CRAWFORD v. COMPASS GROUP USA
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/6. (drw)n.m.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KENNETH PAUL CRAWFORD, SR.,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-2545 (JBS/JS)
v.
COMPASS GROUP USA,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant Compass Group USA’s
(“Compass”) motion for summary judgment. [Docket Item 44.] In
this case, Plaintiff Kenneth Paul Crawford, Sr. seeks to enforce
a judgment issued by the International Commercial Court (“ICC”),
a private alternative dispute resolution organization, in the
amount of $900,000 against Compass, his former employer. Compass
asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because it never agreed to submit any disputes to the ICC and
thus any judgment against it issued by the ICC is invalid and
unenforceable. Because Plaintiff has failed to identify any
evidence in the record of an agreement between the parties to
submit disputes to the ICC or any other indicia of Compass’s
consent to be bound by a decision of the ICC, the Court will
grant Compass’s motion for summary judgment. The Court finds as
follows:
1.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, as alleged by Plaintiff.
2.
On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint [Docket
Item 1] seeking enforcement of a judgment issued by the ICC on
March 3, 2014. After Compass filed a motion for a more definite
statement, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint including
two documents which purportedly form the basis of the $900,000
judgment against Compass: 1) “Abstract of Administrative
Judgment” and 2) “Affidavit in Support of Notice of Conditional
Acceptance.” [Docket Item 20.] Compass filed the instant motion
for summary judgment on January 9, 2015. [Docket Item 44.]
Plaintiff filed opposition [Docket Item 47] and Compass filed a
reply [Docket Item 51.]
3.
Because Plaintiff has submitted neither a responsive
statement of material facts, nor a supplemental statement of
disputed material facts, the Court deems the facts as set forth
in Compass’s Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement undisputed for
purposes of the instant summary judgment motion. L. Civ. R.
56.1(a) (“[A]ny material fact not disputed shall be deemed
undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.”).1
1
Indeed, Plaintiff has not provided any statement of facts with
citations to affidavits or other evidence in the record.
Although the Court construes his “Notice of Conditional
Acceptance and Answer to Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment” [Docket Item 47] as his opposition to Compass’s motion
for summary judgment and this document ostensibly asserts that
2
Compass is a foodservice management and support services
company. (Def. Statement of Material Facts (“Def. SMF”) [Docket
Item 44-2] ¶ 1.) Compass hired Plaintiff in or around October,
1998 and his employment with Compass continued until October,
2010. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 8.) By correspondence dated December 7, 2010,
entitled “Terms of Separation from the Employment with Compass
Group USA, Inc., Release of Claims and Confidentiality
Agreement” (“Separation Agreement”), Compass formalized
Plaintiff’s separation of employment as of October 15, 2010.
(Id. ¶ 13.) The Separation Agreement provided that Plaintiff
would receive two weeks’ pay if he agreed to its terms, which
included a release of all claims against Compass. (Id.) Compass
contends that Plaintiff signed the Separation Agreement on
December 14, 2010 and thereafter received the severance pay
specified therein. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.)
4.
Plaintiff contests that the signature on the
Separation Agreement is his. Whether such a Separation Agreement
existed is not material to the sole issue in this motion,
namely, whether Plaintiff’s “judgment” against Compass in the
private dispute resolution organization is enforceable against
Compass, as explained below.
Compass has failed to identify “verifiable evidence” supporting
its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, this document is
not responsive to Compass’s 56.1 statement.
3
5.
Plaintiff did not work for Compass in 2011 or 2012,
but applied for approximately twelve positions with Compass
during that time. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Beginning in September, 2012,
Plaintiff sent a series of correspondence to Compass seeking an
admission that Compass was liable to Plaintiff in the amount of
$100,000, plus two years of salary. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Compass
responded by letter and email categorically denying Plaintiff’s
claims and allegations and rejecting any basis for liability.
(Id. ¶ 23.) Two additional exchanges of correspondence between
the parties followed which were substantially similar to the
first. Plaintiff sought an admission of liability and Compass
categorically denied Plaintiff’s claims and allegations. (Id. ¶¶
24-25.) The correspondence Plaintiff sent to Compass during this
period appears to be an effort to establish the terms of his
separation from Compass based on his assertion that no
separation agreement had been executed between the parties.
Plaintiff maintained instead that the Separation Agreement
signed on December 14, 2010 was fraudulent and/or a forgery.
6.
The ICC’s now-defunct website described the ICC,
established in December, 2012, as “the principal judicial organ
of the Sovereign Freeman Commissions (‘SFC’).” (Id. ¶ 30.) The
ICC purported to be a “Court of Record established under the
Common Law,” which “provides an alternate dispute resolution
forum for the adjudication of judicial and administrative
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proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Administrative proceedings commence
when “one or more parties to a commercial dispute petitions the
Court . . . to make determinations based on specific agreed upon
terms and conditions and the facts and evidence established by
records.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Article VI(1) of the ICC’s Rules provides,
“Where the parties have agreed to submit to adjudication under
the Rules, they shall be deemed to have submitted ipso facto to
the Rules in effect on the date of commencement of the
adjudicatory proceedings, unless they have agreed to submit to
the Rules in effect on the date of their adjudication
agreement.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
7.
In August, 2013, Plaintiff entered an agreement with
ICC to resolve his claim that the Separation Agreement with
Compass bore a forged signature. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff concedes
that this agreement was solely between him and the ICC. (Id.) It
was not signed by Compass. (Id.) Indeed, Compass never agreed to
resolve any disputes in the ICC, including any disputes with
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff admits that he never saw or
heard anything suggesting that Compass agreed to arbitration or
adjudication through ICC. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff appears to have
unilaterally initiated proceedings in the ICC on August 30,
2013. (Id. ¶ 36.) In response, Compass notified Plaintiff and
the ICC by letters dated September 10, 2013 that it “absolutely
and categorically declines the Request for Adjudication and does
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not agree to have this matter adjudicated by the International
Commercial Court for the Sovereign Freeman Commission.” (Id. ¶
37) (emphasis in original). Compass further noted that it “does
not consent to subject matter or personal jurisdiction” in the
ICC. (Id.) (emphasis in original).
8.
Plaintiff then sent Compass a so-called “Notice of
Conditional Acceptance” demanding certain “proofs.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
Compass responded by again denying any contract between the
parties to resolve disputes in the ICC and rejecting the ICC’s
jurisdiction over any such disputes. (Id. ¶ 39.)
9.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff attaches to his Amended
Complaint an “Abstract of Administrative Judgment,” seemingly
issued by the ICC, identifying Compass as a “Judgment Debtor.”
(Id. ¶ 41.) This document purportedly establishes a so-called
judgment against Compass with damages to Plaintiff in the amount
of $900,000. The $900,000 award consists of $50,000 for
Plaintiff’s annual salary for each 2010 and 2011; $50,000 for
“Dishonor in commerce;” $50,000 for “Collusion;” $50,000 for
“Racketeering;” $50,000 for “Conspiracy;” and $600,000 for
treble damages. (Id. ¶ 43.) At his deposition, Plaintiff could
not explain the basis for the $900,000 judgment and stated that
he had “no idea” what conduct and by whom constituted collusion,
racketeering, conspiracy or any of the above-labeled misconduct.
(Id. ¶¶ 45-50.)
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10.
In its motion for summary judgment, Compass argues
that the $900,000 judgment Plaintiff seeks to enforce in this
action is invalid and unenforceable because Compass never agreed
to resolve any dispute in the ICC. Because Plaintiff claims that
the ICC provided a forum for alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”), the Court’s analysis is guided by principles applicable
to the most prevalent form of ADR – arbitration – and the
determination of validity and enforceability of arbitration
awards.
11.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states that a
written arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “Before
compelling a party to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA, a court
must determine that (1) there is an agreement to arbitrate and
(2) the dispute at issue falls within the scope of that
agreement.” Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, 584 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160
(3d Cir. 2009)). “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which he has not agreed so to submit.” Opalinski v. Robert Half
Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). “[A]n
7
arbitrator has the power to decide an issue only if the parties
have authorized the arbitrator to do so.” Id.
12.
The question of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate is governed by state law principles regarding
formation of contracts. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Under New Jersey law, “if
parties agree on essential terms and manifest an intention to be
bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable
contract.” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 435
(1992). In the employment context, an arbitration agreement
“must reflect that an employee has agreed clearly and
unambiguously to arbitrate the disputed claim.” Leodori v. CIGNA
Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003).
13.
This is not a close question. In the present case,
Plaintiff has identified no evidence of any agreement by Compass
to resolve disputes in the ICC.2 It is clear instead, as a matter
2
Plaintiff’s opposition to Compass’s motion for summary judgment
consists of three documents: 1) “Notice of Conditional
Acceptance and Answer to Respondents Motion for Summary
Judgment;” 2) “Affidavit in Support of Notice of Conditional
Acceptance;” and 3) “Memorandum of Law for Manditory [sic]
Judicial Notice.” [Docket Items 47 & 48-1.] To the extent the
Court can glean any coherent meaning from these documents,
Plaintiff appears to argue that Compass consented to the
jurisdiction of the ICC “through the course of performance” and
that despite numerous opportunities, Compass has failed to
present any “verifiable evidence” showing its entitlement to
summary judgment. Plaintiff also reiterates his allegation that
the signature on the December, 2010 separation agreement is a
forgery, as supported by the findings of his handwriting expert.
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of law, that the parties did not agree to submit any dispute to
the ICC. As such, there is simply no enforceable contract
between the parties to submit to ADR in the ICC. The only
evidence of an agreement in the record is Plaintiff’s unilateral
attempt to have the ICC address his claim that the December,
2010 Separation Agreement contained a forged signature. Compass
did not agree to submit this dispute, or any other, to the ICC.
To the contrary, Compass consistently and unequivocally denied
Plaintiff’s claims and allegations beginning in September, 2012.
Moreover, Compass repeatedly refused to permit the ICC to
adjudicate any dispute between the parties and rejected the
Plaintiff’s arguments are belied by the record in this case
which is entirely devoid of any indication of an agreement
between the parties to submit disputes to the ICC. The record is
replete with evidence to the contrary – that Compass clearly and
repeatedly denied Plaintiff’s claims and allegations and
rejected the jurisdiction of the ICC over any dispute involving
Compass. The Court need not address in detail the report of
Plaintiff’s handwriting expert, Mark Songer. (Pl. Ex. A [Docket
Item 47]). Plaintiff failed to disclose Songer as an expert, and
the time to do so expired under the Court’s scheduling orders.
Moreover, even if Songer’s report were timely, it is invalid
under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) because it fails to include his
qualifications, a list of all publications in the past ten
years, a list of other cases where he testified as an expert in
the last four years, and a statement of the compensation to be
paid for his study and testimony in this case. The Songer report
is thus not admissible evidence for purposes of opposing summary
judgment. In any event, even if the Songer opinion were deemed
admissible, the question of whether Plaintiff signed the
December, 2010 separation agreement is irrelevant and immaterial
to the central issue to be resolved in the pending motion:
whether the parties agreed to submit disputes to the ICC such
that the so-called judgment issued by the ICC against Compass is
enforceable.
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ICC’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff does
not dispute these facts. Therefore, even when viewing the
evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, as it must for purposes of
Defendant’s summary judgment motion, the Court finds no evidence
of an agreement between the parties to submit disputes to the
ICC.3 Consequently, the judgment of the ICC is invalid and
unenforceable. See Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d
215, 220 (3d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (noting
that arbitration award is unenforceable when the arbitrator
“strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and
effectively ‘dispenses his own brand of industrial justice’”)
(quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 671 (2010). The same principle applies when an alternative
dispute resolution organization or self-proclaimed court
attempts to apply its own version of justice to a dispute that
was never subject to the consent of all parties.
3
Compass notes, and the Court agrees, that the judgment is also
unenforceable because it appears to have been issued in
disregard of the ICC’s own rules, which required the consent of
all parties. See Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d
1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (discussing various grounds to vacate
an arbitration award, including “manifest disregard of the
agreement” between the parties).
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14.
Costs will be taxed in favor of Defendant as
prevailing party pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., and L.
Civ. R. 54.1.4
15.
For the reasons explained in the foregoing, the Court
will grant Compass’s motion for summary judgment.
March 6, 2015
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
4
Whether Plaintiff’s filing and prosecution of this case,
seeking to enforce a unilaterally obtained judgment of a selfproclaimed but apparently defunct “court of record,” was
frivolous and vexatious under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or without
reasonable basis in fact or law under Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P.,
will not be addressed at this time as Defendant has not sought
imposition of such sanctions. The award of statutory costs under
Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., on the other hand, is routinely
made in favor of the prevailing party – here Defendant Compass –
unless there is good reason not to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The
Court is unaware of any reason that costs should not be awarded
to the Defendant under the circumstances of this case.
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