MINCEY v. HASTINGS et al
Filing
11
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/29/2016. (dmr)(n.m.) (Main Document 11 replaced on 4/29/2016) (dmr, ).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHARLES MINCEY A/K/A CHARLES
LAQUE,
Civil No. 14-1527 (NLH)
Petitioner,
OPINION
v.
BEVERLY HASTINGS, et al.,
Respondents.
APPEARANCES:
CHARLES MINCEY A/K/A CHARLES LAQUE, #294533C
East Jersey State Prison
Lock Bag R
Rahway, NJ 07065
Pro Se Petitioner
JOHN J. SANTOLIQUIDO, Assistant Prosecutor
JAMES P. MCCLAIN, ATLANTIC COUNTY PROSECUTOR
P.O. Box 2002
Mays Landing, NJ 08330
Attorneys for Respondents
HILLMAN, District Judge:
Charles Mincey filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment of conviction
filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County, on
July 15, 2004, imposing an aggregate 25-year term of
imprisonment, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility, after
he pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter and first-degree
aggravated assault.
The State filed an Answer and the record,
and Mincey filed a Reply.
After carefully reviewing the
arguments of the parties and the state court record, this Court
will dismiss the Petition with prejudice and deny a certificate
of appealability.
I.
A.
BACKGROUND
The Crime
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
summarized the facts of the case this way:
In the early morning of July 8, 2001, [Mincey], then
nineteen years of age, was a passenger in a crowded
taxi van with several other individuals who were being
transported into Atlantic City. Among the passengers
were seventeen-year old codefendant [Howard] Reed,
Fritz Charlestin, Steve Lemus, and the taxi van driver
Christopher Soyer.
When the taxi van arrived at a parking lot adjacent to
the Jacob’s Terrace apartments an armed robbery
ensued. Although first directed at Soyer, the robbery
quickly escalated to involve the remaining passengers.
[Mincey’s] plea allocution revealed that he had
brandished a firearm, pointed it in the direction of
Charlestin and Lemus, and fired the weapon several
times . . . [Charlestin] suffered fatal gunshot
wounds, and ultimately perished at the Atlantic City
Medical Center three days later.
State v. Mincey, 2011 WL 31293 at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct., App.
Div., Jan. 6, 2011).
2
B.
The State Court Proceedings
Sometime in 2001 a grand jury sitting in the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, issued a 15-count
indictment against Charles Mincey and Howard Reed charging them
with the first-degree murder of Fritz Charlestin, first-degree
robbery, and other crimes.
On March 25, 2004, Reed pled guilty
to the first-degree robbery of Christopher Soyer, the cab
driver.
During his plea allocution, Reed stated that he
displayed a 9 millimeter gun to Soyer, he gave the gun to
Mincey, and then Reed got out of the cab.
(ECF No. 6-11 at 9.)
Mincey’s trial began two months later on May 24, 2004.
After two days of testimony, on May 27, 2004, the parties agreed
to a plea agreement whereby Mincey pled guilty to first-degree
aggravated manslaughter and second-degree aggravated assault in
exchange for dismissal of the other charges in the indictment
and the State’s recommendation for a maximum aggregate sentence
of 25 years in prison.
The Appellate Division described the
testimony at Mincey’s abbreviated trial as follows:
Defendant’s trial began on May 25, 2004. During two
days of testimony, the taxi driver, Christopher Soyer,
identified [Mincey] as the instigator during the
robbery, although Soyer did not actually see [Mincey]
shoot Charlestin, who was sitting in the back of the
van. Lemus, who was sitting next to Charlestin during
the shooting, testified that [Mincey] shot Charlestin
and then shot at Lemus, who escaped injury by ducking
3
behind the seat. Lemus identified [Mincey], with
“100%” certainty, as the shooter. Another witness,
who was well-acquainted with [Mincey] and Reed,
testified that she had been a passenger in the van but
departed before the robbery occurred. She testified
that [Mincey] and Reed were both passengers in the
van, and that the two men were dressed differently
from each other and did not look alike.
State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct., App.
Div., Jan. 18, 2013).
On June 4, 2004, the same judge who presided over Mincey’s
trial sentenced Reed to a ten-year term of imprisonment in
accordance with his plea agreement.
(ECF No. 6-12.)
On July 9,
2004, that same judge sentenced Mincey to the agreed upon
aggregate 25-year term of imprisonment.
(ECF No. 6-7.)
Mincey
appealed the sentence, and by order filed on February 8, 2006,
the Appellate Division affirmed.
(ECF No. 6-17 at 68.)
On June 18, 2007, Mincey signed a pro se state petition for
post-conviction relief, which the trial court filed on June 26,
2007.
(ECF No. 6-17 at 69.)
For the reasons expressed on the
record on June 25, 2009, the trial court denied the postconviction relief petition without an evidentiary hearing.
order was filed on July 6, 2009.
(ECF No. 6-17 at 117.)
The
Mincey
appealed, and on January 6, 2011, the Appellate Division vacated
the order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing “limited to
the issue of the exculpatory evidence of codefendant Reed and
4
that which may be developed form Soyer, if any.”
State v.
Mincey, 2011 WL 31293 *5 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 6,
2011).
On June 16, 2011, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied
certification.
See State v. Mincey, 207 N.J. 35 (2011) (table).
The trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on July
6, 2011, hearing testimony from Howard Reed, Mincey, and his
trial attorney.
The trial court denied the post-conviction
relief petition in and order and opinion dated On July 26, 2011.
(ECF Nos. 7-6, 7-5.)
Mincey appealed, and on January 18, 2013,
the Appellate Division affirmed.
See State v. Mincey, 2013 WL
195279 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 18, 2013).
On
September 10, 2013, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied
certification.
C.
State v. Mincey, 215 N.J. 486 (2013) (table).
Procedural History of § 2254 Petition
Mincey signed his § 2254 Petition on February 14, 2014, but
his cover letter is dated March 2, 2014.
Petition on March 10, 2014.1
The Clerk received the
The Petition raises the following
grounds for relief:
1
The Court notified Mincey of his right to amend the Petition to
include all available federal claims in accordance with Mason v.
Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), and he declined to do so.
(ECF No. 2.)
5
Ground One: THE STATE COURT’S RULING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW DURING THE PLEA PROCEEDINGS WAS
CONTRARY TO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW AND AN
UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW[.]
THEREFORE[,] THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE.
Ground Two: THE STATE COURT’S RULING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW DURING THE TRIAL BY FAILING TO
INTERVIEW HOWARD REED WHO EXCULPATED AND EXONERATED
PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY TO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL
LAW AND AN UNREASONABLE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS[.]
THEREFORE[,] THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE.
(Memorandum at ECF No. 1-2 at 43-47.)
The State filed an Answer arguing that Mincey is not
entitled to habeas relief on the merits of his claims, and
Mincey filed a Reply arguing that he is.
II.
(ECF Nos. 6, 10.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR RELIEF UNDER § 2254
Section 2254 of title 28 of the United States Code sets
limits on the power of a federal court to grant a habeas
petition to a state prisoner.
S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131
Section 2254(a) permits a court to
entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody
“in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
6
Where a state court
adjudicated petitioner’s federal claim on the merits,2 as in this
case, a court “has no authority to issue the writ of habeas
corpus unless the [state c]ourt’s decision ‘was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States’, or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.’”
Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
“When reviewing state criminal
convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to
afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions
only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were
wrong.”
Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015).
The
petitioner carries the burden of proof, and review under §
2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits.
See Pinholster, 131
S.Ct. at 1398.
2
“For the purposes of Section 2254(d), a claim has been
‘adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings’ when a state
court has made a decision that 1) finally resolves the claim, and
2) resolves th[at] claim on the basis of its substance, rather
than on a procedural, or other, ground.” Shotts v. Wetzel, 724
F.3d 364, 375 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
7
A court begins the analysis under § 2254(d)(1) by
determining the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme
Court.
See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004).
“[C]learly established law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes
only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of t[he Supreme
Court’s] decisions,” as of the time of the relevant state-court
decision.
Woods, 135 S.Ct. at 1376 (quoting White v. Woodall,
134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014), and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 412 (2000)).
A decision is “contrary to” a Supreme Court
holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if the state court
“contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme
Court's] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme]
Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
Under the “‘unreasonable
application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may
grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court’s decisions
but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.”
Id., 529 U.S. at 413.
Where a petitioner seeks habeas relief pursuant to §
2254(d)(2) on the basis of an erroneous factual determination of
8
the state court, two provisions of the AEDPA necessarily apply.
First, the AEDPA provides that “a determination of a factual
issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct
[and] [t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”
29 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
240 (2005).
Second, the AEDPA precludes habeas relief unless
the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
III.
DISCUSSION
In the two grounds raised in his § 2254 Petition, Mincey
asserts that his trial attorney was constitutionally deficient
in failing to interview co-defendant Howard Reed and in strongly
advising Mincey to plead guilty.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees
the accused the “right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.”
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
A claim that
counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of
a conviction has two components, both of which must be
satisfied.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
9
(1984).
A defendant must “show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” id. at 68788, and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694 (citations omitted).
To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea
negotiation context, Mincey must show:
(1) counsel’s advice
regarding the plea offer was not “‘within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,’” Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)), and (2) “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the petitioner]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.”
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384-85 (2012)
(quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
A.
Failure to Interview Reed
Mincey asserts that his trial attorney was constitutionally
deficient in “failing to interview Howard Reed who exculpated
and exonerated Petitioner[.]”
(ECF No. 1 at 24.)
To be sure,
Reed’s affidavit dated September 15, 2006, which was attached to
Mincey’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief, states that
“Charles Mincey had nothing to do with the robbery or shooting
10
of Fritz Charlestin.
He did not help me in any way.
He was
there and I believe that’s why he was picked in the line up.
I
could not say anything about the truth because I did not want to
get myself any more time.”
(ECF No. 6-17 at 83.)
Although
Reed’s affidavit states that Mincey had nothing to do with the
robbery and murder, it also states unequivocally that Reed would
not have exonerated Mincey had he testified at Mincey’s trial in
2004 “because [Reed] did not want to get [him]self any more
time.”
Id.
Reed’s plea allocution, two months before Mincey’s
trial, confirms that Reed’s trial testimony, if it had been
elicited, would not have been exculpatory.
During the
allocution, Reed stated that he robbed Soyer by displaying a
handgun and that Reed then gave the handgun to Mincey and left
the taxi.
(ECF No. 6-11 at 6-8.)
In affirming the denial of Mincey’s post-conviction relief
petition, the Appellate Division found the following facts with
respect to codefendant Howard Reed:
Codefendant Reed entered a plea of guilty [to firstdegree robbery] approximately two months before the
start of [Mincey’s] trial. As part of Reed’s plea
allocution he also admitted to wielding a firearm,
largely to frighten Soyer while [Mincey] rummaged for
the driver’s cash and belongings. Then, Reed
testified that he handed the firearm to [Mincey] and
left the taxi van.
11
Codefendant Reed was not sentenced until June 4, 2004,
several days after the conclusion of defendant’s
abridged trial. Although he had been called as a
witness at trial, he provided no testimonial evidence.
Instead, with the permission of the court, the State
simply asked him to stand next to defendant so that
the jury could observe their physical attributes, side
by side. Other than taking the oath and acknowledging
that he was Howard Reed, he did not utter a word to
the jury, and there was no cross-examination by
defense counsel.
State v. Mincey, 2011 WL 31293 at *2.
The Appellate Division also found that Reed “confirmed on
cross-examination that he would not have testified to that
exculpatory version of events at [Mincey’s] trial, for fear of
losing the benefit of his plea bargain.”
State v. Mincey, 2013
WL 195279 at * 2 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan. 18, 2013).
The Appellate Division concluded that defense counsel was not
ineffective in failing to interview or call Reed because “Reed
would not have given favorable testimony even if defense counsel
had attempted to cross-examine him or had called him as a
witness.”
State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at *5.
Section 2254(e)(1) requires this Court to presume the
correctness of the Appellate Division’s finding that, if
Mincey’s attorney had interviewed Reed or had called him to
testify at Mincey’s trial, Reed would have testified that he
brandished the gun, gave the gun to Mincey and exited the taxi.
12
Mincey has not rebutted these findings by clear and convincing
evidence.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Given Reed’s post-
conviction relief testimony and his affidavit, both of which
indicated that Reed’s trial testimony would have been consistent
with his plea allocution and would not have exculpated Mincey,
Mincey has not shown that the Appellate Division unreasonably
determined the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)((2).
In addition, the Appellate Division did
not unreasonably apply Strickland or other Supreme Court
precedent when it found that counsel was not deficient in
failing to interview Reed or to call him as a trial witness,
given its finding that Reed’s testimony would not have helped
Mincey.
B.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Advising Mincey to Plead Guilty
Mincey also asserts that trial counsel was deficient in
strongly advising him to plead guilty after hearing two and onehalf days of testimony from the prosecution’s case.
A defendant
who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel “may only attack
the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by
showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within
the [appropriate] standards.” Tollett v. Henderson, 311 U.S.
258, 268 (1973).
Due process requires that a guilty plea is
13
“voluntary” and that the defendant’s waiver of his
constitutional rights is “knowing, intelligent, [and] with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.”
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)
(quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
As
the Court explained in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970):
[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is
in frequently involves the making of difficult
judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be
known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined
in court. Even then the truth will often be in
dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the
defendant and his counsel must make their best
judgment as to the weight of the State’s case.
Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands
them, would be viewed by a court. If proved, would
those facts convince a judge or jury of the
defendant’s guilt . . . ? Questions like these cannot
be answered with certitude; yet a decision to plead
guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel’s answers,
uncertain as they may be. Waiving trial entails the
inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a
reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be
mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a
court’s judgment might be on given facts.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 769-770.
Moreover, “an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel
. . . to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be
entered.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948);
accord Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1999)
14
(“A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his
client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to
be desirable.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis in original); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43
(3d Cir. 1992) (observing that a defendant “is entitled to rely
upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the
facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to
offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered.”)
(quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 721).
In this case, the Appellate Division found the following
facts with respect to counsel’s advice to plead guilty:
On May 27, 2004, when [Mincey] pled guilty, the State
had just presented eyewitness testimony that he was
the ringleader in the robbery and that he was the
shooter. Even if the jury found that he was not the
shooter, he was facing a likely conviction for felony
murder, and the probability of a very long sentence.
As the judge noted at the sentencing, at age nineteen,
[Mincey] already had six juvenile adjudications and
eleven adult arrests, including a pending out-of-state
charge for assault with a deadly weapon. Under all
the circumstances, we cannot find that [defense
counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in
advising [Mincey] to accept a twenty-five year NERA
sentence rather than risk a murder conviction and a
life sentence.
State v. Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at *5.
Based on these findings, the Appellate Division concluded
that “Reed’s testimony [at the post-conviction relief
15
evidentiary hearing] clearly established that [Mincey’s] trial
counsel was not ineffective when he strongly advised [Mincey] to
accept the plea bargain the State was offering.”
State v.
Mincey, 2013 WL 195279 at * 5.
This Court is required to presume the correctness of the
Appellate Division’s factual findings, as Mincey has not
rebutted them by clear and convincing evidence; nor has Mincey
shown that they were unreasonable in light of the evidence
presented.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (e)(2).
In
addition, in light of these findings, the Appellate Division did
not unreasonably apply Strickland or other Supreme Court
precedent when it held that Mincey’s trial attorney was not
constitutionally deficient in strongly advising him to plead
guilty instead of risking a life sentence for murder.
Mincey is
not entitled to habeas relief on this ground under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1).
IV.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The AEDPA provides that an appeal may not be taken to the
court of appeals from a final order in a § 2254 proceeding
unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability on the
ground that “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
16
denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
This Court denies a certificate of appealability because jurists
of reason would not find it debatable that dismissal of the
Petition as time barred is correct.
See Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
V.
CONCLUSION
This Court will dismiss the Petition with prejudice and
deny a certificate of appealability.
An Order consistent with
this Opinion will be filed.
s/Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
April 29, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?