WALKER v. ROMAN et al
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/12/2016. (tf,)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[ECF No. 23]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil No. 14-1182 (RMB/AMD)
SCO. ANDREW ROMAN, et al.,
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Road
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
Plaintiff Pro Se
Shana Bellin, Deputy Attorney General
Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
P.O. Box 116
Trenton, NJ 08625
Counsel for Defendants SCO Andrew Roman and SCO Natalie Zenyuk
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion for summary
judgment of Defendants SCO Andrew Roman (“Roman”) and SCO Natalie
Zenyuk (“Zenyuk”). (Mot. for S.J., ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff Rodney
Walker filed this action February 24, 2014, and he filed an Amended
Complaint on April 2, 2014. (Compl., ECF. No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF
No. 4.) Upon screening the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court allowed Plaintiff’s claims for
monetary damages against Roman and Zenyuk in their individual
(Opinion and Order, ECF Nos. 5, 6.) Discovery was conducted.
Defendants brought the present motion for summary judgment on
April 8, 2016. (Mot. for S.J., ECF No. 23; Brief in Supp. of Mot.
for S.J. (“Defs’ Brief”), ECF No. 24-1.) On August 19, 2016,
Defendants supplemented their motion for summary judgment with the
Declaration of Rebecca Smith (“Smith Decl.”), Executive Assistant
at Bayside State Prison. (ECF Nos. 31-1, 32.) Plaintiff responded
by filing a reply brief and exhibit in support of his exhaustion
of administrative remedies. (ECF No. 33.) This Court has considered
the pleadings, motions, briefs, and supporting documents, and will
decide the motion on the papers, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78(b). For the reasons explained below, the Court will
grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following
against Roman and Zenyuk. On October 23, 2012, in Bayside Prison
E Unit, recreation time was called at approximately 2:30 p.m. As
Plaintiff entered the recreation yard, he was assaulted by four
unknown individuals.1 There were at least 45 people present in the
yard. Plaintiff noticed Defendant Zenyuk standing in the “Bubble”,
overlooking the recreation yard on E Unit. Zenyuk was unable to
call for help because the phone in the Bubble was inoperable. She
stood in the Bubble and watched the assault without attempting to
intervene or alert other officers. Roman and Zenyuk had ample time
to come to Plaintiff’s aid.
Plaintiff never saw Roman until a response team came into the
yard to order everyone down on the ground. The assault lasted
forty-five minutes. Plaintiff alleged Roman’s and Zenyuk’s failure
to protect him or come to his aid resulted in his serious bodily
Plaintiff submitted the Statement of Jay Boyce with his
Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4 at 6.) Boyce said that on October
23, 2012, from his cell window, he witnessed two inmates assaulting
Plaintiff. He saw “Ms. Z (an officer)” watch the incident unfold.
The housing officers did not go into the yard to break up the
fight. The fight was broken up when a response team in riot gear
went into the yard.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants
In his deposition, Plaintiff said he was only aware of two inmates
assaulting him, but the Incident Report said there were four.
(Defs’ Brief, Ex. B, Transcript Depo. of Rodney Walker, p. 54,
lines 8-20, ECF No. 24-6.)
Defendants also asserted that the Amended Complaint does not
properly raise a failure to intervene claim because Plaintiff was
assaulted by other inmates, not officers. As a defense to a failure
realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene. Defendants
submitted that the prison’s Internal Management Procedure mandated
Finally, Defendants asserted
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment is proper where the moving party “shows there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). The
moving party has the burden to show there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
A party asserting that a fact is or is not genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by citing materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, affidavits, declarations, or
other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit or
declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be based on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e):
If a party fails to properly support an
assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party’s assertion of fact as required
by Rule 56(c), the court may:
(1) give an opportunity to
support or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact
purposes of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion
and supporting materials--including the
facts considered undisputed--show that
the movant is entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
Additionally, Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) deems a movant’s statement
of material facts undisputed where a party does not respond or
file a counterstatement.
In determining whether there is a genuine dispute of a
material fact, the court must view the facts in the light most
inferences from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A fact raises a
genuine issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
administrative remedies, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
In their Statement of Material Facts, Defendants stated “Plaintiff
did not file a single inmate remedy form regarding the facts giving
rise to his allegations of failure to protect, unsafe conditions,
or failure to intervene. (Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of
Defs’ Mot. for S.J., ¶ 41, ECF No. 24-3.) Defendants provided the
Declaration of Rebecca Smith, Executive Assistant at Bayside State
Prison. (Smith Decl., ECF No. 31-1.) Smith included an excerpt of
the Inmate Handbook for Bayside State Prison, which describes the
administrative remedy program. (Inmate Handbook, ECF No. 32 at 5.)
The remedy program is available to inmates of Bayside State Prison.
(Id., ¶ B) The procedure begins by submitting Part I of Inmate
Remedy System Form IRSF-101. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 1-4.) The form will
only be processed if it is “placed into the correctional facility
box marked INMATE REMEDY FORMS ONLY.” (Id. at 7, ¶ 1.) If the form
is forwarded by any other means it “will not be processed.” (Id.)
The inmate must submit the written form within ten business days
of the incident, “unless it is not possible to file within such
period.” (Id. at 9, ¶ 1.) Here, the ten business day period expired
on November 6, 2012.
Smith ran a search for Administrative Remedy Forms filed by
Plaintiff while he was incarcerated at Bayside State Prison, and
no records were found. (Smith Decl., ECF 31-1 at ¶¶ 11-12.) On his
IFP application, Plaintiff indicated that he was transferred to
South Woods State Prison on November 8, 2012. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2.)
In reply to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on
submitted a Business Remit showing that he sent an Inmate Remedy
form to Administrator John Powell at Bayside Prison on January 11,
2013. (Exhibit, ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff also asserted that he made
numerous calls to the Central Ombudsperson when he did not receive
a response to the Inmate Remedy. (Reply, ECF No. 33 at 3.)
Plaintiff, however, has not argued or established that it was
impossible for him to file the written form at Bayside State
Prison, using the proper procedure, within ten business days of
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
Exhaustion under this provision is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739
(2001)). Furthermore, the provision requires “proper exhaustion.”
Id. at 93. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s
adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some
orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 9091. “The exhaustion requirement includes a procedural-default
component, and a prisoner must comply with the prison grievance
procedures to properly exhaust his claims.” Veasey v. Fisher,
307 F. App’x 614, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff did not properly exhaust Bayside State Prison’s
administrative remedy program because he did not file a written
IRSF-101 form within ten business days of the incident, by November
6, 2012. Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that it was “not
possible to file [a written form] within such period,” as provided
by the Inmate Handbook. (Inmate Handbook, ECF No. 32 at 9 ¶ 1.)2
If, for example, Plaintiff had been transferred to South Woods
State Prison within that ten day period, it would not have been
possible for him to properly comply with Bayside State Prison’s
Plaintiff claims that “right after the assault, Plaintiff was
taken to the infirmary where he received medical care and was
placed on TCC status, which made him unable to exhaust
administrative remedies while at Bayside State Prison.” (Reply,
ECF No. 33 at 4.) The undisputed facts, however, establish that
Plaintiff was not in the infirmary for the entire ten day period.
Rather, Plaintiff was seen in the infirmary at Bayside Prison on
October 23, 2012, where he received sutures for his head laceration
and was treated for a broken nose, right knee and hip swelling.
ECF No. 19 at 35-51.) He was then discharged with pain medication
and medically cleared for lock-up the same day. (Id. at 35-37, 40,
42.) He received follow-up treatment at Bayside State Prison until
his sutures were removed on November 1, 2012. (Id. at 50-51.)
administrative remedy program within ten days of the incident and
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies may
have been excused. Notably, however, Plaintiff was not transferred
to South Woods State Prison until November 8, 2012, two days after
the ten day period expired. Additionally, Plaintiff’s attempt to
exhaust administrative remedies by sending a form to Administrator
John Powell at Bayside Prison on January 11, 2013 was not proper
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has
been made, the non-movant’s burden is rigorous: he “must point to
concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every
essential element of his case.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police,
71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
Plaintiff has not established that he properly exhausted his
administrative remedies or that it was not possible for him to do
so. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based
In any event, as discussed below, the Court alternatively
finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
merits, as the undisputed facts establish that no constitutional
violation occurred and, even if such a violation had occurred,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. In doing so, the
Court has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff
and made all reasonable inferences from those facts.
C. Failure to Intervene
corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a beating can be the
basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983,
if the officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply
refused to do so.” 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). Smith,
however, involved the duty of a corrections officer to intervene
when an inmate is beaten by another corrections officer. Id.
The Third Circuit, referring to the use of excessive force by
a law enforcement officer, reasoned that “[t]he restriction on
cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment
reaches non-intervention just as readily as it reaches the more
demonstrable brutality of those who unjustifiably and excessively
employ fists, boots or clubs.” Id. at 651. Thus, the court held,
“̔if [plaintiff] can show at trial that an officer attacked him
while [defendant] ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene, he
can recover.’” Id. at 652 (quoting Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491,
495 (7th Cir. 2000)). “Moreover, neither rank nor supervisory
realistic opportunity to intervene.’” Id.
containing an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to intervene as
recognized under Smith v. Mensinger. Such claims are limited to
circumstances where a law enforcement officer is using force
against an inmate. However, the Amended Complaint contains a
failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, which is
analyzed under a similar standard as a failure to intervene claim.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994) (“prison officials
who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to
the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”).
D. Failure to Protect
Clause imposes on prison officials ‘a duty to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Bistrian v. Levi,
696 F.3d 352, 366-67 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
833; see also Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130–33
(3d Cir. 2001); Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir.
1997)). The elements of a failure to protect claim are: (1) the
inmate was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm; (2) the prison official acted with deliberate
indifference to the inmate’s health and safety; and (3) the
official’s deliberate indifference caused the inmate harm. Id. at
367. “‘[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found
liable’ on a failure-to-protect claim.” Id. at 368 (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 845.).
Defendants contend Plaintiff has not produced evidence to
establish each element of a claim for failure to protect him from
inmate violence. Once the inmates began assaulting Plaintiff in
the recreation yard, Roman and Zenyuk were aware of conditions
that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff,
satisfying the first element of a failure to protect claim. The
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety after the
assault started. Plaintiff argued that Roman and Zenyuk were
deliberately indifferent because they failed to intervene to stop
the assault and did nothing until the riot team arrived forty-five
Defendants offered the Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
Internal Management Procedures in support of their claim that they
therefore, they did not act with deliberate indifference.
from the outside courtyard, where she saw three inmates punching
and kicking Plaintiff. (Id.) She reached for the phone to initiate
the emergency notification system but the phone was inoperable.
(Id.) Roman, who was nearby in E Unit, also saw the fight, and he
called a Code
over his radio. (Id.) He then secured the unit
and ordered those inmates in the courtyard who were not involved
in the fight to go to the other side of the courtyard. (Id.) Roman
and Zenyuk gave several direct orders for the inmates to stop
fighting and lay down on the ground. (Id.) The inmates did not
stop fighting until the response team arrived. (Id.)
Defendants asserted “the record indisputably establishes that
Defendants responded to the incident to help Plaintiff by calling
as the riot team arrived on scene shortly after the
assault began.” (Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 24-1 at 18.) In Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, he alleged the fight lasted at least 45 minutes
before the response team arrived. (Am. Compl., ¶ 7, ECF No. 4.)
Defendants argued this is an unsupported claim that cannot survive
45 Minute Response Time
The incident report indicates the assault began at 14:50.
(Def’s Brief, Ex. C, Incident Report, ECF No. 24-7.) Consistent
with this report, Plaintiff, in his deposition, said the incident
began between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. (Defs’ Brief, Ex. B, Transcript
Depo. of Rodney Walker, p. 45, lines 23-25, ECF No. 24-6.) After
two inmates punched Plaintiff, he blacked out for a few seconds.
(Id., p. 63, lines 8-23.) In his deposition, Plaintiff said he
knew the fight lasted more than fifteen minutes before anyone came
to stop it. (Id., p. 118, lines 2-18.)
Sergeant Kita responded to Roman’s call for a Code
Brief, Ex. C, Incident Report, ECF No. 24-7.) When Kita arrived,
he saw three inmates assaulting Plaintiff. (Id.) After Kita gave
several orders to stop fighting, the inmates complied. (Id.) “A
crime scene was established at 1315 in the court yard area where
the assault had happened.” (Id.) The crime scene was closed at
16:45, after 46 inmates were pat frisked and searched for blood
stains or weapons. (Id.)
There is nothing in the record that establishes, without
dispute, how long the assault on Plaintiff lasted. Plaintiff, in
his deposition, said it was more than fifteen minutes, and in his
Amended Complaint he said it was at least 45 minutes. The incident
report indicates that the incident began at 2:50 p.m. and the
investigation was closed at 4:45 p.m. The report also states that
the crime scene was established at “1315” but if the incident began
at 14:50, this was obviously a mistake and does not establish when
the fight ended.
The issue of how long the assault lasted must ultimately be
resolved by the fact finder based on the totality of the evidence.
See Evans v. Cameron, 442 F. App’x 704, 707-08 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding district court improperly resolved a factual dispute
concerning length of assault on inmate at summary judgment stage).
On summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Therefore, the Court will
assume the fight lasted forty-five minutes.
Following the Internal Management Procedures
Summary judgment turns on whether it was reasonable for
Defendants Roman and Zenyuk to stand by until the response team
arrived forty-five minutes later. The undisputed facts are that
Roman did not physically enter the area to intervene in the assault
on Plaintiff until a response team arrived. Zenyuk attempted to
call a Code
, but her equipment malfunctioned and she was unable
to make the call. She did not physically intervene in the assault
following the Internal Management Procedures.
Defendants have offered no reason other
than compliance with the above procedures to explain why they
waited to physically intervene.
In Bistrian, the Third Circuit held it was improper for the
district court to grant a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff
alleged that a corrections officer did not intervene in an inmateon-inmate
pummeling. 696 F.3d at 372. The Court found Plaintiff had plausibly
corrections officer shouted for the assailant to stop and then
waited until “enough staff were present” to enter the area and
subdue the assailant. Id. The Third Circuit explained that, in
light of the procedural posture of the case, there were “enough
questions about the reasonableness of [defendant’s] response to
preclude dismissal,” but that “[i]t may be that summary judgment
for [defendant] is on the horizon.” Id.
Here, the Court considers the reasonableness of Defendants’
response on summary judgment. The undisputed facts establish that
Defendants’ relied upon the DOC Internal Procedures in deciding to
initiate the emergency notification system,
before physically intervening in the
assault on Plaintiff. Additionally, it is undisputed that at least
two inmates assaulted Plaintiff in a small recreation yard while
more than forty other inmates were present and that Defendants
Roman and Zenyuk were the only two corrections officers nearby
until the response team arrived. In light of the undisputed facts,
the Court finds that no reasonable juror could find that Defendants
Zenyuk and Roman acted unreasonably by following the DOC Internal
Procedures and deciding not to physically intervene in the assault
on Plaintiff until the response team in riot gear arrived
. Therefore, as the undisputed facts
establish that no constitutional violation occurred, the Court
will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Defendants asserted that, even if a reasonable juror could
nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to
established based on the facts of this case.” (Defs’ Brief, ECF
constitutional violation occurred, it need not address the issue
of qualified immunity. However, in an abundance of caution, the
Court will do so.
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); accord Plumhoff
v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (“An official sued under
§ 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”).
Qualified immunity is immunity from suit and, as such, should be
resolved as early as possible. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32. It
protects from suit “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743
(2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
The question of whether Roman and Zenyuk are entitled to
qualified immunity requires this Court to answer two questions:
“(1) whether the officer violated a constitutional rights,” and
“(2) whether the right was clearly established, such that it would
have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). The questions may be answered in
either order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.
A defendant has not violated a clearly established right
unless the contours of that right were “sufficiently definite that
understood that he was violating [the right].” Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct.
at 2023 (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). Stated another way,
debate.’” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
Furthermore, courts should not define clearly established law
“at a high level of generality” because to do so avoids the
question of whether the official acted reasonably in the particular
circumstances. Id. Rather, the “inquiry ‘must be undertaken in
light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (citing
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206).
There is a clearly established right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment, as set forth in the Eighth Amendment.
Furthermore, in the abstract, it is clearly established that a
corrections officer must intervene on an inmate-on-inmate assault
if he has a reasonable opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Evans v.
Cameron, 442 F. App’x 704, 708 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Curtis v.
Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973)). The inquiry, however, does
not end there, as the Court must assess the specific circumstances
of the case.
The Court must ask, “in the factual scenario established by
the plaintiff, would a reasonable officer have understood that his
actions were prohibited?” Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136
(3d Cir. 2002). Here, the relevant question is whether Defendants’
decisions to follow the DOC Internal Management Procedures
when they became aware of the inmate-on-inmate
assault and to wait to physically intervene in said assault until
outnumbered by the inmates, violated a clearly established right,
such that it would have clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful. In the context of this case, the Court cannot
Management Procedures and not physically intervene in the assault
until after the arrival of the response team in riot gear was a
violation of a clearly established right.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff was assaulted by at least two
inmates in a small recreation yard with more than forty other
inmates present, with only the two Defendant officers nearby.
Defendants were greatly outnumbered by inmates in the yard, and
their intervention posed a significant risk to their own safety,
and a risk of escalating the incident without sufficient staff to
respond. See Thomas v. Cumberland Cty. Corr. Facility, No. CIV.
09-1323 JBS-JS, 2011 WL 6756897, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011)
heroic measures and risk serious physical harm by intervening
immediately in an inmate’s . . . assault on another inmate.’”)
(quoting Holloman v. Neily, No. CIV. A. 97-8067, 1998 WL 828413,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1998) (citing Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d
525, 532–33 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d
1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995); MacKay v. Farnsworth, 48 F.3d 491, 493
officers did so.
confronted with several inmates assaulting Plaintiff in the small
recreation yard, while dozens of other inmates were present, and
bound by the DOC Internal Management Procedures, that his decision
to follow such procedures and wait for the response team to arrive
before physically intervening in the assault was unlawful or
violated a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly,
the Court finds that, even if Defendants had violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional right, that right was not clearly established such
that it would have been clear to a reasonable corrections officer
in Defendants’ positions that his decision not to physically
intervene on the assault on Plaintiff until the response team
arrived and to instead sound a Code
in accordance with DOC
Internal Management Procedures would be unlawful. Thus, Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted. An appropriate Order shall issue on this date.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 12, 2016
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