PRATOLA v. WARDEN OF SSCF

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: ORDERED that Petitioner's amended pleadings, Docket Entries Nos. 5 and 12, are dismissed; and it is further ORDERED that Petitioner's IFP application is granted; and it is further ORDERED that Petitioner's applications, Docket Entries Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14, are denied; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this matter. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 7/24/2014. (tf, n.m. certified)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
________________________________
:
DONNIE PRATOLA,
:
: Civil Action No. 14-119 (RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
:
SOUTHERN STATE
:
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., :
:
Respondents.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUMB, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the submission of:
(a) two Petitioner’s amended pleadings, see Docket Entries Nos. 5
and 12; (b) Petitioner’s application to proceed in this matter in
forma pauperis, see Docket Entry No. 4; and (c) Petitioner’s
numerous applications, motions and letters docketed as Docket
Entries Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14.
Petitioner is a state prisoner confined at the Southern
State Correctional Facility, Delmont, New Jersey; he is serving,
inter alia, a life sentence.1

See id.

On December 18, 2013, the

Clerk received Petitioner’s submission styled as a § 2241
petition (“Original Petition”); that submission gave rise to

1

The New Jersey Department of Corrections website shows
that Petitioner is serving numerous sentences (with the life term
being the longest) for two groups of offenses, one committed on
June 10, 1982, and another committed on May 18, 1981. See
https://www6.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1005387&n=0.

Pratola v. Southern State Corr. Facility, Civil Action No. 137628.

The Original Petition asserted that Petitioner had six

parole hearings between 1999 and 2012, and the New Jersey Parole
Board declined to release him on parole after each hearing.
id., Docket Entry No. 1, at 1-2.

See

In response, Petitioner filed

his Original Petition demanding immediate release and maintaining
that his rights must have been violated by the aforesaid denials
of parole in light of the fact that the minimum parole
ineligibility period applicable, under the state law, to life
sentences, is shorter than the term Petitioner has served thus
far.

See id. at 2-4.
This Court screened the Original Petition under Habeas Rule

4,2 see id., Docket Entry No. 2, and explained to Petitioner that
the Court was without § 2241 jurisdiction to entertain his
challenges, regardless of their procedural/substantive merits or
deficiencies, since Section 2241 “confer[ed] habeas jurisdiction
to hear the petition of a federal prisoner,” Woodall v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Coady
v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001), while § 2254

2

Habeas Rule 4 requires the court to sua sponte screen and
dismiss a habeas petition without ordering a responsive pleading
“[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4, applicable to Section 2241 actions through
Habeas Rule 1(b). “Federal courts are authorized to dismiss
summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient
on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S. Ct.
2568, 129 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1994).
2

conferred jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions filed by
persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
Id. at 2-3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)).
To enable Petitioner’s proper litigation of his habeas
claims, if any, this Court directed the Clerk to commence the
instant § 2254 habeas matter for Petitioner.

In conjunction with

the same, this Court explained to Petitioner a few threshold
requirements associated with a § 2254 action.
Action No. 13-7628, Docket Entry No. 2.

See Pratola, Civil

For instance, this Court

pointed out that a § 2254 petition must be timely within the
meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), that the litigant must be in custody under the
very order he is challenging at the time he files his § 2254
petition attacking that order, and that his claims must be duly
exhausted in the state forum.

See id. at 3-4.

Since the sole

challenge Petitioner could, seemingly, raise in light of these
requirements was “a timely, duly exhausted § 2254 attack on his
[latest, i.e.,] May 29, 2012, parole hearing that imposed his
denial-of-parole term currently operable,” id. at 4, this Court
allowed him an opportunity to elaborate on his challenges to that
order.

Toward that end, this Court granted Petitioner an

opportunity to file an amended § 2254 petition “detail[ing] the
timeliness, exhaustion and substance of his challenge.”
4-6.

3

Id. at

In response, Petitioner filed:
(a)

a letter expressing his displeasure with the Appellate
Division’s July 2013 proceeding; see Instant Action, Docket
Entry No. 3;

(b)

an application maintaining that this Court erred in its
finding that Petitioner’s challenges could not be raised
under § 2241,3 but nonetheless asserting, as an alternative
jurisdictional basis, 28 U.S.C. § 1361;4 see Instant Action,
Docket Entry No. 5;

3

In support of his position that this Court erred in its
jurisdictional finding, Petitioner cited 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3).
However, § 2241(c)(3) confers jurisdiction to entertain habeas
claims of a federal prisoner maintaining that he “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States,” and has no relation to Petitioner, who is
confined pursuant to a state order of conviction and a state
order denying him parole.
4

Petitioner’s reliance on § 1361 is a facial non sequitur.
Under the All Writs Act, a federal court has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of mandamus only “in aid of” its jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a). Moreover, to be eligible for mandamus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, a party must satisfy three conditions.
First, the party seeking issuance of a writ must demonstrate that
he has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.”
Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)
(internal citation omitted). Next, he must carry the burden of
showing that “his right to the issuance of the writ is clear and
indisputable.” Id. at 381 (internal citations omitted).
Finally, “the issuing court . . . must be satisfied that the writ
is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. Here, Petitioner
is availed to alternative means to seek the relief he desires: by
proceeding with a proper § 2254 habeas action. In addition, he
failed to establish, thus far, that he is entitled any relief.
Hence, his right to relief cannot be clear and indisputable.
Finally, no statement in Petitioner’s voluminous filings
indicates that a mandamus writ is an appropriate remedy.
4

(c)

a motion seeking production of “the complete file of the New
Jersey state Parole Board and the Department of Corrections
[for Petitioner’s] inspection [of what he believes to be]
the defects that cause[d] [Petitioner’s] constitutional
rights to be violated [during] these past 18 years since
February 21, 1996”; see Instant Action, Docket Entry No. 6;5

(d)

a letter expressing Petitioner’s displeasure with this
Court’s obligation not to direct responsive pleading unless
Petitioner’s challenges pass muster under Habeas Rule 4; see
Docket Entry No. 7;

(e)

a memorandum repeating Petitioner’s challenges raised in the
Original Petition, citing a certain state decision that
reversed a Parole Board’s order denying parole to a certain
inmate, quoting a psychologist’s alleged statement to
Petitioner and asserting that Petitioner was entitled to be

5

Petitioner’s motion, to the extent it could be construed
as an application to expand the record with regard to his latest
parole hearing, is without merit. The court sitting in habeas
review is limited to consideration of the record that was before
the state court which adjudicated the claim on the merits and,
thus, cannot expand the record. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388, 1398-1401 (2011). To the extent Petitioner’s motion
could be construed as an application seeking production of
documents as to any other issue, e.g., Petitioner’s prior parole
hearings, such application is barred by: (a) the in-custody
requirement (since the prior hearings have no relation to the
order underlying Petitioner’s current confinement); and, also (b)
Habeas Rule 2(e), pursuant to which a litigant cannot challenge
different determinations in a single habeas petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(e) (applicable to § 2241 through Rule 1(b)).
5

immediately released because “[t]he Parole Act of 1979
create[d a] sufficient expectancy of parole eligibility”;
see Instant Action, Docket Entry No. 8;6 and
(f)

a motion reiterating, again, the challenges raised in the
Original Petition and requesting leave to pursue an
interlocutory appeal; see Instant Action, Docket Entry No.
9.7

6

While states may create a protected-by-the-Due-ProcessClause inmate’s entitlement in a parole hearing, the law does not
recognize a “constitutional or inherent right of a convicted
person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a
valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, a state’s parole board’s
decision to deny parole cannot impinge on any procedural due
process interests. See, e.g., Stephens v. Chairman of Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 173 F. App’x 963, 965 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining
that the United States Supreme Court has held that “an
expectation of release on parole is not a constitutionally
protected liberty interest”) and quoting Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S. 14 (1981). Here, Petitioner’s numerous submissions
establish that Petitioner was indeed provided with many parole
hearings, although the outcomes of those hearings were not to his
liking. However, his displeasure with those outcomes cannot
implicate any federal constitutional right. See id.
7

The appropriate standard for an order granting permission
for an interlocutory appeal is whether: (a) the underlying order
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion”; and (b) “an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Here, there is no difference of opinion that a § 2254 habeas
challenge must be timely, duly exhausted and raised by a litigant
who is in custody under the order he is attacking. Since this
Court’s prior order reached solely that conclusion, and an
immediate appeal from that order could not advance the ultimate
termination of this litigation, and since Petitioner’s claims
appear deficient, as detailed infra, Petitioner’s motion seeking
an interlocutory appeal was facially meritless.
6

On June 2, 2014, in light of Petitioner’s “numerous letters
and motions,” this Court directed the Clerk to “restore this
matter to this Court’s active docket.”

Instant Action, Docket

Entry No. 10.
During the two weeks that followed, Petitioner filed:
(a)

a letter complaining that Respondent filed no responsive
pleading,8 and seeking appointment of a federal public
defender to represent Petitioner in this matter;9 see
Instant Action, Docket Entry No. 11;

8

There is no compulsory service in habeas matters and, a
fortiori, no compulsory obligation to answer: such obligations
could be given rise only by a judicial order. See 28 U.S.C. §
2243 (federal district courts have a pre-service duty to screen
and summarily dismiss petitions showing that the petitioners are
not entitled to relief); see also Habeas Rule 4 (same); accord
Saunders v. Taylor, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3320 (D. Del. Feb. 27,
1997) (motion for default judgment is unavailable in habeas
corpus proceedings).
9

Litigants do not have a constitutional right to counsel
in habeas proceedings. See Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 263
(3d Cir. 1991), superseded on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Moreover, while 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) provides that
the court has discretion to appoint counsel where “the court
determines that the interests of justice so require,” the Court
of Appeals explained that in determining whether counsel should
be appointed depends on whether “the petitioner has presented a
nonfrivolous claim” and “the appointment of counsel will benefit
the petitioner and the court. Factors influencing a court’s
decision include the complexity of the factual and legal issues
in the case, as well as the pro se petitioner’s ability to
investigate facts and present claims.” Id. at 263-64. Here, an
appointment of counsel is unwarranted since Petitioner’s claims
are straightforward and, as detailed infra, appear deficient.
7

(b)

another motion to amend the Original Petition, this time
reflecting on the events of his 2002 parole hearing long
superceded by his following parole hearings, including the
latest hearing in 2012; see Instant Action, Docket Entry No.
12;

(C)

a letter requesting discovery and oral arguments, and
stating Petitioner’s belief that “the New Jersey State
Parole Board [was] caught [by him] using fabricated evidence
from October 1, 2002[,] until 2007”;10 Instant Action,
Docket Entry No. 13; and

(d)

a letter expressing Petitioner’s displeasure with the lack
of this Court’s ruling on his motions seeking discovery and
to amend his Original Petition, as well as with Petitioner
“never receiv[ing] any confirmation of counsel being
appointed by the [S]tate to contest [P]etitioner’s
applications.”

Instant Action, Docket Entry No. 14.

One month later, Petitioner supplemented the foregoing chain
of motions, letters and applications with two more letters.

10

One

Since the undisclosed and allegedly fabricated evidence
to which Petitioner referred was not used in parole hearings that
took place after 2007, and was not a basis for the determination
reached by the Parole Board upon Petitioner’s latest parole
hearing in 2012 (that resulted in the denial-of-parole order
underlying Petitioner’s current confinement), the alleged falsity
of this evidence, even if true, appears wholly irrelevant to
Petitioner’s claims attacking the order for the purposes of which
he can, seemingly, satisfy the “in-custody” requirement.
8

was addressed to this Court and demanded “speedy release” on the
grounds of Petitioner’s impression that “[t]he record should
reflect that the Essex County Prosecutor[’]s Office, along with
the New Jersey State Parole Board[,] are caught fabricating
evidence on October 1, 2002, with evidence to restrain
[P]etitioner.

. . . [P]etitioner asks that Summary Judgment be

granted, because very certainly the case against the prosecution,
who is most likely responsible for this miscarriage/travesty of
justice, be held accountable for their actions.”

Instant Action,

Docket Entry No. 14, at 1-2 (capitalization, grammar and
punctuation in original).11

The other letter was addressed to

11

The sole appropriate Respondent in a habeas matter
commenced by a litigant challenging his current custody is that
litigant’s warden, not a prosecutor who prosecuted the litigant’s
case more than three decades ago. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004)(the petitioner’s immediate custodian is
the sole appropriate respondent). Moreover, a motion for summary
judgment is a device of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
governing civil rather than habeas matters, where the precedence
is taken by the Habeas Rules. Correspondingly, summary judgment
might be appropriate “in a habeas case, [but only if] the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Wilson v.
Beard, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56115, at *11, n. 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
9, 2006) (quoting Forman v. Cathel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18137
(D.N.J. March 23, 2006), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Here, there
was no answer, no depositions, no record and no file: all this
Court was presented with were Petitioner’s bald assertions as to
unspecified falsified evidence that produced a 2002 denial of
parole order long superceded by the chain of later denial of
parole orders which, in turn, were superceded by Petitioner’s
currently-operating 2012 denial of parole order.
9

the Hon. Jerome B. Simandle, the Chief Judge (“Judge Simandle”),
see Instant Action, Docket Entry No. 15, and requested Judge
Simandle’s intervention in the instant matter upon: (a) asserting
that Petitioner’s claims were left unaddressed by this Court for
nine months;12 and (b) stating Petitioner’s belief that a certain
court rule required this Court’s ruling on his habeas challenges
“within 30 days of [his] filing [of the] petition.”13

See id. at

1-2.
Petitioner’s submissions indicate his confusion as to the
jurisdictional, procedural and substantive requirements
associated with § 2254 habeas review.

As this Court already

explained in its prior decision, in order for this Court to have
jurisdiction over Petitioner’s parole challenges, Petitioner must
challenge the denial-of-parole order underlying his current
confinement, not a prior denial-of-parole order that has been
superceded by the currently operating order.

See Maleng v. Cook,

12

Petitioner’s Original Petition was filed in the
currently terminated § 2241 matter (Pratola v. Southern State
Corr. Facility, Civil Action No. 13-7628). That filing was
executed less than nine months ago, and the Original Petition was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on January 8, 2014, with
guidance as to what the content of his amended pleading should
be. Subsequently, the instant § 2254 matter was commenced. Judge
Simandle declined Petitioner’s invitation to intervene in this
matter, and pointed out that the pleading in Pratola v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, Civil Action No. 13-7628, was screened, and
the case was terminated. See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 16.
13

This Court is not aware of any such court rule.
10

490 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1989) (per curiam) (a habeas petitioner
cannot remain “‘in custody’ under [an order that] has fully
expired”); Dessus v. Commonwealth of Penn., 452 F.2d 557, 559-60
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972) (“[C]ustody is
the passport to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction”).

Since that

currently operable denial-of-parole order appears to be the 2012
order, Petitioner’s parole challenges must be limited to that
order, and that order only.
Next, Petitioner’s challenges must be duly exhausted.

While

Petitioner’s submissions made a few references to a 2013
proceeding before the Appellate Division, it is unclear whether
Petitioner, being dissatisfied with the Appellate Division’s
ruling, sought certification from the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.

In the event Petitioner failed to seek certification,

his challenges cannot qualify as properly exhausted, even if the
chances that the New Jersey Supreme Court would certify his
petition for certification and grant him the requested relief are
small.

If his challenges to his currently-operable denial-of-

parole order are

unexhausted, they are subject to dismissal

without prejudice unless Petitioner establishes a valid excuse
from the exhaustion requirement.14

14

In determining whether state court review is available,
this Court must “turn [its] attention to the actuality that the
state courts would refuse to entertain” Petitioner’s federal
claims. Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 1997),
11

In addition, even if Petitioner duly exhausted his
challenges to the denial-of-parole order underlying his current
confinement, his claims raised in the instant matter must: (a) be
timely (i.e., his Original Petition had to be filed within one
year from the date when his AEDPA period was triggered); and, in
addition, (b) present challenges “substantially equivalent” to
the claims asserted by Petitioner in the state forum.

See Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see also Johnson v. Pinchak,
392 F.3d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 2004) (the claims a litigant presents
in the state courts must be substantially the same claim he asks
the federal courts to review).15

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 919 (2001). “[U]unless [an actual] state
court decision exists indicating that a habeas petitioner is
clearly precluded from state court relief, the federal habeas
claim should be dismissed for non-exhaustion, even if it appears
unlikely that the state will address the merits of the
petitioner’s claim.” Id. at 517. For example, the petitioner in
Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, was a New Jersey prisoner who
filed a § 2254 petition challenging his conviction on five
grounds. The Appellate Division had affirmed his conviction on
all five grounds, and the New Jersey Supreme Court had denied his
petition for certification, which raised only two grounds. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Toulson’s petition had to be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust “[b]ecause no
state court has concluded that [he] is procedurally barred from
raising his [three] unexhausted claims and state law does not
clearly require a finding of default.” Id. at 989.
15

Reliance on the same constitutional provision is not
sufficient: both the legal theory and factual predicate must also
be the same with regard to each particular claim. See Picard,
404 U.S. at 277. “The rationale of the ‘substantial equivalent’
requirement is self-evident in light of the standard of review
applicable to federal habeas actions: habeas relief focuses on
whether the state court’s adjudication of the petitioner claim
12

Finally, and paramount here, the claims Petitioner may raise
before this Court – and had to exhaust in the state forum – must
be federal claims, not claims based on state law or on the Parole
Board/state courts’ misapplication of state law.

See Johnson v.

Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 1997) (“errors of state law
cannot be repackaged as federal errors”).

For instance, the

violation of a right created by state evidentiary law is not
itself cognizable as a basis for federal habeas relief.

See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“We have stated
many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for
errors of state law’”) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,
780 (1990))); Ross v. Dist. Attorney of the Cnty. of Allegheny,
672 F.3d 198, 207 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S.
at 62).

Here, Petitioner’s submissions rely on state law and,

essentially, assert an evidentiary error by the Parole Board
(committed in 2002 and/or repeated between 2002 and 2007).

If

“resulted . . . or involved an unreasonable application of . . .
Supreme Court precedent.” Salas v. Warren, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59728, at *13, n.3 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)). “If the legal theory and/or the factual predicate of
each claim presented to the state courts differed from the legal
theory and factual predicate of the claim presented for federal
habeas review, the federal court has no basis to conclude that
the state courts unreasonably applied the governing Supreme Court
precedent, because each Supreme Court precedent (and any legal
precedent) is composed of a particular factual predicate and a
particular rule of law, and so this precedent can only be applied
to substantially same set of circumstances and legal challenges.”
Id.
13

these statements correctly reflect Petitioner’s challenges, such
challenges fall outside the scope of federal habeas review, since
they are state claims (that is, in addition to being challenges
attacking long-superceded denial-of-parole orders that cannot
satisfy the “in-custody” requirement).
Hence, while Petitioner’s filings have been as numerous,
this Court is left without an understanding as to what
Petitioner’s federal claims attacking his currently-operable
denial-of-parole order are, whether those claims were duly
exhausted in the state forum and if these claims are timely.
Correspondingly, both Petitioner’s motions to amend will be
construed as his amended petitions and dismissed for failure to
assert a constitutional violation or a claim over which this
Court has jurisdiction.
However, out of an abundance of caution, this Court will
allow Petitioner one more chance to state his § 2254 habeas
challenges to his currently-operable denial-of-parole order with
the requisite degree of specificity.

“Habeas corpus petitions

must meet heightened pleading requirements.”

McFarland, 512 U.S.

at 856.16

16

Thus, Petitioner shall file a document titled “Amended §
2254 Petition,” stating, clearly and concisely: (a) when his
currently-operable denial-of-parole order was issued; (b) whether
Petitioner challenged that order before the Appellate Division
and the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and when the state courts
rulings were entered; (c) which federal claims Petitioner raised
14

IT IS, therefore, on this 24th day of July 2014,
ORDERED that Petitioner’s amended pleadings, Docket Entries
Nos. 5 and 12, are dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s application to proceed in this
matter in forma pauperis, Docket Entry No. 4, is granted; and it
is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s applications, Docket Entries Nos.
3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14, are denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this
matter by making a new and separate entry on the docket reading,
“CIVIL CASE TERMINATED,” subject to reopening in the event
Petitioner files a timely and duly executed amended § 2254
petition, see Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 731
before the state courts, and what factual predicate he asserted
in support of each of those claims; (d) which of these federal
claims Petitioner wishes to raise for the purposes of this
Court’s habeas review; and (e) what is the basis of Petitioner’s
position that the state courts’ determinations denying him relief
as to those claims were unreasonable applications of the United
States Supreme Court precedent. While this Court is mindful of
Petitioner’s sense of urgency, this Court’s Article III mandate
limits its jurisdiction only to resolution of not-mooted cases or
controversies. Therefore, this Court encourages Petitioner to
draft a thoughtful amended petition, free of irrelevant matters,
reflections on the events unrelated to his current challenges and
expressions of Petitioner’s bald conclusions. “The courts in
this nation stand ready to address challenges brought by
litigants in good faith. Which, in turn, means that the
judiciary — including the Judges in this District — expect
litigants to treat their litigation with utmost seriousness,
without abusing legal process and without unduly testing of the
resolve or common sense of the judiciary.” In re Telfair, 745 F.
Supp. 2d 536, 580 (D.N.J. 2010).
15

F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013) (“administrative closings [are not final
dismissals on the merits; rather, they] are a practical tool used
by courts to prune overgrown dockets and are particularly useful
in circumstances in which a case, though not dead, is likely to
remain moribund”); and it is further
ORDERED that this Court retains its jurisdiction over this
matter for the period of 150 days; and it is further
ORDERED that, within sixty days from the date of entry of
this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Petitioner may, if he so
desires, file his amended petition in this matter, provided that
such amended petition is executed in accordance with the guidance
provided to Petitioner herein; and it is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s future filings, if they are other
than his amended petition executed in accordance with the
guidance provided to Petitioner herein, might be stricken from
the docket, as filed in violation of the terms of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, in the event such measure is appropriate; and
it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion
and Order upon Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt
requested.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
16