MARTINEZ-SANTIAGO v. PUBLIC STORAGE

Filing 24

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/14/2014. (drw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JACKELINE MARTINEZ-SANTIAGO,
on behalf of herself and other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 14-302 (JBS/AMD)

v.
OPINION
PUBLIC STORAGE,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Andrew P. Bell, Esq.
LOCKS LAW FIRM LLC
457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 500
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
- and James A. Barry, Esq.
Michael A. Galpern, Esq.
LOCKS LAW FIRM, LLC
801 N. Kings Highway
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
- and Charles N. Riley, Esq.
RILEY & SHAINE
900 N. Kings Highway
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Joshua A. Zielinski, Esq.
McELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP
1300 Mount Kemble Avenue
Morristown NJ 07962
- and Jamie D. Taylor, Esq.
Robert P. Donovan, Esq.
McELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP
100 Mulberry Street
Three Gateway Center
Newark NJ 07102
Attorneys for Defendant

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jackeline Martinez-Santiago brings this putative
class action against Defendant Public Storage for violations of
the New Jersey Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice
Act (“TCCWNA”), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14, et seq., and the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq. She claims
that the standard form contract used by Defendant for the lease
of personal storage space is unconscionable and unenforceable
because of its exculpatory and indemnification provisions, as
well as a provision that limits the consumer’s opportunity to
challenge such provisions to one year after signing the lease.
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint. [Docket Item 13.]
As explained below, the Court finds that the one-year limit
to bring claims arising from the lease, as written and as
interpreted by Defendant, would be unreasonable, and that under
a reasonable interpretation the Court finds that this action is
timely. Substantively, Plaintiff states a claim under the TCCWNA
and the CFA, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss will accordingly
be denied in large part and granted in part.
II.

Background
On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff Jackeline Martinez-Santiago

entered into a lease agreement with Defendant Public Storage for
2

storage space at Defendant’s Sicklerville, N.J., facility for
$63 per month. (Am. Compl. [Docket Item 10] ¶ 19.) Plaintiff
simultaneously elected to purchase $2,000 of insurance coverage
for her property, for an additional premium of $9 per month.
(Am. Compl. Ex. B [Docket Item 10-2].)
The lease agreement contains three provisions challenged in
this litigation. The first (“Paragraph 4”) limits the time in
which Plaintiff may bring a claim arising out of the lease
agreement to one year after “the date of the act, omission,
inaction or other event that gave rise to such a claim . . . .”
(Am. Compl. Ex. A (“Lease Agreement”) [Docket Item 10-1] at 2.)
This provision also purports to extend the one-year limit to any
defenses Plaintiff may seek to raise in any suit against her
arising out of the lease agreement. (Id.) The second provision
(“Paragraph 7”) caps Defendant’s liability at $5,0001 and
disclaims all liability for property damage or injury to
Plaintiff or other persons from any cause, including Defendant’s
own negligence, however the liability limitation does not extend
to losses “directly caused by Owner’s [Defendant’s] fraud,
willful injury or willful violation of law.” (Id.) The third
contested provision, also in Paragraph 7, requires Plaintiff to
indemnify Defendant “from any loss incurred by Owner [Defendant]

1

Paragraph 5 of the agreement dictates that Plaintiff will not
store more than $5,000 worth of personal property in the storage
unit at any time. (Id.)
3

and Owner’s Agents in any way arising out of Occupant’s
[Plaintiff’s] use of the Premises or the Property, including,
but not limited to, claims of injury or loss by Occupant’s
visitors or invitees.” (Id.)
These provisions, in full, read as follows:
4. APPLICABLE LAW; JURISDICTION; VENUE; TIME TO BRING
CLAIMS. This Lease/Rental Agreement shall be governed
and construed in accordance with the laws of the state
in which the Premises are located. If any provision of
this Lease/Rental Agreement shall be invalid or
prohibited under such law, such provision shall be
ineffective only to the extent of such prohibition or
invalidity, without invalidating the remainder of such
provision
or
the
remaining
provisions
of
the
Lease/Rental Agreement. The parties agree that in view
of the limitations of value of the stored goods as
provided in paragraph 5 below and the limitations as
to Owner’s liability as provided in paragraph 7 below,
the value of any claim hereunder is limited to $5000
and, accordingly, any action for adjudication of a
claim
shall
be
heard
in
a
court
of
limited
jurisdiction such as a small claims court. Any claim,
demand, or right of Occupant, and any defense to a
suit against Occupant, that arises out of this
Lease/Rental Agreement, or the storage of property
hereunder (including, without limitation, claims for
loss or damage to stored property) shall be barred
unless Occupant commences an action (or, in the case
of a defense, interposes such defense in a legal
proceeding) within twelve (12) months after the date
of the act, omission, inaction or other event that
gave rise to such claim, demand, right or defense. By
INITIALING HERE ____, Occupant acknowledges that he
understands and agrees to the provisions of this
paragraph.
. . . 7. LIMITATION OF OWNER’S LIABILITY; INDEMNITY.
Owner and Owner’s Agents will have no responsibility
to Occupant or to any other person for any loss,
liability, claim, expense, damage to property or
injury to persons (“Loss”) from any cause, including
without limitation, Owner’s and Owner’s Agents active
or passive acts, omissions, negligence or conversion,
4

unless the Loss is directly caused by Owner’s fraud,
willful injury or willful violation of law. Occupant
shall indemnify and hold Owner and Owner’s Agents
harmless from any loss incurred by Owner and Owner’s
Agents in any way arising out of Occupant’s use of the
Premises or the Property including, but not limited
to, claims of injury or loss by Occupant’s visitors or
invitees. Occupant agrees that Owner’s and Owner’s
Agents’ total responsibility for any Loss from any
cause whatsoever will not exceed a total of $5,000. By
INITIALING HERE ____, Occupant acknowledges that he
understands and agrees to the provisions of this
paragraph.
(Id.)
Plaintiff listed Mr. Orlando Colon as an “Alternate Contact
Name” on her lease agreement. (Id. at 1.) On February 12, 2012,
Colon slipped on a patch of ice on a walkway directly in front
of Plaintiff’s storage unit. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23; Lease Agreement
at 1 (listing Plaintiff’s unit as No. B034); Ex. C [Docket Item
10-3] ¶ 8 (asserting that Colon fell on the walkway in front of
unit No. B034).) Colon sued Public Storage for his injuries in
New Jersey Superior Court, alleging negligence. (Am. Compl. ¶
24.) On October 1, 2012, Public Storage filed an amended answer
and third-party complaint naming Martinez-Santiago as a thirdparty defendant in Colon’s lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 26.) Public Storage
sought indemnification from Martinez-Santiago because Public
Storage’s potential liability arose from Colon’s use of the
premises, which brought the matter within the scope of the
indemnification provision in Martinez-Santiago’s lease
agreement. (Id. ¶ 27.) Martinez-Santiago did not respond to the
5

lawsuit, and no attorney entered an appearance on her behalf.
Public Storage obtained a default judgment against her on
February 8, 2013. [Docket Item 10-7 (Am. Compl. Ex. G) at 4041.] On September 24, 2013, Martinez-Santiago, with the aid of
counsel, filed a motion to vacate default judgment and sought
permission to file a third-party answer and class-action
counterclaim out of time, along with a proposed third-party
answer and class-action counterclaim. [Id. at 3.] In the
supporting brief, Martinez-Santiago argued:
[T]here is a meritorious defense in this case, as
alleged in the proposed Third Party Answer and ClassAction Counterclaim. (See Proposed Answer and ClassAction Counterclaim, attached as Exhibit E.) As
alleged in the attached pleading, the contractual
language relied upon by the Defendant as forming the
basis for its Third-Party Complaint, and the practices
utilized in selling consumer contracts containing said
clauses violates the New Jersey Truth in Consumer
Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), N.J.S.A.
§ 56:12-14, et seq. and is therefore unenforceable.
Specifically, the clause violates the TCCWNA in that
it
(1)
impermissibly
shortens
the
Statute
of
Limitations for actions under the N.J. Consumer Fraud
Act; (2) fails to disclose to consumers that specific
portions of the contract are not enforceable under New
Jersey law; and (3) wrongfully disclaims liability for
Third Party Plaintiff’s own negligence, and requiring
consumers to hold harmless and indemnify Third Party
Plaintiff for losses resulting from Third Party
Plaintiff’s own negligence.
[Id. at 8-9.] The class-action counterclaim [id. at 54-64], sets
forth the same causes of action in the Amended Complaint here.
Some passages of the Amended Complaint are identical to the
proposed class-action counterclaim submitted to the state court.
6

Public Storage settled Colon’s suit and, before the
Superior Court could rule on Martinez-Santiago’s motion to
vacate the default judgment against her, on September 27, 2013,
Public Storage voluntarily dismissed the third-party complaint
against Martinez-Santiago. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 30, 32-33.) The
Amended Complaint does not state whether Martinez-Santiago ever
indemnified Public Storage for any loss.
On December 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County, and Defendants
removed the action to this Court.2 [Docket Items 1 & 1-2.] Count
One of the Amended Complaint alleges a violation of the TCCWNA.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-61.) Count Two alleges a violation of the CFA.
(Id. ¶¶ 62-70.) Count Three requests declaratory and injunctive
relief, specifically an order: (1) declaring that Defendant “is
estopped from requiring Plaintiff and class members to bring
2

Defendant asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over this
putative class action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because
minimal diversity exists among the hundred-plus class members
and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. (Notice of
Removal [Docket Item 1] ¶ 12.) Neither party pleads Plaintiff’s
state of citizenship, but Plaintiff lists her address on the
lease agreement as being in Sewell, N.J. (Lease Agreement at 1.)
In a supplemental letter after oral argument, Plaintiff
represented to the Court that she has lived in New Jersey since
2008, after moving from Pennsylvania, to support the existence
of jurisdiction here. [Docket Item 21 at 1.] Defendant is a
“real estate investment trust organized under the laws of the
state of Maryland” with its principal place of business in
Glendale, California. (Notice of Removal ¶ 14.) The Court
construes the Amended Complaint as asserting that Plaintiff is a
citizen of New Jersey, and that putative class members who
signed contracts in New Jersey are also citizens of New Jersey.
Therefore, jurisdiction is proper under § 1332(d).
7

claims or defenses within twelve mo[n]ths of an event giving
rise to such claim or defense,” (2) declaring that Defendant “is
estopped from requiring Plaintiff and class members to indemnify
and hold Defendant harmless . . . for losses resulting from the
negligence of Defendant and/or its agents,” (3) prohibiting
Defendant from offering or entering into contracts with illegal
provisions, (4) requiring Defendant to provide notice to all
class members that certain clauses in the lease agreements are
“void and unenforceable” and that class members may sue
Defendant on or before the statutory limitations period, and (5)
requiring Defendant to notify all class members who may have
indemnified Defendant that such indemnification is illegal. (Id.
¶ 72.) Plaintiff defines the putative class as:
All persons, since September 7, 2007 (or such date as
discovery may disclose), to whom form contracts, the
preprinted portions of which were identical or
substantially similar to the Agreement (Exhibit A),
have been given, displayed, offered, signed and/or
entered into, in New Jersey presented by or on behalf
of Defendant or its agents.
(Id. ¶ 45.)
Defendant now moves to dismiss all claims. No issues of
class certification are addressed in this motion.
III. Standard of review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under
8

any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d
116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).
IV.

Discussion
Defendant seeks dismissal of this action on the grounds

that (1) the provisions of the lease agreement are lawful and
enforceable and (2) Plaintiff has failed to allege that
Defendant engaged in unlawful conduct under the CFA and, even if
she did, she fails to allege a causal link between the unlawful
conduct and her alleged injury. Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under the lease agreement,
because they were filed more than one year after she entered
into the agreement.
A. Timeliness of the action
The Court begins with the contention that Plaintiff’s
claims are untimely. Defendant contends that the terms of the
lease agreement require Plaintiff to bring all claims arising
from the contract within one year of “the act, omission,
inaction or other event that gave rise to such a claim . . . .”
(Def. Mot. at 24, citing Docket Item 10-1 ¶ 4.) Defendant argues
that because Plaintiff’s claims arise from the language of the
contract itself, the claims arose “when she signed and initialed
the Contract on February 7, 2012.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff did
not file this lawsuit until December 3, 2013, or 22 months after
9

the she signed the agreement, Defendant concludes that the
action is time-barred. (Id.)
Defendant acknowledges that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 establishes a
default six-year statute of limitations for these TCCWNA and CFA
claims, but argues that nothing in those statutes prohibits
parties from contracting for a shorter limitations period,
provided that the shorter period is reasonable. (Id. at 19-20.)
Indeed, New Jersey courts, including courts in this District,
have upheld reasonable contractual limitations provisions of one
year or less when the applicable statutes of limitations
exceeded those time frames. See Eagle Fire Protection Corp. v.
First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 145 N.J. 345, 354 (1996)
(upholding a one-year limitation provision in a surety bond when
the claim otherwise would have been subject to a six-year
statute of limitations);

A.J. Tenwood Assocs. v. Orange Sr.

Citizens Hous. Co., 200 N.J. Super. 515, 523-25 (App. Div. 1985)
(stating that the six-year limitations period in N.J.S.A. 2A:141 “may be waived by express agreement of the parties,” and
upholding a one-year limitation provision); Winograd v. Carnival
Corp., No. L-3690-08, 2011 WL 9318, at *2-*3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. May 28, 2010) (upholding a one-year limitations
provision in a ticket contract and affirming the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant); Mirra v. Holland
Am. Line, 331 N.J. Super. 86, 90, 92 (App. Div. 2000) (stating
10

that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 “does not prohibit parties to a contract
from stipulating to a shorter time period” and upholding a
limitations provision of 180 days); see also New Skies
Satellites, B.V. v. Home2US Commc’ns, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d ---,
No. 13-200, 2014 WL 1292218, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014) (“It
is well settled that parties may contractually limit the time
for bringing claims, despite a statute of limitations to the
contrary”) (citing Eagle Fire, A.J. Tenwood, and Order of United
Comm. Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947)).
Contract provisions limiting the period of time in which
parties may bring suit are enforceable if reasonable. Eagle
Fire, 145 N.J. at 354; Mirra, 331 N.J. Super. at 91. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, in discussing reasonableness of
limitations, has favorably quoted language from the Michigan
Supreme Court explaining the inquiry:
The boundaries of what is reasonable under the general
rule require that the claimant have sufficient
opportunity to investigate and file an action, that
the time not be so short as to work a practical
abrogation of the right of action, and that the action
not be barred before the loss or damage can be
ascertained.
Eagle Fire, 145 N.J. at 359 (quoting Camelot Excavating Co.,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 N.W.2d 275, 277
(Mich. 1981)).
Here, Defendant’s own argument in favor of barring these
claims actually counsels in favor of finding the provision
11

unreasonable, not because the period of time is too short, per
se, but because meritorious actions very easily could be barred
by the limitation even before losses are incurred or damage
sustained.
As Defendant would have it, a consumer who stored property
at a Public Storage location might have to bring suit before he
or she had any reason to invalidate the lease agreement. A
consumer would have to decide to consult a lawyer upon signing
the contract and proactively challenge the agreement on the off
chance that, at some point 12 months or more into the future, he
or she might be sued by, or need to sue, Public Storage and
would need to attack the enforceability of the lease agreement.
In reality, only consumers who were injured by Public Storage or
sued by Public Storage within a year of signing a lease, as
Plaintiff was -- or clairvoyants -- would choose to challenge to
the agreement. Those who remained satisfied Public Storage
customers for one year would have little or no incentive to file
a lawsuit, and if they later found themselves sued by Public
Storage, and wanted to argue in defense that provisions of the
lease were unenforceable, they would be out of luck.
It is plainly unreasonable to start the limitations clock
before the ink dries on the lease agreement and to force
consumers to retain lawyers to review the fine print of a
standard consumer contract as a matter of course before the
12

consumer has suffered any ascertainable loss. Under the
interpretation advanced by Defendant, a consumer potentially
would have to challenge the indemnification provision, for
example, before Public Storage ever sought indemnification from
her. The New Jersey Supreme Court would not endorse such an
interpretation or such a provision. See Eagle Fire, 145 N.J. at
359 (“a contractual limitation period would be unreasonable and,
therefore, unenforceable if the ‘provision [had] been
constructed in such a way that plaintiff could not have
reasonably discovered its loss prior to the point at which the
limitation period ran’”) (quoting Camelot, 301 N.W.2d at 282).
Therefore, the Court holds that the limitations provision
does not render this action untimely; Defendant’s interpretation
would be unreasonable because the time to bring suit challenging
clauses for the tenant’s liability and indemnification for
Public Service’s negligence could expire before a tangible loss
is suffered. Because TCCWNA and CFA claims are governed by a
six-year statute of limitations, see N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1,
Plaintiff’s claims are timely.
Even if the one-year limitations provision were preserved
by a more reasonable interpretation, Plaintiff’s claims still
would be timely. Paragraph 4 of the lease agreement provides
that “[a]ny claim . . . shall be barred unless Occupant
commences an action . . . within twelve (12) months after the
13

date of the . . . event that gave rise to such claim . . . .”
(Lease Agreement ¶ 4) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff raised
these claims in response to the indemnification action by Public
Storage in state court within one year of being named a thirdparty defendant. Although Defendant urges the Court to start the
limitations clock from the signing of the lease agreement,
contracts in New Jersey are to be given “a reasonable
interpretation.” Borough of W. Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell,
26 N.J. 9, 25 (1958). For the reasons explained above,
Defendant’s interpretation of the relevant contractual language
-- “after the date of the act, omission, inaction or other event
that gave rise to such claim” -- to mean that Plaintiff’s claim
accrued the moment she signed her lease, is unreasonable. The
only way to reasonably interpret this provision is to say that
the limitations period began to run when Public Storage asserted
a third-party complaint for indemnification against MartinezSantiago, on October 1, 2012. In other words, when Public
Storage sought to use the lease agreement against MartinezSantiago, she had one year to bring claims challenging those
provisions. She did. Plaintiff first raised these claims on
September 24, 2013, in her proposed class-action counterclaim,
attached to the motion to vacate default judgment -- within one
year of Public Storage bringing its third-party complaint. The
state court would have ruled on Plaintiff’s motion but for
14

Defendant’s voluntary withdrawal of the third-party complaint,
which was a defense tactic outside Plaintiff’s control. In the
end, Plaintiff never had the opportunity to file the classaction counterclaim in the prior proceeding. On December 3,
2013, 67 days after the withdrawal, Plaintiff filed this
putative class action in state court.
Statutes of limitations are subject to the “doctrine of
substantial compliance, [which] allows for the flexible
application of a statute in appropriate circumstances.” Negron
v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296, 304 (1998). To successfully invoke the
doctrine of substantial compliance to “‘avoid technical defeats
of valid claims,’” id. (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J.
218, 239 (1998)), a party must show:
(1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2)
a series of steps taken to comply with the statute
involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of
the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's
claim[;] and (5) a reasonable explanation why there
was not a strict compliance with the statute.
Negron, 156 N.J. at 305. Although the limitation at issue here
is contractual, and not statutory, the doctrine of substantial
compliance informs the Court’s analysis of whether to bar these
claims on technical grounds. See Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of
Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Time limitations
analogous to a statute of limitations are subject to equitable
modifications”). The one-year contractual limitation must be

15

given “a reasonable interpretation,” Borough of W. Caldwell, 26
N.J. at 25, as explained above.
Relatedly, courts apply “equitable tolling” when the “rigid
application” of a limitations period is “unfair.” Miller, 145
F.3d at 618. A party seeking the benefit of equitable tolling
“must show that he or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in
investigating and bringing [the] claims.’” Id. (quoting New
Castle Cnty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d
Cir. 1997)). “Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.” Id.
Here, both analyses point toward permitting Plaintiff’s
claims to move forward. Plaintiff took steps to comply with the
limitations provision, as interpreted herein, thereby serving
the general purposes of the limitation provision. The timing of
this action does not prejudice Defendant, because Plaintiff put
Defendant on notice of the claims and filed the proposed defense
and counterclaim within the limitations period and then
commenced this action with reasonable diligence after Defendant
withdrew the third-party complaint. If not for Defendant’s
withdrawal, the state court may have permitted the class-action
counterclaim to be filed, and Plaintiff’s claims likely would
have proceeded to an adjudication on the merits. One reasonable
explanation why there was not strict compliance with the
limitation provision is that Public Storage deprived her of the
opportunity to prosecute her defense of contractual invalidity
16

when it withdrew its demand for indemnification. She and her
attorneys were then left to pursue the option of recasting her
counterclaim as a complaint and refiling it. The period of two
months to do so, after giving Public Storage notice of the
claims, was reasonable, and therefore Plaintiff’s claims are
timely.
In summary, the one-year limitations provision that
requires Plaintiff to bring all claims within one year of their
accrual is unreasonable as interpreted by Defendant and does not
bar this action; a consumer would have to be clairvoyant to
challenge contractual fine print addressed to circumstances
(like indemnification) that did not themselves arise when the
contract was signed. Plaintiff’s claims are governed by a sixyear statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, and are timely.
Even if the limitations provision is enforceable, the claims are
timely because Plaintiff asserted the claims in state court
within one year of the filing of the third-party complaint
seeking indemnification from the consumer, which substantially
complies with the terms of the limitation, and she was
reasonably diligent in refiling this action promptly after
Public Storage voluntarily dismissed its third-party complaint.

17

B. Limitation on raising defenses
Plaintiff argues that the limitations provision in the
contract violates the TCCWNA because it limits her ability to
raise a defense in any lawsuit arising from the agreement:
. . . any defense to a suit against Occupant, that
arises out of this Lease/Rental Agreement, or the
storage of property hereunder . . . shall be barred
unless Occupant . . . interposes such defense in a
legal proceeding . . . within twelve (12) months after
the date of the act, omission, inaction or other event
that gave rise to such . . . defense.
(Lease Agreement ¶ 4.) Plaintiff argues that because Defendant
is not bound by the one-year limitations period to bring suit,
and thus may bring suit more than a year after the cause of
action accrues, the lease agreement potentially requires
Plaintiff to “interpose” a defense in a lawsuit before that suit
has been filed. Plaintiff contends that such a provision is
unconscionable. (Pl. Opp’n at 24-27.)
Defendant argues that the Court should not consider the
limitation on defenses as a claim, because the Amended Complaint
discusses only the limitation on bringing a claim within one
year and does not specifically discuss the defenses aspect of
that term, although the Amended Complaint quotes the provision
in full, including the defenses language. (Reply at 9.) For
support, Defendant cites In re Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. Blu-Ray
Class Action Litig., No. 08-0663, 2008 WL 5451024, at *3 n.3
(D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2008) (declining to consider an argument raised
18

in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, because “[n]o
allegation to that effect appears in the Complaint”). In that
case, the court permitted the plaintiffs to “clarify” their
Consumer Fraud Act claim related to compatibility and
playability problems associated with Blu-ray players, but denied
the plaintiffs’ attempt to insert a new basis for the CFA claim
on the grounds that the user manuals contained misleading and
deceptive information. Id.
It is true that Plaintiff does not focus on the limitation
on defenses in the Amended Complaint, but Plaintiff argues that
the provision waives Plaintiff’s rights and Plaintiff names the
TCCWNA and quotes the full provision. Although Plaintiff’s
opposition focuses on a different part of the sentence than that
highlighted in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is not injecting
a new theory for a TCCWNA violation; she always challenged the
enforceability of the limitation provision. Plaintiff is
clarifying the TCCWNA claim based on the language of the
agreement. Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition will be
considered in deciding the motion.
The TCCWNA provides in relevant part:
No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall in
the course of his business offer to any consumer . . .
or enter into any written consumer contract . . .
which includes any provision that violates any clearly
established
legal
right
of
a
consumer
or
responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender
or bailee as established by State or Federal law at
19

the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is
signed . . . .
N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.
Plaintiff has stated a claim for a violation of the TCCWNA.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the New Jersey Court
Rules clearly establish legal rights and responsibilities of
litigants and dictate the timing to interpose or waive defenses.
These rules continue to govern civil litigation even beyond 12
months from the incident giving rise to the cause of action or
the defense. An action might not even be brought within one year
of “the date of the act, omission, inaction or other event that
gave rise to such . . . defense,” (Lease Agreement ¶ 4), and
thus this provision, on its face, would appear to block the
right to raise defenses beyond 12 months. It is further
plausible that a complaint filed within one year of the act
giving rise to the cause of action or defense could be amended
multiple times, and, after one year, defenses to the amended
complaint would appear to be barred by the limitation provision.
For those reasons, the Amended Complaint states a claim that
this limitation on raising defenses is overbroad and would
violate a clearly established legal right of a consumer in the
litigation process.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

20

C.

N.J.S.A. 56:12-16

Plaintiff alleges that the lease agreement violates
N.J.S.A. 56:12-16, because the agreement states that some
provisions may be invalid under state law without specifying
which provisions are enforceable. This provision of the TCCWNA
provides:
No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that
any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable
or
inapplicable
in
some
jurisdictions
without
specifying which provisions are or are not void,
unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New
Jersey[.]
N.J.S.A. 56:12-16. Defendant contends that the claim is
meritless because “the TCCWNA can only be violated if a contract
contains a provision prohibited by state or federal law, and
that violation must be of a right independent from the TCCWNA.”
(Def. Mot. at 23) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the agreement
provides:
Lease/Rental
Agreements
shall
be
governed
and
construed in accordance with the laws of the state in
which the Premises are located. If any provision of
this Lease/Rental Agreement shall be invalid or
prohibited under such law, such provision shall be
ineffective only to the extent of such prohibition or
invalidity, without invalidating the remainder of such
provision
or
the
remaining
provisions
of
the
Lease/Rental Agreement.
(Lease Agreement ¶4.) Defendant argues: “[c]ontrary to the First
Amended Complaint, this provision does not contain the language
expressly prohibited under N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 ‘that any of its
provisions is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in
21

some jurisdictions.’” (Def. Mot. at 24.) Defendant also argues
that because no provisions of the agreement violate state or
federal law, there can be no violation of N.J.S.A. 56:12-16.
Defendant’s arguments are not persuasive. Plaintiff has
independently stated a claim under the TCCWNA, as discussed
above, Part IV.B, and so Defendant’s argument fails to the
extent it relies on the wholesale enforceability of the lease
agreement. The Court also disagrees with Defendant that the
savings clause here does not use the magic words of N.J.S.A.
56:12-16. The provision in the lease agreement plainly
communicates that some terms of the agreement may be invalid or
prohibited in the state in which the premises are located, in
which case the enforceable provisions of the agreement will
remain in force. Although Defendant is technically correct that
the language does not expressly state, in a simple, declarative
sentence, that some provisions may be invalid under state law,
the savings clause necessarily implies that assertion by
describing the consequences of that reality. Defendant cannot
escape the dictates of N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 by drafting a
conditional sentence rather than a declarative one about the
validity or enforceability of certain terms and proceeding
directly to the implications of that circumstance. See Vaz v.
Sweet Ventures, Inc., No. UNN-L-004619-10, 2011 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3189 (Super. Ct. Law Div. July 14, 2011) (denying a
22

motion to dismiss a claim based on N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 because the
contract contained an unenforceable limitation on the
defendant’s liability and did not state which provisions are or
are not void).
If N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 means anything, it must mean that the
lease agreement needs to specify which provisions are
unenforceable under New Jersey law. Because Plaintiff alleges
that a provision of the lease agreement is unenforceable under
the TCCWNA -- as explained above, Plaintiff states a claim that
a provision of the agreement violates federal and/or state law - Plaintiff also has stated a claim under N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 in
the absence of any indication of which provisions are
enforceable and which are not under New Jersey law.
D. Liability for negligence
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that the exculpatory
provision in Paragraph 7 violates the TCCWNA. (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.)
The provision holds Defendant harmless for injuries or damage to
property for any reason, including, but not limited to,
Defendant’s own negligence, but excluding fraudulent or willful
conduct by Defendant:
Agents will have no responsibility to Occupant or to
any other person for any loss, liability, claim,
expense, damage to property or injury to persons
(“Loss”) from any cause, including without limitation,
Owner’s and Owner’s Agents active or passive acts,
omissions, negligence or conversion, unless the Loss
is directly caused by Owner’s fraud, willful injury or
willful violation of law.
23

(Lease Agreement ¶ 7.)
Defendant moves to dismiss this claim because exculpatory
provisions for the defendant’s own negligence have been upheld
in New Jersey. The exculpatory provision at issue in this case
was upheld by a judge in New Jersey Superior Court, Special
Civil Part, in a proceeding with a pro se plaintiff. See Paruta
v. Public Storage, No. SOM-DC-001704-2013 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
Special Civ. Pt. June 19, 2013). Although not binding on this
Court, Defendant offers the unpublished opinion as persuasive
authority.
In Paruta, the pro se lessee brought suit against Public
Storage after a pipe burst in his storage unit and damaged his
personal property. In considering the exculpatory provision of
the lease agreement, the court conducted a four-part inquiry
outlined in Gershon v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J.
Super. 237, 248 (App. Div. 2004),3 and concluded that the
exculpatory provision was enforceable. The court found that
Public Storage was not a public utility, that it had no legal
duty to perform (because Public Storage took no form of title to
the plaintiff’s property), and that the bargaining power was not
so unequal as to make enforceable of the contract inequitable
3

“In New Jersey, an exculpatory release will be enforced if (1)
it does not adversely affect the public interest; (2) the
exculpated party is not under a legal duty to perform; (3) it
does not involve a public utility or common carrier; or (4) the
contract does not grow out of unequal bargaining power or is
otherwise unconscionable.” Gershon, 237 N.J. Super. at 248.
24

(because consumers could shop around, and could purchase
insurance). Paruta, at *4-*5. The court also concluded that the
contract did not adversely affect the public interest because
the exculpatory provision offered a “counteracting benefit for
the public” by allowing storage units to be rented at more
affordable prices than if Public Storage were fully liable for
any loss. Because Public Storage was not liable for losses
caused by fraudulent or willful behavior, and because consumers
were offered insurance, the court found that the Gershon factors
were met, and that Public Storage was “not liable for any acts
of ordinary negligence by itself or its agents.”
Exculpatory provisions are disfavored by New Jersey law
because they undermine one purpose of tort law, which is to
deter careless behavior by a party in the best position to
prevent injuries in the first place. Marcinczyk v. State of N.J.
Police Training Comm’n, 203 N.J. 586, 593 (2010). However, the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an exculpatory provision that
eliminated liability for a fitness center’s own negligence if
the consumer was injured in the course of using the amenities or
equipment of the facility, or under the instruction or training
or supervision of the staff. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC,
203 N.J. 286, 293 (2010). The exculpatory provision in Stelluti
also covered “slipping and/or falling while in the club, or on
the club premises,” but the plaintiff in that case was injured
25

when equipment malfunctioned, and the New Jersey Supreme Court
expressly did not address the disclaimer of liability for
injuries on the premises. Id. at 293, 313. The court stated:
Although there is public interest in holding a health
club to its general common law duty to business
invitees—to maintain its premises in a condition safe
from defects that the business is charged with knowing
or discovering—it need not ensure the safety of its
patrons who voluntarily assume some risk by engaging
in strenuous physical activities that have a potential
to result in injuries.
Id. at 311. Key to the Stelluti court analysis was the fact that
the plaintiff had assumed risk in engaging in strenuous physical
activity, where injuries were foreseeable. Id. at 310-11. The
Stelluti court upheld the provision, but stated that the fitness
center could not escape liability for reckless conduct or gross
negligence.
Defendant also points to this Court’s opinion in Sauro v.
L.A. Fitness, No. 12-3682, 2013 WL 978807 (D.N.J. Feb. 13,
2013). There, the exculpatory provision itself was qualified as
releasing the defendant from liability for active or passive
negligence “to the fullest extent permitted by law.” Defendant
here argues that its exculpatory clause must be read in
conjunction with the statement that the agreement “shall be
governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the state
in which the Premises are located,” which appears in an entirely
different provision. (Lease Agreement ¶ 4.)

26

Defendants also rely on Kane v. U-Haul, 218 F. App’x 163
(3d Cir. 2007), in which the Third Circuit upheld an exculpatory
clause in the context of a personal storage context, which
provided that the consumer bore the risk of loss for the
property, including for U-Haul’s own negligence. Kane, 218 F.
App’x at 165. The court likened the lease to that for
“commercial property” and therefore found that there was no
unequal bargaining power, stating that the consumer had the
option to purchase insurance for the value of the property and
could have contracted with other storage facilities. Id. at 16667. The court also held the clause was not unconscionable,
because, among other reasons, bargaining power was not unequal,
there was no economic compulsion to sign the contract (no
evidence suggested that storage facilities were a necessity),
and no public interest was affected by the contract between
private parties when the consumer had the option to purchase
insurance. Id. at 167. The Third Circuit held the provision was
enforceable. Id. Here, in response, Plaintiff rightly observes
that Kane concerned damage to property, not personal injury on
the business premises. No insurance was offered to Plaintiff for
personal injury in this case, and therefore Kane is inapposite
on these facts.
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the cited New Jersey
cases do not answer the question of whether the standard duty of
27

care owed to business invitees may be waived in consumer
contracts. Plaintiff argues that the duty cannot be waived, that
a business is under a legal duty to perform up to the standard
of care required by common law. The Paruta opinion is the least
persuasive on this point, because New Jersey common law and
dicta in Stelluti suggest that businesses are under a legal duty
“to guard against any dangerous conditions on his or her
property that the owner either knows about or should have
discovered,” Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof’l Baseball Club,
Inc., 185 N.J. 70, 85 (2005), particularly when the invitee is
not engaged in risky conduct.4 See Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 311
(stating there is a public interest in holding a business to its
general common law duty to business invitees, while
distinguishing the need to “ensure the safety of its patrons who
voluntarily assume some risk by engaging in strenuous physical
activities that have a potential to result in injuries”).
Turning to the Gershon analysis, 237 N.J. Super. at 248,
the Court holds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that the
4

Although the exculpatory provision was upheld in Paruta, that
case involved damage to personal property in storage. Paruta,
No. SOM-DC-001704-2013, at *1. The court held that Public
Storage was not under a duty to perform with respect to that
property, because the only “legal duty that could possibly apply
for defendant in the present matter is the higher standard of
care created by a bailment.” Id. at *5. The court found that no
bailment had been created. Id. Because the facts of that case
did not involve personal injury on the premises, the court in
Paruta had no occasion to hold that Public Storage has no legal
duty to maintain its premises. Therefore, Paruta is not to the
contrary.
28

exculpatory release cannot be enforced. Although Public Storage
is not a public utility or common carrier, and even assuming
that the contract does not grow out of unequal bargaining power
or is otherwise unconscionable, here Public Storage is under a
legal duty to maintain its premises for business invitees. This
duty was clearly established at the time that Plaintiff signed
her lease. The exculpatory provision, on its face, provides that
Public Storage is not liable for its own negligence, gross
negligence or recklessness, even though, under common law,
Public Storage has a duty to guard against any known dangerous
conditions on its property or conditions that should have been
discovered. The lease agreement only exposes Public Storage to
potential liability when a loss is “directly caused by [Public
Storage’s] fraud, willful injury or willful violation of law.”
(Lease Agreement ¶ 7.) Walking outside of a storage unit is not
a particularly risky or strenuous activity, which may be the
subject of lawful exculpatory clauses, as was the case in
Stelluti. Moreover, “there is a public interest in holding a
[business] to its general common law duty to business invitees - to maintain its premises in a condition safe from defects that
the business is charged with knowing or discovering . . . .”
Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 311. Businesses are in the best position
to maintain their premises for the safe use of customers, and
enforcing the exculpatory provision would give Public Storage
29

permission to be careless -- negligent, reckless -- in the
maintenance of its property. Accordingly, the Court holds that
the Amended Complaint states a plausible claim that the
exculpatory provision is not enforceable, because Defendant has
a legal duty to maintain its premises, and relieving businesses
from that duty to business invitees allegedly adversely affects
the public interest.
The general statement in Paragraph 4 of the lease agreement
-- that the agreement “shall be governed and construed in
accordance with the laws of the state in which the Premises are
located” -- does not warrant dismissal of this claim. In Sauro,
the waiver provision itself was limited to the extent permitted
by law. Sauro, 2013 WL 978807, at *7. Here, the exculpatory
provision is not so circumscribed. Although Paragraph 4 names
New Jersey law as the “APPLICABLE LAW” that “govern[s]” the
lease agreement and by which the lease is to be “construed”
(Lease Agreement ¶ 4), Paragraph 4 does not purport to limit the
reach of any specific provisions in the lease agreement.
Therefore, the outcome reached in Sauro is not compelled here.
“[T]he TCCWNA is a remedial statute, entitled to a broad
interpretation to facilitate its stated purpose.” Shelton v.
Restaurant.com, 214 N.J. 419, 442 (2013). The New Jersey Supreme
Court, discussing the act’s legislative history, observed that
one of the wrongs that the TCCWNA sought to address was the
30

inclusion of provisions in consumer contracts that are not
enforceable but appear to be so, thereby discouraging consumers
from enforcing their rights:
Far too many consumer contracts, warranties, notices
and signs contain provisions [that] clearly violate
the rights of consumers. Even though these provisions
are legally invalid or unenforceable, their very
inclusion in a contract, warranty, notice or sign
deceives a consumer into thinking that they are
enforceable and for this reason the consumer often
fails to enforce his rights.
Id. at 431 (quoting Sponsors’ Statement, Statement to Assembly
Bill No. 1660 (May 1, 1980)). Here, the exculpatory provision
purports to hold Public Storage harmless for most losses
incurred by consumers, except those that are the direct result
of Public Storage’s fraud or willful conduct. Although Plaintiff
plausibly pleads that such a broad exculpatory provision is not
permitted under New Jersey law, the provision purports to be
enforceable in the lease agreement. Plaintiff states a valid
claim that this is the kind of provision that TCCWNA was
designed to address.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
E. Initialing provisions of the agreement
Plaintiff also appears to argue that requiring “consumers
to specifically acknowledge and initial” provisions of the
agreement violates the TCCWNA because it “deceive[s] Plaintiff
and members of the Class into thinking such illegal provisions
were valid” and persuades consumers “not even to try to enforce
31

their rights.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) Defendants correctly point out
that Plaintiff offers no legal support for this claim. Plaintiff
does not defend it in her opposition brief. To the extent this
is a claim in the Amended Complaint, it is dismissed.
F. Indemnity provision
Plaintiff claims that the indemnification provision in the
contract is void and unenforceable under the TCCWNA. (Am. Compl.
¶ 41.) The indemnification provision reads:
Occupant shall indemnify and hold Owner and Owner’s
Agents harmless from any loss incurred by Owner and
Owner’s Agents in any way arising out of Occupant’s
use of the Premises or the Property including, but not
limited to, claims of injury or loss by Occupant’s
visitors or invitees.
(Lease Agreement ¶ 7.)
Defendant’s motion to dismiss does not discuss the
indemnification provision in depth. However, Plaintiff, in her
opposition, defends her position that the provision is
unenforceable. (Pl. Opp’n at 11-13.) Plaintiff argues that the
provision is too broad, because it requires indemnification for
any loss arising in any way out of her (or her invitees’) use of
the public storage facility. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff observes
that the exception to the exculpatory provision -- which states
that Defendant remains liable for its own willful or fraudulent
conduct -- does not apply to the indemnification provision, and
therefore Plaintiff must indemnify Defendant for any loss, even
if it arises out of a claim for injury caused by Defendant’s
32

negligent, reckless or intentional conduct. (Id. at 12.)
Defendant argues in reply that (1) Plaintiff’s claim is
raised for the first time in the opposition brief and should be
disregarded, (2) the indemnification provision is triggered by
the consumer’s use of the premises, not by “Public Storage’s
willful, intentional, grossly negligent, or fraudulent acts,”
(3) no adjudication of liability was made in state court, and
(4) Public Storage was not seeking indemnity for its own
negligence. (Reply at 5-7.) These arguments are not persuasive.
First, Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint that the
indemnification provision is void and unenforceable under the
TCCWNA. There is no reason to disregard this argument.
Second, it is clearly established that “a contract will not
be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses
resulting from its own negligence unless such an intention is
expressed in unequivocal terms.” Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus.
of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 191 (1986); Azurak v.
Corporate Prop. Investors, 175 N.J. 110, 112-13 (2003)
(reaffirming Ramos and Mantilla v. NC Mall Assocs., 167 N.J. 262
(2001)). Defendant argues that it “was not seeking indemnity for
its own negligence,” but rather “filed a Third Party Complaint
for contractual indemnification to recover any loss it may have
incurred as a result of Plaintiff’s or her guest’s negligence.”
(Reply at 7.) Defendant’s position is unsupportable. Colon sued
33

Public Storage for negligence. [Docket Item 10-3 ¶¶ 11-30.]
Public Storage then filed an amended answer and third-party
complaint alleging that “Santiago is required to indemnify
Public Storage in an amount to be proven at trial.” [Docket Item
10-4 at 13-14.] Contrary to Defendant’s current contention,
nothing in the third-party complaint expressly seeks
indemnification for Colon’s or Plaintiff’s own negligence;
Defendant appears to have sought indemnification for Colon’s
claims arising from Defendant’s alleged negligence.5 Defendant
does not explain why Defendant would be liable for Colon’s or
Plaintiff’s negligence in the first place, necessitating
indemnification. Because New Jersey law does not permit a party
to indemnify against losses resulting from its own negligence
“unless such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms,”
Ramos, 103 N.J. at 191, and because the provision here does not
5

The third-party complaint states:
On or about July 30, 2012, Plaintiff [Colon] filed
this lawsuit, purporting to assert a claim against
Public Storage for negligence. . . . Plaintiff was at
the Public Storage Facility on February 12, 2012,
allegedly for the purpose of accessing the storage
unit Santiago rented from Public Storage. Pursuant to
Paragraph 7 of the Agreement, Santiago is obligated to
indemnify and hold Public Storage and its agents
harmless from Plaintiff’s claims and to reimburse
Public Storage for any attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claims.

Third Party Complaint, Colon v. Public Storage Props., No. CAML-3353-12 ¶¶ 5-7 (Sept. 25, 2012) [Docket Item 10-4] (paragraph
numbers and formatting omitted).
34

unequivocally express an intention for such indemnification,
Plaintiff states a claim that the indemnification provision is
unenforceable against her.6
G. Consumer Fraud Act claims
To state a claim under the CFA, a plaintiff must allege (1)
unlawful conduct by the defendants, (2) an ascertainable loss on
the part of the plaintiff, and (3) a causal relationship between
the defendants’ unlawful conduct and the plaintiff’s
ascertainable loss. Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J.
557, 576 (2011). An unlawful act is “any unconscionable
commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false
promise, misrepresentation,” among other practices not relevant
here. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Plaintiff claims the unlawful acts are
the exculpatory, limitation and indemnification provisions in
the contract. (Pl. Opp’n at 21-22.) Plaintiff claims in the
Amended Complaint that her ascertainable losses are “additional
attorneys’ fees and costs associated with filing pleadings and
defending the Third Party Complaint brought by Defendant . . .
.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff does not mention attorneys’ fees
in her opposition to the motion to dismiss but rather argues
that her ascertainable loss is the entire amount paid under the

6

It is unclear what significance Defendant places on the fact
that “no adjudication of liability was made in the State Court
Action.” (Def. Reply at 6.) Defendant asserted a claim against
Plaintiff for indemnification in the state-court proceeding,
which required her response.
35

contract. (Pl. Opp’n at 22.) At oral argument, counsel for
Plaintiff confirmed that Plaintiff was not abandoning her
argument that her attorneys’ fees constitute an ascertainable
loss.
Plaintiff states a claim under the CFA. The challenged
indemnification provision, which permits Defendant to seek
indemnification, even for its own negligence, related to
incidents arising from a consumer’s use (or the consumer’s
invitee’s use) of the property, is allegedly unlawful conduct
that is claimed to be misleading and unconscionable. See Turf
Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 416
(1995) (“To constitute consumer fraud . . . , the business
practice in question must be ‘misleading’ and stand outside the
norm of reasonable business practice in that it will victimize
the average consumer, and thus most clearly and directly involve
a matter of legitimate public concern.”). The provision
plausibly has the capacity to mislead the average consumer,
because the average consumer may believe that such a provision
in a standard form contract is enforceable under New Jersey law.
That Public Storage would seek to make Martinez-Santiago
responsible for money Defendant owed to Colon based on
Defendant’s alleged failure to clear snow and ice in front of
its own storage unit stands outside the norm of reasonable
business practice. The costs that Martinez-Santiago incurred
36

defending against the indemnification action plausibly
constitute an ascertainable loss directly attributable to the
allegedly unlawful conduct.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the CFA claim is denied.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, this action is timely.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted
to the extent Plaintiff claims a violation of the TCCWNA based
on the initialing of provisions of the lease agreement. In all
other respects, Defendant’s motion is denied. An accompanying
Order will be entered.

August 14, 2014
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

37