OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. v. TORRENT PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED et al
Filing
152
MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING OTSUKA's MOTIONS TO STRIKE. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 9/25/2015. (drw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TORRENT PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED,
INC., TORRENT PHARMA INC., and HETERO
LABS LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALEMBIC PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED,
ALEMBIC LIMITED, ALEMBIC GLOBAL
HOLDING SA, and ALEMBIC
PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZYDUS PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. and
CADILA HEALTHCARE LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AUROBINDO PHARMA LIMITED, AUROBINDO
PHARMA USA, INC., and AUROLIFE PHARMA
LLC,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTAS PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED, ACCORD
HEALTHCARE, INC., and HETERO LABS
LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.,
SUN PHARMA GLOBAL INC., SUN PHARMA
GLOBAL FZE, SUN PHARMA USA, SUN
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES, INC., and
CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES,
Defendants.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action Nos.
14-1078 (JBS/KMW)
14-2982 (JBS/KMW)
14-3168 (JBS/KMW)
14-3306 (JBS/KMW)
14-3996 (JBS/KMW)
14-4307 (JBS/KMW)
14-4508 (JBS/KMW)
14-4671 (JBS/KMW)
14-5537 (JBS/KMW)
14-5876 (JBS/KMW)
14-5878 (JBS/KMW)
14-6158 (JBS/KMW)
14-6397 (JBS/KMW)
14-6398 (JBS/KMW)
14-6890 (JBS/KMW)
14-7105 (JBS/KMW)
14-7106 (JBS/KMW)
14-7252 (JBS/KMW)
14-7405 (JBS/KMW)
14-8074 (JBS/KMW)
14-8077 (JBS/KMW)
15-1585 (JBS/KMW)
15-1716 (JBS/KMW)
15-161 (JBS/KMW)
MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING
OTSUKA’s MOTIONS TO STRIKE
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MYLAN, INC., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS
INC., and MYLAN LABORATORIES
LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TORRENT PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED,
INC., TORRENT PHARMA INC., and HETERO
LABS LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZHEJIANG HUAHAI PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD., HUAHAI US INC., PRINSTON
PHARMACEUTICAL INC., and SOLCO
HEALTHCARE U.S., LLC,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AJANTA PHARMA LIMITED and AJANTA
PHARMA USA INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
Defendant.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTAS PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED, ACCORD
HEALTHCARE, INC., and HETERO LABS
LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.,
SUN PHARMA GLOBAL INC., SUN PHARMA
GLOBAL FZE, SUN PHARMA USA, SUN
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES, INC., and
CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES,
Defendants.
[Caption Continues]
2
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
Defendant.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AUROBINDO PHARMA LIMITED, AUROBINDO
PHARMA USA, INC., and AUROLIFE PHARMA
LLC,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
LUPIN LIMITED, LUPIN ATLANTIS HOLDING
SA, LUPIN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and
HETERO LABS LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ACTAVIS ELIZABETH LLC, ACTAVIS, INC.,
ACTAVIS PLC, JUBILANT LIFE SCIENCES
LIMITED, JUBILANT GENERICS LIMITED,
and JUBILANT LIFE SCIENCES (USA)
INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZYDUS PHARMACEUTICALS USA and CADILA
HEALTHCARE LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALEMBIC PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED,
ALEMBIC LIMITED, ALEMBIC GLOBAL
HOLDING SA, and ALEMBIC
PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
APOTEX CORP., APOTEX INC., APOTEX
PHARMACHEM INC., and HETERO LABS
LIMITED,
Defendants.
[Caption Continues]
3
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCIEGEN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. and
BACTOLAC PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, AMNEAL
PHARMACEUTICALS INDIA PVT. LTD., MSN
PHARMACHEM PVT. LTD., and MSN
LABORATORIES PVT. LTD.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SANDOZ INC., SANDOZ PRIVATE LTD., and
SANDOZ INTERNATIONAL GMBH,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
HETERO DRUGS LIMITED, HETERO LABS
LIMITED, and HETERO USA, INC.,
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
These related patent infringement actions under the HatchWaxman Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281, generally concern Plaintiff
Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co, Ltd.’s (hereinafter, “Otsuka”)
position that various generic Defendants’ submissions of
abbreviated new drug applications (hereinafter, “ANDAs”)
infringe one or more claims of the various patents covering
Otsuka’s brand name aripiprazole product, Abilify®. 1
1
The patents asserted in these related actions specifically
include: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,006,528 (“the ’528 patent”),
7,053,092 (“the ’092 patent”), 8,017,615 (“the ’615 patent”),
8,580,796 (“the ’796 patent”), 8,642,600 (“the ’600 patent”),
8,642,760 (“the ’760 patent”), and 8,759,350 (“the ’350 patent,”
and collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).
4
On the eve of the Court’s October 19, 2015 Markman hearing,
Otsuka now moves to strike “new opinions” from the responsive
Markman declarations of five separate defense experts: Graham
Buckton, Ph.D (hereinafter, “Dr. Buckton”); 2 (2) Robin D. Rogers,
Ph.D (hereinafter, “Dr. Rogers”); (3) Anthony Palmieri III,
Ph.D, R.Ph (hereinafter, “Dr. Palmieri”); (4) Robert J. Orr,
Ph.D (hereinafter, “Dr. Orr”); and (5) Ira S. Halper, M.D.
(hereinafter, “Dr. Halper”). 3
19.)
(See generally Otsuka’s Br. at 6-
Otsuka argues, in particular, that certain portions of
these expert declarations proffer far more than the responsive
opinions permitted under the Local Patent Rules, specifically L.
Pat. R. 4.5(c), and instead venture into new areas that could
have, and should have, been disclosed and explored in time for
Otsuka to challenge the assertions through Markman expert
discovery.
(See generally id.)
The generic Defendants,
however, take the position that their experts’ supplemental
opinions are directly responsive to opinions advanced by
Otsuka’s own experts during their depositions, and therefore
2
The Court will address the issue of counsel for Apotex Corp.’s
and Apotex Inc.’s instruction not to answer during Dr. Buckton’s
deposition by separate Order. [See Docket Item 177 in Civil
Action No. 14-8074.]
3 Otsuka requests, in the alternative, that it be permitted to
“reopen the depositions” of Dr. Buckton and Dr. Orr in relation
to their “new opinions,” followed by an opportunity to file a
“short supplement” to its responsive Markman briefing.
(Otsuka’s Br. at 2, 19-20.)
5
fall well within the bounds of permissible responsive
declarations.
(See generally Defs.’ Opp’n. at 3-28.)
Local Patent Rule 4.5(c) provides that, “[n]ot later than
60 days after the filing of the Opening Markman Submissions, the
parties shall contemporaneously file and serve responding
Markman briefs and any evidence supporting claim construction,
including any responding experts’ certifications or
declarations.”
The pending motion calls upon the Court to apply
Local Patent Rule 4.5(c) with regard to the latitude given to
responding experts’ declarations.
For the reasons that follow, Otsuka’s motion to strike will
be granted in part to the extent it seeks to convene a limited,
additional deposition of Dr. Buckton, and also to strike the new
opinion of Dr. Halper regarding the ordinary artisan, but denied
to the extent it seeks any additional relief. 4
The Court finds
as follows:
1.
Otsuka filed the first infringement action in this
large series of actions on February 18, 2014, see Otsuka Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Torrent Pharm., Inc., Civil Action No. 14-1078
(JBS/KMW), followed shortly thereafter by a cascade of twentysix related actions. 5
In the aftermath of Otsuka’s preliminary
4
The Court heard oral argument upon Otsuka’s motion on September
24, 2015.
5
The related actions specifically include: Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Alembic Global Holding SA, Civil Action No. 14-2982 (JBS/KMW) (filed
6
injunction motion practice, see Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Torrent Pharm. Ltd., Inc., ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 1782653
(D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2015), and the parties’ lengthy discovery
period (marked by a plethora of discovery disputes), the parties
May 9, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil
Action No. 14-3168 (JBS/KMW) (filed May 16, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co.,
Ltd. v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-3306 (JBS/KMW)
(filed May 23, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Intas Pharm. Ltd.,
Civil Action No. 14-3996 (JBS/KMW) (filed June 20, 2014); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action No. 14-3168
(JBS/KMW) (filed May 16, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sun Pharm.
Indus., Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-4307 (JBS/KMW) (filed July 7, 2014);
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc., Civil Action No. 14-4508
(JBS/KMW) (filed July 11, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Torrent
Pharm., Inc., Civil Action No. 14-4671 (JBS/KMW) (filed July 25,
2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zhejiang Huahai Pharm. Co., Civil
Action No. 14-5537 (JBS/KMW) (filed September 4, 2014); Otsuka Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Ajanta Pharm. Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-5876 (JBS/KMW)
(filed September 19, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-5878 (JBS/KMW) (filed September 19,
2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Intas Pharm. Ltd., Civil Action No.
14-6158 (JBS/KMW) (filed October 2, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-6397 (JBS/KMW) (filed
October 6, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
Civil Action No. 14-6398 (JBS/KMW) (filed September 19, 2014) (filed
October 10, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.,
Civil Action No. 14-6890 (JBS/KMW) (filed October 31, 2014); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-7105 (JBS/KMW)
(filed November 3, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Actavis Elizabeth
LLC, Civil Action No. 14-7106 (JBS/KMW) (filed November 10, 2014);
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action No. 147252 (JBS/KMW) (filed November 20, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Alembic Pharm., Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-7405 (JBS/KMW) (filed
November 26, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Apotex Corp., Civil
Action No. 14-8074 (JBS/KMW) (filed December 24, 2015); Otsuka Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Hetero Drugs, Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-161 (JBS/KMW)
(filed January 8, 2015); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Amneal Pharm. Co,
Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-1585 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 2, 2015); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz Inc., Civil Action No. 15-1716 (JBS/KMW)
(filed March 9, 2015); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Indoco Remedies
Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-1967 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 17, 2015; stayed
and administratively terminated on September 15, 2015); Otsuka Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Macleods Pharms. Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-5109 (JBS/KMW)
(filed July 2, 2015); and Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Standard Chem. &
Pharm. Co., Civil Action No. 15-6353 (JBS/KMW) (filed August 21,
2015).
7
filed their voluminous opening Markman submissions on June 25,
2015.
[See, e.g., Docket Items 85, 86, & 87 in Civil Action No.
15-1716.]
The record amassed by the parties in connection with
these opening claims construction submissions, and concerning
only five disputed claim terms/phrases, 6 spans over 1,600 pages,
and includes lengthy declarations from seven experts.
Otsuka
specifically produced declarations of Stephen R. Byrn, Ph.D
(hereinafter, “Dr. Byrn”) and Christoph U. Correll, M.D.
(hereinafter, “Dr. Correll”), while the generic Defendants 7
proffered declarations from Dr. Buckton, Dr. Rogers, Dr.
Palmieri, Dr. Orr, and Dr. Halper.
2.
Following an extended period of Markman-specific
expert discovery [see Docket Items 71 & 80 in Civil Action No.
15-1716], the parties filed their responsive Markman submissions
on August 14, 2015.
No. 15-1716.]
[See Docket Items 99 & 100 in Civil Action
In connection with these submissions, the parties
6
The disputed claim phrases specifically consist of
(1) “Anhydrous Aripiprazole Crystals B,” (2) “mean particle
size,” (3) “wherein said low hygroscopicity is defined as a
moisture content of [0.40%/0.10%] or less after placing said
substance/Crystals for 24 hours in a desiccator maintained
at a temperature of 60° C and a humidity level of
100%,” (4) “aripiprazole drug substance,” and (5) “a/the
pharmaceutical composition” / “in combination with.” (See,
e.g., Otsuka’s Opening Claim Constr. Br.)
7 Actavis staked out and briefed claims construction positions
separate from the remaining generic Defendants. (See generally
Actavis’ Opening Claim Constr. Br.) Nevertheless, Actavis does
not proffer an expert opinion in support of their proposed
construction, and so its distinct position has no impact on the
pending motion.
8
again compiled an impressive (and even larger) record, in excess
of 1,700 pages.
[See, e.g., Docket Items 99, 100, & 107 in
Civil Action No. 15-1716.]
The generic Defendants additionally
produced supplemental declarations from Dr. Buckton, Dr. Rogers,
Dr. Palmieri, Dr. Orr, and Dr. Halper—each of which purports to
respond to the declarations and/or deposition opinions of
Otsuka’s experts.
[See generally Docket Items 99 & 100 in Civil
Action No. 15-1716.]
3.
On August 24, 2015, the Court convened a pre-Markman
logistics conference, at which time the parties presented their
positions on the propriety of the supplemental declarations, and
the Court entered a Scheduling Order on Otsuka’s anticipated
motions to strike.
[See Docket Item 119.]
The pending motions
followed.
4.
Given that the pending motion turns, in its entirety,
upon an interpretation of the Local Patent Rules, the Court
explains at the outset the overall structure of the Local Patent
Rules, the comprehensive body of rules that, together with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, govern patent litigation
within this District.
See L. PAT. R. 1.1, et seq.
The District
promulgated these Rules for the twin purposes of ensuring robust
disclosure of all information necessary to litigate complex
infringement actions, TFH Publ’ns, Inc. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365 (D.N.J. 2010) (citation omitted),
9
and requiring “‘parties to [fully] crystallize their theories of
the case early in [the] litigation.’”
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.
v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 12-3289, 2014 WL 997532, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan.
6, 2014) (citation omitted).
In other words, the Local Patent
Rules “‘ensure litigants put all their cards on the table up
front,’” Voxpath RS, LLC v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. 12-952,
2012 WL 5818143, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2012) (citation
omitted), and generally require early disclosure of Markmanrelated expert testimony.
See generally Mycone Dental Supply
Co, Inc. v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., No. 11-4380, 2014 WL
3362364, at *3-*5 (D.N.J. July 9, 2014); Warner Chilcott Labs.
Ir. Ltd. v. Impax Labs., Inc., Nos. 08–6304, 09–0228, 09–0468,
09–1233, 09–2073, 2010 WL 339034, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2010).
A purpose of the Local Patent Rules is to assure that the case
is well-prepared for a claim construction hearing at the
earliest practicable date, usually within twelve months of the
filing of the complaint, following a rigorous period of
mandatory disclosures regarding the claims, contentions,
defenses, and supporting documents, see L. Pat. R. 3.1-3.8.
For
Hatch-Waxman cases, such as the present ones, patent litigation
disclosures are governed by L. Pat. R. 3.6.
5.
Part Four of the Local Patent Rules, beginning with L.
Pat. R. 4.1, in turn, governs the claim construction phase of
patent litigation, with an eye towards allowing for “maximum
10
consideration” of all evidence necessary for the judge “to make
an educated and informed decision” on the proper construction. 8
Janssen Prod., L.P. v. Lupin Ltd., No. 10-5954, 2013 WL 3772655,
*3 (D.N.J. Jul. 16, 2013) (citing APP Pharm., LLC v. AmeriDose
LLC, No. 10-4109, 2011 WL 6325975, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2011)).
To that end, the Rule advances a carefully timed and methodical
process of identifying and exchanging proposed constructions
(together with the intrinsic and extrinsic support for these
constructions), and then filing opening and responsive Markman
submissions.
6.
See L. PAT. R. 4.1-4.5.
In relation to Markman submissions, Local Patent Rule
4.5 places the briefing on a continuum that involves three
iterative steps.
See L. PAT. R. 4.5(a)-(c).
First, the parties
“contemporaneously file and serve their opening Markman briefs
and any evidence supporting claim construction, including any
experts’ certifications or declarations.”
L. PAT. R. 4.5(a).
Thereafter, the parties engage in a 30-day discovery period
relative to “an[y] expert witness who submitted a certification
or declaration” pursuant to Local Patent Rule 4.5(a).
4.5(b).
L. PAT. R.
Finally, the parties “contemporaneously file and serve
responding Markman briefs and any evidence supporting claim
8
In that respect, the Local Rule augments the expert discovery
floor provided by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) and
(e).
11
construction, including any responding experts’ certifications
or declarations.” 9
7.
L. PAT. R. 4.5(c) (emphases added).
As evident from their responsive designation, these
declarations must, in turn, critique and/or rebut the opposing
party’s expert, by identifying, among other things, the expert’s
“scientific disagreement” with the proffered construction.
Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 11-3781, 2013 WL 1932927, *9
(D.N.J. May 7, 2013) (emphasis added); Haskins v. First Am.
Title Ins. Co., No. 10-5044, 2013 WL 5410531, at *2 (D.N.J.
Sept. 26, 2013) (same); see also Janssen, 2013 WL 3772655, at *4
(same).
In other words, a responsive expert declaration must be
specifically addressed to the opinions expressed by the
adversary’s expert, and cannot simply be used as a vehicle to
propose a competing construction of a disputed claim term, see
Shire LLC, 2013 WL 1932927, at *9, nor as the means of first
disclosing an opinion that the proffering party could have, and
should have, timely exchanged in accordance with L. Pat. R.
9
Given the comprehensive scheme embodied by the Local Patent
Rules, the Court declines to analyze the pending motion under
either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a rule directed at
salacious and/or irrelevant materials in pleadings, or Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c), a rule describing the applicable
sanctions where a party fails to disclose certain information or
to appropriately supplement its prior disclosures. Rather, the
Court finds that the pending motion presents an issue squarely
arising under the Local Rules, namely, whether certain opinions
constitute responsive opinions within the confines of Local
Patent Rule 4.5(c).
12
4.5(a). 10
See Warner Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd., 2010 WL 339034, at
*3.
8.
Against this rubric, 11 the Court turns to Otsuka’s
position on the allegedly offending portions of Defendants’
responsive expert declarations.
Otsuka specifically moves, as
stated above, to strike certain, limited portions of the
responsive declarations of Dr. Buckton, Dr. Rogers, Dr.
10
Similarly, courts within this District routinely strike expert
declarations, initial, supplemental, or otherwise, to the extent
the experts purport to render a legal opinion or conclusion, as
opposed to merely reiterating a legal premise and then providing
a scientific opinion based upon that premise. See, e.g., Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd., ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 1782653, at *6
(striking supplemental declarations to the extent the
declarations contained the experts’ “own legal conclusions”);
see also L. CIV. R. 7.2(a) (“Legal arguments and summation in
[affidavits, declarations, and certifications] will be
disregarded by the Court and may subject the signatory to
appropriate censure, sanctions or both.”).
11 In determining whether to strike evidence that is untimely
disclosed, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit directs
district courts to consider an array of factors, including: (1)
the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence
would have been admitted; (2) the ability of the party to cure
that prejudice; (3) the extent to which permitting the evidence
might disrupt the orderly and efficient administration of the
case; (4) the bad faith or willfulness, if any, that accompanies
the untimely disclosure; and (5) the overall importance of the
evidence proposed for exclusion (hereinafter, the “Pennypack
factors”). See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d
133, 148 (3d Cir. 2000); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112
F.3d 710, 719 (3d Cir. 1997); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home
Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 904 (3d Cir. 1977). Although
exclusion constitutes a drastic and generally disfavored remedy,
the decision of whether to allow certain expert testimony rests
within the sound discretion of the district court. See In re
TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 663 (3d Cir. 1999). This framework
will be applied to the present context of whether these
propounded responsive expert opinions should be permitted.
13
Palmieri, Dr. Orr, and Dr. Halper.
(See generally Otsuka’s Br.)
For the following reasons, because the disputed opinions in
these declarations prove directly responsive to deposition
testimony and/or opinions otherwise proffered by Otsuka’s own
experts, its motion will, in large part, be denied.
The Court
addresses each expert in turn.
9.
Dr. Buckton.
In his 23-page supplemental declaration,
Dr. Buckton augments his opinion on the appropriate meaning of
three of the most hotly-contested disputed claim terms:
“Anhydrous Aripiprazole Crystals B,” “wherein said low
hygroscopicity,” and “mean particle size.”
at ¶¶ 6-47.)
(Buckton Supp. Dec.
Otsuka moves to strike paragraphs 18-22, 34, 37-
39, 41-43, 45, and footnotes 4-5, on the grounds that Dr.
Buckton adds new opinions founded upon new documents that should
have been disclosed in his initial declaration.
Br. at 6-12.)
(See Otsuka’s
Nevertheless, even a cursory inspection of Dr.
Buckton’s supplemental declaration makes plain that he
specifically addressed his responsive opinions to testimony
provided by Otsuka’s expert, Dr. Byrn, during his deposition,
and/or to documents upon which the parties directly questioned
Dr. Byrn who gave his interpretations. (See, e.g., Buckton Supp.
Dec. at ¶ 18 (“I disagree with Dr. Byrn’s interpretations . .
.”), ¶ 19 (“Dr. Byrn’s interpretations are also inconsistent
with Byrn Dep. Ex. 8 and Byrn Dep. Ex. 9”), ¶ 34 (“Dr. Byrn
14
testified . . .”), ¶ 37 (“Dr. Byrn testified . . .”), ¶¶ 41-43
(“Dr. Byrn testified . . .”), ¶ 45 (“Dr. Byrn testified . .
.”).)
Even more critically, Dr. Buckton’s statements appear
limited to his scientific disagreement with Dr. Byrn’s proposed
construction, and appear, in each instance, to be accompanied by
the documentary basis for Dr. Buckton’s position.
(See
generally Buckton Supp. Dec. at ¶¶ 18-22, 34, 37-39, 41-43, 45.)
The Court need only recite a few examples to illustrate this
point.
10.
Under a heading entitled “Characterization of
Anhydrous Aripiprazole Crystals B,” the Detailed Description
section of the ’615 Patent states that the “‘Anhydrous
Aripiprazole Crystals B’ of the present invention ... have the
physicochemical properties given in (6)-(12) below.”
Patent at 9:36-39.)
(’615
In discussing this portion of the
specification, Dr. Byrn testified, in essence, that despite this
disclosure, he would define “Anhydrous Aripiprazole Crystals B”
to require “one or more,” but not all, of the physicochemical
properties described in (6)-(12).
(Byrn Dep. Tr. at 113-151.)
Dr. Buckton, in turn, set forth his responsive opinion that a
person of ordinary skill in the art “would not read and
understand the plain language to include the phrase ‘one or
more,’ or to exclude any part of the listed physicochemical
properties...”
(Buckton Supp. Dec. at ¶ 18.)
15
Dr. Buckton then
explained, in successive paragraphs, that certain of Otsuka’s
own documents prove inconsistent with Dr. Byrn’s interpretation.
(See id. at ¶¶ 19-22.)
These supplemental assertions constitute
permissible responsive opinions within the meaning of Local
Patent 4.5(c), and Otsuka’s challenges to the substance of the
assertions go to weight (an issue reserved for Markman), not to
the overarching propriety of the opinions as responsive.
(See
Otsuka’s Br. at 6-8.)
11.
The Court reaches a similar conclusion in connection
with paragraphs 34, 37-39, all of which concern documents
introduced at, and testified to, during Dr. Byrn’s deposition.
Indeed, Dr. Byrn testified to acute familiarity with the “Snorek
publication” referenced by Dr. Buckton in paragraph 34 (see Byrn
Dep. Tr. at 178), and Dr. Buckton only referenced an “Australian
Proceeding Paper” in paragraphs 37-39, in order to bolster his
opinion that Dr. Byrn, in his deposition, made a “fundamental
technical error” in explaining “mean particle size.”
Buckton Supp. Dec. at ¶¶ 37-39.)
(See
The parties explored these
topics during Dr. Byrn’s deposition who offered his
interpretations or opinions which bore on issues relevant to
claim construction, and the Court similarly finds them
appropriate for critique in responsive declarations.
See
Janssen, 2013 WL 3772655, at *2 (finding a declaration aimed at
refuting a new construction appropriate); Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova
16
Chems. Corp (Canada), No. 05-737, 2010 WL 2044931, at *2-*3 (D.
Del. May 20, 2010) (finding a supplemental declaration
appropriate as an elaboration of an initial opinion).
12.
Lastly, Otsuka challenges paragraphs 41-43, 45, and
footnotes 4-5, on the grounds that these paragraphs present “new
opinions” about “a series of unrelated patents” and documents.
(Otsuka’s Br. at 10-12.)
Nevertheless, even if the Court
concluded that these paragraphs plainly constituted “new
opinions,” which it does not, Dr. Buckton’s inclusion of
opinions on issues deemed unimportant by Otsuka do not warrant
being stricken, much less demonstrate a sufficient showing of
prejudice under the Pennypack factors.
Even more, these
paragraphs merely present Dr. Buckton’s disagreement with
opinions expressed by Dr. Byrn during his deposition, and are
therefore permissible responsive materials.
(See, e.g., Buckton
Supp. Dec. ¶ 41 (“Otsuka’s 469 patent, particularly claims 14,
15 and 16 of Otsuka’s 469 patent, are inconsistent with Dr.
Byrn’s opinion...”), ¶ 42 (“The 994 patent is inconsistent with
Dr. Byrn’s opinions...”), & ¶ 45 (“The 811 patent is
inconsistent with Dr. Byrn’s opinions...”).)
13.
For all of these reasons, Otsuka’s motion will be
denied to the extent it seeks to strike paragraphs 18-22, 34,
37-39, 41-43, 45, and footnotes 4-5, from Dr. Buckton’s
supplemental declaration.
Nevertheless, because the Court will
17
permit Dr. Buckton to be re-deposed as a result of certain
instructions not to answer during his depositions (an issue to
be addressed by separate Order), the Court will also permit
counsel for Otsuka to engage in a limited inquiry of Dr. Buckton
in relation to these responsive opinions. 12
This assures that
Otsuka will have had sufficient opportunity to probe Dr.
Buckton’s supplemental opinions in the event, contrary to this
Court’s finding, that they were new and not responsive opinions,
all in advance of the Markman hearing. 13
14.
Dr. Orr.
In his 6-page supplemental declaration, Dr.
Orr relies upon Otsuka’s “Investigational New Drug Application”
(hereinafter, the “IND”) in support of his opinion that
“‘aripiprazole drug substance’” refers to the “aripiprazole
pharmaceutical ingredient prior to incorporation with other
excipients in a drug product.” 14
(Orr Supp. Dec. at ¶¶ 4-9.)
Otsuka moves to strike paragraphs 5-9 of Dr. Orr’s declaration,
on the grounds that he failed to base his initial opinion upon
the IND, and because Defendants otherwise “saved” their reliance
12
Given the volume of submissions filed to date, and Otsuka’s
repeated assertion that the intrinsic record suffices to
construe the disputed claim phrases, the Court will not permit
Otsuka to file any additional submission at this time.
13 Counsel have advised that Dr. Buckton’s deposition has been
scheduled for September 30, 2015, three weeks before the Markman
hearing.
14 Dr. Orr proffered an identical opinion in connection with his
opening declaration. (Orr Dec. at ¶ 18.)
18
upon the document for Dr. Byrn’s deposition. 15
12-13.)
(Otsuka’s Br. at
Otsuka’s position, however, ignores the fact that Dr.
Orr’s supplemental opinion solely arises from Dr. Byrn’s own
deposition testimony, in which he revealed, for the first time,
his opinion that “aripiprazole drug substance” means “the
chemical, the chemical drug,” or, in other words, the
aripiprazole pharmaceutical ingredient together with other
excipients. 16
(Byrn Dep. Tr. At 91:22-92:19.)
Dr. Orr, in turn,
simply presented his disagreement with that newly-offered
construction, together with the scientific backing for his
position.
(See Orr Supp. Dec. at ¶¶ 4-9.)
This is a classic
responsive opinion under L. Pat. R. 4.5(c).
15.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds the disputed
portions of Dr. Orr’s supplemental declaration permissible as a
responsive declaration, because the expressed opinions provide
only a refutation of Dr. Byrn’s new opinions and are consistent
with the opinions expressed by Dr. Orr in his opening
declaration.
See Janssen, 2013 WL 3772655, at *2; Dow Chem.
15
In addition, Otsuka challenges Dr. Orr’s opinions on the
grounds that he mischaracterized the IND, and/or overemphasized
its interpretative relevance to the disputed construction of
“‘aripiprazole drug substance.’” (Otsuka’s Br. at 13-14.) The
Court, however, need not reach these challenges, which go to the
weight to be afforded Dr. Orr’s opinion, an issue for the Court
in its Markman decision.
16 In his opening declaration, Dr. Byrn stated, without
explanation, that “‘aripiprazole drug substance’ has its plain
and ordinary meaning.” (Byrn Dec. at ¶ 66.)
19
Co., 2010 WL 2044931, at *2-*3.
Otsuka’s motion will,
accordingly, be denied to the extent it concerns Dr. Orr.
16.
Dr. Rogers.
In his 12-page supplemental declaration,
Dr. Rogers relies upon the specifications of certain of the
patents-in-suit (and particularly the “Hygroscopicity Test
Method” of the asserted patents) in order to augment his opinion
that the claimed “low hydroscopicity test” proves indefinite,
and therefore lacks “a plain and ordinary meaning.”
Supp. Dec. at ¶ 4.)
(Rogers
Otsuka moves to strike paragraphs 6-8 of
Dr. Rogers’ declaration, on the grounds that his opinions on the
specifications amount to new and previously undisclosed
opinions.
(See Otsuka’s Br. at 15-16.)
Again, however, Otsuka
ignores the contours of its own expert’s disclosures.
Critically, in his opening declaration, Dr. Byrn opined, in
contrast to Dr. Rogers, that the claimed “low hygroscopicity
test” possesses a “plain and ordinary meaning,” but stated that
“a person of ordinary skill in the art would [nevertheless] look
to the portion of the specification entitled ‘HygroscopicityTest Method’” in order to inform the artisan’s understanding of
the disputed claim phrase. 17
(Byrn Dec. at ¶¶ 59, 63.)
Dr.
Rogers’ supplemental opinion therefore proves plainly
responsive, because it highlights differences between the
17
Dr. Byrn provided consistent testimony during his deposition.
(See Byrn Dep. Tr. At 63:4-71:4.)
20
claimed test method and the Hygroscopicity Test Method set forth
in the specification, and serves to rebut Dr. Byrn’s position
that “low hygroscopicity test” should be construed through the
lens of the “Hygroscopicity Test Method” disclosed in the
specifications.
(Rogers’ Supp. Dec. at ¶¶ 5-9.)
Even more, Dr.
Rogers’ supplemental opinion remains entirely consistent with
the positions he set forth in his opening declaration (albeit
augmented by additional references in response to Otsuka’s own
position). 18
(See, e.g., Rogers’ Dec. at ¶¶ 48-54 (inclusive of
its exhibits).)
For these reasons, the Court similarly finds
the disputed portions of Dr. Rogers’ supplemental declaration
appropriate.
See Janssen, 2013 WL 3772655, at *2; Dow Chem.
Co., 2010 WL 2044931, at *2-*3.
Otsuka’s motion will,
accordingly, be denied to the extent it concerns Dr. Rogers.
17.
Dr. Palmieri.
In his 9-page supplemental declaration,
Dr. Palmieri reiterates his position that the “‘pharmaceutical
composition’” disclosed in the ’350 Patent refers to “a single
dosage form containing at least two active ingredients.”
(Palmieri Supp. Dec. at ¶ 7.)
Otsuka moves to strike paragraphs
10 and 13 of the declaration, on the grounds that these
assertions constitute new opinions predicated upon “long”
18
For that reason alone, Otsuka cannot be heard to claim
surprise, much less any prejudice, from Dr. Rogers’ opinions.
21
available materials. 19
(Otsuka’s Br. at 16-18.)
Otsuka
specifically argues that Defendants failed to disclose their
intended reliance upon this Court’s April 16, 2015 Opinion
resolving Otsuka’s motion for a temporary restraining order
(hereinafter, the “TRO Opinion”), and a supposed “typographical
error” in claim 9 of the ’350 Patent.
(See id.)
The Court,
however, finds no merit to Otsuka’s position that Dr. Palmieri
improperly relied, for the first time, upon the Court’s TRO
Opinion.
Indeed, in relation to the TRO Opinion, Dr. Palmieri
states no more than “[t]he Court appears to agree” with his long
held position on the proper construction of “pharmaceutical
composition.”
(Palmieri Supp. Dec. at ¶ 10.)
This fleeting
reference to a publicly available decision does not amount to a
new opinion, nor does it come within the realm of information
19
Otsuka additionally argues that paragraphs 8, 10, and 13
should be stricken, in part, as impermissible legal argument.
(See Otsuka’s Br. at 17.) The Court disagrees, because the
cited paragraphs contain, on their face, no such legal argument.
Indeed, in paragraph 8, Dr. Palmieri simply summarizes the
claims construction approach of Otsuka’s expert (as described in
the words of Otsuka’s own expert), and states that the approach
differs from his “understanding.” (Palmieri Supp. Dec. at ¶ 8.)
Dr. Palmieri then describes his understanding of proper claim
construction and the manner in which he applied that
understanding to his proposed construction. (See id.) Dr.
Palmieri’s statements in this respect do not amount to legal
argument. Nor do his assertions in paragraphs 10 and 13
otherwise exceed the province of his expert testimony. Indeed,
in both instances, Dr. Palmieri describes little more than
discrepancies in the ’350 Patent, which, in his view, provide
further support for his proposed constructions (and prove
directly responsive to arguments made by Dr. Correll during his
deposition). (See id. at ¶¶ 10, 13.)
22
arguably subject to being stricken.
Moreover, the TRO Opinion
did not exist when Dr. Palmieri signed his initial expert
declaration on March 27, 2015.
18.
Similarly, the Court finds no basis to strike
paragraph 13, on the ground that Dr. Palmieri failed to include
“his speculation about a typographical error” in his “earlier
opinion.”
(Otsuka’s Br. at 17.)
Indeed, Dr. Palmieri could not
have disclosed this “opinion” on any earlier occasion, because
it directly arose from the deposition testimony of Dr. Correll
regarding claim 9 of the ’350 Patent.
Tr. at 143:8-10, 235-237.)
(See, e.g., Correll Dep.
Given the testimony of Otsuka’s own
expert, the Court finds paragraph 13 to be properly responsive.
For all of these reasons, Otsuka’s motion will be denied to the
extent it concerns Dr. Palmieri.
19.
Dr. Halper.
Finally, the Court turns to the 3-page
supplemental declaration of Dr. Halper, in which he provides a
construction of “pharmaceutical composition” in accordance with
Dr. Palmieri, and defines a person of ordinary skill in the art
to include a medical doctor, a pharmacist, and/or a drug
formulator.
(Halper Supp. Dec. at ¶ 8.)
Otsuka moves to strike
paragraph 8 of Dr. Halper’s supplemental declaration, on the
“straightforward” basis that Dr. Halper failed to provide a
definition of the ordinary artisan in his first declaration, and
“should not be permitted to fill” this “hole[]” under the guise
23
of a responsive opinion.
(Otsuka’s Br. at 18-19.)
The generic
Defendants, however, argue that Dr. Halper’s definition
“directly responds” to Dr. Correll’s concessions in his initial
declaration and at his deposition that “‘somebody who knows
pharmacology’” could “‘be considered a person of ordinary
skill.’”
(Defs.’ Opp’n at 19-20 (citation omitted).)
With
respect to this statement, the Court harbors serious doubts
concerning the propriety of Dr. Halper’s plainly new opinion.
Critically, Dr. Halper conceded in his deposition that his
initial declaration provided no definition of an ordinary
artisan, nor any description of the skills, training, and/or
experience of such individual.
30:1.)
(See Halper Dep. Tr. at 29:4-
Dr. Correll, in his initial declaration, only defined
the ordinary artisan to include an individual with “a medical
degree and specialty training in psychiatry” or “a medical
degree or Ph.D in a relevant science, such a
neuropsychopharmacology” (Correll Dec. at ¶ 16 (emphasis)), and
the generic Defendants have not otherwise substantiated their
position that Dr. Correll “appears to have conceded” that
someone with only general knowledge of pharmacology suffices. 20
(Defs.’ Opp’n at 19-20 (emphases added); see also Halper Supp.
20
Defendants did not provide the relevant deposition transcript,
and their position appears to rest primarily upon an
extrapolation from Dr. Correll’s testimony. (See Defs.’ Opp’n
at 19-20.)
24
Dec. at ¶ 8.)
In short, the Court finds nothing in Dr.
Correll’s deposition testimony about the ordinary artisan that
is a significant departure from Dr. Correll’s initial expert
declaration; therefore, there is no new Correll opinion on this
subject, and nothing that would call for a response from an
expert (Dr. Halper) who previously offered no opinion on the
ordinary artisan issue.
This portion of Halper’s new opinion
regarding the ordinary artisan thus is not “responsive” within
the meaning of L. Pat. R. 4.5(c), and it will not be allowed.
Defendants have not demonstrated the necessity for adducing a
new opinion that basically agrees with Dr. Correll’s opinion on
the identification of the ordinary artisan.
Otsuka’s motion
will, accordingly, also be granted to strike Dr. Halper’s new
opinion on the “ordinary artisan.” 21
20.
An accompanying Order will be entered.
September 25, 2015
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
21
Given the limited nature of this opinion (one sentence of Dr.
Halper’s supplemental declaration), however, the Court will not
require the generic Defendants to file revised declarations.
25
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?