SNYDER v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/30/14. (dd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________________
:
ROBIN NEIL SNYDER,
:
: Civil Action No. 14-2473 (RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
JORDAN L. HOLLINGSWORTH,
:
:
Respondent.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUMB, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s § 2241
petition, see Docket Entry No. 1 (“Petition”), that arrived
accompanied by his statement that his spouse is about to forward
the Clerk Petitioner’s filing fee.

See id. at 1.1

Petitioner is a federal inmate currently confined at the FCI
Fort Dix, New Jersey.

See generally, Docket.

His imprisonment

resulted from the conviction and sentence rendered by the

1

In the event no filing fee is received within thirty days
from the date of entry of the Order accompanying this Opinion,
this Court will direct the Clerk to institute collections against
Petitioner. Section 1914, which governs filing fees in United
States District Courts, provides that “[t]he clerk of each
district court shall require the parties instituting any civil
action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original
process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $350,
except that on application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing
fee shall be $5.” Accord Valles v. O’Sullivan, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11071, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1998) (directing trust
fund officer to collect the fee from the inmate’s prison trust
fund account).

District of Maryland (“D. Md.”).2

See Docket Entry No. 1, at 2;

see also Snyder v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6992 (D.
Md. Jan. 17, 2013).

Detailing the history of his conviction,

direct appellate and collateral proceedings, his trial judge,
Hon. Catherine C. Blake, stated:
[Petitioner], convicted by a jury of wire fraud, money
laundering, and obstruction of justice, was sentenced
to a total of 97 months in prison on August 26, 2008 .
. . . On appeal, his convictions were affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit. [See] United States v. Snyder, 365 F.
App’x 508 (4th Cir. 2010). [Petitioner] then filed a
motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in November
2011, which was . . . denied. [During that collateral
proceeding, Petitioner] argue[d] that he [was] actually
innocent of the wire fraud charges brought against him
. . . . He relie[d] on Skilling v. United States, [561
U.S. 358] (2010), decided after []his appeal was
concluded, which dealt with the constitutionality of
the “honest-services” fraud statute enacted by Congress
in 1988. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346. That statute defines
“scheme or artifice to defraud” to include a scheme “to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.” Id. In Skilling, the Court construed the
honest-services doctrine as limited to schemes
involving bribes and kickbacks. [Here, Petitioner’s]
argument is [misplaced since] the charges against him
did not involve a theory of depriving others of honest
services; rather he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1343

2

To effectuate his offenses, “[Petitioner] secured advance
fees from persons seeking commercial mortgage loans, though he
had no ability or intention in fact to obtain the requested
loans. . . . [These] advance fees initially were wired into the
Nations Express bank account [and then] promptly transferred to
the [Petitioner’s business] Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. [having an]
account at the same bank, [and then] used by [Petitioner] for his
own benefit, and never returned to the would-be borrowers.”
United States v. Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101196, at *3-4
(D. Md. Dec. 12, 2008). Petitioner was ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $ 423,000 See USA v. Snyder, Crim.
Action No. 07-0155 (CCB) (D. Md.) (filed Mar. 29, 2007, term.
Feb. 12, 2009).
2

with an advance-fee scheme to defraud victims by
obtaining money from them through false promises that
he would work to obtain a loan on their behalf. . . .
Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6992, at *1-2.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Blake’s findings.

See

United States v. Snyder, 520 F. App’x 220 (4th Cir. 2013).
Petitioner’s numerous applications for certiorari filed in
connection with his direct appellate proceedings were denied by
the Supreme Court, see Snyder v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 552
(Nov. 4, 2013); Snyder v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 595 (Nov. 15,
2010); Snyder v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 384 (Oct. 4, 2010),
and his application for certiorari in connection with his
collateral attack was also denied.
134 S. Ct. 1000 (Jan. 21, 2014).
filed the Petition at bar.
1.

See Snyder v. United States,

After that last denial, he

See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No.

Repeating his argument that, under Skilling, he has become

“actually innocent” of the “honest-services” fraud, he attempted
to invoke the “saving clause” of Section 2255 so to: (a) submit
his Petition under Section 2241; and (b) seek this Court’s
decision effectively vacating/overruling the findings of Judge
Blake, the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court.

See id.

Petitioner’s jurisdictional reliance on Section 2241 is
without merit.

As Judge Blake already explained to Petitioner,

the statute affected by Skilling differs from that underlying his
conviction for the wire fraud offense.

3

Since neither Skilling

nor any other Supreme Court precedent decriminalized the conduct
underlying Petitioner’s fraud conviction, he cannot be “actually
innocent” of that conviction and, thus, cannot take advantage of
the “saving clause.”

See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117,

120 (3d Cir. 2002); Cradle v. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir.
2002); United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 2000);
In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).
Moreover, Petitioner’s attempt to relitigate his Skillingbased position is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Here,

Petitioner already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
his Skilling challenges.

Since res judicata precludes claims

that were disposed of on the merits (and even those that could
have been litigated) during a prior proceeding, see R & J Holding
Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Cnty. of Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420,
427 (3d Cir. 2011); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 486
(1991) (pointing out that § 2244(b) “establishes a ‘qualified
application of the doctrine of res judicata’ [to habeas
actions]”) (citation to legislative records omitted),
Petitioner’s Skilling-based position cannot be relitigated here
because this Court does not sit in appellate review of the
Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, and the District of Maryland,
and no mandate allows Petitioner to take yet another “bite of
this well-chewed apple.”

Toolasprashad v. Grondolsky, 570 F.

Supp. 2d 610, 645 (D.N.J. 2008).

4

Therefore,

the

Petition

will

be

dismissed

for

lack

of

jurisdiction or, in the alternative, as barred by res judicata.
An appropriate Order follows.

s/Renée Marie Bumb _________
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: April 30, 2014

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