FIELDS v. CITY OF SALEM HOUSING AUTHORITY et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff's IFP application is GRANTED. ORDERED Clerk is directed to file Plaintiff's complaint. ORDERED Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ORDERED Clerk is directed to mark his matter as CLOSED. ORDERED Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint in this action within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order which sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating that Plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/14/2014. (bdk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALBERT J. FIELDS, JR.,
Civil No. 14-778 (NLH/KMW)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

v.

CITY OF SALEM HOUSING
AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Albert J. Fields, Jr.
P.O. Box 1052
Salem, New Jersey 08079
Pro Se Plaintiff

HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter having come before the Court by way of
Plaintiff’s application [Doc. No. 1-3] to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP application”) in this action and by way of
Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. No. 1] both of which were submitted
to the Court on February 7, 2014; and
The Court recognizing that when a non-prisoner seeks
permission to file a civil complaint in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
requires the person 1 to submit an affidavit that includes a

1

Although Section 1915 refers to “prisoners,” federal courts

statement of all assets and that the person is unable to pay
such fees or give security therefor, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a);
and
The Court recognizing that the decision to grant or deny an
IFP application is based solely on the economic eligibility of
the petitioner, see Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir.
1976); and
The Court having reviewed Plaintiff’s IFP application and
affidavit of poverty submitted on February 7, 2014, and
Plaintiff having signed the affidavit in support of his IFP
application declaring under penalty of perjury that he is unable
to pay the costs of these proceedings, accordingly, based on the

apply Section 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications as well.
See, e.g., Hickson v. Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J. 2011)
(citing Lister v. Dept. of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for
IFP status, and not just to prisoners.”) (citing Martinez v.
Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n. 1 (11th Cir.
2004); Haynes v. Scott, 116 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1997); Floyd
v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275 (6th Cir.
1997)); El Ameen Bey v. Stumpf, No. 11-5684, 2011 WL 4962326, at
* 11 n.7 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2011) (Kugler, J.) (“Although Section
1915(a) refers to a ‘statement of all assets such prisoner
possesses,’ this section has been applied by courts in their
review of applications of non-prisoners as well.”) (citing
Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The
reference to prisoners in § 1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.
In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons,
not just prisoners.”)).
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information contained therein, the Court hereby grants
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis in this
case and directs the Clerk to file the complaint in this action;
and
The Court also noting that under the PLRA the Court, prior
to docketing or as soon as practicable after docketing, must
also review the complaint in a civil action in which a plaintiff
is proceeding in forma pauperis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The PLRA requires the Court to sua sponte dismiss any claim if
the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Id.;

and
The Court further noting that a “document filed pro se is
to be liberally construed, ... and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”

Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); and
In considering whether Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
a claim, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in

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the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir.

2005); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n deciding a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), [a district court is] ... required to accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences
from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to” the
plaintiff); and
The Court asking “‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence
to support the claims[.]’”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232,
236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953
(2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard
for ‘all civil actions[.]’”) (citation omitted); and
The Court noting that under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a
district court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.”

Fowler

v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949); and
The Court further noting that a district court “must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

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sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for
relief.’”
1950).

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

“[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief.”

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211; and

Plaintiff alleging that the Defendant City of Salem Housing
Authority “deprived the plaintiff of his public housing unit in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.10, the Tenant Reprisal Act” as a
result of Plaintiff’s “efforts to secure or enforce [his] rights
under the lease or contract, or under the laws of the State of
New Jersey or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United
States, specifically the National Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1437, 42 U.S.C. [§]1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1986[,]” (Pl.’s Compl.
[Doc. No. 1] ¶ 6); and
Plaintiff further alleging that “Defendant, Elizabeth Loyle
conspired with Defendant, Francine Dickerson and deprived the
plaintiff of the opportunity for a hearing under the Public
Housing grievance procedure prior to eviction as provided by 24
C.F.R. § 966.4(1)(3)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. [§]
1985[,]” (Id. ¶ 7); and
The Court noting that Plaintiff now seeks compensatory
damages in the amount of $7,000,000.00, plus punitive and
exemplary damages, and all other relief provided for under 42

5

U.S.C. § 1983, (Id. ¶¶ 10-12); and
The Court finding that, even construed liberally,
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate that Plaintiff can maintain a plausible claim for
relief.

Rather, Plaintiff’s pleading simply alleges - in a

conclusory fashion - that Plaintiff is entitled to relief based
Defendants’ purported conduct.

For example, Plaintiff fails to

allege the location of his public housing unit, what specific
rights he attempted to enforce under his lease that lead to
Defendants’ alleged reprisal against him, and the specific ways
in which Defendants treated Plaintiff which he contends
constitute reprisal; and
The Court noting that the Twombly/Iqbal standard requires
Plaintiff to do more than simply allege his entitlement to
relief in this conclusory manner.
Accordingly,
IT IS on this

14th

day of

April

, 2014, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Doc. No. 1-3]
shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to file Plaintiff’s
complaint [Doc. No. 1] in this action; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint shall be, and hereby is,

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DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to mark his matter as
CLOSED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended
complaint in this action within thirty (30) days of the date of
this Memorandum Opinion and Order which sets forth sufficient
facts demonstrating that Plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief.

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

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