CLARK v. SHARTLE et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 11/12/2014. (nz, )N.M.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
RALPH CLARK,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 14-2469 (RBK) (KMW)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
J.T. SHARTLE, et al.
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner who was previously incarcerated at F.C.I. Fairton in Fairton,
New Jersey at the time he brought this action. Plaintiff is now incarcerated at USP Hazelton in
Bruceton Mills, West Virginia. He brings this civil rights action pro se pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 1 Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis will be granted based on the information provided therein.
At this time, the complaint will be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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While plaintiff asserts that he is bringing his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this
action is actually under Bivens as plaintiff is a federal prisoner. See Walker v. Zenk, 323 F.
App’x 144, 145 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d
Cir. 2004)).
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II.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this screening.
Plaintiff names three defendants in this case: (1) J.T. Shartle; (2) M. Angud, MLP; and (3) R.
Morales, MD. Plaintiff states that doctors at the Howard University Hospital diagnosed him with
torn meniscus in his left knee in 2009. He claims that surgery was scheduled. Plaintiff was
transferred to F.C.I. Fairton before surgery was performed.
Plaintiff reported his torn meniscus to the medical staff at Fairton upon his arrival.
However, plaintiff was told all he needed to do was exercise. Plaintiff continued to complain
about the pain and was seen by medical staff on March 15, 2012. At that time, the medical staff
gave plaintiff an X-Ray, pain medication and a knee sleeve. Plaintiff asserts that the medical
staff at F.C.I. Fairton have downplayed the extent of his injuries and acted with deliberate
indifference.
Plaintiff attaches several of his medical records and reports to his complaint. Many of
these records appear to be created/signed by defendant Angud, Morales or both. The records
indicate that plaintiff was prescribed medication for his knee, and also underwent a cortisone
shot for the pain he was having with his knee.
Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against the defendants for the purported violation
of his constitutional rights.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 132166 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
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seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua
sponte screening for failure to state a claim 2, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
B. Bivens Actions
Bivens is the federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Walker, 323 F. App’x at 145
n.1 (citing Egervary, 366 F.3d at 246). In order to state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must
2
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.
App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v.
United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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allege: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and
(2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by a person acting under color of federal law. See
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that under Section 1983 “an
individual may bring suit for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States
Constitution or federal law,” and that Bivens held that a parallel right exists against federal
officials); see also Collins v. F.B.I., No. 10-3470, 2011 WL 1627025, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,
2011) (“The Third Circuit has recognized that Bivens actions are simply the federal counterpart
to § 1983 claims brought against state officials’ and thus the analysis established under one type
of claim is applicable under the other.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is proceeding with an Eighth Amendment claim for denial/deprivation of
medical care against the three defendants. To assert an Eighth Amendment claim:
a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that defendants were deliberately
indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those needs were
serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference requires proof that the official “knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
We have found deliberate indifference where a prison official:
“(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner
from receiving needed or recommended treatment.” Rouse, 182
F.3d at 197. Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the
diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any
attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular
course of treatment. . . (which) remains a question of sound
professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce,
612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). Allegations of negligent treatment or
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medical malpractice do not trigger constitutional protections.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Furthermore, deliberate
indifference can be found “where the prison official persists in a course of treatment in the face
of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” See McCluskey v. Vincent, 505 F. App’x 199,
202 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A medical need is serious if
it ‘has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment,’ or if it ‘is so obvious that a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” See Mitchell v. Beard,
492 F. App’x 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257,
272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d
Cir. 1987))).
A. Defendant Shartle
The complaint fails to state a Bivens claim against defendant Shartle. It appears as if
plaintiff is asserting that Shartle is liable under a theory of respondeat superior as warden of
F.C.I. Fairton. Indeed, he is not named in any of the documents attached to the complaint, nor in
the complaint itself besides the caption. “In order for liability to attach under [Bivens], a plaintiff
must show that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his federal rights.”
Fears v. Beard, 532 F. App’x 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Rode v. Dellaciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff’s allegations against Shartle appear to be
based primarily on a respondeat superior theory in his capacity as warden. This is insufficient to
state a Bivens claim against him.
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B. Defendants Angud & Morales
Plaintiff names Angud and Morales as defendants in this action. While the complaint
does not name these defendants specifically aside from in the caption, the documents plaintiff
attaches to his complaint indicate that these two defendants are medical professionals at F.C.I.
Fairton. Plaintiff admits and the medical records indicate that plaintiff was receiving treatment
for his knee injury. Indeed, plaintiff notes in the complaint that he was prescribed pain
medication and given a knee sleeve. Furthermore, the medical records indicate that plaintiff
received a cortisone shot in his injured knee. Thus, this is not a case where plaintiff’s knee pain
was simply being ignored by the medical professionals at F.C.I. Fairton. Rather, plaintiff’s claim
may amount to merely a disagreement as to the proper care for his knee. Mere disagreement as
to the proper medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim of inadequate medical care under
the Eighth Amendment. See Lenhart v. Pennsylvania, 528 F. App’x 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (stating that complaint that alleges physician was negligent in diagnosing and treating a
medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment and that mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not state a claim of inadequate medical
care) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 529 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Monmouth Cnty Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the complaint fail to state a claim against
Angud and Morales for another reason. Like Shartle, plaintiff fails to specifically allege in the
complaint how Angud and Morales were personally involved in the deprivation of his
constitutional rights. See Fears, 532 F. App’x at 81 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). While
plaintiff attaches medical records completed by Angud and Morales to his complaint, these
records do not show, nor does plaintiff allege, that Angud and Morales were the individuals who
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were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Indeed, the complaint only alleges
that “staff” downplayed the extent of his injuries, yet the records indicate that plaintiff was
receiving treatment for his knee. Thus, plaintiff fails to allege how Angud and/or Morales were
themselves personally involved in being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. He
does not allege that either of these two defendants specifically: (1) knew of plaintiff’s need for
medical treatment but intentionally refused to provide it; (2) delayed necessary medical treatment
based on a nonmedical reason; (3) prevented plaintiff from receiving needed or recommended
treatment, or (4) persisted in a course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of
permanent injury.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because it is possible that plaintiff may be able
to supplement his complaint with facts sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted herein,
plaintiff will be given leave to amend the complaint should he elect to do so. An appropriate
order will be entered.
DATED: November 12, 2014
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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