JONES v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
157
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 5/17/18. .(dd, )
Case 1:14-cv-00139-NLH-KMW Document 157 Filed 05/17/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID: 1275
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
DONALD JONES,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
No. 14-cv-139 (NLH) (KMW)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
WARDEN DONNA ZICKEFOOSE,
:
MICHELLE BAKER, JOHN DOE,
:
and JANE DOE,
:
:
Defendants.
:
______________________________:
APPEARANCES:
Douglas F. Johnson, Esq.
Eric P. Sando, Esq.
Earp Cohn P.C.
20 Brace Road, Fourth Floor
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
Counsel for Plaintiff
Daniel J. Gibbons, Esq.
Office of the U.S. Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff, through counsel, filed an Amended Complaint
brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
ECF No. 122.
In it, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs.
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I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was an inmate formerly incarcerated at the
Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, in Fort Dix, New
Jersey. 1
See ECF No. 139-1, Declaration of Donald Jones at 1.
Plaintiff suffers from a serious pre-existing heart condition, a
condition known to the staff at FCI Fort Dix.
Id. at 2.
On
Saturday, April 7, 2012, Plaintiff’s heart condition became
significantly worse, and he requested emergency medical
treatment from his unit correctional officer.
Id.
He alleges
that he was denied access to treatment because no medical staff
was available at the prison that weekend and was told that the
unit officer had no ability to call medical staff on the
weekends.
Id.
On Monday, April 9, 2012, Plaintiff waited in a line of
approximately 90-100 inmates at health services to receive
medical treatment and submitted a sick call slip.
Id. at 2-3.
There, he spoke to an unknown staff member in the medical unit,
to whom he reported his symptoms of severe chest pain, shortness
of breath, excessive perspiration, difficulty walking, and
difficulty standing.
Id. at 3.
He also told that individual
about his known heart condition and that he had suffered from a
heart attack a year ago.
1
Id.
The individual inputted
Plaintiff was released from custody on January 9, 2018.
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Plaintiff’s comments into a computer but did not examine
Plaintiff or check his vital signs.
Id. at 3-4.
Plaintiff was
told to return to his cell and wait for a medical appointment.
Id. at 4.
On April 10, 2012, Plaintiff received a medical treatment
appointment and multiple EKGs.
Id. at 4-5.
When the EKG
reports were given to a doctor to interpret, the doctor stated,
“whoa, what was she thinking--she almost cost him his life.”
Id. at 5.
Plaintiff was then transferred for emergency care at
the Deborah Heart and Lung Center, where he was told that he
would need surgery for an implantable cardioverter
defibrillator.
Id.
The prison staff, however, delayed
providing the surgery for months and placed Plaintiff in the
Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) for the duration of his time at FCI
Fort Dix.
Id. at 5, 7-8
Plaintiff also alleges that after the incident, various
individuals employed by the prison altered and destroyed his
medical records from April 9, 2012.
Id. at 5-10.
In addition,
individuals acted to prevent Plaintiff from utilizing the prison
administrate grievance system and tampered with Plaintiff’s mail
and records.
Id.
Despite these attempts, Plaintiff asserts
that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing all
necessary grievance forms and tort claims notices.
3
Id.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
affidavits show that no genuine issue exists as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A fact is material when
it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
substantive law.
248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
An issue is genuine when a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence.
Id. at 249.
The court should view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and make all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor.
Hugh v. Butler County Family
YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
Initially, the moving party must show the absence of a
genuine issue concerning any material fact.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
See Celotex Corp.
Once the moving party has
satisfied its burden, the nonmoving party, “must present
affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
See
Alternatively, when facts are
unavailable to the nonmovant, the nonmovant may show by
affidavit or declaration that it cannot present facts essential
to justify its opposition.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
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In such
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circumstances, the Court may delay consideration of or deny the
motion, provide time for discovery, or issue any appropriate
order.
Id.
If the court determines that the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, then no genuine issue for trial exists.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986).
Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment
against the party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants FCI Fort Dix Warden Donna Zickefoose and the
former Health Services Administrator Captain Michelle Baker have
moved to dismiss the claims against them, or, in the
alternative, have the Court enter summary judgment in their
favor.
ECF No. 134.
Because Defendants have already filed an
answer and submit declarations in support of their arguments,
the Court will construe the motion as one for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, they are entitled to qualified
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immunity, and Defendant Baker is entitled to absolute immunity
as a member of the Public Health Service.
7.
See ECF No. 134-1 at
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Motion for Summary
Judgment is premature because Plaintiff has not had the
opportunity to obtain discovery necessary to respond to and
oppose the Motion.
ECF No. 139-3, Pl’s Br. in Opp. at 6-9.
Plaintiff also submits declarations pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(d) detailing the discovery needed to respond
to any motion for summary judgment.
ECF Nos. 139-1, 139-2.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides as follows:
“If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify
its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion
or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations
or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”
Summary judgment should generally be granted only when the
nonmoving party has had an “adequate time for discovery.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
“[N]othing precludes a party from
requesting an opportunity for discovery under Rule 56(d) by
simply attaching an appropriate affidavit or declaration to that
party’s response to a motion for summary judgment, and by
asserting that summary judgment should not be granted without
affording the responding nonmovant an opportunity for
discovery.”
Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir.
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2015).
In such circumstances, the court “is obligated to give a
party opposing summary judgment an adequate opportunity to
obtain discovery.”
Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136,
139-40 (3d Cir. 1988).
Such requests for discovery are usually
provided as a matter of course, especially when there are
discovery requests outstanding.
Shelton, 775 F.3d at 568.
The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met his burden
under Rule 56(d), and the Court will thus deny without prejudice
the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff has explained by
declaration the discovery needed to refute the arguments
regarding administrative exhaustion and immunity.
139-1, 139-2.
See ECF Nos.
The Court also notes that discovery in this
matter is open until June 29, 2018, that Plaintiff has sought
the Court’s intervention in resolving discovery disputes arising
from Defendants’ failures to produce documents and other
information, and that dispositive motions are due by October 26,
2018.
See ECF Nos. 156 (amended scheduling order), ECF 154
(letter from plaintiff regarding discovery dispute).
After
discovery closes, Defendants may refile their motion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 134, will be denied without prejudice.
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Defendants may refile their motion after discovery closes.
An
appropriate Order follows.
Dated: May 17, 2018
s/ Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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