MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. IVEY et al

Filing 107

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/21/2016. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT
CO., LLC doing business as
BORGATA HOTEL CASINO & SPA,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 14-2283(NLH/AMD)
OPINION

v.
PHILLIP D. IVEY, JR., GEMACO
INC., and CHENG YIN SUN,
Defendants.

Appearances:
JEREMY M. KLAUSNER
AGOSTINO & ASSOCIATES, PC
14 WASHINGTON PLACE
HACKENSACK, NJ 07601
On behalf of plaintiff
JEFFREY W. MAZZOLA
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM E. STAEHLE
445 South Street
P.O. BOX 1938
MORRISTOWN, NJ 07962-1938
On behalf of defendant Gemaco, Inc.
EDWIN JOSEPH JACOBS, JR.
MICHAEL F. MYERS
LOUIS M. BARBONE
JOEL SOLOMON JUFFE
JACOBS & BARBONE
1125 PACIFIC AVENUE
ATLANTIC CITY, NJ 08401
On Behalf of defendants Phillip D. Ivey and Cheng Yin Sun

Every breaking wave on the shore
Tells the next one "there'll be one more"
Every gambler knows that to lose
Is what you're really there for 1
HILLMAN, District Judge
As a general matter, gambling is illegal.

This is because

the law considers gambling malum per se, a function of the ageold belief, arising perhaps from Judeo-Christian doctrine, that
gambling is an immoral vice.

Hence, it is prohibited by both

the state and the federal government.
But like most vices, which would exist in some measure
whether banned by governments or not, many states choose to
allow, regulate, and tax some versions of it while preserving
the ban on unregulated enterprises.

The theory is a simple one.

State-sanctioned gambling will be cleansed of its most unsavory
elements and the games will be conducted under a defined set of
published rules overseen by an administrative body.
Most importantly, the odds will be set up to benefit the
“house”, and the state will tax the revenue.

In short, and by

design, over time every gambler who plays against the house will
eventually bet - and lose - more than they win.

Of course, some

games allow for more skill than others and there is always lady

1

U2, “Every Breaking Wave,” © 2010-2014 (lyrics only) Bono, the
Edge.
2

luck.

But the principle that the odds are against you is

literally true and eventually wins out.

This is something every

gambler knows.
In this case, the uncontroverted facts establish that
defendants Phillip D. Ivey and Cheng Yin Sun, “high-stakes”
professional gamblers, set out to shift the odds of the casino
game of Baccarat away from the house and in their favor.

They

achieved this, and profited handsomely from it, by the use of an
elaborate and hidden “edge-sorting” scheme to create, and
thereafter use, a deck of cards aligned in such a way as to
reveal to them the face value of a card before it was turned
over.

Knowing the value of the card beforehand (here within a

range they chose) dramatically increased the odds their
resulting bets would beat the house.

And beat the house they

did.
Not surprisingly, when the scheme was revealed, the
Plaintiff Marina District Development Co., LLC, which does
business as Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa in Atlantic City, New
Jersey, cried “fraud,” among other things, and brought this
suit.

Ivey and Sun previously moved to dismiss Borgata’s

complaint against them, but the Court permitted the case to
proceed through discovery.
The outcome of the discovery process reveals that not much
has changed since the Court issued the decision denying Ivey and
3

Sun’s motion to dismiss, other than that each side’s position is
more fully supported by additional facts and testimony.

Ivey

and Sun and Borgata agree that the primary issue to be decided
by the Court in order to resolve Borgata’s claims against Ivey
and Sun is whether their use of the edge sorting technique in
Baccarat constitutes fair play, breach of contract, or fraud.
Accordingly, the parties have each moved for summary judgment in
their favor. 2
Because the Court issued a comprehensive Opinion in
resolving Ivey and Sun’s motion to dismiss that recounted the
timeline of events, the details of the parties’ conduct, the
nature of Borgata’s claims, and Ivey and Sun’s arguments in
opposition, the Court will fully incorporate that Opinion into
this decision.

(See Docket No. 32.)

This Opinion will

supplement the contents of the prior decision, and restate facts
and law only to the extent necessary to support the Court’s
findings.

2

Also pending is Borgata’s motion for summary judgment on Ivey
and Sun’s counterclaims for fraudulent and negligent spoliation
of evidence relating to the destruction of the playing cards
from the April 2012 and May 2012 sessions. The Court finds that
because an examination of the actual cards that were used during
these sessions is not relevant to the Court’s resolution of
Borgata’s claims against Ivey and Sun, the Court will grant
Borgata’s motion for summary judgment as to Ivey and Sun’s
counterclaims, as they have not suffered damages as a result of
the alleged spoliation. Separately pending is Gameco, Inc.’s
motion for summary judgment. The Court will address that motion
in a separate Opinion.
4

For the reasons expressed below, the Court will grant-inpart and deny-in-part Ivey and Sun’s motion for summary judgment
and Borgata’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
For ease of reference, the following timeline of events and
description of the “edge sorting scheme” are restated from the
Court’s prior Opinion.

In April 2012, Ivey contacted Borgata to

arrange a visit to play high-stakes Baccarat. 3

3

Ivey made five

Borgata explains the rules of Baccarat in its complaint.
(Docket No. 5 at ¶¶ 23-30.) Mini Baccarat (“Baccarat”) is a
game of chance in which the players bet on the relative value of
two hands of two cards each before the hands are dealt or the
cards are revealed. One hand is referred to as the “player’s”
hand, the other is known as the “banker’s” hand. The “banker”
is not the House, and the “player” does not refer to those
playing the game. Players are free to bet on either hand. The
object of Baccarat is to bet on the hand that will have a total
value closest to nine (9). Tens, face cards, and any cards that
total ten are counted as zero. All other cards are counted at
face value. The scores of hands range from 0 to 9. Neither
hand can “bust.” The game is generally played with six or eight
decks of cards placed into a dealing “shoe.” Before the cards
are dealt, the players must place one of three bets: “banker,”
“player,” or “tie.” A bet on “banker” is a bet that the banker
will hold the hand closest to nine. A bet on “player” is a bet
that the player will have the hand closest to nine. A bet on
“tie” is a bet that the two hands will be tied. Two hands are
then dealt from the shoe, one for the “player” and one for the
“banker.” The first card is dealt to the “player’s” hand. In
certain circumstances, a third card may be dealt to either or
both hands, depending on the score of the hands. A winning bet
on “banker” pays 19 to 20. A winning bet on “player” pays even
money. A winning bet on “tie” pays 8 to 1. The house advantage
for Baccarat is approximately 1.06% on “banker” bets, 1.24% on
“player” bets, and 4.84% on “tie” bets. Based on mathematical
probability, when the first card dealt to the “player” has a
value of 6, 7, 8, or 9, the chances of the “player” hand winning
are greatly increased. Conversely, if the “player” hand’s first
5

requests: (1) a private area or “pit” in which to play; (2) a
casino dealer who spoke Mandarin Chinese; (3) a guest (defendant
Sun) to sit with him at the table while he played; (4) one 8deck shoe of purple Gemaco Borgata playing cards to be used for
the entirety of each session of play; and (5) an automatic card
shuffling device to be used to shuffle the cards after each shoe
was dealt.

Borgata agreed to Ivey’s requests.

In return, Ivey

agreed to wire a “front money” deposit of $1 million to Borgata,
and that the maximum bet would be $50,000 per hand.
Under these parameters, Ivey played sixteen hours on April
11, 2012 and won $2,416,000, with his average bet of $25,000.
With the same terms, Ivey returned to Borgata in May 2012, and
over the course of fifty-six hours of Baccarat play, Ivey won
$1,597,400, with his average bet of $36,000.
In July 2012, Ivey returned to Borgata a third time to play
Baccarat with his same five requests, but this time he had
prearranged to raise his front money to $3 million, and raise
his maximum bet to $100,000 per hand.

Over the course of

seventeen hours of Baccarat play, Ivey won $4,787,700, with his

card has a value of 10, 1 (Ace), 2, 3, or 4, the chances of the
“banker” hand winning are greatly increased. Thus, if a player
knows the value of the first card in the shoe before it is
dealt, the player can reverse the house advantage, and instead
have a significant advantage over the house. The player with
this “first card knowledge” has an overall advantage of
approximately 6.765% over the house. The advantage is up to
21.5% for “player” bets and up to 5.5% for “banker” bets.
6

average bet of $89,000.

Under these same terms, Ivey came back

to Borgata one more in October 2012, and over the course of
eighteen hours, Ivey won $824,900 (after being up almost $3.5
million) with an average bet of $93,800. 4

After each visit to

Borgata, Ivey requested that his front money and winnings be
wired to a bank account in Mexico.

Ivey’s total winnings for

his four visits to Borgata was $9,626,000.
During his last visit to Borgata on October 7, 2012,
Borgata learned through a media report that a casino in London,
Crockfords, was withholding £7.3 million won by Ivey playing
Punto Banco, which is essentially the same game as Baccarat.
After Ivey left Borgata on October 8, 2012, Borgata learned more
about the Crockfords matter, and discovered that Ivey had made
the same five requests to Crockfords as he had to Borgata.
Borgata also discovered that Ivey and Sun committed what it
considers to be an “edge sorting scam.”
According to Borgata, as well as Ivey’s own representations
in his suit against Crockfords to recover his winnings as
described in Borgata’s complaint in this case, the mechanics of
“edge sorting” are as follows:
126. The backs of casino playing cards generally
contain a repeating diamond or geometrical pattern as seen
in Exhibit A.

4

Borgata claims that Ivey intentionally lost a portion of his
winnings during his October 2012 play.
7

127. If the cards are not cut symmetrically during
the manufacturing process, the two long edges of the cards
will not be identical. In other words, one edge will have
more of the geometrical pattern than the other. See
Exhibit B.
128. During play, Ivey and Sun used the
accommodations they requested from Borgata to “turn”
strategically important cards so that they could be
distinguished from all other cards in the deck.
129. The dealer would first lift the card so that Sun
could see its value before it was flipped over all the way
and placed on the table. If Sun told the dealer “Hao”
(pronounced “how”), which translates to English as “good
card,” he was instructed to continue to flip the card over
so that the orientation of the long edges of the card
would stay on the same side when flipped. In other words,
the right edge of the card as seen by Sun before the card
was turned all the way over would still be the right edge
of the card as she looked at when it was laid face up on
the table.
130. If Sun told the dealer “Buhao” (pronounced
“boohow”), which translates into English as “bad card,” he
was instructed to flip the card side to side, so that the
long edges would be reversed when flipped. In other words,
the right edge of the card as seen by Sun before the card
was turned all the way over would now be the left edge of
the card as she looked at it when it was laid face up on
the table.
131. By telling the dealer “good card” or “bad card”
in Mandarin, the dealer would place the cards on the table
so that when the cards were cleared and put in the used
card holder, the leading edges of the strategically
important cards could be distinguished from the leading
edges of the other cards in the deck.
132. Upon information and belief Ivey and Sun
“turned” the cards with values of 6, 7, 8, and 9, so that
they could be distinguished from all other cards in the
deck.
133. The process of “edge sorting” all the cards in
the decks took more than one shoe.

8

134. Ivey and Sun knew that if an automatic card
shuffler was used, the edges of the cards would remain
facing in the same direction after they were shuffled.
135. Conversely, Ivey and Sun knew that if the cards
were shuffled by hand, the dealer would turn part of the
deck, rendering their attempts to “turn” the strategically
important cards useless.
136. Keeping the edges of the cards facing the same
direction is the reason Ivey requested the use of an
automatic card shuffler.
137. Ivey also knew that if the same cards were not
reused for each shoe, there would be no benefit to “edge
sorting.”
138. That is why Ivey requested that the same cards
be reused for each shoe.
139. The leading edge of the first card in the shoe
is visible before the cards are dealt.
140. Once the “edge sorting” was completed, Ivey and
Sun were able to see the leading edge of the first card in
the shoe before it was dealt, giving them “first card
knowledge.”
141. If the first card in the shoe was turned, that
meant a strategically important card was being dealt to
the “player” hand, and Ivey would bet accordingly.
142. If the first card in the shoe was not “turned,”
that meant that a less advantageous card was being dealt
to the “player” hand, and Ivey would again bet
accordingly.
143. This “first card knowledge” changed the overall
odds of the game from an approximate 1.06% house advantage
to an approximately 6.765% advantage for Ivey.
144. Ivey began each playing session with bets well
below the maximum bet.
145. Ivey bet below the maximum bet until he and Sun
had completed “edge sorting” all the cards in the shoe.

9

146. Once all the cards in the shoe were “edge
sorted,” Ivey “flatlined” at the maximum bet; i.e. he bet
the maximum amount on every hand.
147. A review of Ivey’s betting pattern shows that
once the cards were “edge sorted,” when he bet on
“player,” the first card dealt was significantly more
likely to be a strategically important card.
148. Conversely, once the cards were “edge sorted,”
when Ivey bet on “banker,” the first card dealt was
significantly more likely to be a strategically
unimportant card.
(Amend. Compl., Docket No. 5 at ¶¶ 126-148.)
DISCUSSION
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 because there is complete diversity of citizenship
between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000.

Borgata is a limited liability company.

The members

of Borgata are Boyd Atlantic City, Inc. and MAC Corp., both
corporations organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the
State of New Jersey, with their principal places of business in
New Jersey.

Defendants Ivey and Sun are citizens of the State

of Nevada, and defendant Gemaco is a corporation organized and
existing pursuant to the laws of the State of Missouri, with its
principal place of business in Blue Springs, Missouri.
B.

Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is
satisfied that the materials in the record, including

10

depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, or
interrogatory answers, demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

If

review of cross-motions for summary judgment reveals no genuine
issue of material fact, then judgment may be entered in favor of
the party deserving of judgment in light of the law and
undisputed facts.

See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo Jr., 150 F.3d

298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
C.

Analysis
1.
Borgata’s Claims for Breach of Contract (Count
I), Breach of Implied Contract (Count II), and Breach
of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
(Count III)

Borgata’s contract-based claims are premised on the
contention that when Ivey and Sun played Baccarat at Borgata,
Borgata agreed to fulfill its obligations to provide a gaming
experience in compliance with the New Jersey Casino Control Act
(“CCA”), N.J.S.A. 5:12-1, et seq. (“CCA”), and Ivey and Sun
agreed to play the game in compliance with the CCA.

Because

Borgata complied with the CCA, while Ivey and Sun did not, Ivey
and Sun breached their agreement with Borgata.
In assessing the viability of Borgata’s claim when

11

resolving Ivey and Sun’s motion to dismiss, the Court observed
that the only way gambling at a casino is lawful is if the
patrons and the casino follow the strictures of the CCA, and
that contractual agreements, whether express or implied,
involving casino gambling in New Jersey must therefore include a
provision that both parties agree to abide by the CCA.
In their motion to dismiss, Ivey and Sun argued that the
CCA preempted or otherwise barred Borgata’s contract-based
claims.

The Court rejected that argument, but found that

although Borgata pleaded a claim for breach of contract, rather
than a private cause of action for violations of the CCA,
Borgata’s contract-based claims were actually just that – a
claim that Ivey and Sun committed various violations of the CCA
and they are not entitled to their gambling winnings.

The Court

also found that even though the CCA did not explicitly preempt
Borgata’s breach of contract claims against Ivey and Sun, the
CCC or the DGE should consider in the first instance whether
Ivey and Sun’s actions violated any provisions of the CCA.
It has been over four years since Ivey and Sun played their
first Baccarat game at the Borgata using the edge sorting
strategy, and the CCC and DGE have never issued a decision as to
the propriety of Ivey and Sun’s actions. 5

5

Thus, the Court must

After the DGE’s investigation, the Attorney General closed the
matter after declining to lodge criminal charges against Ivey
12

decide whether Borgata’s contract-based claims premised on CCA
violations are viable, and if so, whether Borgata or Ivey and
Sun are entitled to judgment on those claims.

See Golden Nugget

v. Gemaco, Inc., ATL-L-5000-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 9,
2015) (recognizing the importance of the CCC or DGE interpreting
the CCA, while also recognizing that when the CCC or DGE
declines to interpret the CCA, a court must make that
determination, and finding that because after two and half
years, the DGE investigation resulted in no enforcement and the
CCC declined to take any action, the court would determine
whether a baccarat game played with unshuffled cards was an
“illegal” game under the CCA).
Borgata contends that the turning of the cards was “marking
cards,” the request to use the automatic shuffling machine
constitutes a “cheating device,” and that the edge sorting
technique is “cheating and swindling.”

See N.J.S.A. 5:12-115(b)

(“It shall be unlawful knowingly to use or possess any marked
cards.”); N.J.S.A. 5:12-115(a)(2) (to “carry on” with or “expose
for play” cards that are marked “in any manner” is expressly
prohibited); N.J.S.A. 5:12-113.1 (making it a crime to “use or
assist another in the use of, a computerized, electronic,
electrical or mechanical device which is designed, constructed,

and Sun.
13

or programmed specifically for use in obtaining an advantage at
playing any game in a licensed casino or simulcasting
facility”); N.J.S.A. 5:12-114 (a crime “[k]nowingly to use or
possess any cheating device with intent to cheat or defraud”);
and N.J.S.A. 5:12-115(a) (providing that “a person is guilty of
swindling and cheating if the person purposely or knowingly by
any trick . . . or by a fraud or fraudulent scheme . . . wins or
attempts to win money or property . . . in connection to casino
gambling”).
The Court finds that Ivey and Sun breached their contract
with Borgata to play Baccarat in compliance with the CCA by
violating N.J.S.A. 5:12-115(a)(2) and (b) when they knowingly
engaged in a scheme to create a set of marked cards and then
used those marked cards to place bets based on the markings.
The term “marked cards” is not defined in the CCA, see 5:12-2,
but it has traditionally been demonstrated by the physical
alteration of the playing card in some way with, for example,
darkened lines down the vertical sides, 6 a little red triangle in
the middle, 7 a substance only visible to the trained eye applied

6

Kelly v. First Astri Corp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 462, 468, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 810, 813 (1999).
7

Id.
14

to the backside (“daubing”), 8 or slight folds (“crimping”) 9.
The purpose of card marking is so that these cards can
later be identified without seeing their faces, which can
substantially increase the odds of winning a particular hand.
United States v. Jing Bing Liang, 362 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.
2004).
In this case, there is no dispute that Ivey and Sun did not
mark the cards used in the Baccarat playing sessions in a
traditional way.

Ivey and Sun did not physically touch any of

the cards at any time, and they did not have access to the card
decks prior to their playing sessions.

These factors support

Ivey and Sun’s argument that they did not mark any cards or
knowingly use or possess any marked cards in violations of the
CCA.
Ivey and Sun’s view of what constitutes a “marked” card is
too narrow.

Such an interpretation would undermine in a

fundamental way the purpose behind the regulatory ban on marked
cards.

“Marking” a card is to surreptitiously identify the

value of the card to a player – and that player alone.

The

physical acts of a card being drawn on, daubed, or crimped are
several ways to inform a player of its value.

8

But, as

United States v. Tschirgi, 65 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 1995).

9

United States v. Jing Bing Liang, 362 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.
2004).
15

demonstrated by Ivey and Sun’s edge sorting technique, a
physical act is not necessary to alert a player surreptitiously
of a card’s value.

Asking a card dealer to turn a card a

particular way so that the pattern on the edge of the card will
distinguish it from other cards such that it will inform the
player of that card’s value also constitutes “marking” within
the meaning and intent of the regulatory ban.

The term

“marking” therefore can be defined as having something done to
the card that identifies the value of the card to a player 10 but
to no one else. 11
Moreover, it is not the act of “marking” a card that
violates the CCA, but rather the “use” or “possession” of the
marked card that violates the CCA.

That is because using or

possessing a marked card that reveals the value of that card
leads to an artificial adjustment of the set odds in the
player’s favor.

The State of New Jersey’s purpose in enacting

10

Or to anyone who is aware that a card is marked, however
accomplished, like a dealer or pit boss who would be advantaged
by the marked card. See, e.g., Kelly, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 468
(patrons were defrauded by the casino when a marked card
cheating scheme was perpetrated by casino employees, including
cardroom dealers, pit bosses, and the cardroom manager).
11

The basic dictionary definitions of the verb “mark” support
this meaning as well. See Merriam-Webster Dictionary (defining
“mark” as “to take notice of, to take careful notice”); Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“MARK: A symbol, impression, or
feature on something, usu. to identify it or distinguish it from
something else.”).
16

laws that permit gambling when it otherwise would be unlawful
was in recognition of “the importance of the tourist, resort,
recreational and convention industry of the State, the need to
restore, rehabilitate and redevelop Atlantic City, and the
potential contribution of this new industry to the economic
structure, general welfare, health and prosperity of the State
and its inhabitants.”

Knight v. City of Margate, 431 A.2d 833,

836–37 (N.J. 1981) (citing N.J.S.A. 5:12-1(b)(1)-(5)).

Allowing

a player to unilaterally adjust the odds of a casino game in his
favor would violate the essential purpose of legalized gambling.
Indeed, since the inception of legalized gambling, the Casino
Control Commission has implemented numerous countermeasures to
prevent threats to the statistical advantage that casinos need
to remain profitable. 12
By using cards they caused to be maneuvered in order to
identify their value only to them, Ivey and Sun adjusted the
odds of Baccarat in their favor.

This is in complete

contravention of the fundamental purpose of legalized gambling,
as set forth by the CCA.

Ivey and Sun’s violation of the card

marking provision in the CCA constitutes a breach of their

12

Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 714 A.2d 299, 305–06
(N.J. 1998) (discussing CCC’s countermeasures to card counting,
which threatens a casino’s statistical advantage).
17

mutual obligation with Borgata to play by the rules of the CCA. 13
Consequently, summary judgment must be entered in Borgata’s
favor, and against Ivey and Sun, on Borgata’s contract-based
claims. 14
2.
Borgata’s fraud and RICO conspiracy claims (Counts IV,
VI, X, XI, XII)
In addition to its breach of contract claims, Borgata has
alleged fraud, RICO and conspiracy-based claims against Ivey and
Sun arguing that they misrepresented that they intended to abide
by the rules of honest play established and required by the CCA,
and they intentionally misrepresented their true reasons,
motivation and purpose for the playing accommodations they
sought.

Borgata claims that Ivey and Sun’s misrepresentations

of their true motivations constitute fraud and conspiracy to
commit fraud in violation of the common law and the federal and
New Jersey Racketeer Influence and Corruption Organizations Acts
(“RICO”).

13

Borgata is equally obligated to follow the CCA. For example,
it would be a breach of contract if Borgata secretly tampered
with the cards so that its house advantage was greater than the
set odds of the game.
14

As the Court explains below in assessing Borgata’s fraud-based
claims, the Court does not find that Ivey and Sun breached their
contract with Borgata, or otherwise violated the CCA, with
respect to CCA provisions that require a finding of fraud.
Additionally, without any direction by the CCC or the DGE to the
contrary, the Court finds that Borgata’s position strains the
other provisions beyond their basic and intended meaning.
18

To state a claim of fraud under the common law, a plaintiff
must allege facts that, if proven, would establish the
following: “‘(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently
existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant
of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on
it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5)
resulting damages.’”

Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 963 A.2d

849, 855 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) (quoting Gennari v.
Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1997))(other citation
omitted).
A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons
acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a
lawful act by unlawful means, a principal element of which is to
inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, together with an
act that results in damage.

Morgan v. Union Cty. Bd. of Chosen

Freeholders, 633 A.2d 985, 998 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993),
cert. denied, 135 N.J. 468 (1994).

Even though the unlawful

agreement need not be expressed, and the participants need not
know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the
objective or possess the same motives, they must share the
general conspiratorial objective.

Id.

The federal RICO statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68,
provides, in relevant part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or
19

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

In order to adequately plead a violation

of the federal RICO statute, a plaintiff must allege: (1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity.

Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223

(3d Cir. 2004) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479, 496 (1985)).
Similarly, New Jersey’s state RICO statute, codified at
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2a et seq., provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in or activities of which affect trade
or commerce.
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2.

To sufficiently allege a violation of the New

Jersey RICO statute, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence
of an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise engaged in activities
that affected trade or commerce; (3) that the defendant was
employed by, or associated with the enterprise; (4) that the
defendant participated in the conduct of the affairs of the
enterprise; (5) that the defendant participated through a
pattern of racketeering activity; and (6) that the plaintiff was
injured as a result of the conspiracy.
20

Ford Motor Co. v.

Edgewood Props., Inc., 2009 WL 150951, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 20,
2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2c) (other citations omitted).
It has previously been recognized that, in certain aspects,
the New Jersey RICO statute is broader in scope than the federal
statute, and that New Jersey courts take a “liberal stance in
permitting plaintiffs to plead NJRICO violations, rejecting the
narrow construction of the federal statute that many circuits,
including this one, have adopted.”

Edgewood Props., 2009 WL

150951 at * 10 (citing State v. Ball, 661 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1995)).
A valid RICO claim must be based on one of the predicate
criminal offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1962, or a conspiracy to
commit such an offense.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c).

For a NJ

RICO claim, the primary criterion of New Jersey's “pattern of
racketeering activity” is “relatedness”; that element calls for
the application of a broad standard involving the totality of
all relevant circumstances, which may include “continuity.”
State v. Ball, 661 A.2d 251, 265 (N.J. 1995).
A defendant in a racketeering conspiracy need not itself
commit or agree to commit predicate acts.
F.3d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2001).

Smith v. Berg, 247

Rather, “all that is necessary

for such a conspiracy is that the conspirators share a common
purpose.”

Id.

Thus, if defendants agree to a plan wherein some

conspirators will commit crimes and others will provide support,
“the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.”
21

Salinas v.

United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997).

Each defendant must

“agree to commission of two or more racketeering acts,” United
States v. Phillips, 874 F.2d 123, 127 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989), and
each defendant must “adopt the goal of furthering or
facilitating the criminal endeavor,” Smith, 247 F.3d at 537.
The parties agree that Baccarat is a game, and all games
have rules.

The fundamental tenet of all games is that the

players abide by the rules, otherwise any win garnered through
broken rules would be unfair.

In this case, none of the actual

rules of Baccarat were broken, and nothing except for Ivey and
Sun’s motivation for certain requests was hidden from Borgata.
Over four days and dozens of hours of play, observed by Borgata
staff in person and on video surveillance, Ivey and Sun
performed their edge sorting technique without Borgata
determining that Ivey and Sun were violating Baccarat or casino
rules.

Therefore, the ultimate question is whether Ivey and Sun

committed fraud by misrepresenting their true reasons for their
five requests and card turning, even while none of the game’s
rules had been technically broken.

The Court finds that the

answer to that question is no.
The rules of Baccarat do not prohibit a player from
manipulating the cards.

In certain Baccarat games, referred to

as “Macau” style, the customers are allowed to squeeze, crease,

22

bend, or tear the cards. 15

(Docket No. 78-6 ¶ 64.)

Baccarat is

a casino game well known for unique and superstitious rituals,
including asking dealers to let the players “peek” at cards
before they are placed on the gaming table.
82.)

(Docket No. 78-6 ¶

Thus, Sun telling the dealer to turn a card in a certain

way did not raise any red flags for Borgata. 16
Borgata’s fraud claims hinge on Ivey and Sun’s
misrepresentation that their five requests, along with Sun’s
instructions to the dealer on how to turn a card, were because
they were superstitious.

Obviously, if Ivey and Sun had

explained to Borgata that they were directing the dealer to turn
a card a certain way so that they could later identify the
card’s value by the pattern on the back of the card, the
“misrepresentation” element of establishing fraud would be
lacking.

And also obviously, if Ivey and Sun had told Borgata

the real reason they wanted the cards turned, Borgata would have
never let them play.
The Court notes these obvious points for a reason – a

15

These cards cannot be shuffled and reused, and are instead
discarded immediately after each hand.
16

It is apparent that Ivey and Sun’s other requests - a private
“pit” in which to play; a casino dealer who spoke Mandarin
Chinese; one 8-deck shoe of purple Gemaco Borgata playing cards
to be used for the entirety of each session of play; and an
automatic card shuffling device – did not raise any red flags
for Borgata, either.
23

reason that is dispositive to the finding that Ivey and Sun did
not commit fraud.

Even though Ivey and Sun manufactured an

explanation for their instruction to the dealer to turn the
cards, the rules of Baccarat do not require an explanation to
permit a player to manipulate the cards.

In other words, a

player could crease, tear, bend, or have a card turned without
any explanation at all and not violate Baccarat’s rules of play.
To meet the elements of fraud, Borgata must show that Ivey
and Sun made a material misrepresentation and that Borgata
relied upon that misrepresentation to its detriment.

Ivey and

Sun’s five specific requests to Borgata, and their instruction
to the dealer to turn the cards a certain way, did not violate
any rules or regulations. 17

Ivey and Sun did not need to claim

superstition to make their requests and card turning
instructions permissible – they already were.

If Ivey and Sun

had simply made their requests without explanation, Borgata was
still empowered to grant or deny those requests.

That Borgata

chose to believe that Ivey and Sun were superstitions does not
amount to detrimental reliance, when no explanation at all could
have resulted in the same course of events. 18

17

Even though Sun’s marking of the cards through the observation
of the card’s patterned edges, as described above, violates the
CCA, a request to turn the cards, without more, does not violate
the CCA or the rules of Baccarat.
18

The court in Chen v. Nevada State Gaming Control Bd., 116 Nev.
24

Stated differently, Borgata allowed defendants to give a
silly, nonsensical reason for the card turning.

That is

tantamount to allowing defendants to give no reason at all.
Borgata is estopped in such circumstances from alleging that the
misrepresentation was material. 19
Borgata casts itself as an innocent victim who
altruistically provided Ivey with his five requests, including
allowing Sun to play with him, because it trusted Ivey.
Borgata, however, is a for-profit business whose commodity is

282, 285, 994 P.2d 1151, 1152 (2000), made a similar observation
on a casino’s claims of fraud against a card counter who
presented a false passport to buy chips to play blackjack. The
court found that even though the player presented false
identification to the casino to obtain chips, the casino did not
detrimentally rely upon the player’s misrepresentation of his
identity when it allowed him to play blackjack because the
casino did not require valid identification in order for a
patron to play blackjack. Thus, the court found that the casino
did not show the detrimental reliance element of its fraud
claim.
19

Borgata’s argument devolves into a contention that defendants
acted fraudulently because they did not reveal their fraudulent
intent. Fraud is not so easy to prove. It is well to remember
that fraud is both a crime and a tort and the elements are the
same. While the element of a material misrepresentation may be
satisfied by an omission under some circumstances, failing to
confess to your victim is not one of them. Such a legal
requirement would certainly be efficient, but it is not our
jurisprudence. Rather the law requires either a
misrepresentation that is material or an omission where there is
a separate duty to disclose. Here, no duty to disclose why the
defendants wanted to turn the cards was imposed by the CCA, the
casino rules of the game, or as a result of the arrangements
made with the defendants.
25

gambling, and whose methodology is to use the odds of casino
games in its favor, among other techniques, to win as much money
from its patrons as it can.

Ivey is a professional gambler

whose business is to play high-stakes casino games to win as
much of the casino’s money as he can.

In exchange for agreeing

to Ivey’s five requests, Borgata required millions of dollars in
front money from Ivey.

Borgata also wanted Ivey to gamble at

its casino so that his celebrity status would attract more
gamblers to the casino.

Borgata and Ivey had the same goal when

they entered into their arrangement - to profit at the other’s
expense.

Trust is a misplaced sentiment in this context. 20

Even though Ivey and Sun did not reveal to Borgata the true
purpose behind their requests and actions, they were not

20

Relatedly, Borgata’s argument that Ivey made material
misrepresentations to Borgata because he did not reveal the
identity of Sun is unavailing. Borgata claims that if it knew
that Sun was the same person who had been banned at other
casinos for edge sorting, it never would have agreed to let her
play along with Ivey. Sun, however, played Baccarat with Ivey
for many hours over four different days, where she participated
in speaking with the dealer on hundreds of hands. She also took
notes throughout the play. There is no evidence in the record
that she did not use her real name, or that she wore a disguise,
other than wearing a baseball cap. Ivey and Sun cannot be
blamed for Borgata failing to investigate Sun prior to her
coming the first time, or for the three subsequent visits. Ivey
and Sun also cannot be blamed for Borgata now claiming to not
realize that Sun was playing the game, rather than being a
passive observer. It is clear from the surveillance video that
Sun actively participated in playing Baccarat with Ivey on all
four occasions.
26

required to provide a reason.
fraud or a RICO conspiracy. 21

This does not amount to legal
Ivey and Sun are therefore

entitled to summary judgment on all of Borgata’s fraud-based
claims against them. 22
CONCLUSION
Ivey and Sun, and perhaps others, view their actions to be
akin to cunning, but not rule-breaking, maneuvers performed in
many games, such as a play-action pass in American football 23 or
the “Marshall swindle” in chess 24.

Sun’s mental acumen in

21

The absence of a sustainable fraud claim dooms any showing of
the commission of the predicate acts required to sustain
Borgata’s state and federal RICO claims even if the other
elements could be met.
22

Borgata has alleged several other claims against Ivey and Sun
for rescission for unilateral mistake and illegality of purpose,
unjust enrichment, and conversion. These claims are in the
alternative to its breach of contract, fraud and RICO claims.
Because of the Court’s resolution of Borgata’s contract-based
and fraud-based claims, the Court determines these alternative
claims become either redundant or legally barred as derivative
of dismissed claims.
23

The intention of a play-action pass is to deceive the defense
by appearing to perform a running play. A quarterback fakes a
handoff to a running back, who, as part of the deceit, pretends
to run with the ball. While the defense is tricked into
guarding against the running play, the quarterback seeks to pass
the ball to an undefended receiver. A play-action pass requires
deceit over the other team to be successful, but the success of
the play-action pass depends on how adept the offense is in
executing the deception within the constraints of football’s
rules of play.
24

Even though the word “swindle” connotes “a diabolically clever
move or combination that turns the tables on the opponent,” a
swindle “is not a kind of cheating or a contravening of the
27

distinguishing the minute differences in the patterns on the
back of the playing cards is remarkable.
But, even though Ivey and Sun’s cunning and skill did not
break the rules of Baccarat, what sets Ivey and Sun’s actions
apart from deceitful maneuvers in other games is that those
maneuvers broke the rules of gambling as defined in this state.
Borgata and Ivey and Sun were obligated to follow the
proscriptions of the CCA in order to lawfully gamble in the
first place, and then they were also obligated to follow the
rules of Baccarat. 25

Ivey and Sun breached their primary

obligation.
Ivey and Sun’s actions violated the rules of the CCA, a

rules of the game.” Robert Byrne, Chess; The Marshall Swindle,
N.Y. Times, January 4, 1987. In order to effect a “Marshall
swindle,” a player plays a move which is designed to - and does
- provoke an error from his opponent, and this error makes
possible a profitable combination for the player. Jonathan
Rogers, The Fine Art of Swindling – Defined, Kingpin Chess
Magazine, Issue 27, Sept. 4, 2013. In order to make this
combination, however, the swindler must surreptitiously enlist
his opponent’s help. Id.
25

Ivey and Sun argue that the edge sorting technique is just
like card counting, which has not been held to be a violation of
the CCA or any casino games. “A card counter is [] a highly
skilled player who analyzes the statistical probabilities
associated with blackjack and, based upon those probabilities,
develops playing strategies which may afford him an advantage
over the casino.” Bartolo v. Boardwalk Regency Hotel Casino,
Inc., 449 A.2d 1339, 1341–42 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. 1982). The
difference between card counting and edge sorting is that a card
counter uses memory and statistics, not a manipulation of the
cards, to create an advantage for himself.
28

necessary, material, and mutual term of their contract with the
Borgata, which undermined and defeated the New Jersey
Legislature’s intent when it legalized gambling and enacted the
CCA.

In order to fulfill the goal of providing economic

structure, general welfare, health and prosperity to the State
of New Jersey through legalized gambling, the casinos and the
patrons must all abide by the CCA.

Ivey and Sun breached this

obligation when they marked the cards to shift the odds of
Baccarat in their favor.
However, it is axiomatic that a breach of contract alone is
not fraud.
fraud.

Nor does every act of deceit meet the elements of

Fraud, whether as codified or at common law, requires a

higher showing.

Ivey and Sun did not defraud Borgata in the

legal sense, just as a football team that runs a pass play
instead of a running play does not defraud the other team.

This

is because their representations did not violate Baccarat’s
rules, were not material to Borgata, and no independent
obligation to disclose existed under the circumstances.

Their

conduct is far from admirable, but fraud requires more.
Accordingly, Ivey and Sun’s motion for summary judgment on
Borgata’s claims against them are granted on all claims except
for Borgata’s claims for breach of contract.

Borgata’s cross-

motion for summary judgment in its favor is granted on its
breach of contract claims, but denied as to all other claims.
29

Within 20 days of the date of this Opinion, Borgata shall submit
a brief setting forth its damages resulting from Ivey and Sun’s
breach of contract, along with a proposed form of judgment.
Ivey and Sun shall have 20 days thereafter to file a response to
Borgata’s submission.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: October 21, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

30