SHIELDS v. PENNS GROVE-CARNEYS POINT REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
Filing
43
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 3/1/16. (js)
[Docket No. 24]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
BRIAN SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 14-2106 (RMB/JS)
OPINION
PENNS GROVE-CARNEYS POINT
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et
al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Katherine Charbonnier Oeltjen
Console Law Offices
110 Marter Avenue, Suite 105
Moorestown, NJ 08057
Laura C. Mattiacci
Console Law Offices
1525 Locust Street, 9th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Michael Paul Madden
Timothy R. Bieg
Madden & Madden
108 Kings Highway East, Suite 200
P.O. Box 210
Haddonfield, NJ 08033-0389
Attorneys for Defendants
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendants Penns Grove-Carneys Point
Regional School District, Penns Grove-Carneys Point Board of
Education (together, the “Defendants”), and Gregory T. Wright
[Docket No. 24].1
For the reasons set forth below, the motion
for summary judgment shall be denied.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This dispute stems from the decision made by the Penns
Grove-Carneys Point Board of Education (the “Board”) at an
August 12, 2013 meeting not to hire Plaintiff Brian Shields for
the position of elementary school teacher at the Field Street
School.
In approximately July 2013, the Plaintiff applied to be an
elementary school teacher at the Field Street School.
Dep. Tr. 30:1-5 [Docket No. 31-2, Exhibit A].
Shields
A committee that
included the school principal, Ms. Mary Kwiatkowski, selected
and interviewed several candidates, including the Plaintiff.
Kwiatkowski Dep. Tr. 8:8-15 [Docket No. 31-2, Exhibit D]; August
1, 2013 Letter [Docket No. 31-4, Exhibit N].
1
The committee
Gregory T. Wright and the John Doe Defendants have since been
dismissed by a stipulation signed by all parties pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) [Docket No. 27].
It is also unclear to the Court whether Defendants Penns GroveCarneys Point Regional School District and Penns Grove-Carneys
Point Board of Education are separate and distinct entities,
given the language in the stipulation, which describes the
remaining Defendants as “the Penns Grove-Carneys Point Regional
School District, also referred to as the Penns Grove-Carneys
Point Board of Education.” Id. The parties will need to
clarify this issue.
2
recommended the Plaintiff specifically for the elementary school
special education position.
Kwiatkowski Dep. Tr. 7:23-8:2.
The
Plaintiff was then interviewed by the Superintendent, Dr. Joseph
Massare.
Dr. Massare was impressed by the Plaintiff and
indicated that he would recommend the Plaintiff to the Board of
Education.
Massare Dep. Tr. 26:10-27:14 [Docket No. 31-2,
Exhibit E].
Dr. Massare explained to the Plaintiff that,
although the Board would make the final decision on whether or
not to hire the Plaintiff, he “was 99.9 percent sure that [the
Plaintiff] would be hired at that board meeting, simply because
that has been [his] record with the current school board” during
his eleven years as the Superintendent.
Id. at 34:2-11.
After
his interview with Dr. Massare, the Plaintiff resigned from his
teaching position at another school.
Shields Dep. Tr. 63:4-11.
On August 12, 2013, the Board met to vote on a number of
personnel issues, including whether to hire the Plaintiff.
The
meeting began with the Executive Session, which is closed to the
public.
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) [Docket No. 31-
7] ¶ 38.
Dr. Massare and the Board members reviewed the agenda
for the meeting, including the vote on whether to hire the
Plaintiff.
Massare Dep. Tr. 28:7-20.
During the Executive
Session, Dr. Massare recommended the Plaintiff to the Board for
hiring.
Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) [Docket No. 24-
2] ¶ 28.
The Board also discussed concerns over “local people
3
[] not being hired, particular those that the Board had paid for
their education.”
August 12, 2013 Executive Session Minutes
[Docket No. 24-2, Exhibit G].
According to Dr. Massare, during
the closed portion of the meeting, the Board appeared to be in
favor of hiring the Plaintiff.
Massare Dep. Tr. 54:1-4, 136:14-
137:8.
The Board then considered the candidates, including the
Plaintiff, in a public session, during which members of the
public are permitted to make statements to the Board.
31.
DSOF ¶
During this public session, a community activist, Walter
Hudson, and others accused the Board of not hiring enough
minorities for teaching positions.
PSOF ¶ 43; DSOF ¶ 31.
Dr.
Massare and Ms. Debra Bradford, a Board member, testified that
Mr. Hudson specifically urged the Board to vote against the
Plaintiff and Ms. Jaime Kirkpatrick, another Caucasian
individual seeking a teaching position at the Field Street
School.
Massare Dep. Tr. 52:22-53:10, 143:13-17; Bradford Dep.
Tr. 17:1-10 [Docket No. 31-3, Exhibit G].
Mr. Hudson and his
followers had made similar accusations at previous Board
meetings, but, according to Ms. Kwiatkowski, had never before
recommended against specific teaching candidates.
52.
PSOF ¶¶ 45,
All other personnel matters on the agenda for the Board
meeting were voluntary transfers of individuals already employed
4
by the School District.
August 12, 2013 Meeting Minutes [Docket
No. 24-2, Exhibit F].
Ultimately, the Board voted against hiring the Plaintiff
and Ms. Kirkpatrick.
Id.
Only one Board member, Mrs. Jeannette
Harbeson, voted in favor of hiring the Plaintiff, while the
remaining seven Board members voted against.
Id.
After the
vote, Dr. Massare called the Plaintiff and informed him that the
Board had voted against hiring him because he was Caucasian.
Shields Dep. Tr. 56:12-57:19.
Ms. Bradford testified at her
deposition that the fact that the Plaintiff is white played a
role in her decision to vote against hiring him.
Bradford Dep.
Tr. 41:5-12.
The Board was unable to fill the two elementary school
teacher positions by the beginning of the school year.
substitute teachers fulfilled these roles.
20:12-21:13.
Instead,
Kwiatkowski Dep. Tr.
A Caucasian woman who did not live in the
District, but who had previously taught at a different school in
the District, was eventually hired for the position of special
education elementary school teacher at the Field Street School.
DSOF ¶¶ 41-42; Massare Dep. Tr. 72:9-19.
On April 3, 2014, based on the Board’s decision not to hire
him for allegedly discriminatory reasons, the Plaintiff filed a
complaint against Penns Grove-Carneys Point Regional School
District, Penns Grove-Carneys Point Board of Education, Gregory
5
T. Wright, and several John Doe Defendants [Docket No. 1].
The
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against Mr. Wright
and the John Doe Defendants by stipulation on August 13, 2015
[Docket No. 27].
After extensive discovery, including the
depositions of the Board members, Dr. Massare, and the
Plaintiff, the Defendants moved for summary judgment [Docket No.
24].
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
Fed. R.
A fact is “material” if it will “affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]”
Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A dispute is
“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.
When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact, a court’s role is not to weigh the evidence; all
reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should
be resolved against the moving party.”
Meyer v. Riegel Prods.
Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1983).
However, a mere
“scintilla of evidence,” without more, will not give rise to a
genuine dispute for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Further,
a court need not adopt the version of facts asserted by the
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nonmoving party if those facts are “utterly discredited by the
record [such] that no reasonable jury” could believe them.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 373, 380 (2007).
In the face of such
evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “where the
record . . . could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party[.]”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary
judgment [has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’”
56(e)).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
The non-movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to
concrete evidence in the record”; mere allegations, conclusions,
conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment.
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995);
accord Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d
7
199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[S]peculation and conjecture may not
defeat summary judgment.”)).
III. ANALYSIS
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants illegally
discriminated against him due to his race.
He asserts claims
under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act (Count I), Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act (Count II), the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act (Count III), and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”) (Count IV).
As an initial matter, the Court observes that “[s]ummary
judgment is to be used sparingly in employment discrimination
cases[.]”
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. 527 F.3d 358,
369 (3d Cir. 2008).
“[T]he plaintiff’s burden at this stage is
not particularly onerous.”
Id.
The Third Circuit has also
advised that, “[i]n an employment discrimination case a trial
court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an
employer when, as here, its intent is at issue.”
Goosby v.
Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2000)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
A. Municipal Liability
The Defendants contend that the “Court can spend short
shrift with plaintiff’s federal claims against the District”
because the “Plaintiff has failed to produce even the slightest
of evidence that the District maintained an unconstitutional
8
custom, policy or practice, with deliberate indifference to the
rights of plaintiff,” as required to establish municipal
liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
Motion at 14 [Docket No. 24-1].
“A municipality cannot be held liable for the
unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat
superior.”
Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
For municipal
liability under Section 1983, the Plaintiff must demonstrate
that a municipal policy or custom was the “moving force” behind
the constitutional tort of one its employees.
Id. at 222
(quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d
Cir. 1991) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326
(1981)).
Monell also establishes that actions undertaken
directly by municipal subdivisions, such as boards of education,
“unquestionably involve[] official policy.”
Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694 (holding that policy of Department of Social Services and
the City of New York Board of Education involves official
policy).
“[A] municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single
decision by its properly constituted legislative body--whether
or not that body had taken similar action in the past or
intended to do so in the future--because even a single decision
by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official
9
government policy.”
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480 (1986); accord Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235
F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Third Circuit has reiterated
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Pembaur makes clear that
an official with policymaking authority can create official
policy, even by rendering a single decision.”
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2005).
McGreevy v.
Municipal
liability may only be imposed “where the decisionmaker possesses
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to
the action ordered.”
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
“Accordingly,
even one decision by a school [board], if [it] were a final
policymaker, would render [its] decision district policy.”
McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 368; accord Ecotone Farm LLC v. Ward, 2016
WL 335837, at *7 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2016) (“An official has final
policy-making authority, and can thus bind the municipality by
his conduct if the official is responsible for making policy in
the particular area of municipal business in question and the
official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and
unreviewable.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations,
quotations, and modifications omitted).
Whether an official or entity is a final policymaker is a
question of state law.
Ecotone, 2016 WL 335837, at *7;
McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 368.
Under New Jersey law, “[n]o teaching
staff member shall be appointed, except by a recorded roll call
10
majority vote of the full membership of the board of education
appointing him.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-1.
Therefore, as the
Defendant Board has “final, unreviewable discretion to make a
decision or take action” with regards to hiring teachers, it is
considered a policymaker for purposes of this analysis.
See
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir.
2007) (“Plaintiffs may establish a government policy by showing
that a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issued an official
statement of policy.”) (internal quotations and modifications
omitted) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481).
Accordingly, the Board’s decision not to hire the Plaintiff
is an act of official government policy and, as such, Monell
does not bar the Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims against
either Defendant.
B. “Reverse” Discrimination Claims
The Court now turns to the substance of the Plaintiff’s
claims.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that
there are genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary
judgment as to whether the Defendants unlawfully discriminated
against the Plaintiff because of his race, in violation of
Sections 1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (Counts I and
II), the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count III), and the NJLAD
11
(Count IV).
“This district has repeatedly interpreted [the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act] analogously to § 1983.” Pettit v. New
Jersey, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011)
(collecting cases); accord Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E.
Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, n. 5 (3d Cir. 2008).
Likewise, NJLAD
claims are “evaluated using the familiar three-step, burdenshifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green[.]”
Arenas v. L’Oreal USA Products, Inc., 461 F. App’x
131, 133 (3d Cir. 2012).
For these reasons, the Court considers
all four claims together.
The Court will set forth its detailed analysis below.
Put
plainly, however, the undisputed evidence indicates that, at the
August 12, 2013 meeting, members of the public and the Board
members themselves articulated concerns about not hiring enough
minorities and about not hiring teachers from within the
District.
The Board then voted against hiring the Plaintiff and
Ms. Kirkpatrick.
Whether the Board members were persuaded by
one or either of these concerns and voted accordingly is clearly
disputed and is a question of fact for the jury.
190 F.3d at 165.
See Iadimarco,
As there are genuine issues of material fact
regarding the Board’s motives in voting against hiring the
Plaintiff, the Court finds that summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants is inappropriate.
See Goosby, 228 F.3d at 321
(reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants
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where there were genuine issues of material fact as to the
motives behind adverse employment action taken by employer).
To state a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the
employment context, a plaintiff generally must establish “(i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant’s qualifications.”
Iadimarco v. Runyon,
190 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
In the context of a
“reverse” discrimination case, to meet the first prong, the
plaintiff must “present[] sufficient evidence to allow a fact
finder to conclude (given the totality of the circumstances)
that the defendant treated plaintiff less favorably because of
his race[.]”
Id. at 163 (internal quotations and modifications
omitted) (quoting Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978)).
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, once
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to “the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”
Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 157 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
13
at 802).
“If the employer offers some evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason then plaintiff must ‘be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [employer’s] stated reason for
[plaintiff’s] rejection was in fact pretext.’”
(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).
Id. at 157-58
This burden-
shifting analysis “applies with equal force to claims of
‘reverse discrimination.’”
Id. at 158.
When all inferences drawn from the record are viewed in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as they must be on
summary judgment, the undisputed facts suggest that the
Plaintiff may have been treated less favorably by the Defendants
because of his race.
The ultimate resolution of this issue is a
question of fact for the jury.
The Superintendent, Dr. Massare,
directly informed the Plaintiff that he had not been approved by
the Board because he is Caucasian.
57:19.
Shields Dep. Tr. 56:12-
Dr. Massare also testified under oath that, in his
opinion, the Plaintiff would have been hired had he been
African-American.
Massare Dep. Tr. 16:15-17:8.
What’s more,
when asked if she “specifically remember[ed] race playing a
part” in “whether [she was] going to say yes or no to Mr.
Shields’ hiring,” Ms. Bradford, one of the seven Board members
to vote against hiring the Plaintiff, testified under oath that
she “would have to say yes.”
Bradford Dep. Tr. 41:5-12.
Based
on this, a fact finder could reasonably conclude that race
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impermissibly played a role in the Board’s decision not to hire
the Plaintiff.
This is sufficient to establish the first prong.
Further, as the Defendants do not truly contest that the
Plaintiff has established the remaining prongs of a prima facie
case, the Court turns to the next step in the McDonnell Douglas
analysis.
The Defendants respond that the Plaintiff was not hired
because he did not live in the District.
This, if believed, may
be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the
Plaintiff.
However, the Plaintiff must be given an opportunity
to demonstrate that that the Defendants’ nondiscriminatory
reason is merely pretext.
Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 157-58.
A
plaintiff can demonstrate pretext and, therefore, withstand a
motion for summary judgment by “point[ing] to some evidence,
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could
reasonably either, (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the employer’s action.”
Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
Based on the testimony of Dr. Massare and Ms. Bradford, the
Court finds that a fact finder could reasonably “believe that an
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause” of the Board’s decision not
15
to hire the Plaintiff.
Id.
Discrimination need not be the “the
sole cause for an adverse employment decision.”
See Robinson v.
City of Philadelphia, 491 F. App’x 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2012).
Additionally, two Board members specifically denied, under oath,
that they considered the Plaintiff’s residence when voting.
Bradford Dep. Tr. 45:9-17; Wright Dep. Tr. 43:5-7.
This is
further evidence from which a fact finder may reasonably
disbelieve the Defendants’ articulated nondiscriminatory reason
for not hiring the Plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to Counts I, II, III, and IV is denied.
C. Punitive Damages
The Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages, in
addition to compensatory damages, for the wrongs he allegedly
suffered at the hands of the Defendants.
As a preliminary
matter, punitive damages may not be awarded under Section 1981
against a “government, government agency or political
subdivision.”
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
It is also well-
established that “municipalities, and more broadly, state and
local government entities, are immune from punitive damages” in
Section 1983 actions.
Doe v. Cty. of Ctr., PA, 242 F.3d 437,
455 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
Accordingly, to the extent that
16
the Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the Defendants
under Sections 1981 and 1983, the claims fail.
Punitive damages, however, are recoverable against a public
employer under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination under
certain circumstances.
See Gares v. Willingboro Twp., 90 F.3d
720, 730 (3d Cir. 1996).
To recover punitive damages, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) “actual participation in or
willful indifference to the wrongful conduct on the part of
upper management” and (2) “proof that the offending conduct [is]
‘especially egregious.’”
Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp.,
161 N.J. 107, 113 (1999) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J.
282, 313 (1995)); accord Muzslay v. City of Ocean City, 238 F.
App’x 785, 791 (3d Cir. 2007).
Since the Defendants concede
that “upper management actually participated in plaintiff’s
termination,” the Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages hinges
on proof that the Defendants’ actions were “especially
egregious.”
Motion at 17.
The Defendants contend that there is
insufficient evidence to support a finding of egregiousness.
While the Court sees little to support punitive damages, the
issue of punitive damages is generally a question of fact for
the jury.
Elmiry v. Wachovia Corp., 2007 WL 4117260, at *16
(D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2007) (quoting Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333,
347 (3d Cir. 1974)).
Therefore, summary judgment is denied
17
without prejudice as to punitive damages.
The Defendants may
revisit the issue at trial.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is DENIED.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 1, 2016
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