LINBLAD v. HARLEYSVILLE INSURANCE COMPANY
Filing
30
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/4/2014. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
EMMA LINBLAD,
Civ. No. 14-908 (NLH/KMW)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Audwin F. Levasseur, Esquire
The Law Offices of Harbatkin &
Levasseur, P.A.
616 E. Palisade Ave
Suite 102
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07024
Counsel for Plaintiff
Catherine S. Straggas, Esquire
Margolis Edelstein
The Curtis Center
Suite 400E
170 S. Independence Mall West
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Counsel for Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge:
On February 12, 2014, Plaintiff Emma Linblad filed a twocount complaint alleging breach of contract, one pursuant to New
Jersey state law and one pursuant to the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (hereafter, “NFIA”), against
1
Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. 1
Presently before
the Court is Defendant’s motion [Doc. No. 7] seeking to dismiss
both claims as barred by the statute of limitations.
Alternatively, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s prayer
for consequential damages and attorney’s fees.
file a response to the motion.
Plaintiff did not
The Court has considered
Defendant’s submission and decides this matter pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4072, as well
as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the controversy arises under the
laws of the United States, including the NFIA.
Van Holt v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 163 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding that “42 U.S.C. § 4072 vests district courts with
original exclusive jurisdiction over suits by claimants against
[Write Your Own insurance] companies based on partial or total
disallowance of claims for insurance arising out of the National
1
Although Plaintiff named Harleysville Insurance Company as the
defendant in this matter, the parties subsequently submitted a
stipulation substituting Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company as
the defendant. This stipulation was signed by Magistrate Judge
Williams on July 9, 2014.
2
Flood Insurance Act.”).
II.
BACKGROUND
This suit concerns the adjustment of an insurance claim
under a policy placed through the National Flood Insurance
Program (“NFIP”).
(Compl. ¶ 5.)
As the Third Circuit has
explained, the NFIP is “a federally supervised and guaranteed
insurance program presently administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (‘FEMA’) pursuant to the NFIA and
its corresponding regulations.”
Van Holt, 163 F.3d at 165
(citing 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1–77.2).
The NFIP essentially
“guarantees and subsidizes flood insurance.”
Brusco v.
Harleysville Ins. Co., No. 14-914, 2014 WL 2916716, at *1
(D.N.J. June 26, 2014).
“In 1983, pursuant to regulatory authority granted by
Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 4081(a), FEMA created the ‘Write Your
Own’ (‘WYO’) program.”
C.F.R. §§ 62.23–.24).
Van Holt, 163 F.3d at 165 (citing 44
The WYO program authorizes “private
insurance companies like [Defendant] [to] write their own
insurance policies.”
Id. (citing 44 C.F.R. § 62.23).
Through
the WYO program, Defendant and other private insurance companies
“administer[] standard form policies, pay[] any excess from
premiums to the federal government, and act[] as ‘fiscal agents’
3
of the United States.” 2
Brusco, 2014 WL 2916716, at *1 (citing
44 C.F.R. § 62 app. A (2013)).
“[R]egardless [of] whether FEMA
or a WYO company issues a flood insurance policy, the United
States treasury funds pay off the insureds’ claims.”
Van Holt,
163 F.3d at 165 (citations omitted).
According to the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff
purchased a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (“SFIP”), policy
number 99050775302012, for her residential property located at 9
North Sacramento Avenue, Ventnor, New Jersey.
(Compl. ¶ 5.)
Defendant issued the policy in accordance with the NFIP.
(Id.)
Plaintiff avers that she paid “all related premiums in a timely
fashion.”
(Id. ¶ 6.)
On October 29, 2012, within the policy
period, Superstorm Sandy struck Ventnor, New Jersey, purportedly
causing catastrophic damage to the covered property.
6.)
(Id. ¶¶ 5,
Plaintiff made a claim for damage to the insured property,
but Defendant allegedly “improperly adjusted and otherwise
mishandled Plaintiff’s claim” insofar as Plaintiff has not
received proper payment for the extensive damages caused by
Superstorm Sandy.
(Id. ¶¶ 7, 11.)
2
Under the WYO Program, a WYO company must issue coverage under
a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (“SFIP”). 44 C.F.R. §
62.23(c). The SFIP is set forth at Appendix A to 44 C.F.R. Pt.
61. “All subsidized flood insurance must be sold as a standard,
unaltered policy, and the terms of the policy are governed by
the NFIA and its corresponding regulations.” Brusco, 2014 WL
2916716, at *1.
4
On February 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant civil
action for breach of contract under New Jersey law and the NFIA.
(Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16.) 3
As noted previously, Defendant seeks
dismissal on two grounds.
First, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Alternatively, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s demand for
consequential damages and attorney’s fees are preempted by the
NFIA and the NFIP.
III. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In considering whether Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
a claim, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir.
2005); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n deciding a motion under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), [a district court is] . . . required to accept as
true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable
3
On the same date, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a nearly identical
action in this District on behalf of a different plaintiff. See
Brusco v. Harleysville Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 14-914
(JEI/JS). Defendant, who is also the defendant in Brusco,
sought dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims in Brusco on the same
grounds raised in the motion presently before this Court. The
District Court in Brusco granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss
on June 26, 2014.
5
to” the plaintiff).
A pleading is sufficient if it contains “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims[.]’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90
(1974)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions[.]’”)
(citation omitted).
First, under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a
district court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.”
Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
Second, a district
court “must then determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
‘plausible claim for relief.’”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
“[A] complaint must
do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211; see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234
(“The Supreme Court’s Twombly formulation of the pleading
6
standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating . . . a claim requires
a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest’ the required element.
This ‘does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead
‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.”)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
“The
defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
presented.”
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.
2005).
Finally, a court in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must
consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, the documents
attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of public record.
Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d
Cir. 2013).
A court may also consider “‘undisputedly authentic
documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these
documents[.]’”
Id. (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
230 (3d Cir. 2010)).
If any other matters outside the pleadings
are presented to the court, and the court does not exclude those
matters, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary
judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56.
7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
IV.
ANALYSIS
Defendant seeks to dismiss both the breach of contract
claim under New Jersey law and the breach of contract claim
under the NFIA.
A.
The Court addresses each claim in turn.
State-Law Breach of Contract Claim
To foster the uniform handling of civil cases arising out
of Hurricane Sandy, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey adopted Hurricane Sandy Case Management
Order No. 1.
This Case Management Order governs all Hurricane
Sandy cases involving SFIPs sold and administered by
participating WYO insurance companies in accordance with the
NFIP.
(Standing Order No. 14-2.)
The Case Management Order
expressly provides that all state-law claims are to be dismissed
from any WYO action or direct suit, citing C.E.R. 1988, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 386 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2004).
In C.E.R. 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether the NFIA preempts
state-law claims related to an insurance contract, an issue that
the Third Circuit had left open when it decided Van Holt. 4
Id.
Although C.E.R. 1988 was decided in reference to a state-law
tort claim, the Third Circuit held simply that “state-law claims
4
In Van Holt, the Third Circuit found that the state-law tort
claims in that case lacked merit, and the Court therefore
declined to decide whether the NFIA preempted the state-law
claims. Van Holt, 163 F.3d at 168 n.6.
8
are preempted by the NFIA.”
Id.
“Subsequent disputes
concerning the handling of SFIPs have determined that Van Holt
and C.E.R. essentially conclude that ‘all causes of action
involving the adjustment of a claim [under the NFIP] are
preempted by federal law.’”
Brusco, 2014 WL 2916716, at *3 n.5
(quoting Uddoh v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 13-cv-2719
(SRC), 2014 WL 183815, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2014)).
In this dispute, Plaintiff brings a breach of contract
claim concerning the handling of an SFIP under New Jersey law.
Pursuant to the holding of C.E.R. 1988, the Court finds here
that Plaintiff’s state-law claim is preempted by the NFIA and is
therefore subject to dismissal.
See also Hurricane Sandy Case
Management Order No. 1 (“The following claims are hereby
dismissed from any WYO action . . . state law claims[.]”);
Brusco, 2014 WL 2916716, at *3-4 (court conducted thorough
preemption analysis of state-law contract claim, which was
virtually identical to claim in this case, and concluded that
such claim was preempted under NFIA).
B.
Claim under the NFIA
1.
Statute of Limitations
Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal
breach of contract claim as time-barred.
Defendant argues that
the applicable statute of limitations is one year, as set forth
in 42 U.S.C. § 4072, and that Plaintiff missed the filing
9
deadline by twenty-six days.
In support of its argument,
Defendant relies upon a letter dated January 17, 2013, by which
Defendant denied in part Plaintiff’s claim.
Defendant notes
that Plaintiff did not file suit until February 14, 2014.
42 U.S.C. § 4072 provides in relevant part as follows:
[U]pon the disallowance by the Administrator
of any such claim, or upon the refusal of
the claimant to accept the amount allowed
upon any such claim, the claimant, within
one year after the date of mailing of notice
of disallowance or partial disallowance by
the Administrator, may institute an action
against the Administrator on such claim in
the United States district court for the
district in which the insured property or
the major part thereof shall have been
situated . . . [.]
42 U.S.C. § 4072 (emphasis supplied).
The time frame for filing
suit under the statute is similar to, but not identical to, the
time for filing suit pursuant to the SFIP.
Specifically, the
policy provides:
If you do sue, you must start the suit
within one year after the date of the
written denial of all or part of the claim .
. . [.]
44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A(1), Section VII(R).
Thus, the time for
filing suit pursuant to the SFIP is calculated by the date of
the denial letter, and pursuant to the statute by the date the
denial letter is mailed. 5
5
Notwithstanding the discrepancy between the statute and the
policy itself, which is codified in the Code of Federal
10
Defendant argues that the statute of limitations begins to
run as of the date it issued the letter denying part of
Plaintiff’s claim for reimbursement.
However, several courts
have held that an insurer’s denial of a claim based upon an
adjuster’s report is not sufficient to trigger the one-year
statute of limitations.
Rather, the one-year filing period
begins to run when the insurer denies a claim that is based upon
the insured’s sworn proof of loss.
The Eastern District of Louisiana squarely faced this issue
in Qader v. FEMA, 543 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. La. 2008), in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina.
In Qader, the plaintiff’s properties
were insured under SFIPs issued under the NFIP, purchased
directly from FEMA, and were flooded during Hurricane Katrina in
2005.
Id. at 559.
FEMA attempted to have the suit dismissed on
the ground that the plaintiff did not timely file suit.
560.
Id. at
FEMA argued that a June 23, 2006 letter denying the
plaintiff’s request for additional payment started the clock to
file suit.
Id.
The District Court disagreed with FEMA’s
position, noting that the Federal Insurance Administration (a
component of FEMA) partially waived the proof of loss
Regulations, the Court need not resolve which date controls
because Defendant fails, as discussed below, to establish that
the January 17, 2013 letter triggered Plaintiff’s obligation to
timely file suit. As such, the Court need not calculate the
date by which Plaintiff must have initiated litigation based
upon the January 17, 2003 letter.
11
requirement to expedite the processing and payment of flood
claims arising out of Hurricane Katrina.
Id. at 561.
Under the
modified procedure, NFIP insurers could inspect, adjust and make
payments on flood claims before they even received a sworn proof
of loss.
Id.
As such, NFIP insurers could disallow or
partially disallow flood claims before receiving a proof of
loss.
Id. at 562.
In such cases, the one-year statute of
limitations would not begin to run until FEMA denied a claim
that was accompanied by a proof of loss, unless proof of loss
was waived.
Id.
The court found that allowing the statute of
limitations to run before a plaintiff even submitted a proof of
loss would render the proof of loss extension meaningless.
Id.
The rationale of Qadar was recently adopted in this
District in Kroll v. Johnson, No. Civ. A. 14-2496, 2014 WL
4626009, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2014).
In Kroll, the court
addressed when the statute of limitations began to run for the
plaintiffs’ claims for flood damage arising from Hurricane
Sandy.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
statute of limitations began to run when FEMA first mailed a
letter to the plaintiffs denying part of their claim for
reimbursement.
Kroll, 2014 WL 4626009, at *3-4.
Instead, the
court found “most persuasive” the reasoning in Qader.
*4.
Id. at
The court noted that following Hurricane Sandy FEMA
extended the deadline to file a proof of loss to two years, and
12
pointed out that adopting the defendant’s reading of Section
4072 would “render the proof-of-loss extension meaningless.”
Id.
Several other courts have similarly concluded that the
statute of limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 4072 does not begin to
run until the insurer denies a claim based upon a sworn proof of
loss.
See, e.g., M & K Rest. v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 4:12-cv-
00783 KGB, 2014 WL 3347865, at *10 (E.D. Ark. July 8,
2014)(“[S]ince the September 9, 2011, denial letter was not
based upon a proof of loss, it does not trigger 42 U.S.C. §
4072.”); Altman v. Napolitano, Nos. G-10-3004, G-10-cv-487, 2013
WL 788452, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2013) (“The one-year filing
period begins to run when FEMA denies a claim that is based upon
the insured’s sworn proof of loss, not from the date FEMA denies
a claim based upon an adjuster’s report.
Until the insured
submits a sworn proof of loss, FEMA has no ‘statement of the
amount (the insured) is claiming under the policy.’”); Willis v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Civ. A. No. 07-4862, 2008 WL 793514,
at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2008) (“[B]ecause the August 9, 2006
letter was not generated as a result of a claim accompanied by a
signed Proof of Loss, it failed to serve as the statutory notice
of denial described in section [4072] and as a result, failed to
trigger the one year time limitation.”); but see, In re
Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14 MC 41, 2014 WL 1379612, at *3
13
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (“[C]onflicting guidance exists as to
the proper application of the one-year statute of limitations
for filing an action vis-à-vis the proof of loss requirement,
particularly following the time extension and expedited
procedures afforded to victims of Hurricane Katrina and
Sandy.”); Brusco, 2014 WL 2916716, at *6 (finding the insurer’s
letter denying the plaintiff’s claim, based on adjuster’s
report, sufficient to trigger Section 4072’s one-year statute of
limitations).
Here, the Court is unable to conclude, based on the record
at this time, that the January 17, 2013 letter sent by Defendant
to Plaintiff is sufficient to trigger the statute of
limitations.
Although the proof of loss must ordinarily be
filed within 60 days of a loss event, 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App.
A(1), Section VII(J)(4), FEMA extended the time to file a proof
of loss for flood claims arising out of Hurricane Sandy to two
years.
See FEMA Bulletins W–12092a, W–13060a, W–14017.
Plaintiff therefore had until October 29, 2014 to file a proof
of loss under the SFIP.
The Court notes Plaintiff’s averment in
the complaint that “[a]ll conditions precedent to recovery by
Plaintiff have been met or have occurred,” and that the filing
of a proof of loss is a condition precedent to the filing of a
civil action.
44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A(1), Section VII(J)(4).
However, it is not apparent from the record that Defendant’s
14
January 17, 2013 denial was based on a claim that included
Plaintiff’s sworn proof of loss.
Given that the statute of
limitations begins to run as of the date Defendant denied
Plaintiff’s claim that is based upon her sworn proof of loss,
not from the date Defendant denied a claim based upon an
adjuster’s report, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff
filed this civil action after the statute of limitations
expired.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract
claim under the NFIA is denied, without prejudice to Defendant’s
right to address this issue at a later time.
2.
Available Remedies under the NFIA
Plaintiff’s complaint seeks, inter alia, actual damages,
consequential damages, and attorney’s fees.
Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s prayers for “extra-contractual” damages,
specifically, the request for consequential damages and
attorney’s fees, are subject to dismissal.
As set forth above, Plaintiff may only pursue a claim
through a breach of contract action based on the SFIP itself
under federal law.
Courts have uniformly held that in breach of
contract actions where the contract had been issued pursuant to
the NFIA, prevailing plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
attorneys’ fees because federal law does not provide for such a
remedy.
See, e.g., Jefferson Beach House Condo. Ass’n v.
Harleysville Ins. Co. of New Jersey, Civil No. 13-6480, 2014 WL
15
4681074, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2014)(granting motion to
dismiss to extent plaintiff sought attorney’s fees and costs);
Ryan v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. A. 13-6823, 2014 WL
2872089, at *2-3 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014) (granting insurance
company’s motion to dismiss insofar as complaint sought counsel
fees in connection with plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
under SFIP); Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp.
2d 513, 523 (D.N.J. 2000) (“Plaintiffs may still pursue that
claim through their breach of contract action based on the SFIP
itself.
However, plaintiffs are not entitled to receive
compensatory, punitive, or consequential damages, or attorney's
fees, for alleged bad faith during the National Flood Insurance
Program claims handling process, because federal law does not
provide for those remedies in this type of case.”); 3608 Sounds
Ave. Condo Ass’n v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 499,
502 (D.N.J. 1999) (“It is also well established that plaintiffs
who assert flood insurance claims cannot recover penalties and
attorney’s fees because federal law preempts such state law
claims.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney’s fees
in connection with her claim under the NFIA will be dismissed.
With respect to Plaintiff’s prayer for consequential
damages, the Court notes that the SFIP provides that coverage is
limited to “direct physical loss by or from flood . . . [.]”
See 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A(1), Sections I, V(A).
16
To the
extent Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for any direct physical
loss by or from the flood, Plaintiff may potentially recover
such sums in her breach of contract claim under the SFIP.
Plaintiff, however, is not entitled to recover sums for any and
all loss resulting from a flood, as the policy specifically
excludes from recovery certain enumerated damages.
Id. at Art.
V(A)(1)-(7).
Consequential damages are “indirect in nature, arising from
related harms and expenses.”
Ryan, 2014 WL 2872089, at *3.
In
Ryan, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for
consequential damages in connection with a breach of contract
claim under the SFIP, finding that such damages are indirect and
therefore are not an available remedy under the SFIP.
Id.
Several other courts have likewise held that consequential
damages are not recoverable under the SFIP.
See, e.g., Atlas
Pallet, Inc. v. Gallagher, 725 F.2d 131, 139 (1st Cir. 1984)
(“We believe that the type of loss insured under the SFIP does
not include the kind of economic loss claimed by appellant under
the rubric of ‘consequential damages.’
Instead, we conclude
that the SFIP only covers physical damage to the insured
building.”); Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No. C085760BHS, 2010 WL 3220620, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2010) (“The
flood policy does not allow for consequential damages -- it must
be directly by or from flood.”), aff’d, 653 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
17
2011); Perdido Sun Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 3:06cv318/MCR, 2007 WL 2565990, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
30, 2007)(finding demand for consequential damages improper
because SFIP provides that coverage extends only to direct loss
and does not include economic loss).
Given the above authority, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff cannot recover economic damages caused by or from a
flood, as these are not a direct physical loss.
Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s prayer for consequential damages
will be granted.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
will be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendant’s motion
is granted insofar as Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s
state-law claim for breach of contract and Plaintiff’s prayer
for consequential damages and attorney’s fees in connection with
her claim under the NFIA.
Defendant’s motion is denied insofar
as Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the NFIA
as time-barred, without prejudice to Defendant’s right to
address this issue at a later time.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Date: December 4, 2014
At Camden, New Jersey
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