)

Indeed, Dr. Purcell found that

Plaintiff’s “extremely limited” academic skills would “require a
more intensive individual vocational setting.” (R. at 258.)
Moreover, Dr. Purcell indicated that such a vocational setting
must include “rote activities” taught through “extensive
repetitions and opportunities to review materials,” and with
“frequent positive reinforcements.” (R. at 259.)
therefore stated that any

10

Dr. Purcell

[V]ocational placement must consider his level of
academic functioning to be that of what one could
reasonably expect a fifth or sixth grader to
accomplish. All information must be presented in small
manageable portions and with many repetitions in order
for [Plaintiff] to master the task. New tasks or
information should be introduced slowly and constant
review of past tasks is necessary for retention.
(R. at 261.) Nevertheless, Dr. Purcell noted that Plaintiff
“desire[d] to improve” and concluded that such improvement
“could be achieved in a highly structure vocational training
environment.” (R. at 259.) Plaintiff thereafter proceeded to an
administrative hearing before an ALJ, at which time Plaintiff
appeared, with counsel, and testified before an ALJ.

(R. at

15.)
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision on
September 11, 2012, finding Plaintiff “not under a ‘disability,’
as defined in the Social Security Act,” and therefore ineligible
for Social Security benefits. (See R. at 12-28.) Plaintiff filed
a formal request for review of the ALJ’s decision on November 6,
2012 (see R. at 10), and submitted additional legal argument
concerning Plaintiff’s alleged entitlement to Social Security
benefits. (See R. at 244-47.)

The Appeals Council, however,

found “no reason” to review the ALJ’s decision and, accordingly,
denied Plaintiff’s request for review on November 6, 2013,
thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final administration
decision in this action.

(R. at 1-3.)

11

Plaintiff timely filed

this action, which Defendant opposes.

The Court has

jurisdiction to review the Defendant’s final decision pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
B. ALJ’s Decision
In a written opinion dated September 11, 2012, the ALJ
discussed, at length, Plaintiff’s representations concerning his
functional abilities and work history, in addition to the
various consultative examiners’ findings and observations, and
the testimony adduced during the hearing. (See, e.g., R. at 1924.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 3, 2009, the date on
which Plaintiff filed his initial application for Social
Security benefits. (R. at 16.)

The ALJ further determined that

Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of intellectual
disability. (R. at 17.)

In so finding, however, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating any additional severe impairment, including
obesity, but noted that such a condition may nevertheless affect
the ALJ’s analysis at later stages of the sequential analysis.
(Id.)
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s “severe” impairment, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s intellectual disability did not meet or
equal in severity, any impairment found in the Listing of
Impairments, including Listing section 12.05 (“Intellectual
12

Disability”), which “refers to significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning
initially manifested during the developmental period.” (Id.)
In addressing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the
ALJ evaluated, among other factors, Plaintiff’s testimony and
other statements regarding his ability to engage in daily
activities, his assertions concerning restrictions and/or
limitations on his abilities, and the medical opinions rendered
by the various consultative examiners. (Id.)

The ALJ found the

record evidence indicated that Plaintiff suffered from an
impairment “not as debilitating as suggested” by Plaintiff.
(Id.)

In particular, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s professed

limitations inconsistent with his lengthy employment history,
his depiction of a typical day, and his ability to participate
in the various evaluative assessments with relative ease. (R. at
20-21.) In that regard, the ALJ found credible the uniform
conclusions of the state agency psychological consultant and Dr.
Coffey that Plaintiff possessed “adequate ability for simple,
rote labor and [that Plaintiff’s] mental capacity appear[ed]
adequate for simple work.” (R. at 22.)
Moreover, the ALJ noted that “the record contain[ed]
several inconsistencies that adversely affect[ed]” Plaintiff’s
credibility. (R. at 24.) Critically, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s
statement that Pep Boys terminated his employment as a result of
13

his disability in contradiction to Plaintiff’s statement to Dr.
Coffey that Pep Boys let him “go because they were cutting back
people and that he collected unemployment and was job
searching.” (Id. (citation omitted).) In addition, the ALJ took
note of the fact that Plaintiff “appeared highly functional”
throughout the various examinations, and found that Plaintiff’s
“long and fairly consistent work history” demonstrated an
“ability to perform substantive gainful activity, despite his
mental limitations.” (Id.) For all of these reasons, the ALJ
found Plaintiff’s “reported restrictions” inconsistent “with the
preponderance of the medical evidence,” and other record
evidence. (R. at 25.) The ALJ therefore determined that
Plaintiff possessed the residual functional capacity to perform
“work activities of all exertional levels,” but that his
nonexertional limitations required that such activities be
limited to “simple, repetitive tasks and simple instructions
with occasional social contacts.” (R. at 20.)
Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that the “detailed tasks”
required by Plaintiff’s past relevant work “as a automotive
parts customer service person/stocker” exceeded Plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity. (R. at 26.) The ALJ accordingly
found Plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant work, but
concluded that Plaintiff’s ability “to understand, carry out or
remember simple instructions, [and] respond appropriately to
14

peers or authorities” demonstrated his ability “to meet the
basic mental demands of work” and to “function within a routine
work-like setting.” (R. at 27.)

In so concluding, the ALJ

relied upon the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and SSR 85-15, and
ultimately concluded that Plaintiff possessed the ability to
“make an adjustment” to work existing in “significant numbers in
the national economy,” despite his nonexertional (i.e., mental)
limitations. (R. at 27-28.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, the Court
must determine whether substantial evidence supports the denial.
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988); Johnson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).

The

requirement of substantial evidence, however, constitutes a
deferential standard of review, see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004), and does not require “a large or [even]
considerable amount of evidence.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 564 (1988).

Rather, substantial evidence requires “more

than a mere scintilla[,]” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427
(3d Cir. 1999), but generally less than a preponderance.
Jones, 364 F.3d at 503.

See

Consequently, substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s determination where a “reasonable
mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate” to support
the conclusion reached by the Commissioner. Monsour Med. Ctr. v.
15

Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986); Hartranft v. Apfel,
181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
In order to facilitate the Court’s review, the ALJ must set
out a specific factual basis for each finding. Baerga v.
Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
931 (1975).

Additionally, the ALJ “must adequately explain in

the record [the] reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent
evidence,” Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(citing Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)), and
must review all pertinent medical and nonmedical evidence “and
explain his conciliations and rejections.”

Burnett v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the
ALJ need not discuss “every tidbit of evidence included in the
record.” Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).
Rather, the ALJ must set forth sufficient findings to satisfy
the reviewing court that the ALJ arrived at a decision through
application of the proper legal standards, and upon a complete
review of the relevant factual record. See Friedberg v.
Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard for Determination of Disability
The SSA reviews claims of disability in accordance with the
sequential five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
In step one, the SSA determines whether the claimant currently
16

engages in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 1520(b).
In step two, the claimant must demonstrate that the claimant
suffers from a “severe impairment.”

20 C.F.R. § 1520(c).

Impairments lacking sufficient severity render the claimant
ineligible for disability benefits.
F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).

See Plummer v. Apfel, 186

Step three requires the

Commissioner to compare medical evidence of the claimant’s
impairment to the list of impairments presumptively severe
enough to preclude any gainful activity.

20 C.F.R. § 1520(d).

If a claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its
equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps four and five.
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. Step four requires the ALJ to consider
whether the claimant retains the ability to perform past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(e). If the claimant’s
impairments render the claimant unable to return to the
claimant’s prior occupation, the ALJ will consider whether the
claimant possesses the capability to perform other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy, given the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(g); 20 C.F.R. 404.1560(c).
Here, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determinations at
steps two, three, and five, and the Court will address each in
turn.

17

1. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Intellectual
Disability Plaintiff’s Sole Severe Impairment
At step two, the ALJ concluded, upon review of the record
evidence, that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he suffers
from any severe impairment other than an intellectual
disability. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff, however, insists that the ALJ
erred in this determination, by failing to adequately discuss
Plaintiff’s obesity and emotional limitations. (See Pl.’s Br. at
12-14.) Defendant, by contrast, argues Plaintiff’s intellectual
functioning “has always” formed the fabric of his claim for
Social Security benefits, not his obesity, and further disputes
the substantiality of any other alleged impairments. (Def.’s
Opp’n at 9-11.) For the reasons that follow, the Court finds
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step two
determination.
As stated above, step two requires the ALJ to determine
whether the plaintiff’s claimed impairment and/or combination of
impairments possesses the requisite severity. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

A severe impairment, in turn, has been

defined as any impairment that significantly limits an
individual’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c), including
“seeing, hearing, and speaking,” and “understanding, carrying
out, and remembering simple instructions.” 20 C.F.R. §§

18

404.1520(c), 404.1521(b); see also SSR 85–28, 1985 WL 56856, at
*3 (Jan. 1, 1985).

An impairment is not severe, however, where

the record demonstrates merely a “slight abnormality or a
combination of slight abnormalities” that has, individually or
in the aggregate, “‘no more than a minimal effect on an
individual's ability to work.’” Magwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
417 F. App’x 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newell v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003)).
In evaluating severity, the ALJ must consider the available
medical evidence, “in order to assess the effects of the
impairment(s) on [the individual’s] ability to do basic work
activities.” SSR 85–28, 1985 WL 56856, at *4. However, because
the plaintiff bears a minimal burden on the issue of severity,
the Court of Appeals has directed that “[r]easonable doubts on
severity” be “resolved in favor of the claimant,” Newell, 347
F.3d at 546, and that a denial of benefits on the ground of nonseverity “be reviewed with close scrutiny.” McCrea v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, the ALJ did not deny Plaintiff Social Security
benefits on the ground of non-severity. (R. at 17.) Rather, the
ALJ found that the record lacked sufficient evidence to conclude
that Plaintiff’s obesity significantly impacted Plaintiff’s
ability to perform basic work activities. (Id.) The Court finds,

19

as stated below, that substantial record evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination in this respect.
Critically, Plaintiff never claimed obesity as an
impairment in connection with his application (see R. at 59-76),
nor did he articulate any weight-based limitations during the
various evaluative assessments or at the administrative hearing.
(See R. at 29-47.) To the contrary, throughout the entirety of
the administrative process, Plaintiff only alleged the following
impairments: a learning disability, developmental delays, mental
challenges, and sleep apnea. (See, e.g., R. at 51, 68, 102, 190,
218.)

Plaintiff, accordingly, indicated that his conditions

affected his ability to concentrate, complete tasks, and to
follow instructions, but specifically denied any impact on his
ability to lift, squat, walk, or engage in substantial activity
on a regular basis during an eight-hour, five-day work week or
equivalent schedule (R. at 201-202), considerations the ALJ
noted would typically be associated with obesity.6 (R. at 17.)
Moreover, despite his weight, Plaintiff repeatedly
described his ability to engage in an array of household and
personal tasks, without any physical limitations.7

6

(R. at 199-

To the contrary, Plaintiff described, as stated below, an
unimpeded ability to undertake full-time employment. (R. at 20915.)
7 For that reason, among others, the ALJ found the record
“silent” as to any severe physical and/or exertional
limitations, particularly given Plaintiff’s professed physical
20

200, 248-49.)

Indeed, Plaintiff professed an ability to take

walks, exercise, ride a bike, vacuum, and mow the lawn, all
without issue other than the fact that Plaintiff occasionally
“los[t] track” of his task, and had to be reminded to finish.
(R. at 199-200, 248-49.)

In addition, Plaintiff listed a

lengthy, full-time employment history that required him to
perform a number of physical tasks, and to remain walking and/or
standing for the majority of his 8-hour workday. (See R. at 20715.) Indeed, Plaintiff stated that his past employment at Pep
Boys required him, on a daily basis, to “move parts, tires,
batter[ies],” to “unload trucks,” and to lift items that weighed
up to 50 pounds. (R. at 209.)
In light of Plaintiff’s own statements, and the absence of
any evidence to suggest any physical limitations, Dr. Coffey,
Dr. Padilla, and the state agency psychological consultant all
consistently concluded that Plaintiff suffered from cognitive,
rather than weight-based, issues.8 (See, e.g., R. at 250, 260-

abilities. (R. at 19-20.) This conclusion finds substantial
support in the record.
8 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that the state agency
psychological consultant necessarily concluded that Plaintiff’s
“obesity precluded [him] from work[ing] beyond a light level of
exertion.” (Pl.’s Br. at 12-13.) Notably, although the state
agency psychological consulted concluded that “the seven
strength factors” (i.e., lifting/carrying, standing, walking,
sitting, pushing, and pulling) demonstrated that Plaintiff
possessed a capability to perform, at most, “light” work,
Defendant correctly notes that the state consultant does not
reference Plaintiff’s obesity, nor provide any explanation for
21

61.)

Indeed, Dr. Coffey unequivocally stated that Plaintiff’s

condition appeared “to be 100% mental,” and concluded, as a
result, that Plaintiff’s work should “be limited to simple, rote
labor.”

(R. at 250.)

Moreover, Dr. Coffey predicated his

recommendation that Plaintiff’s employment be limited to
“simple” tasks upon Plaintiff’s IQ test and interpersonal
relatedness, not upon any professed physical, or obesityrelated, conditions. (Id.; see also R. at 258-61 (setting forth
Dr. Purcell’s discussion of Plaintiff’s limited intellectual and
academic skills, without reference to any physical limitations
or any notation of a readily apparent physical ailment).)

To

the contrary, although Dr. Coffey recognized that Plaintiff’s
body mass index fell within the obese range, Dr. Coffey noted
Plaintiff’s “normal” gait, posture, and movements, in addition
to Plaintiff’s ability to “run around the block with a bike,
[and] work out,” among other physical activities. (R. at 248-

such conclusion. (Def.’s Br. at 10.) Moreover, even if the state
consultant intended to conclude that Plaintiff’s obesity
precluded him from work beyond a light level of exertion, the
Court finds the ALJ’s contrary conclusion consistent with the
weight of record evidence, particularly Plaintiff’s own
statements concerning his ability, both personally and
professionally, to engage in a wide array of exertional
activities. (See, e.g., R. at 199-201 (Plaintiff describing his
ability to engage in significant household chores), 209-15
(Plaintiff describing his prior work history as having included
long periods of walking and/or standing, a requirement that he
“[h]andle, grab or grasp big objects,” and lift/move items
(including, parts, tires, and batteries) with weights between 10
and 50 pounds).)
22

49.)

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that substantial

record evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
obesity did not constitute a severe impairment, and therefore
turns to Plaintiff’s alleged emotional impairment.
However, the Court need not belabor Plaintiff’s position
concerning an “emotional disorder” separate from Plaintiff’s
intellectual disability, because the record contains no
reference to any emotional disorder. (Pl.’s Br. at 13.) Rather,
the record reflects that Plaintiff never received or sought any
psychiatric treatment, and he expressed independence in selfcare, and an ability to interact socially. (See R. at 201.)
Moreover, the various evaluative examiners all consistently
concluded that Plaintiff’s conduct lacked any indication of an
emotional condition.

Dr. Coffey, for example, expressly stated

that Plaintiff exhibited “no evidence of obsessions or
compulsions,” an abnormal mood, and/or any “suicidal or
homicidal thinking.” (R. at 249.) The state agency psychological
consultants similarly concluded that Plaintiff has no
“psychiatric or mental impairments,” other than his limited
cognitive functioning. (See, e.g., R. at 57.) Moreover, although
Dr. Purcell noted some level of emotional fragility (see R. at
260 (“he presents as a need may emotionally and academically”),
Dr. Purcell specifically concluded that his emotional issues
resulted from his embarrassment concerning his limited
23

intellectual and academic skills, not as a result of any
separate and distinct impairment. (Id.) Indeed, Dr. Purcell
specifically explained her emotional observations as follows,
[Plaintiff] stated that all academics were difficult
for him and he was a “little rusty” concerning his
academics. However, he did attempt all tasks given to
him and actually wanted to perform well. He was very
self-conscious concerning his academic limitations. He
has experienced much negativism surrounding his
academics and now as an adult finds himself in a
difficult situation at his age to be unemployed and
seeking new employment.
(R. at 254.) Consequently, any emotional issue related,
inextricably, to Plaintiff’s intellectual challenges, and the
Court cannot find any record evidence—nor has Plaintiff
proffered any—that the purported emotional issues qualifies as a
severe impairment.9

For all of these reasons, the Court finds

that substantial record evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff only suffered from one severe
impairment: intellectual disability.10 (R. at 17.)

9

The Court

Nor can the Court find any error in the ALJ’s failure to
discuss Plaintiff’s alleged emotional issues at step two, in
light of the fact that Plaintiff did not allege such impairment,
nor does the existence of such purportedly separate condition
find support in the record.
10 However, even if the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s obesity
and alleged emotional limitations non-severe, any error would be
harmless, because the ALJ found in favor of Plaintiff at step
two on the basis of his intellectual disability, and ultimately
considered the effect of the non-severe impairments in assessing
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. See Salles v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven
if [an ALJ] had erroneously concluded that some of [a
claimant’s] other impairments were not severe, any error was
24

next addresses Plaintiff’s argument concerning the ALJ’s
conclusion at step three.
2. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding that Plaintiff’s
Condition Did Not Meet or Equal Listing 12.05C
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
intellectual impairment failed to meet or equal section 12.05 of
the Listing of Impairments, because the “objective evidence in
the record” did not support any severe impairment other than
intellectual disability, nor indicate that Plaintiff’s
intellectual impairment resulted in a marked restriction to

harmless.”); see also Golubosky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13196, 2014 WL 3943029, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2014) (finding
any error at step two harmless, because the ALJ proceeded with
the sequential analysis and considered the limitations caused by
the non-severe condition throughout the remaining evaluation).
Critically, “even if an ALJ erroneously determines at step two
that one impairment is not ‘severe,’ the ALJ’s ultimate decision
may still be based on substantial evidence if the ALJ considered
the effects of that impairment at steps three through five.”
McClease v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-1673, 2009 WL 3497775,
at *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009) (citation omitted). Here, the
ALJ found in favor of Plaintiff at step two, albeit only on the
basis of Plaintiff’s intellectual disability, and therefore
continued the sequential evaluation process. (R. at 17-18.)
Moreover, the ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff’s obesity
“may have an adverse impact upon co-existing impairments” and,
throughout the remainder of the analysis, the ALJ accounted for
Plaintiff’s potential exertional and emotional limitations.
(See, e.g., R. at 19-20 (considering the presence, if any, of
exertional limitations at step four), 21-22 (considering at step
four, Dr. Purcell’s observation that Plaintiff presents as
emotionally and academically “needy”).) Consequently, though the
Court finds no error, even if it did, any error would be
harmless.
25

Plaintiff’s daily living, social functioning, concentration,
persistence, and pace. (R. at 17-18.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “rightly considered the
[section] 12.05 listing,” but improperly evaluated one of its
subparts, section 12.05C, by failing to adequately consider
evidence related to Plaintiff’s ability to engage in “only
occasional social contacts.” (Pl.’s Br. at 14-15.)

Defendant

counters, however, that Plaintiff’s “social-contact limitation”
constitutes “merely a symptom or manifestation” of Plaintiff’s
intellectual disability, and therefore fails to satisfy section
12.05C’s requirement of an “additional and significant workrelated limitation of function.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 13-14.)

For

the reasons that follow, the Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s step three determination.
As relevant here, Listing 12.05 provides, in relevant part,
that
Intellectual disability refers to significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning with
deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested
during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence
demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment
before age 22.
(Id.) In order to meet or equal the Listing, however, the
plaintiff must meet both the introductory criteria, requiring
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with
deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested [before

26

age 22],” and, as relevant here, the criteria of subpart C.

See

Gist v. Barnhart, 67 F. App’x. 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[a]s is
true in regard to any 12.05 listing, before demonstrating the
specific requirements of Listing 12.05C, a claimant must show
proof of a ‘deficit in adaptive functioning’ with an initial
onset prior to age 22.”);

Cortes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 255 F.

App’x. 646, 651 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).
Subpart 12.05C, in turns, requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate a “valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60
through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an
additional and significant work-related limitation of function.”
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1 (emphases added).

Therefore,

Plaintiff must establish “another impairment, in addition to the
[intellectual disability], that imposes an additional and
significant work-related limitation of function.” Williams v.
Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1184 (3d Cir. 1992).
The ALJ in this instance found subpart C inapplicable
because Plaintiff suffers from no additional “severe impairment
under the Social Security Act.” (R. at 18.) Plaintiff challenges
the ALJ’s determination, and argues that his purportedly limited
“social interaction” and related requirement of “regular
supervision,” constitute an “additional and significant workrelated limitations not strictly arising out of the intellectual

27

disability,” thereby satisfying the requirements of subpart
12.05C. (Pl.’s Br. at 15.)
The Court, however, rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to divorce
Plaintiff’s alleged social limitations from his intellectual
disability. (See generally Pl.’s Br. at 12-15.) Despite
Plaintiff’s position, the record amply reflects that any social
limitations (to the extent minimally supported by record
evidence) constitute merely a symptom or manifestation of
Plaintiff’s intellectual disability, rather than an independent
impairment.

In that regard, the Court notes that, it is

undisputed that Plaintiff never sought any psychiatric
treatment, nor complained of any specific limitations in his
ability to interact with others. (See, e.g., R. at 56, 65, 249
(all noting that Plaintiff “denied a psychiatric history”).) To
the contrary, Plaintiff stated that he socializes weekly with
friends and family, attends church on Sundays, and has no
problems getting along with others. (See R. at 201.) Moreover,
Plaintiff specifically stated that “he prefers to work with
others, utilizing physical energy, in a casual environment.” (R.
at 258.) The record therefore lacks any significant suggestion
that Plaintiff possessed a significant, albeit undiagnosed,
limitation in social interaction.
Indeed, in arguing that the ALJ failed to conduct “a proper
evaluation of all [] Plaintiff’s limitations,” Plaintiff solely
28

relies upon Dr. Coffey’s observation that Plaintiff has
“limited” social interaction, and Dr. Purcell’s statement that
Plaintiff presents as emotionally fragile. (Pl.’s Br. at 14-15.)
Such statements, however, do not suggest that Plaintiff suffers
from a social-contact limitation separate from his intellectual
disability.

Rather, Dr. Coffey appears to have noted

Plaintiff’s “limited” social interaction as a matter of fact,
given his observation that Plaintiff spends a “typical day” at
home, and only interacts with friends “2-3 times per month,” and
not as part of Dr. Coffey’s diagnosis. (R. at 248, 250.)
Moreover, Dr. Coffey did not find Plaintiff unable or limited in
his actual ability to engage in social interactions or to
maintain socially appropriate behavior. (See R. at 249.)

Nor

did Dr. Coffey state that Plaintiff would require “regular
supervision” as a result of any limited social skills. (R. at
250.)

Rather, Dr. Coffey indicated that supervision would be

necessary, in light of Plaintiff’s extremely low ability to
process and comprehend complex instruction and processes. (Id.)
In addition, although Dr. Purcell commented that Plaintiff
appeared emotional fragile and required constant encouragement
during the intellectual assessment, she specifically noted that
such attributes arose from Plaintiff’s frustration and
embarrassment with his limited intellectual and academic
abilities, not due to any limitation unconnected to Plaintiff’s
29

intellectual disability. (See R. at 254-55, 258-61 (“It was
obvious that [Plaintiff] was very embarrassed concerning his
lack of academic mastery.”).) Dr. Purcell, accordingly,
concluded that any occupational placement must account for
Plaintiff’s limited academic functioning and, in particular, his
inability to process complex information and/or instructions.
(R. at 261.)
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff
failed to establish that his social limitations constitute
another impairment, in addition to his intellectual disability.
See Williams, 970 F.2d 1184.

Rather, the record evidence

reflects that Plaintiff’s social-contact limitation—to the
extent it exists—constitutes a symptom or manifestation of
Plaintiff’s intellectual disability and not, as required by
subpart 12.05C, an additional impairment. See Hartzog v.
Barnhart, 189 F. App’x 98, 100 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to satisfy 12.05C because the plaintiff’s
illiteracy appeared “to be a symptom or manifestation of his
[intellectual disability], not an additional impairment”)
(citing Bucker v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding learning disability and difficulty concentrating and
reasoning to be merely symptoms or manifestations of the
plaintiff’s intellectual disability, rather than an additional
impairment)). Moreover, even if the Court found record evidence
30

to suggest that Plaintiff’s alleged social-contact limitations
presented an additional impairment, the record contains no
evidence—nor has Plaintiff pointed to any—that such limitation
significantly and adversely affected Plaintiff’s work-related
functioning. See Trego v. Astrue, No. 07-002, 2008 WL 638078, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2008) (recommending affirmance of the
ALJ’s decision, where substantial evidence did not suggest that
plaintiff’s hernia constituted an impairment that imposes “‘an
additional and significant work-related limitation of
function’”), rejected on other grounds, 2008 WL 638081 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 29, 2008).
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that substantial
record evidence supports the ALJ’s step three determination that
Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of any other
impairment that imposed an additional and significant workrelated functional limitation, and that Plaintiff therefore
failed to satisfy the criteria of subpart C.

The Court next

considers Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity assessment.
3. The ALJ Properly Relied Upon the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines and SSR 85-15 in Finding Plaintiff Able
to Perform “Other Work”
Because the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff lacked the
residual function capacity to perform his past relevant work,
the ALJ proceeded to step five. (R. at 26.)
31

In step five, the

ALJ considered whether Plaintiff possessed the capability to
perform other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy, given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §
1520(g); 20 C.F.R. 404.1560(c).

The ALJ then evaluated the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2, and noted that, because Plaintiff
possessed the residual functional capacity to perform work at
all exertional levels, the Guidelines might have directed a
finding of “not disabled.” (R. at 26-27.)

The ALJ found,

however, “[s]trict application” of the Guidelines “not
possible,” because Plaintiff’s mental, or nonexertional,
limitations necessarily narrowed his range of work. (R. at 26.)
The ALJ, accordingly, relied upon SSR 85-15, in finding, without
the benefit of a vocational expert, that Plaintiff’s
intellectual disability did not preclude him from meeting the
basic mental demands of unskilled labor, including an ability to
understand, to carry out or remember simple instructions, and to
function within a work-like setting. (R. at 27.)

For the

reasons that follow, the Court finds the ALJ’s reliance
appropriate.
In order to determine whether jobs exists in the national
economy for a particular plaintiff, the Court of Appeals
generally requires that an ALJ support his determination by
32

citing to rules, relying on vocational testimony, or by taking
judicial notice of certain vocational resources.

See Sykes v.

Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2000); Hall v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 218 F. App’x. 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2007).

When a claimant

exhibits “only exertional (i.e. strength) impairments,” the ALJ
may properly rely in step five solely upon the grids.

Nieves v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-5590, 2013 WL 3811645, at *4 (D.N.J.
July 22, 2013) (citing Sykes, 228 F.3d at 269) (emphasis added).
Where, however, the claimant exhibits nonexertional limitations,
as here, the ALJ cannot simply rely on the medical-vocational
guidelines to direct a finding of not disabled at step five.
See Hall, 218 F. App’x at 215.

Rather, the ALJ generally must

take the testimony of a vocational expert or rely upon similar
evidence in determining the manner in which the claimant’s
nonexertional impairments affect his residual functional
capacity. See Sykes, 228 F.3d at 273.
In the alternative, an ALJ may rely upon an SSR, provided
that “‘it is crystal-clear that the SSR is probative as to the
way in which the nonexertional limitations impact the ability to
work, and thus, the occupational base.’” Burrows v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 2919469, at *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014)
(quoting Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Under such circumstances, an ALJ need not resort to a vocational
expert, and may instead rely upon an SSR, so long as the “ALJ’s
33

own reference to the SSR ruling discuss[es] specifically the
limitations presented by the medical record.” Allen, 417 F.3d at
407; see also See Meyler v. Commissioner of Social Security, 238
F. App’x 884, 890-91 (3d Cir. 2007) (vacating and remanding for
further explanation by the ALJ concerning how the plaintiff’s
specific limitations affected “her ability to perform unskilled
work in a job that constitutes substantial gainful employment”
and “relate[d] to the categories or examples in SSR 85-15”).
Here, the parties do not dispute the existence of
nonexertional limitations. (See Pl.’s Br. at 17; Def.’s Opp’n at
15.)

Rather, Plaintiff solely argues that the ALJ’s erred in

relying upon SSR 85-15, without seeking testimony from a
vocational expert.11 (See Pl.’s Br. at 14-17.)

11

In addition, “if the ALJ plans to rely on an SSR rather than
make an individualized determination based on the testimony of a
vocational expert,” the ALJ must generally provide notice to the
claimant of his intention. Fullaway v. Astrue, No. 06-5771,
2008 WL 877968, at *7 (citing Allen, 417 F.3d at 407). The
record in this action leaves some doubt concerning whether the
ALJ provided notice of his intention to rely upon SSR 85-15, but
because Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s determination on
this ground, the Court need not reach this issue. (See Pl.’s Br.
at 15-18 (only arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to call a
vocational expert).) Nevertheless, the Court notes that the
Court of Appeals does not require advanced noticed in every
instance, nor does the failure to provide such notice
automatically require reversal. See Smalls v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 09–2048, 2010 WL 2925102, at *9 (D.N.J. July 19, 2010)
(“The Court ... finds that, under Allen, advanced notice is not
unequivocally required in every circumstance.”). Rather, in the
absence of advanced notice, courts must subject the ALJ’s
reliance upon a Social Security ruling to “close scrutiny.”
Allen, 417 F.3d at 408. Having closely scrutinized the ALJ’s
34

SSR 85-15 provides in relevant part that,
Where a person’s only impairment is mental, is not of
listing severity, but does prevent the person from
meeting the mental demands of past relevant work and
prevents the transferability of acquired work skills,
the final consideration is whether the person can be
expected to perform unskilled work. The basic mental
demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work
include the abilities (on a sustained basis) to
understand, carry out, and remember simple
instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with
changes in a routine work setting. A substantial loss
of ability to meet any of these basic work-related
activities would severely limit the potential
occupational base.
SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4. SSR 85-15 further “states that
depending upon the nature and extent of the impairment, an ALJ
may need to consult a vocational resource, or for ‘relatively
simple issues,’ the publications in sections 404.1566 and
416.966.” Burrow, 2014 WL 2919469, at *5 (quoting SSR 85-15,
1985 WL 56857, at *3). In more complex cases, by contrast, SSR
85-15 directs that “a person or persons with specialized
knowledge,” namely, vocational experts, “would be helpful.” SSR
85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *3.
Here, Plaintiff insists that the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff’s intellectual disability limited Plaintiff’s to work
involving only simple, repetitive tasks, simple instructions,
and occasional interaction with others, “drastically

decision, the Court finds that the ALJ conducted the requisite
legal analysis at step five.
35

restrict[ed] the numbers and types of jobs [that] any individual
could perform.” (Pl.’s Br. at 17.)

Moreover, given Plaintiff’s

position concerning Plaintiff’ social-contact limitations,
counsel for Plaintiff argues that he could hardly imagine a job
that an individual could perform “away from the public or coworkers,” or that would “not require at least some contact with
a supervisor at the time and place of the supervisor’s
choosing.” (Id.)

Plaintiff therefore insists that the

complexity of Plaintiff’s impairment exceeded the ALJ’s
abilities to independently assess Plaintiff’s potential work
limitations, and required vocational testimony.

(Id.)

The Court, however, finds the ALJ’s reliance upon SSR 85-15
as an alternative to a vocational expert appropriate, in light
of the “relatively simply issues” presented by the nature and
extent of Plaintiff’s intellectual disability, and because the
record evidence demonstrated that Plaintiff’s limitations did
not result in a substantial inability to meet the basic mental
demands of unskilled work.

In that regard, the Court finds

Burrows v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 13-3744, 2014 WL
2919469 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014), instructive.
In Burrows, the ALJ found that the plaintiff suffered from
severe impairments consisting of opiate dependence, and an
anxiety and depressive disorder.

Id. at *3.

As a result, the

ALF found at step four that the plaintiff suffered, as here,
36

from only nonexertional limitations, including “a mild
restriction in her activities of daily living, a moderate
difficulty in social functioning, and moderate difficulties with
regards to concentration, persistence, or pace.”

Id. at *4.

At

step five, the ALJ further determined that the plaintiff could
not return to her past relevant work as a waitress, because her
impairments limited her “to unskilled work with short, simple
instructions, routine tasks, and only occasional contact with
the public, supervisors, and co-workers.”

Id.

Based upon the

Guidelines, however, the ALJ concluded, through specific
reference to SSR 85-15, that the plaintiff could perform
alternative jobs in the national economy, and was therefore not
disabled, nor entitled to Social Security benefits.

Id.

On appeal, counsel for the plaintiff identically argued, as
here,12 that the nature of the plaintiff’s nonexertional
limitations required vocational testimony, because the
plaintiff’s “impairments resulted in her limitation to work
involving only short, simple instructions, routine tasks, and
occasional interaction with others, [and] drastically restricted
the numbers and types of jobs any individual could perform.” Id.
at *5.

The Burrows court, however, found that “the nature and

12

As noted by Defendant, Mr. Polonsky, counsel for Plaintiff,
represented the Burrows plaintiff. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 17
(noting parenthetically that Mr. Polonsky represented the
Burrows plaintiff).)
37

extent of [the] plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations did not
require” a vocational expert, because she retained the ability
“to go to a Methadone clinic daily, to receive therapy 1 to 2
hours once a week, clean her house, garden, do laundry, prepare
meals, to read 2 to 3 hours per day, arrange for transportation,
and [to] maintain relationships with her husband, daughter and
grandson.”

Id.

The court further rejected the plaintiff’s

“hypothetical that there are not jobs in which any person would
not be required to interact with a supervisor,” because the ALJ
found plaintiff “limited to occasional contact with others,” not
“that she could have no contact with others.”

Id.

The court,

accordingly, found the case lacked the complexity necessary to
require testimony from a vocational expert, and found the ALJ’s
reliance upon the Guidelines and SSR 85-15 “allowable.”

The

Court finds the facts of Burrows particular analogous to this
action, and follows its rationale.
Critically, although Plaintiff finds the ALJ in no position
to assess how Plaintiff’s limitation would affect his work
absent vocational testimony, Plaintiff ignores the ALJ’s
extensive citation to the record evidence demonstrating
Plaintiff’s ability “to understand, carry out or remember simple
instructions,” in addition to his ability to “respond
appropriately to peers or authorities and [to] function within a
routine work-like setting.” (R. at 27.)
38

Indeed, the record, all

of which the ALJ incorporated into his decision, is replete with
references to Plaintiff’s ability to meet all of the basic
mental demands of unskilled work.

(See, e.g., R. at 58, 72

(setting forth the state agency psychological consultants’
conclusions that Plaintiff had no significant limitation in his
ability to understand and remember simple instructions), 201-02
(setting forth Plaintiff’s only statements that he had no
problem getting along with others, nor understanding), 250
(setting forth Dr. Coffey’s determination that Plaintiff
possessed “adequate understanding” and an ability to maintain
regular employment “limited to simple, rote labor”), 259-61
(setting forth Dr. Purcell’s consistent conclusions that
Plaintiff possessed the ability to process simple instructions,
provided he received appropriate repetition).)

Given the weight

of this consistent evidence, the ALJ found it “reasonable” to
conclude that jobs existed in significant numbers that Plaintiff
could perform “on a regular, sustained, reliable and competitive
basis.” (R. at 28.)

And, despite Plaintiff’s contention to the

contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s nonexertional
limitations squarely comport with the manner in which SSR 85-15
states that such nonexertional limitations impact Plaintiff’s
occupational base.

Indeed, SSR 85-15 specifically states that

an individual has skills sufficient to meet the basic mental
demands of unskilled work where the individual “can understand,
39

carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond
appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work
situations; [and/or] deal with changes in a routine work
setting,” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4, and, as stated above,
the record clearly discloses Plaintiff’s ability to meet such
demands.
Given the consistency between the record evidence in this
instance and SSR 85-15’s directives, the ALJ reasonably
concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer from a substantial loss
of ability to meet any of the basic work-related activities. (R.
at 26-28.)

To that end, the Court does not find that this

action rises to a level of complexity that necessitates a
vocational expert.

See Burrows, 2014 WL 2919469, at *6.

Consequently, the Court finds the ALJ’s reliance upon the
Guidelines and SSR 85-15 appropriate, particularly given the
ALJ’s specific discussion of Plaintiff’s limitations.13

13

See

Nor does the Court find that Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396
(3d Cir. 2005) or Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88 (3d
Cir.2007) compel any contrary result. (See Pl.’s Br. at 17-18
(relying upon Allen and Poulos).) To the contrary, the agrees
with the Burrows court that both cases concern factually
distinct scenarios, particularly because the Court of Appeals
only remanded both actions in light of the ALJs’ failures to
make sufficient and specific findings concerning the impact of
the plaintiffs’ limitations on their ability to work. See
Allen, 417 F.3d at 405-07; Poulos, 474 F.3d at 94. Here, by
contrast, the ALJ made specific findings concerning the manner
in which Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations impact—or fail
to impact—his ability to meet the basic mental demands of
unskilled work. (See R. at 26-27.)
40

Padilla v. Astrue, 2011 WL 6303248, at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 15,
2011) (finding that “the ALJ’s reliance on SSR 85–15 as an
alternative to calling a vocational expert satisfied the
requirements set forth in Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396 (3d
Cir. 2005).
V.

CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not
have a qualifying disability under the Social Security Act.
Court, accordingly, affirms the ALJ’s decision.

An accompanying

Order will be entered.

March 6, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

41

The