RANKINES v. MEYRICK et al

Filing 25

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 2/10/2016. (TH, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

[Docket No. 14]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

JAVAN RANKINES,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 14-1842 (RMB/AMD)
v.
OPINION
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE
DETECTIVE TROOPER I DAVID L.
MEYRICK, BADGE #6005
(individually and in his
official capacity); NEW JERSEY
STATE POLICE, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Matthew S. Wolf
Matthew S. Wolf, Esquire, LLC
B, 2nd Floor
1236 Brace Road
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
Attorney for Plaintiff
Robert P. Preuss
Office of the Attorney General
Division of Law
P.O. Box 112
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625-0112
Attorney for Defendants
BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Trooper David L. Meyrick,
1

Badge #6005, and the New Jersey State Police (collectively the
“Defendants”) [Docket No. 14], seeking to dismiss all of
Plaintiff Javan Rankines’s claims.

For the reasons set forth

below, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in
its entirety.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit stems from the arrest of Plaintiff Javan

Rankines (“Rankines”) on January 31, 2012 by Trooper David L.
Meyrick (“Meyrick”) for various drug-related offenses.

Rankines

was arrested during the execution of a properly authorized “no
knock” search warrant.
(“DSOF”) ¶¶ 78, 79, 82.

Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
The execution of the search warrant and

the arrest of Rankines were the culmination of an investigation
by Meyrick lasting over a week.
On or about January 22, 2012, Meyrick met with a
confidential informant with whom he was familiar and who had
previously provided him with reliable information.
37.

DSOF ¶¶ 36,

The confidential informant advised Meyrick that there were

individuals selling cocaine and weapons at 1091 Thurman Street,
Camden, New Jersey (“1091 Thurman Street”) and that he had
recently purchased cocaine at this address.

DSOF ¶¶ 36, 38.

The confidential informant further identified a man known as “JRan” as one of the individuals selling cocaine out of 1091
2

Thurman Street.

DSOF ¶ 39.

Later that week, Meyrick and the

confidential informant drove by 1091 Thurman Street.
Exhibit E ¶ 9.

DSOF ¶ 40;

The confidential informant identified the person

standing outside the property as J-Ran.

Exhibit D ¶ 9.

Meyrick proceeded to conduct covert surveillance of 1091
Thurman Street.

DSOF ¶ 43.

He observed several men entering

and exiting the residence and engaging in brief conversations
with each other.

Exhibit D ¶ 10.

According to the tax and

utility records reviewed by Meyrick, the property at 1091
Thurman Street was abandoned.

DSOF ¶ 50.

Based on his

experience and training as a state trooper, Meyrick believed
this, along with the frequent foot traffic at the property,
indicated that drugs were being sold from 1091 Thurman Street.
DSOF ¶¶ 45, 52.
Meyrick then provided the name J-Ran to the Camden County
Prosecutor’s Office Intelligence Unit.

DSOF ¶ 46.

The

Intelligence Unit identified J-Ran as the Plaintiff, Javan
Rankines, and provided Meyrick with a photograph of him.
¶¶ 47, 48; Exhibit D ¶ 11.

DSOF

The confidential informant

identified the man in the photograph of Rankines as J-Ran.
¶ 48; Exhibit D ¶ 12.
Although he was confident in the reliability of the
confidential informant’s information, Meyrick proceeded to
3

DSOF

confirm the information with his own observations.

He arranged

for the confidential informant to make two controlled purchases
of cocaine from 1091 Thurman Street.

The first took place

during the week of January 22, 2012.

DSOF ¶ 54.

Meyrick

provided the confidential informant with a certain sum of money,
searched him to ensure he did not have other money or contraband
on his person, and instructed him to purchase an “8-ball” of
cocaine at 1091 Thurman Street.

DSOF ¶¶ 55, 56.

The

confidential informant was under Meyrick’s constant
surveillance.

DSOF ¶ 57, 63.

Meyrick observed the confidential

informant briefly converse with the Plaintiff outside 1091
Thurman Street.

DSOF ¶ 59.

The Plaintiff admits that he spoke

with the confidential informant outside 1091 Thurman Street at
this time.

Plaintiff’s Response (“Pl. Resp.”) to DSOF ¶ 59.

The confidential informant entered the residence briefly.1
Exhibit D ¶¶ 19-20.

The confidential informant then reunited

with Meyrick at a designated meet location and provided Meyrick
with a substance, later confirmed to be cocaine, which he stated

1

Meyrick claims that both the confidential informant and the
Plaintiff entered the residence. DSOF ¶ 60. The Plaintiff,
however, disputes that he has ever been inside 1091 Thurman
Street. See, e.g., Pl. Resp. to DSOF ¶ 60. At this stage, the
Court must assume that the Plaintiff’s statement is true. Given
the other undisputed facts regarding Meyrick’s investigation and
observations, the Court does not consider this a genuine dispute
of material fact precluding a finding of summary judgment.
4

he purchased from the Plaintiff while inside 1091 Thurman
Street.

DSOF ¶¶ 63-65.

The second controlled purchase took place during the week
of January 29, 2012.

In preparation, Meyrick searched the

confidential informant and confirmed that he had no money or
contraband on his person.

DSOF ¶ 67.

Under Meyrick’s constant

surveillance, the confidential informant once again spoke
briefly with the Plaintiff outside 1091 Thurman Street.
68.

DSOF ¶

Upon return to the predetermined meet location, the

confidential informant gave Meyrick a substance, also later
confirmed to contain cocaine, which he indicated he purchased
from the Plaintiff.2

DSOF ¶ 71, 74.

On January 31, 2012, Meyrick prepared a “no knock” search
warrant to search the premises of 1091 Thurman Street, which was
approved by Assistant Prosecutor Gary Menchen, and finally
reviewed, signed, and authorized by Judge Freeman.
78; Exhibit D ¶ 34.

DSOF ¶¶ 77,

Later that day, members of the Troop ‘A’

T.E.A.M.S. South, Canine South Unit, Metro South, and the
Strategic Investigations Unit executed the “no knock” search
warrant at 1091 Thurman Street and recovered 161 jars or baggies

2

While the Plaintiff denies that he sold drugs from 1091 Thurman
Street, he does not dispute that the confidential informant told
Meyrick that the Plaintiff sold him cocaine during the
controlled purchases. Pl. Resp. to DSOF ¶ 71.
5

of suspected raw marijuana, ¾ ounce of cocaine, nine decks of
suspected heroin, fifty-nine baggies of suspected crack cocaine,
a 20 gauge shotgun, thirty-two .45 caliber hollow point rounds,
and thirteen separate rounds of ammunition.

DSOF ¶ 79.

The

drugs were found in the exact location inside 1091 Thurman
Street that the confidential informant had told Meyrick they
would be.

DSOF ¶ 81.

The Plaintiff does not dispute this.

Pl.

Resp. to DSOF ¶ 81.
During the execution of the search warrant, the Plaintiff,
who was standing on the street about four doors down from 1091
Thurman Street, was arrested.

DSOF ¶ 82; Plaintiff’s Counter-

Statement of Material Facts (“PSOF”) ¶ 1.

The Plaintiff was

charged with numerous drug and firearm-related offenses,
including possession with intent to distribute marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin, possession of marijuana, conspiracy to
distribute marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a drug-related offense, and
unlawful possession of a weapon.

DSOF ¶ 86; PSOF ¶ 9.

Judge

Burkett set bail on the Plaintiff at $300,000 and Defendant
Meyrick transported the Plaintiff to Camden County Jail.

DSOF ¶

87.
The Plaintiff was never indicted on any charges resulting
from the January 31, 2012 arrest.
6

PSOF ¶ 20.

He was ultimately

released in October 2012.
[Docket No. 14-3].

Rankines Deposition Tr. 59:10-18

On or about January 10, 2013, the Plaintiff

filed a notice of claim related to this incident.

DSOF ¶ 92;

Exhibit H.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

A fact is “material” if it will “affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]”

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A dispute is

“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Id.

When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact, a court’s role is not to weigh the evidence; all
reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should
be resolved against the moving party.”

Meyer v. Riegel Prods.

Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1983).

However, a mere

“scintilla of evidence,” without more, will not give rise to a
genuine dispute for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

Further,

a court does not have to adopt the version of facts asserted by
the nonmoving party if those facts are “utterly discredited by
the record [so] that no reasonable jury” could believe them.
7

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 373, 380 (2007).

In the face of such

evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “where the
record . . . could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party[.]”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).

Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary

judgment [has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’”
56(e)).

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
The non-movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to

concrete evidence in the record”; mere allegations, conclusions,
conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment.
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995);
accord Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d

8

199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[S]peculation and conjecture may not
defeat summary judgment.”)).
III. ANALYSIS
Rankines brings claims for civil rights violations under
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act, as well as a Section 1983 Monell claim.
Additionally, Rankines brings claims for false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, negligence, and vicarious
liability.
claims.

The Defendants move for summary judgment on all

The Defendants also argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity.
A. Violation of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count 1), False
Imprisonment (Count 3), and False Arrest (Count 4)
The Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary
judgment on Rankines’s civil rights claims under Section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act and under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,
as well as his false arrest and false imprisonment claims,
because Defendant Meyrick had probable cause to arrest the
Plaintiff for drug possession and sale.

Alternatively, the

Defendants maintain that they are entitled qualified immunity.
The Plaintiff responds that questions of fact exist regarding
the presence of probable cause.

Because the Court finds that

probable cause existed for the Plaintiff’s arrest for possession
9

with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances, the
Plaintiff’s claims alleging civil rights violations, false
arrest, and false imprisonment are defeated in their entirety.
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n
analyzing false arrest claims, a court to insulate a defendant
from liability need only find that probable cause existed as to
any offense that could be charged under the circumstances.”)
(alterations omitted).
i. Probable Cause
“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to
warrant a reasonable person to believe an offense had been
committed.”
Cir. 1992).3

United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 342 (3d
While the existence of probable cause at the time

of arrest is generally a question for the jury, Merkle v. Upper
Dublin School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000), when

3

“This district has repeatedly interpreted [the New Jersey Civil
Right Act] analogously to § 1983.” Pettit v. New Jersey, Civ.
A. No. 09-3735 (NLH/JS), 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30,
2011) (collecting cases). Likewise, the standard for probable
cause is identical under federal and New Jersey law. Maples v.
Atlantic City, Civ. A. No. 06-2200 (RMB/AMD), 2008 WL 2446825,
at *6 (D.N.J. June 16, 2008); New Jersey v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570,
585-86 (2010) (reciting standard for probable cause to arrest
under New Jersey law and citing to federal law as the basis for
that standard). For these reasons, the Plaintiff’s federal and
state law claims are considered together.
10

there are no material, disputed facts, the Court may resolve the
issue as a matter of law.

Id. at 788-89.

In determining

whether probable cause existed at the time of an arrest, the
“arresting officer’s state of mind” and the charges “actually
invoked by the arresting officer” are irrelevant.

Devenpeck v.

Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004); Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149,
154 (2d Cir. 2006).

Courts must instead objectively assess

whether, at the time of the arrest and based upon the facts
known to the officer, probable case existed “as to any offense
that could be charged under the circumstances.”

Wright v.

Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005); Barna v. Perth
Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994).

Courts must determine

“whether, at the moment the arrest was made, . . . the facts and
circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had
committed or was committing an offense.”

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.

89, 91 (1964).
Probable cause may exist “even in the absence of the actual
observance of criminal conduct when a prudent observant would
reasonably infer that a defendant acted illegally.”

United

States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 97 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n. 13 (1983) (“probable
11

cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”)).
Additionally, “[t]he validity of the arrest does not depend on
whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact
that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he
is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest.”
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979).

“[T]he kinds

and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary
for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest.”

Id.

The Defendants argue that the record, even when viewed in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, establishes that
Meyrick had probable cause to arrest Rankines, because the facts
viewed as a whole would lead a reasonable person to believe
Rankines was selling drugs in or around 1091 Thurman Street.
The only attack the Plaintiff makes is one of his innocence.
repeatedly disputes ever entering 1091 Thurman Street.
however, misses the point.

He

That,

Even assuming that to be true, which

the Court must at this stage, Defendant Meyrick had sufficient
probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff based on the information
from the confidential informant, the two controlled purchases of
cocaine, his general observations of 1091 Thurman Street,
including the Plaintiff’s own undisputed presence outside the

12

residence, and the illegal drugs recovered from 1091 Thurman
Street after the execution of the search warrant.
The Plaintiff also relies heavily on the fact that he was
never convicted of any of the crimes charged in relation to the
January 31, 2012 arrest.

As already explained, however, this

fact is immaterial to the determination of whether Meyrick had
probable cause to arrest Rankines.

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35.

Likewise, the Plaintiff’s protestations that Meyrick never
personally and directly observed him engaging in criminal
conduct are unavailing.

Burton, 288 F.3d at 97 (probable cause

may exist “even in the absence of the actual observance of
criminal conduct . . . .”).
Under the undisputed facts as established, it was
reasonable to believe that Plaintiff Rankines was selling
illegal drugs in or around 1091 Thurman Street.

First,

Defendant Meyrick relied upon the information of a confidential
informant with whom he was familiar and who he believed to be
reliable based on information provided in prior investigations.
The confidential informant told Meyrick that he had previously
purchased cocaine from 1091 Thurman Street from an individual,
later identified as the Plaintiff, who he knew as “J-Ran.”

The

Plaintiff does not attack the credibility of the confidential
informant.

The Plaintiff could have, for example, taken
13

discovery on that issue to challenge the confidential
informant’s credibility or Meyrick’s prior experiences with the
confidential informant.

Apparently, however, he did not.

Information obtained from confidential informants,
especially when confirmed, as here, by independent police
investigation, often supports a finding of probable cause.

See,

e.g., Napier v. City of New Castle, 407 F. App’x 578, 583 (3d
Cir. 2010) (finding that probable cause for arrest existed where
“[a]t the time of the arrest, [defendant] knew that [plaintiff]
had been identified by the CI, that he had witnessed a woman
selling drugs who looked like [plaintiff’s] driver’s license
photograph, that [plaintiff] resembled the woman he had seen
selling drugs—albeit with a different hairstyle and weight—and
that it had been three and one-half months since he observed the
woman selling drugs.”); O’Connor v. City of Philadelphia, 233 F.
App’x 161, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An informant’s ‘veracity,’
‘reliability’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant
in determining the value of his report.

An informant who

relates his or her information to a law enforcement officer
during an in-person meeting is more reliable than an anonymous
caller.

The corroboration of an informant’s tip by independent

police work enhances the value of an informer’s tip.

In making

a warrantless arrest an officer may rely upon information
14

received through an informant, rather than upon his direct
observations, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably
corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.”)
(internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
Second, Meyrick personally observed several men going in
and out of 1091 Thurman Street, a property he knew to be
abandoned.

Based on his training and experience as a state

trooper, Meyrick found this to be consistent with a location
used to sell illegal drugs.

Among the men he saw in the

vicinity of 1091 Thurman Street was the Plaintiff.

The

Plaintiff does not deny being in the vicinity of 1091 Thurman
Street during the relevant time period.
Third, Meyrick further observed the confidential informant
and Rankines speaking outside 1091 Thurman Street during the
controlled purchases of illegal drugs.

The Plaintiff does not

deny that he spoke to the confidential informant outside 1091
Thurman Street.

During the two controlled purchases, Meyrick

did not observe the confidential informant interacting with
anyone except the Plaintiff.

Meyrick searched the confidential

informant to ensure that he did not have any contraband on his
person prior to the controlled purchase.

After each of the

controlled purchases, the confidential informant returned to

15

Meyrick and turned over cocaine he stated he purchased from the
Plaintiff at 1091 Thurman Street.
Finally, law enforcement recovered large quantities of
illegal drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, after
the execution of the search warrant at 1091 Thurman Street.
Rankines does not challenge the search of the residence.

The

contraband recovered from the residence confirmed the
confidential informant’s information regarding the sale of drugs
at that address.
The Court agrees with the Defendants that these facts,
viewed in their totality, would plainly lead a reasonable person
to believe that Plaintiff Rankines was engaging in criminal
activity and, thus, support a finding of probable cause.

For

these reasons, summary judgment as to Counts 1, 3, and 4 is
granted in the Defendants’ favor.
ii. Qualified Immunity
The Defendants argue, in the alternative, that they are
entitled to qualified immunity.

Even if the Defendants had

violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, which the Court
has already found they did not, qualified immunity would shield
the Defendants from liability.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
16

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); accord Plumhoff v. Rickard,
134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (“An official sued under § 1983 is
entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”).
The question of whether Defendant Meyrick is entitled to
qualified immunity requires this Court to answer two questions:
“(1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right,” and
“(2) whether the right was clearly established, such that it
would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001).
either order.

Saucier v. Katz,

The questions may be addressed in

Pearson, 555 at 242.

Where the underlying facts

are undisputed, the doctrine’s applicability is a question of
law.

Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
In determining whether Meyrick’s actions violated a

“clearly established right,” the “inquiry ‘must be undertaken in
light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.’”

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198

(2004) (citing Saucier, 533 at 206).

While arrest without

probable cause is certainly a clearly established constitutional
17

violation, that is not enough.

See id.

The Court agrees with

the Defendants that it is not clearly established that an
officer in Meyrick’s position would not have probable cause to
arrest Rankines.
Probable cause need not be supported by “the kinds and
degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a
conviction.”

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35.

All that is required

is that “the facts and circumstances within the arresting
officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable
person to believe an offense had been committed.”
F.2d at 342.

McGlory, 968

Here, as the Court has already detailed, the

“facts and circumstances within [Meyrick’s] knowledge”
supporting his belief that Rankines was engaging in criminal
activity are overwhelming.

A known and reliable confidential

informant had informed Meyrick that the Plaintiff sold drugs out
of 1091 Thurman Street.

Meyrick himself saw Rankines outside

1091 Thurman Street talking to the confidential informant during
two controlled purchases of cocaine.

The confidential informant

told Meyrick that the cocaine procured during the two controlled
purchases was bought from Rankines.

After obtaining a search

warrant to search 1091 Thurman Street and searching the
premises, large quantities of illegal drugs were found.
Plaintiff disputes none of this.
18

The

Given the ample case law establishing that probable cause
exists where an officer has information from a credible and
reliable informant, as well as corroboration of that information
by independent police work, the Court holds that it is not
clearly established that no probable cause would exist for an
officer in Meyrick’s position to arrest an individual for drug
possession and sale.

See, e.g., Napier, 407 F. App’x at 583;

O’Connor, 233 F. App’x at 164-65; see also United States v.
Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 556 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As in Gates, the
magistrate judge in this case had a ‘substantial basis for
crediting the [informant’s] hearsay’ tip because the tip was
corroborated in significant part by independent police
investigation. . . . Crucially, officers corroborated [the
arrestee’s] drug involvement when they observed the confidential
informant consummate a controlled buy of 3.5 grams of cocaine
from [him] at the intersection of Higbee and Cottage.”) (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45); United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d
647, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Our cases consistently have
recognized that police establish probable cause for a search
where they corroborate a reliable informant’s tip about drug
activity at a residence by conducting a single controlled buy of

19

illegal narcotics.”) (collecting cases).4

Therefore, even if

there had been no probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff, which
this Court finds there was, Defendant Meyrick would be entitled
to qualified immunity.
B. Section 1983 Monell Claim (Count 2)
The Plaintiff also argues that the New Jersey State Police
should be held liable because it was aware of, condoned,
encouraged, and failed to deter or to stop a pattern of
allegedly unlawful acts of Defendant Meyrick and any other state
troopers involved in the Plaintiff’s arrest.

The Plaintiff

further alleges that the New Jersey State Police failed to
properly supervise, discipline, and train its officers as a
matter of policy and pattern.

See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
This claim fails for two reasons.

First, because this

Court has already found that there was probable cause to arrest
the Plaintiff and, therefore, that there was no constitutional
violation for which Defendant Meyrick or any officers could be
held liable under Section 1983 or the New Jersey Civil Rights
Act, the New Jersey Police Department cannot be held vicariously

4

These cases, relied upon by the Defendants for the proposition
that confidential informants may be used to support a finding of
probable cause, are criminal cases. The Court observes that,
while these cases are useful, they are not dispositive.
20

liable.

Napier, 407 F. App’x at 584 (citing Williams v. Borough

of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Second, as the Defendants correctly note, a police
department is not a separate legal entity that can be sued.
“[A] police department is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978).”

Hannah v.

Bridgewater Police Dep’t, 2014 WL 4272759, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug.
28, 2014); accord Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
For these reasons, summary judgment as to Count 2 is
likewise granted in favor of the Defendants.
C. Malicious Prosecution (Count 5)
The Defendants also contend that they are entitled to
summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.
“To prevail on a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant initiated a
criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5)
the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with
the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”
21

Stetser v. Jinks, Civ. A. No. 10-3094 (RMB/JS), 2013 WL 3791613,
at *2 (D.N.J. July 19, 2013), aff’d 572 F. App’x 85 (3d Cir.
June 5, 2014).5

When claims of malicious prosecution are brought

against an arresting officer, it must also be shown that the
chain of causation was not broken by the “intervening exercise
of independent judgment” by a judge or prosecutor.

Freeman v.

State, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 25 (App. Div. 2002).
The Defendants argue that the charges against the Plaintiff
were initiated with probable cause and that the record is devoid
of any evidence that the Defendants acted with malice or any
other improper motive.

The Plaintiff counters that Defendant

Meyrick lacked probable cause to arrest and charge him, but does
respond to the Defendants’ contention that there is no evidence
of malice or improper motive.

The Court agrees with the

Defendants and, for the following reasons, grants summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants on the Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim (Count 5).

5

To establish a malicious prosecution claim under New Jersey
state law, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the criminal
action was instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff,
(2) that it was actuated by malice, (3) that there was an
absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (4) that it
was terminated favorably to the plaintiff. Stolinski v.
Pennypacker, 772 F. Supp. 2d 626, 636-37 (D.N.J. 2011). As the
elements are materially identical, the Court will discuss the
state and federal claims together.
22

“Lack of probable cause is the sine qua non of malicious
prosecution.”

Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 269

F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001).

As this Court has already

concluded, there was probable cause for the Plaintiff’s arrest
and for the drug-related charges brought against him.

Defendant

Meyrick arrested and charged the Plaintiff after consulting with
a reliable confidential informant with whom he had worked
before, observing two controlled purchases of controlled
substances, and executing a valid search of 1091 Thurman Street
pursuant to a warrant and recovering large quantities of illegal
controlled substances, a firearm, and ammunition.

The Plaintiff

was standing on the street near the premises while the search
warrant was executed.

These facts, considered together, support

a finding of probable cause.
Additionally, the Court finds that, as the Defendants
contend, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding
of malice or other improper motive.

In fact, the Plaintiff does

not dispute this in his opposition brief.

“Malice can be

inferred from want of probable cause, provided the plaintiff
produces at least some extrinsic evidence of that malice.”
Prince v. Aiellos, 594 F. App’x 742, 746 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).

In

the context of malicious prosecution, “malice can mean ill-will
23

or the use of a prosecution for an extraneous purpose or a lack
of belief in the guilt of the accused.”

Lippay v. Christos, 996

F.2d 1490, 1503 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).

First,

probable cause existed for the Plaintiff’s arrest and charges.
Second, the Plaintiff produced no evidence that the Defendants
acted with malice or for any purpose other than bringing the
Plaintiff to justice.
For these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants on the malicious prosecution claim.
D. Negligence (Count 6)
Plaintiff Rankines further alleges that Defendant New
Jersey State Police was negligent in its hiring, training, and
supervision of the officers, including Defendant Meyrick,
involved in his arrest.

The Defendants seek summary judgment on

this claim, arguing that there is no evidence in the record that
even suggests that Defendant Meyrick or any other officers had
any propensities to act in an illegal manner, let alone that the
New Jersey State Police had notice of such propensities.
A claim for negligent hiring or retention requires two
showings.

The first is evidence of the employer’s knowledge and

foreseeability of harm to third persons.

Gilbert v. Camden

City, Civ. A. No. 04-3268 (RMB/AMD), 2007 WL 1040978, at *5
(D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2007) (citing DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 173
24

(1982)).

“An employer will only be held responsible for the

torts of its employees beyond the scope of the employment where
it knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness,
incompetence or dangerous attributes of the employee and could
reasonably have foreseen that such qualities created a risk of
harm to other persons.”

DiCosala, 91 N.J. at 173.

“The second

required showing is that, through the negligence of the employer
in hiring the employee, the latter’s incompetence, unfitness or
dangerous characteristics proximately caused the injury.”

Id.

at 174.
A negligent supervision claim requires similar showings.

A

plaintiff must establish that the employer knew or had reason to
know that its employees “exhibited dangerous characteristics.”
Cordial v. Atl. City, Civ. A. No. 11-1457 (RMB/AMD), 2014 WL
1095584, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2014).

Harm to others must be

reasonably foreseeable and the negligent supervision must be the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

Id.

There is no evidence in the record that Defendant Meyrick
or any other state troopers involved in the Plaintiff’s arrest
are unfit, incompetent, or dangerous.
suggests the opposite.

In fact, the evidence

Defendant Meyrick thoroughly

investigated the Plaintiff and the occurrences at 1091 Thurman
Street prior to obtaining a valid search warrant for the
25

premises and arresting the Plaintiff.

Furthermore, there is no

evidence whatsoever in the record that the New Jersey State
Police knew of any propensities of Defendant Meyrick to act in
an illegal, dangerous, or otherwise improper manner.

Likewise,

there is no evidence that any negligence on the part of the New
Jersey State Police was the proximate cause of Rankines’s
alleged injury.
In sum, the Plaintiff has not produced evidence to support
a single element of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the
Defendants on the Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
E. Vicarious Liability (Count 7)
According to the Defendants, Count 7 of the Plaintiff’s
Complaint, which sets forth a claim for vicarious liability,
must be dismissed to the extent that Counts 1 through 6 are
dismissed because a vicarious liability claim “depends for its
viability on the establishment of the underlying torts upon
which it is based.”
No. 16].

Defs. Summary Judgment Br. at 27 [Docket

“[I]n the absence of an underlying tort by an employee

there can be no vicarious liability on the part of the
employer.”

Ricketti v. Barry, Civ. A. No. 13-6804 (AET/DEA),

2015 WL 2376013, at *4 (D.N.J. May 18, 2015) (citing Carter v.
Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003)); accord Moriarty v. Classic
26

Auto Grp., Inc., Civ. A. No. 13-5222 (JBS/AMD), 2014 WL 884761,
at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2014).

Likewise, where there is no

underlying constitutional violation by an employee, there can be
no vicarious liability on the part of the employer.

Napier, 407

F. App’x at 584; Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia,
328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003).
As the Court has already dismissed Counts 1 through 6 of
the Plaintiff’s Complaint for the reasons set forth above, there
are no underlying claims capable of supporting a vicarious
liability claim against the New Jersey State Police.
Accordingly, the Court also grants summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants on the Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim.
F. Notice of Claim Requirement
The Defendants urge the Court, in the alternative, to grant
summary judgment in their favor on Counts 3 through 7 because
the Plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within 90 days of
the accrual of his claims as required by the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act (“NJTCA”).

Under the NJTCA, a plaintiff bringing a

claim against a public entity or public employee must give the
relevant public entity notice of the claim within ninety days
after the cause of action accrues.

N.J.S.A. § 59:8—8.

A

plaintiff who fails to comply with this requirement “shall be

27

forever barred from recovering against a public entity or public
employee.”

Id.

The Plaintiff concedes that he filed his only notice of
claim on January 10, 2013, nearly a year after his arrest by
Defendant Meyrick.

DSOF ¶ 92; Pl. Resp. to DSOF ¶ 92.

The

Plaintiff’s only response to the Defendants’ argument is that
the NJTCA “does not bar the fee shifting civil right claims in
the Complaint.”

Pl. Opp. Br. at 10 [Docket No. 20].

The

Defendants, however, do not move for summary judgment on the
constitutional claims on this ground.

Characterizing this

action as a “civil rights action” does not permit the Plaintiff
to bypass the notice requirements applicable to his state law
claims.

See Rolax v. Whitman, 53 F. App’x 635, 637 (3d Cir.

2002) (“When an action in tort is initiated against a public
entity or its employees, the complaint must also meet the
requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act”); Baklayan v.
Ortiz, Civ. A. No. 11-3943 (CCC/MF), 2012 WL 3560384, at *5
(D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2012) (“All common law tort claims, including
both negligence and intentional claims, are subjected to this
notice requirement.”).
“False arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue at the
time of the detention.”
833, 838 (3d Cir. 2009).

Hyatt v. Cty. of Passaic, 340 F. App'x
Rankines’s false arrest and false
28

imprisonment claims accrued on the day of his arrest and
detention, January 31, 2012.

His notice of claim is, therefore,

untimely and Counts 3 and 4 are barred under the NJTCA.
Likewise, the Plaintiff’s negligence claim, Count 6, is also
barred by the NJTCA, insofar as it relates his arrest and
detention.

Additionally, the vicarious liability claim, Count

7, fails to the extent it is dependent upon these claims.

The

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice requirements as to
Counts 3, 4, 6, and 7 provides an additional basis for granting
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on these claims.
A malicious prosecution claim, however, does not accrue
until there is a favorable termination of the criminal
proceedings.

Otherwise, “a requisite element of the cause of

action would not have been present.”

Shontz v. Cumberland Cty.,

2008 WL 2329928, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 9, 2008);
accord Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 1998);
Castillo-Perez v. City of Elizabeth, Civ. A. No. 11-6958
(KM/CL), 2014 WL 1614845, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2014).
Therefore, Rankines’s malicious prosecution claim accrued on the
date the charges against him were dismissed, which he alleges
occurred on October 15, 2012.

PSOF ¶ 18.

Assuming this to be

true, the Plaintiff’s notice of claim regarding his malicious
prosecution tort claim was timely.
29

While the notice of claim requirement does not bar this
claim, the Court holds that the Defendants are nonetheless
entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim
for the separate reasons outlined above.

To reiterate, the

undisputed evidence establishes that probable cause existed for
Rankines’s arrest and the institution of criminal proceedings
against him.

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record

that the Defendants acted with malice or for any purpose other
than bringing the Plaintiff to justice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED in its entirety.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED:

February 10, 2016

30