RAGLAND v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/4/2014. (bdk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
KIM RAGLAND,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
COMMISSIONER GARY M. LANIGAN, et al.
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :

Civ. No. 14-0458 (RBK) (KMW)
OPINION

ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Mid State Correctional Facility in
Wrightstown, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Previously, the Court administratively terminated this case as plaintiff had not
paid the filing fee nor submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff has since
filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, the Clerk will be ordered to reopen
this case. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted based on the
information provided therein and the Clerk will be ordered to file the complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be
permitted to proceed in part.

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II.

BACKGROUND

The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this screening.
Plaintiff names four defendants in this action: (1) Commissioner Gary M. Lanigan; (2) Warden
Evelyn Davis – Superintendent at Mid State Correctional Facility; (3) Ms. Quinones – Business
Office Manager at Mid State Correctional Facility; and (4) Lydell Sherer – Business
Superintendent Northern State Prison.
Plaintiff alleges that in October, 2013, funds were withdrawn from his prison account
well beyond New Jersey statutory and Department of Corrections rules for fines and past
restitution. Plaintiff filed an institutional remedy form with the prison due to these withdrawals
that was denied. Plaintiff alleges defendants Davis and Quinones took his funds in violation of
his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, he
claims that Lanigan knew that his subordinates at the Mid State Correctional Facility would
violate plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by taking his funds beyond that which
was permitted.
Plaintiff also alleges that Sherer withdrew funds from his prison account from 2002 to
2005 in the amount of $900.00 even though he was not incarcerated in the State of New Jersey.
Plaintiff states he was serving a term in a New York prison at this time.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for these purported constitutional violations.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 132166 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),

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seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua
sponte screening for failure to state a claim 1, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of
his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.
App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v.
United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp.
Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Lydell Sherer
Plaintiff states that Lydell Sherer is the Superintendent of the business office at the
Northern State Prison. He claims that Sherer withdrew $900.00 from his account from 2002
until 2005 even though he was not incarcerated in the State of New Jersey at the time. Assuming
arguendo that such allegations give rise to a constitutional claim, the claims against this
defendant will be dismissed with prejudice as they are barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations. See
Patyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Dique v. N.J. State
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)
(“42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires courts to borrow and apply to all § 1983 claims the one most
analogous state statute of limitations.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Cito v. Bridgewater
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Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 24-25 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that in New Jersey, two-year
statute of limitations set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2 applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims);
Wilson v. City of Newark, No. 06-5219, 2008 WL 834398, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2008)
(applying New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions under N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A: 14-2 to Section 1983 claim); Scrutchins v. Div. of Youth and Family Servs., No. 050925, 2005 WL 3588481, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005) (“[A]ll claims brought in New Jersey
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . are subject to a two-year statute of limitations period.”).
The date when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues is determined by federal law. See
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Genty v. Resolution Trust. Corp., 937
F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which
its action is based.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Estate of
Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, No. 12-5441, 2013 WL 3146883, at *2 (D.N.J. June
19, 2013) “As a general matter, a cause of action accrues at the time of the last event necessary
to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 634
(citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979)).
The alleged acts by Sherer of taking money out of plaintiff’s account occurred between
2002 and 2005. Plaintiff should have known at that time then that such deductions were being
taken out of his account. However, he did not file his claims against Sherer until 2014, well after
the applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against
Sherer are deemed barred by the statute of limitations and will be dismissed with prejudice. See
Ostuni v. Wa Wa’s Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Although the
running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is

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obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court
may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure
to state a claim.”) (citing Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)); Hunterson v.
Disabato, 244 F. App’x 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A] district court may sua sponte
dismiss a claim as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) where it is apparent from the
complaint that the applicable limitations period has run.”).
B. Claims Against Gary M. Lanigan, Evelyn Davis & Ms. Quinones
Plaintiff raises two claims against defendants Lanigan, Davis and Quinones arising from
the taking of funds from his prison account in October, 2013; specifically: (1) violation of his
due process rights; and (2) violation of his equal protection rights. Both of these claims are
considered in turn.
i.

Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated by the taking of funds from his
prison account in October, 2013, which includes taking funds beyond the amount prescribed by
the applicable state statutes and regulations. Plaintiff has a protected property interest in the
funds held in his inmate account. See Hale v. Beard, 168 F. App’x 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 2002); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty.
Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2000)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has noted, “[i]n some cases, takings of property by the State require predeprivation
notice and a hearing.” See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 421 (citations and footnote omitted). However,
the Third Circuit has also noted “where the State must take quick action, or where it is
impractical to provide meaningful predeprivation process, due process will be satisfied by a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy.” Id.

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The petitioner in Hale alleged that money was withdrawn from his prison account
pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute that stated that wages, salaries and commissions of individuals
may be attached for restitution to crime victims, costs, fines or bail judgments pursuant to an
order entered by a court in a criminal proceeding. See 168 F. App’x at 533 n. 1 (citing 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8127(a)(5)). In Hale, the District Court had dismissed the action under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim after concluding that Pennsylvania provided
an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the alleged wrong. See Hale, 168 F. App’x at 533.
Ultimately, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s decision. See id. at 53435. The Third Circuit stated that it was reluctant to find without first hearing argument from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that “the existence of the of the Pennsylvania statute and the
proceedings attendant to sentencing provide sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard to
satisfy the requirements of due process[.]” Id. The Third Circuit also stated more recently in
another case arising out of Pennsylvania that dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage from similar
facts was in error. See Montanez v. Beard, 344 F. App’x 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(noting that absent the basic knowledge of current administrative procedures, the court was
limited to assess the adequacy of procedural due process under the Pennsylvania statute).
The Court recognizes that Hale and Montanez arise from the procedural due process that
was afforded Pennsylvania prisoners with respect to deductions from their prison accounts
according to Pennsylvania statutes and regulations as opposed to New Jersey statutes and
regulations. Furthermore, the Court is well aware of New Jersey’s post-deprivation remedy for
unauthorized deprivation of property by public employees through the New Jersey Tort Claims
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-1, et seq. Nevertheless, given the rulings in Hale and Montanez,
this Court will not dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim without first hearing arguments on the

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issue. Accordingly, at this early stage of this case, this Court cannot say that plaintiff has failed
to state a due process claim. Therefore, plaintiff’s due process claim shall be permitted to
proceed.
ii.

Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff also claims that his equal protection rights have been violated as defendants
failed “to treat plaintiff like similar situated prisoners.” (Dkt. No. 1 at p. 4.) “The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Thus, to state a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he is a member of a
protected class; and (b) he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates. See id.
Where the plaintiff does not claim membership in a protected class, he must allege arbitrary and
intentional discrimination in order to state an equal protection claim. See Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Specifically, he must state facts showing that: “(1) the
defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so
intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough
of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff does not allege that he was discriminated against based on his membership in a
protected class in the complaint. Therefore, his equal protection claim can only proceed if he has
sufficiently alleged facts under the “class-of-one” theory as stated in Olech and Hill.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail under the Iqbal pleading standard to state an equal protection
claim under a “class of one” theory. Plaintiff’s sole allegation in the complaint with respect to

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this claim is that he was treated differently than similarly situated prisoners. This amounts to
nothing more than a thread-bare recital of the first element of stating a “class-of-one” equal
protection claim without any further factual allegations. This is insufficient to state an equal
protection claim. See Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Perano has simply alleged that he was treated differently from ‘other similarly situated
residential and commercial developers.’ Without more specific factual allegations as to the
allegedly similar situated parties, he has not made plausible the conclusion that those parties
exist and that they are like him in all relevant aspects. Accordingly, Perano has failed to state an
Equal Protection claim.”) (internal citation omitted); Mann v. Brenner, 375 F. App’x 232, 238-39
(3d Cir. 2010) (finding that district court properly dismissed “class of one” equal protection
claim where plaintiff’s allegations that he was selectively and vindictively cited and prosecuted
by the City in an effort to force him into cooperation with York College amounted “to nothing
more than ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.”)
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1951); Myers v. Shaffer, No. 11-1107, 2012 WL 3614614, at *12-13
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012) (dismissing “class of one” equal protection claim as plaintiff’s
allegations amounted to nothing more than a thread bare recitation of the elements needed to
bring his claim).
Additionally, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he was
treated differently than those similarly situated under the Iqbal pleading standard, the complaint
is devoid of any allegation whatsoever that there was no rational basis for this difference in
treatment. Indeed, as previously stated, the sole allegation with respect to plaintiff’s equal
protection claim is that defendants violated his rights “by failing to treat plaintiff like similar
situated prisoners.” (Dkt. No. 1 at p. 4.) Thus, plaintiff also failed to allege the third prong of

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stating a “class of one” equal protection claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s equal protection claim
will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s claims against defendant Sherer will be dismissed
with prejudice. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against the remaining defendants will be
dismissed without prejudice but his due process claim will be permitted to proceed. An
appropriate order will be entered.

DATED: June 4, 2014
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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